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SYNOPSIS
The thesis examines how Bangladesh relates herself to 
her international environment. While the central concern 
of the study is the behaviour-pattern of a single state actor 
in the international arena, the fact that the subject shares 
certain characteristic attributes with many others, invests 
the inquiry with wider relevance.
The thesis argues that Bangladesh's two foreign policy 
aspirations, the search for security and the quest for 
external resources for development, have led to co-terminous 
rather than mutually exclusive policies, that have for their 
thrust the weaving of a web of extra-regional linkages.
These linkages, which are described and analyzed, are meant 
to buttress Bangladesh's sense of security vis-a-vis the 
regional preeminent power as well as to support her develop­
mental aspirations. The various policies and postures that 
Dacca tends to adopt towards events and issues of international 
significance, as well as the factors influencing such policies 
and postures, are also explained.
The study reviews the intricate problems that Bangladesh 
as an aid-recipient country confronts with regard to aid-donors 
It focuses on how her ability to manoeuvre in policy-making is 
curtailed due to this relationship. It explores the role, 
interests, and predilections, particularly with regard to 
foreign affairs, of the leading category within the community, 
which is a segment of the international elite.
V
THE REGIONAL POWER BALANCE (?)
Countries
Bangladesh
India
Pakistan
Burma
Nepal
Estimated Defence
Area GDP/GNP Expenditure Armed Forces
(sq.km) Population in US$ in US$ Army Navy Air Force
143,998 84.8m. GDP(1978) (1979) 70,000 3,500 3,000
8.0b. 115m.
3,287,782 647m. GNP(1978) (1977-78) 950,000 46,000 100,000
106.4b. 3.72b.
796,000 77.86m. GNP(1978) (1978-79) 400,000 12,000 17,000
18.5b. 1.05b.
676,577 32.6m. GNP(1977) (1977-78) 153,000 9,000 7,500
3.9b. 16 4m.
141,100 13.7m. GNP (19 7 7) (1977-78) 20, 000
1.4b. 13.8m.
Sources: (1) The Military  Balance 1979-1980 (IISS, London).
(2) Far Eastern Economic Review, Asia  1980 Yearbook. TA
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
I. Subject and Scope
The thesis is a micro-study from a macro-perspective, 
an analysis of the behaviour pattern of a single state actor 
in a particular geo-political setting. The state actor 
is Bangladesh, and the setting is the South-Asian subcontinent. 
Bangladesh shares many characteristics with a large number 
of States in the contemporary world; she is an ex-colony; 
she is weak; she has scarce resources; she is non-aligned, 
non-Christian and non-white. It is reasonable to expect, 
therefore, that the study provide us with some understanding 
of unit behavior in comparable milieux. Hopefully, therefore, 
the research ha2 wider relevance.
At her independence in December 1971, Bangladesh was 
confronted with a mostly hostile world. China and the U..S 
among the Great Powers had opposed her emergence. The Arabs 
were unhappy at the dismemberment of a powerful Muslim State, 
Pakistan. Many Third World countries, some with incipient 
secession movements within themselves, were chary of approving 
a phenomenon that might set in motion the forces of balkan­
ization in their own backyard. The Global State system was 
a club unto itself and it appeared doubtful if Bangladesh, 
the presumptuous new Actor whose arrival on the international 
scene was so unconventional (hers being the only successful 
secession movement in recent times) would gain ready 
admittance.
2Her initial problem was therefore to seek this 
admission, to be accepted by the Club of International State 
Actors as one of their own, to get it to recognize her 
sovereignty, whose extinction, at that stage, was the declared 
goal of Pakistan and some of her friends. Bangladesh's desire 
to maximise her manoeuverability appeared to be threatened 
not only by those who opposed her, but also by her dependence 
on close allies. The situation was a ready testing ground 
for skilful diplomacy.
The retention of flexibility in the country's external 
policies and thereby the maintenance of a sufficient degree of 
independence was a problem that was compounded by the urgent 
need for external assistance for her very survival, given 
the scarcity of domestic economic resources. Thus it was 
that security and the need for external resources became her 
primary interests. These two objectives imparted saliency 
to her foreign policy which was seen as a major instrument 
for securing them.
This is not to say that there exists a well thought out 
and carefully formulated 'foreign p o l i c y ' for that would 
convey more than what is actually there. Also to speak of 
'policy goals' would smack of a precision that is probably 
absent. A more appropriate term would be what Arnold Wolfers 
has called the 'aspirations' of foreign policy.^ This does 
not, however, mean that the area of external relations is one
1 A. Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), p.71.
3of low priority to the Bangladeshi policy makers. In fact, 
as this thesis hopes to demonstrate, the truth is quite 
the reverse.
The leadership of Bangladesh has given public expressior
to the significance of foreign policy in the securing of
2certain basic objectives of the polity. Attempts are indeec 
being made to gear external relations for the above purpose. 
The basic objectives, as the study will reveal, appears to 
be the search for security and the quest for external resourc 
However, several factors, as we shall soon see, act as 
constraints in Bangladesh's foreign-policy endeavours and 
introduce complexity.
The time-frame chosen for investigation is the first 
decade of the country's existence, 1971 through 1980. These
ten years have seen several different governments in operatici
in Bangladesh as well as in the countries of her immediate
concern. It is therefore sufficiently long enough a time
period for analysis to be made with a view to determining
a general behaviour pattern with some implications for the
future. Also, the period has seen Bangladesh recover from
the trauma of her genesis and steady herself into concen-
3tratmg on more permanent goals. This is a part of what 
the title of the thesis describes as the 'Strategy of a Small 
Power in a Subsystem'.
2 Statement of Bangladesh Foreign Minister, Professor Shamsul Huq, 
Bangladesh Times, Dacca, 11 September 1979.
 ^Such goals, as Christopher Clapham states, can only be articulated as 
the immediate aftermath of independence recedes. C. Clapham (ed), 
Foreign Policy Making in Developing States: A Comparative Approach 
(Farnborough, Hants; Saxon House, Reprinted 1979), p.17.
4First one must define one's terms. What is 'smallness' 
in an International Actor? David Vital has furnished us 
with some criteria for measurement. This is largely on the 
basis of population - ten to fifteen million in the case of 
economically advanced countries and less than twenty or
4thirty million m  the case of underdeveloped countries.
The Vatican and Fiji obviously fit the bill. But what about 
an advanced country with less than fifteen million in 
population but a vast territory, like Australia, or a develop­
ing state of a teeming eighty million crowded into 54,000 
square miles, like Bangladesh? Population, therefore, is 
an inadequate criterion.
Keohane suggests influence instead. To him a Small 
State is one whose leaders consider that it can never, 
acting alone or in a small group, make a significant impact
5on the System. The crucial criterion is thus a very subjec­
tive consideration of the leadership. But what if the leaders 
of a particular State considered it powerful and acted 
accordingly, when in objective terms the State actually 
lacked such power? Nkrumah's Ghana, for instance?
At another level, military power has been suggested 
as a possible index. Robert Rothstein has attempted to 
define a Small State as 'one which recognizes that it cannot 
obtain security primarily by its own capabilities and that
4 D. vital, The Inequality of States: A Study of the Small Power in Internat­
ional Relations (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969), p.8.
5 Robert Keohane, 'Lilliputians Dilemmas: Small States in International 
Politics', International Organization, V o l . x x m  (Spring 1969), p.296.
5it must rely fundamentally on the aid of other states, 
institutions, processes or developments to do so1. But 
would this not confuse the status of Japan or India, both 
of whom have fairly inadequate defence capabilities (compared 
to Israel or Sweden for instance) but can hardly be termed 
small?
Should the criterion then be economic strength? Karl W.
7Deutsch emphasizes this aspect. However, in that case we 
would end up assigning a disproportionate priority to Saudi 
Arabia. If economic power is computed not in terms of GNP 
or resources, but in terms of the level of industrialization, 
Hong Kong or Singapore would have to be considered near-Great 
Powers.
All these definitions suffer from one common fallacy 
that render them inadequate; their tendency to generalize. 
But is there, in fact, a Small State per s e? Small States 
are not all States, as we have seen, that are underpopulated 
or undersized, uninfluential or weak, poor or underdeveloped, 
It might therefore be more appropriate to use 'smallness' 
as a relative expression. State 'A' may be described as 
'small' in comparison with State 'B' with regard to one, 
some, or all of those criteria.
It may of course be that 'A' is smaller than 'B' by one 
criterion and larger by another. It may, for instance, 
have a smaller population, but more strategic power: Iran, 
compared to Pakistan, for example. In that case 'A' cannot
7 . . .Karl W. Deutsch, The Anlaysis of International Relatzons (Englewood
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1968), p.31.
6be generalized as being smaller than 'B'. This can only 
be done when 'A', as compared to 'B1, has less population, 
less territory, less influence, less military power potential, 
less resources and a lower level of development; just as 
Bangladesh vis-a-vis India.
Using smallness as a relative concept has the advantage 
of limiting its scope. Otherwise the number of what could 
be called 'Small States' would be so large as to render the 
concept an inadequate tool for analysis, as Peter Baehr
gso powerfully argues it is. In any case, though Bangladesh 
is doubtlessly a Small State vis-a-vis India, we may give 
its attribute of large population some recognition by 
calling it a 'Small Power' (emphasizing the limitation of 
influence rather than size) instead of a 'Small State'.
The expression 'Subsystem' also requires some explanation. 
Michael Brecher has described Southern Asia as a 'Subordinate 
System' fulfilling six necessary conditions, i.e. (i) its 
scope is delimited with primary stress on geographic region;
(ii) there are at least three actors; (iii) taken together 
they are objectively recognised by other actors as constituting 
a distinctive community, region, segment of the Global System; 
(iv) the members identify themselves as such; (v) the units 
of power are relatively inferior to units in the Dominant 
System (i.e. Superpowers) and (vi) changes in the Dominant
Q Peter A. Baehr, 'Small States: A Tool for Analysis?' Review Article, 
World. Politics, Vol.27, No.3, (April 1975), pp.456-66.
7System have greater effect on the Subordinate System than 
9the reverse.
Brecher's Southern Asia, however, encompasses a vast 
and diverse territory.^ The diversity is more pronounced 
now than even when Brecher wrote. Indo-China, the ASEAN 
states, Burma, the Subcontinent, all now have their own 
distinctive interests and preoccupations. This, then, 
evidently calls for a further reclassification.
It is possible to conceive of a smaller Subsystem within 
the larger 'Subordinate System' to render it a more useful 
category for the purpose of analysis. This is a three-body 
concept comprising India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. These 
three countries share a common ethos rooted in their social, 
ethnic and historical tradition which binds them together 
and at the same time sets them apart from other States in 
the region. It is this concept that is used in the ensuing 
study. It is wise to point out, however, that the expression 
'Subsystem' is being used in this thesis merely to describe 
a setting. It does not mean that the inquiry is based on 
what is known in the social sciences as systems theory.^
His definition covers not only all states from Pakistan to Indonesia, 
but, arguing that the subordinate system is a political as well as geo­
graphic concept and that the region is a necessary but not sufficient 
basis for definition, also includes the vital peripheral State of China. 
Michael Brecher, 'International Relations and Asian Studies: The 
Subordinate State System of Southern Asia', World Politics, Vol.15, No.2 
(January 1963) , pp.213-35.
^ 'Systems theory' in vogue in the hehavioral sciences was introduced 
into international relations primarily by Morton Kaplan in his System 
and Process in International Politics (New York: John Wiley and Sons,
Inc., 1957). Kaplan's work is global. This is not an attempt to use 
his theory at a narrower level of area studies, as the following discussion 
on the general frame of analysis will indicate.
All that is being done is that the international state system 
is being viewed, as a set of units in interaction and a sub­
system is seen as a conglomerate of several of these units
12possessing some common characteristics.
This thesis will endeavour to delineate and explain the
manner in which Bangladesh acted in order to live in  concord
with but d ist in c t  from her powerful neighbour, India. The concord
was necessary because Bangladesh too, to borrow an expression
from a Nepalese Prime Minister describing Nepal's situation,
13is largely 'India-locked'; the distinction is essential
because Bangladesh's own separate identity can only be defined
14in those terms. The interactions within the 'regional core'
have had significant bearings on Bangladesh's relations with
the outside world.
The thesis does not encompass the total gamut of
Bangladesh's external relations. It leaves out, for instance,
Bangladesh's relations with the U.K. except for that component
that could be subsumed under relationship with the West in
general. This has nothing to do with what Professor Northedge
15would call Britain's 'descent from power'. There still
12 In fact, it might also be said of a subsystem, as has indeed been said of 
a system by Singer, that like beauty it is in the eye of the beholder.
J. David Singer, 'The Global System and Its Subsyst ems: A Developmental 
View' in James N. Rosenau (ed), Linkage Politics: Essays on the Convergence 
of National and International Systems (New York: The Free Press, 1969), p.22n.
13 Quoted in Shelton Kodikara, Strategic Factors in Interstate Relations
in South Asia, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence, No.19 (The Strategic 
and Defence Studies Centre, A.N.U., 1979), p.18.
14 . .Canada in North America is placed in a comparable situation. See Janice
L. Murray (ed), Canadian Cultural Nationalism: The Fourth Lester B. Pearson 
Conference on the Canada-U.S. Relationship (New York: New York University 
Press, 1977) passim.
15 . . .F.s. Northedge, Descent from P0wer: British Foreign Policy 1945-73
(London: Goerge Allen & Unwin, 1974).
exists a near mystical bond between Britain and Bangladesh. 
London remains for Dacca's middle classes a continual source 
of intellectual nourishment and at times, even, political 
inspiration. Over a hundred thousand Bengalis, including 
some politically very articulate ones, live in Britain.
An editorial article of The Times can still have a profound 
impact on Bangladesh politics. Yet, Britain, as the empirical 
evidence in the thesis will substantiate, is no longer 
c r it ic a l to the major aspirations of Bangladeshi foreign 
policy, security and the obtaining of external resources.
Also excluded, for the same reason, are the links with 
South East Asia. Bangladesh has often been described as 
a 'b r i d g e b e t w e e n  South and South East Asia, but to date, 
in terms of both security and development, the latter region 
seems peripheral to Dacca's interests.
It would also be wise to enter a caveat here. The 
thesis is by no means an attempt to generalise. It is 
primarily an effort to discern a behavior pattern for 
Bangladesh, for each international actor in the States-system 
is unique and merits separate examination. However, this 
study may help to provide, if not a model of small-power 
behavior, at least some key to the understanding of the 
problems, as it endeavours to surmount them, of a weaker 
state locked into a perennial relationship with a far more 
powerful neighbour by the 'tyranny of geography'.
 ^ This concept seems to have found enthusiastic expression at rhetorical 
levels at various points in time. See for instance, the Bangladesh-Burma 
Joint Communique of April 1974 (Bangladesh Documents, Vol.2, No.4 [Ap/ril- 
June, 1974], p.8) or Prime Minister Shah Azizur Rahman's speech in Parlia­
ment in course of a debate on foreign policy in February 1980 (Bangladesh 
Observer, 29 February 1980).
9
10
II. Approach and Methodology
Contemporary literature on foreign policy analysis 
tends to be either 'process-oriented' mostly with respect 
to modernized, industrialized, Western States, or 'function- 
oriented' as with the traditional 'lp^st developed countries'(LDCs) 
The former concentrates on the detailed analysis of foreign 
policy-making processes with emphasis on such institutions 
as bureaucracies, political parties and pressure-groups
17and the influence they exert on foreign policy outcomes.
On the developing countries the argument has been advanced
that their institutions, still being rudimentary, deserve
less attention than the functions of foreign policy or the
purposes they are put to. In other words their foreign
policies are seen as a function of functions.
There is indeed a strong case for this line of argument.
Firstly, in the LDCs, government agencies are often small,
intellectually inadequate establishments unable to wield
19policy-making influence. Secondly, developing countries 
are often characterised by the presence of charismatic-
For instance G. Allison, Essence of Decision (Boston, Little Brown, 1971). 
M. Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy (Washington D.C., 
Brookings Institute, 1974). William Wallace, Foreign Policy and the 
Political Process (London, Macmillan, 1971).
18 Some notable proponents of this view are B. Korany, 'Foreign Policy 
Models and their Empirical Relevance to the Third World Actors: A Critique 
and an Alternative', International Social Science Journal, Vol.26, No.l 
(1974), pp.70-94. F.B. Weinstein, 'The Uses of Foreign Policy in Indonesia: 
An Approach to the Analysis of Foreign Policy in the Less Developed 
Countries', World Politics, Vol.XXIV, No.3 (April 1972), pp.356-81.
19 As evidenced in a study of the Ugandan System by Maurice East in 
'Foreign Policy-Making in Small States: Some Theoretic Observations 
based on a Study of the Ugandan Ministry of Foreign Affairs', Policy 
Sciences, Vol.4, No.4 (1973), pp.491-92.
11
revolutionary leaders, described by Henry Kissinger as 'the
2 0Prophet'. Examples would be Kemal Ataturk, Gandhi, Jmnah.
Thirdly, the developing countries are circumscribed in their
economic behavior due to their situation of 'dependency'
i.e. the fact that they are on the 'peripheries' of the
global economy, being structurally linked in dependent
relationships to the 'Metropolitan Centres'. Fourthly and
finally, the military wields a disproportionate influence
in many developing societies and has been, and is, in effective
control of government in many countries from Turkey to South 
22Korea.
To what extent does this stand the test of detailed 
examination?
First, to argue that bureaucratic institutions in the 
developing countries (most of whom are also traditional 
societies) wield no influence in policy-making would be 
untrue. Indeed, scholars have argued strongly to the contrary. 
Karl Wittfogel, for instance, insists that the 'common
20 Henry A. Kissinger, 'Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy', in 
Wolfram A. Handreider (ed) , Comparative Foreign Policies: Theoretic 
Essays (New York: David Mckay Co. Inc., 1971), p.47.
21 There is a growing body of 'dependencia' literature. To cite some 
examples, Johan Galtung, 'A Structural Theory of Imperialism', Journal 
of Peace Research, Vol.8, No.2 (1971), pp.81-117. Andre Gunder Frank,
The Development of Underdevelopment (Monthly Review Press, 1970). Samir 
Amin, Unequal Development: An Essay on the Social Formations of 
Peripheral Capitalism, Trans. Brian Pearce (New York: Monthly Review 
Press, 1976). Celso Furtado, 'The Brazilian "Model"', Social and Economic 
Studies (Jamaica, 1973), pp.122-131. For a discussion on 'dependency' 
theory, see Chapter 9.
22 One explanation of this has been that a large proportion of the intelli­
gentsia in these countries is to be found in the Army, the only sector 
in such societies whose development received the attention of the Colonial 
Powers. Edward ShiIs, Political Development in the New States (Gravehow: 
Morton & Co., 1967).
12
substance in the various oriental societies appeared most
which of course, was a hierarchy structured to form bureau­
cratic systems. He notes the existence in these societies 
of the phenomenon which contemporary social analysts in their 
esoteric parlance have called 'bureaucratic politics'. For 
instance, he tells us
Secondly, in spite of developed systems and institutions 
Kissinger's 'prophets' have not been lacking in modernized 
societies. Churchill, De Gaulle, Franco and Kissinger 
himself serve as obvious examples. These individuals have 
had a profound influence on their respective countries' 
policies, including those relating to external affairs.
Thirdly, while economic dependency undoubtedly reduces 
the manoeverability of the small/weak powers, economic inter­
dependence also imposes restrictions on the developed states.
23Current literature on transnationalism points to that fact. 
Others such as the 'functionalists' and the 'neo-function­
alists' would encourage such a process and see this trend 
already developing. The 'functionalists' argue that complex
Karl A. wittfogel, Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total 
Power (Yale University Press, 1967), p.337.
24 ibid., p.337.
250 See Samuel Huntingdon, 'Transnational Organizations in World Politics', 
W0rld Politics, Vol.XXV, No.3 (April 1973). R.D. Keohane and J. Nye (eds), 
Transnational Relations and World Politics (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1971).
conspicuously in the despotic strength of their authority 23
All bureaucracies have certain technical 
features in common: and some methods of 
intra-bureaucratic competition appeal
controlled and
13
technetronic developments have thrown up equally complex
issues whose solutions need to be handled by international
agencies with tasks defined by the nature of these problems
26rather than by the interests of Governments. The 'neo- 
functionalists' will go even further in the hope that future
technical agencies would so integrate states as to make them
27lose all the attributes of sovereignty. Moreover, some
social scientists have in very recent times pointed to a
2 8situation of 'reverse dependency' where the industrialized
nations experience a critical need) for example, of oil.
Fourthly and finally, to say that the military has no
lever in developed countries is to totally ignore the
influence of what Eisenhower has called 'the military
industrial complex' and what has in fact been a cause for
29worry of some distinguished western intellectuals.
The above examination shows that to presuppose that 
developing countries are qualitatively so different from 
developed countries that they require a distinctly different 
set of tools for analysis cannot be sustained beyond a point. 
This type of intellectual dichotomy would imply a rather 
superficial study of the developing world. What implications 
does this have for research, then?
David Mitrany, 'The Functional Approach to World Organization',
International Affairs , Vol.XXlV (1948), pp.350-63.
27 Ernst B. Haas, Beyond the Nation State: Functionalism and International 
Organization (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1964).
28 Mahbubul Haq in Khadija Haq, Equality of Opportunity Within and Among 
Nations (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1977), p.193.
29 See for instance John Kenneth Galbraith's Hou to Control the Military 
(New York: New American Library, 1965).
14
It indicates that it is necessary and important to study 
the process of foreign policy along with its functions in 
the case of a ll international actors; in other words the 
'hows', 'whys' and 'whats' are equally important in all 
foreign policy analyses, irrespective of the country's 
size, power, or state of development, if a proper under­
standing of its external affairs is to be attained.
It also underlines the hazards of prejudging a certain
international actor and categorizing it before the research
commences, and of simultaneously choosing a particular model
of analysis (to the exclusion of other such models) which
30is determined a prvorv as suitable for the subject. It 
is obvious, then, that empiricism should decide in the end 
as to which category the subject belongs. It is only 
appropriate that a proper approach should be eclectic in 
nature, keeping options open at the outset and adopting a 
'model-mix' only after an initial survey of the existing data 
on any given issue area.
Another reason why any particular prevalent model is 
discounted, and no attempt has been made to establish a new 
one is because in such a case the ensuing study would become
Migdal has identified four broad conceptual models presently being 
used for foreign policy explanation: (1) the 'geo-political model', 
whereby physical location assumes prime importance and internal changes 
in regimes or ideologies have little significant impact; (2) the 'Organi­
zation Process model' which sees all foreign policy as Organizational 
output; (3) the 'bargaining model' whereby 'players' bargain with one 
another to produce 'political outcomes' and (4) the 'Rational Policy Model', 
which assumes that policy is a result of actions which are calculated 
responses to achieve certain ends. Joel Migdal, 'Internal Structures and 
External Behavior: Explaining Foreign Policies of Third World States', 
International Relations, vol.iv, No.5 (May 1974), pp.510-26.
15
more an attempt to test the model rather than an effort 
to acquire a proper comprehension of the subject under 
examination, in this case, Bangladesh's external behavior.
The approach adopted in this particular investigation, 
then, is the eclectic one; one of 'models-mix1. The method 
is basically analytical, that is, it relies on 'the proposition 
that policy rests on multiple determinants including the 
State's historic tradition, geographic location, national 
interests, purposes and security needs' To these could 
be added developmental requirements, ideological beliefs 
(religion or nationalism, for instance), and elite perceptions. 
Policy is the resultant outcome of the interplay of these 
variables.
Though these determinants will be identified and due 
emphasis given them in the course of the study, they are not 
neatly arranged in a taxonomic order. The reason is that 
while such neatness would lend the investigation both form 
and discipline, it would divert the researcher from a proper 
appreciation of the constant shifts and changeability which 
the thesis argues is a part of the subject's external strategy.
III. Note on the Sources
The contemporaneousness of the study posed some problems 
with regard to sources. Most relevant documents, except for
Kenneth W. Thompson and Roy C. Macridis, 'The Comparative Study of 
Foreign Policy' in Roy C. Macridis (ed), Foreign Policy in World Politics, 
Fifth edition (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.; Prentice-Hall Inc., 1976), p.3.
16
some Treaties, Joint Communiques and Trade Agreements, have 
not been made public and there was, therefore, a great 
reliance on interviews with individual 'policy makers'. Since 
South Asian bureaucrats are somewhat chary of public exposure, 
more so as some of the issues involved are still active,many 
of these interviews assumed the form of less formal discussions 
(these have been identified as such in footnotes). Many 
individuals directly involved with events in South Asia over 
the decade were interviewed including Prime Minister Gandhi, 
former Bangladesh President A.S. Choudhury, former Bangladesh 
Foreign Minister Dr Kamal Hossain, and a large number of
other politicians, senior bureaucrats from India, Bangladesh
32and Pakistan.
Some private papers have immensely benefited the study, 
particularly those on the struggle for Bangladesh's indepen­
dence, made available ¡by the former Bangladesh Deputy Prime 
Minister, Moudud Ahmed.
Press clippings were widely used from files at the 
Australian National University, Sapru House (New Delhi),
Chatham House (London), Queen Elizabeth House (Oxford), the 
Pakistan Institute of International Affairs (Karachi), the
Perhaps a brief note is necessary to explain why in the thesis Subcon­
tinental public leaders have been called at times by their surnames and on 
other occasions by their first names. In all cases the name by which they 
are more popularly known have been used. With Indians this is mostly the 
surname such as Gandhi, Desai and Nehru. For Pakistani and Bangladeshi 
Muslims, it is more complicated. Usually they are known by their first names 
such as Ayub or Yahya. However when 'Mohammed' forms a part of the name, it 
is not used by itself out of respect for the prophet of Islam. 'Mohammed 
Ayub Khan' thus becomes 'Ayub'. In some cases a shortened version of the 
name is commonly used, e.g. Zia for Ziaur Rahman or Mujib or Mujibur Rahman. 
These rules are not followed at all times and Muslim leaders have been known by 
surnames (Jinnah, Suhrawardy, Bhutto). Throughout the subcontinent government 
officials, perhaps because of the British legacy, traditionally use initials 
followed by the surname (such as G. Parthasarathy, M.M. Ahmed or S.A.M.S. 
Kibria).
17
Foreign Office (Dacca) and the Bangladesh Missions in New 
York, London, Cairo, Abu Dhabi and Canberra. A wide range 
of newspapers, Subcontinental, Middle Eastern and Western, were
relied on. Most were English language 'Dailies' or 'Weeklies', 
though some Bengali and Urdu ones have also been used.
Where such sources have been in another language, such cls 
Arabic/ translations have been used.
Government publications and Press hand-outs, particularly 
those from the External Publicity Division of the Bangladesh 
Foreign Office or the Planning Commission, proved valuable.
Minor publications from some embassies abroad, such as Press 
releases from the Bangladesh Representation at the U.N. have 
also been utilized. U.N. documents proved useful for exam­
inations of General Assembly debates and those in various comm­
ittees. Reports from the World Bank provided some valuable data.
The secondary sources used have been from a wide range 
of disciplines - Political Science, Economics, History,
Sociology and International Relations. Reliance on secondary 
sources is more evident in the Second Chapter, where strictly 
historical research was neither intended nor undertaken.
Through the rest of the thesis secondary sources have been 
interspersed with primary ones.
IV. Structure and Organization
The questions that the thesis seeks to answer, then, 
are as follows: What influence does the Bangladesh community's 
historical inheritance have on her contemporary external 
behavior? How does she now relate herself to her immediate 
environment? What ramifications do such relations have for
18
her interactions with other states in the wider international 
arena/ j&hd to the more comparable states in the regional 
periphery? What is the relevance of international institutions 
to Bangladesh? How does she, in her capacity as an aid 
recipient, respond to the donors? How do her external 
policies and postures emerge, and who, indeed, give th£m 
shape?
The chapters are organized as follows: the current chapter
the first, introduces the subject, discusses the approach and 
methodology and includes a note on the sources.
Chapter 2 deals with the historical backdrop of the
development of Bangladesh's national consciousness and
attempts to present a 'theory' of external behavior w,ithin
the regional parameters. The historical approach in this
chapter is,however,not undertaken- with the specific interest that
would motivate a historian, who, as Professor Olafson would
have us believe,
is primarily interested in getting a 
correct account of what happened over 
a particular period of time in some 
particular place or places, and if some 
thoery of economics or sociology put at 
his disposal helps him to understand his 
material, well and good; but he is 
not likely to be very strongly interested 
either in working out such a theory himself 
or even confirming it in the way that the 
social scientist is. The latter, by contrast, 
will to the degree that he is theoretically 
oriented, be drawn to the study of a particular 
set of events only if they earlier suggest 
or partially confirm some theory he is 
concerned to establish.33
33 Frederick A. Olafson, 'Some Observations on Area Study Programs',
The American Behavioral Scientist, Volume III, No.l (September 1964), 
p.12.
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Chapter 3 is a study of the influence of the geo­
graphical setting, an events-analysis of interactions within 
the 'core' region. It seeks to discern what ramifications 
the intra-regional interactions have for Bangladesh's extra- 
regional attitudes, particularly the importance of 'Indo- 
centrism' in Bangladesh's extra-regional behavior.
Three sets of states have been identified as crucial 
extra-regional 'areas': (i) the Superpowers, (ii) China, and
(iii) the Middle East. These are covered in Chapters 4, 5 
and 6 respectively, and the method followed is one of events- 
analysis .
Does Bangladesh react in the same manner to comparable 
powers in the neighbourhood as she does to India? If not, what 
are the differences? Chapter 7 concerns itself with these 
questions and examines Bangladesh's relations with less power­
ful (as compared to India) neighbours, Burma and Nepal.
What attitudes does Bangladesh adopt in the wider 
international arena? What postures does she assume on the 
various crucial international questions? What is the 
relevance of the United Nations to her external expression? 
Chapter 8 attempts to answer these questions.
Chapter 9 deals with the importance of economic factors, 
particularly aid requirements, on Bangladesh's international 
relations; the developmental philosophy of the State is 
scrutinized along with a detailed examination of donor- 
recipient relationship and has, therefore, a wider theoretical 
relevance to such relationships in other parts of the world.
The method adopted is descriptive-interpretive.
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Chapter 10 concentrates on the Elites and the Foreign 
Policy System , an attempt to explain the 'how' of foreign 
policy. Bureaucratic politics is discussed and the study 
adopts a sociological perspective when it seeks to explain 
the behavior pattern and the motivation of the powerful 
middle class.
Finally Chapter 11 is a 'Summing Up' of what has gone 
before. Since each chapter, except for the first, contains 
a concluding section, the final one is meant more as an over­
view of the< entire discussion in the context of some of 
the prevalent literature on 'Small' or 'Weak' Power Foreign 
Policy.
The research commences with the attempt to answer the 
first of our queries, the one regarding the influence of the 
past in the conditioning of Bangladesh's contemporary external 
behavior.
21
CHAPTER 2
'PREHISTORY1 OF BANGLADESHI NATIONALISM 
AND A 'THEORY' OF TRIPARTITE BALANCE
I . Introduction
The growth of the consciousness of the Bengali. Muslims 
as a distinct social and political entity, that culminated 
in their carving out for themselves a separate state in 1971, 
was the product of historical evolution whose beginnings 
date back td one and half centuries. Their past experience 
is important inasmuch as it continued largely to condition 
their external expression even after their distinctiveness 
was sharply defined by their attainment of sovereign 
international personality.
II. The Colonial Period
Two factors assisted this process up to the Partition
of 1947. One was British policy decisions during the Colonial
Period and the other, certain social and political develop-
vments within the two major communities of ^undivided Bengal, 
the Hindus and the Muslims.^
After the advent of the Muslim conquerors in Bengal in the 13th Century, 
there were large conversions of the inhabitants, partly because of 
the Hobson's choice before them and partly because of their distaste for 
'a rigid system of caste discipline' (E.A. Gait, Census of India, 1909} 
Vol.6, Part 1, Report, p.165). This happened largely in the deltaic east 
Bengal, but the western portions because of better communications and more 
stable forms of cultivation that contributed to social differentiation, 
was integrated into the Hindu culture of the Upper Gangetic Plains. 
Eventually, by the turn of the century, a majority of the population of 
the whole of Bengal became Muslims. See Premen Addy and Ibne Azad, 
'Politics and Society in Bengal' in Robin Blackburn (ed), Explosion in a 
Subcontinent (Penguin, 1975), pp.80-82.
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A. British Colonial Policies:
Of the several policy decisions during the Colonial
Period that one might allude to, the first was the Permanent
Settlement scheme introduced by Lord Cornwallis in 179 3,
whereby revenue demands of the government were fixed in
perpetuity with the incumbent landholders.
The Permanent Settlement had several important effects
on both the major communities in Bengal. First, because
the fixed quantum of revenue was high and collection by
the British far more efficient than collection from the
peasants by the landlords (many of whom were Muslims, remnants
of the period of 1N a w a b i' rule), these landlords (zamindars)
fell into arrears and were compelled to alienate their
properties to mainly two Hindu groups, one, the city based
2commercial class of rising businessmen and the other, those
employed in tax collection establishments of the larger
3
zarmndarzs (estates) or of the East India Company. Secondly, 
because it was the revenue to the Government that was fixed 
in perpetuity and not the rent from the peasants to the 
zamindars, the new class of zamindars endeavoured to extricate 
as much as possible from the former, who were mostly Muslims. 
This was not conducive to inter-communal harmony which tended 
to get enmeshed with class conflict as the sense of deprivation 
of the Muslim peasants (including the jotedars or richer
2 Addy and Azad in Blackburn (ed), op.cit., pp.87-88.
3 . . . .See Raj at and Ratna Ray, The Dynamics of Continuity in Rural Bengal
under the British Imperialism: A Study of Quasi-stable Equilibrium in
Underdeveloped Societies in a Changing World', The Indian Economic and
Social History Review, Vol.x (1973), p.106.
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4peasants) sharpened. Thirdly, the nouveau-riche commercial- 
class zamindars preferred to be 'absentee landlords' which
encouraged subinfeudation further adversely affecting the
5ryot. Subinfeudation also resulted from the fact that 
the British sealed off the apex of the feudal hierarchy
rwith their corps of civil servants, permitting only undergrowth.
A second policy decision that affected the Muslims 
was the shift from the use of Persian in government offices 
to English and Bengali. This led to a loss of positions 
on their part in the administration, especially of the
*7'high-born' A sh raf class. This tradition-bound aristocracy 
displayed no eagerness, at least at that stage, to learn
Rajat and Ratna Ray state that 'the social peculiarity of East Bengal 
which fed the growing political conflict in the province was that the 
Zamindars and Talukdars (bigger landlords) in the area were mostly high 
caste Hindus, while the largejotedars under them were invariably Muslims 
of peasant stock'. Rajat and Ratna Ray, 'Zamindars and Jotedars: A Study 
of Rural Politics in Bengal', Modern Asian Studies, Vol.9 (1975), p.101.
5 N.K. Sinha, Economic History of Bengal (Calcutta, 1962), Ch.VII passim.
0
Dietmar Rothermund, The Phases of Indian Nationalism and Other Essays 
(Bombay: Nachikita Publications Ltd., 1970), pp.177-78. Rothermund 
argues that while the European bourgeoisie overthrew feudalism in their own 
countries, they did not perform the same service as colonial rulers in 
Asia. For instance in India, while reserving the capitalist mode of 
production for themselves, they endeavoured to keep the rest of the country 
at the level of pre-capitalist production, which required the maintenance 
of 'the stunted and ossified remnants of feudalism', capped by a salaried, 
efficient bureaucracy (p. 177).
7 Initially the Ashraf Muslims who claimed descent from the Turco-Afghans, 
spoke Persian and Urdu, and the Atraf, or functional groups, spoke Bengali. 
The latter were of course numerically superior, and eventually by early 
20th Century Bengali became the mother tongue of most Bengal Muslims. 
However in course of the 19th Century a special patois came into vogue 
especially in eastern Bengal, known as Musalmani Bangla. Amalendu De,
Roots of Separatism in Nineteenth Century Bengal (Calcutta: Ratna 
Prakashan, 1974), p.14. A large number of Muslims in Calcutta continued 
their links with the Urdu-Persian ethos of their co-religionists in the 
rest of India, and the ranks of Urdu speakers among Calcutta Muslims 
swelled with the arrival of migrants after the 1850s from Bihar, the
(cont1d)
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oEnglish. Nor were they given much encouragement to do
so either by the authorities or by the Bengali Hindus, as
evidenced by the fact that when in 1817 the first secular
institution, the Hindu College was established, its charter
stipulated that none but Hindus could be admitted.^
The Census of 1871 reports:
Hindus, with exceptions of course, are the 
principal Zamindars, talukdars [owners 
of large subinfeudatory estates] public 
officers, men of learning, money lenders, 
traders, shopkeepers, and [are] engaging 
in most active pursuits of life and coming 
directly and frequently under notice of 
the rulers of the country: while the Mussalmans 
with exceptions also, form a very large majority 
of the cultivators of the ground and day 
labourers and others engaged in the humblest 
forms of mechanical skills and of buying and 
selling.10
This social decline engendered disaffection among 
different Muslim classes, whose interests appeared to blend 
for a while and found expression in three peasant led
7 (cont'd)
United Provinces and the Punjab (Kenneth McPherson, 'The Muslims of Madras 
and Calcutta: Agitational Politics in the early 1920s', South Asia, 
University of Western Australia, No.5 (December 1975), p.33.)
Q
a.k. Mallick, British Policy and the Muslims in Bengal 1757-1856 
(Dacca: Asiatic Society of Pakistan, 1961), p.200.
9 M. Mujeeb, The Indian Muslims (London: John Allen and Unwin Ltd.,
1966), p.521. R.c. Majumdar, Glimpses of Bengal in the Nineteenth Century 
(Calcutta: Firma K.L. Mukhopadhaya, 1960), p.48. A privately founded 
institution initially, it was not just the Muslims who were excluded, 
but the lower caste Hindus as well. Eventually the British authorities 
intervened and the College (later known as the Presidency College) was 
thrown open to all castes and communities, but this was not to happen 
until the middle of the Nineteenth Century.
10Quoted in Abdul Majeed Khan, 'Research about Muslim Aristocracy in 
East Pakistan', in Pierre Bessaignet (ed), Social Research in East Pakistan 
(Dacca: Asiatic Society of Pakistan, 1960), p.19.
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movements - the F ara iz i  Movement (1810-1831), the Indigo
riots (1859-60), and the Pabna Rent Revolt (1873)— as well
as in the communal riots in Calcutta in the 1890s. The
F a r a iz i  Movement was the Bengali version of the Pan-Islamic
Wahabi Movement, that sought to revive the pristine glories
of Islam: initially the content was religious but eventually
the bias became socio-economic, aiming at the two-fold
objective of 'protecting the peasantry [largely Muslims]
from the oppression of the Hindu zamindars' and 'securing
social justice for the masses of the Muslims'.^ The Indigo
riots resulted from coercion of the peasants by the indigo
] 2planters to produce the plant at a loss. The third movement,
the rent revolt was a protest against absentee landlordism
1 3in the district of Pabna in 1873; the Calcutta rtots in 
the 1890s grew from the rise of 'community consciousness' 
among the jute-labourers of Calcutta, especially after the
Muin-ud-din Ahmed Khan, 'Social Organization of the Faraidis',
Pakistan Historical Society Journal, Vol.12 (1964), p.195.
12 Chittabrata Palit, Tensions in Bengal Rural Society: Landlordsj 
Planters3 and Colonial Rule 1830-1860 (Calcutta: Progressive Publishers, 
1975), pp.140-151.
13 There were, however, some Hindus among the leaders of the revolt.
See Kalyan Kumar Sengupta, 'The Agrarian League of Pabna, 1873', The 
Indian Economic and Social History Review, Vol.7, No.2 (June 1970), 
pp.253-270. Some of the grievances of the peasants were later attempted 
to be removed by the Bengal Tenancy Act of 1885. Initially, the British 
tended generally to favour the landlord and their legislations facilitated 
rent extraction. The tenancy protection that gradually emerged, and 
which had for its aim the forestalling of peasant agitation, flowed 
from rent recovery Acts. Dietmar Rothermund, Government3 Landlord and 
Peasant in India: Agrarian Relations Under British Rule (Weisbaden:
Franz Steiner Verlag GMBH, 1978), p.89.
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influx of Urdu-speaking labour migrants into Bengal from
14 . . . .Northern India. The Hindus participated in only those
of the above movements where the thrust was against the
British but, quite understandably, remained uninvolved
15when the Islamic features were emphasized.
Two traits become evident at this stage. First the
growing formation of a loose alliance of interest between
the A shraf (the old aristocracy) and the A t r a f (the more
indigent functional groups, rural peasantry and urban workers)
poised against the State authority (the British) and the
16burgeoning Hindu Middle Class, the bhadralok) and second, 
the power of religion as the means of rousing Muslims of 
all classes.
The simmering discontent among Bengali Muslims that 
had begun to foster the development of separatist consciousness
See Dipesh Chakrabarty, 'Communal Riots and Labour:' Bengal's Jute Mill- 
hands in the 1890s', Past and Present (forthcoming).
15 Addy and Azad, Blackburn, op.cit., p.104.
16 . .Contemporary historians and sociologists have assigned a Weberian
'status group' to the powerful bhadralok, who, unrelated to the processes 
of production, do not strictly constitute a class. J.H. Broomfield has 
described them as being 'distinguishable by many aspects of their 
behaviour - their deportment, their speech, their dress, their style of 
housing, their eating habits, their occupations and their associations - 
and quite as frequently by the cultural values and their sense of 
propriety'. Elite Conflict in a Plural Society (University of California 
Press, 1968), pp.5-6. John McGuire sees them as a composite group of 
middle class and rentier class of Calcutta who continued to retain strong 
residual ties with their own pre-capitalist past. He notes the absence of 
any industrial bourgeoisie among them as the paradoxy of the colonial 
situation demanded that the latter was found in Britain only. (Development 
and Underdevelopment: Calcutta and the Bhadralok, 1857-1885\ A.N.U. 
Conference Paper, December 1979), p.11. However, S.N. Mukherjee has 
argued that to describe the bhadralok as a mere status group or even a 
category would be to ignore the economic changes and social mobility in 
nineteenth century Bengal. Mukherjee would go a step further and call the 
bhadralok a Class. S.N. Mukherjee, 'Class, Caste and Politics in Calcutta 
1815-38' in Edmund Leach and S.N. Mukherjee (eds), Elites in South Asia 
(Cambridge University Press, 1970), p.51.
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was yet unarticulated in any major way except for the 
occasional local 'uprisings'; but this incipient 'community­
consciousness ' was brought a step closer to nationalism by 
yet another decision of the Colonial Power, the partition 
of Bengal (1905) that gave it a territorial content.
The Partition of Bengal (1905) ostensibly had a two­
fold objective, 'reinvigoration of Assam and relief of
17Bengal'. Eastern Bengal was hived off and joined to Assam 
creating a separate province. It was hoped that the reduction 
of Bengal's size would make it more governable and that 
Assam's acquisition of the port of Chittagong in East Bengal 
would invigorate the rather neglected province, which 
together with its now larger size and population would make
1 oit attractive for the Covenanted Civil Servants.
Curzon was certainly motivated by his desire to curb
the rising power of the Calcutta bh adralo k. A senior British
official, H.H. Risley, recorded that
Bengal united is power. Bengal divided 
will pull in different ways. That is what 
the Congress leaders feel; their 
apprehensions are perfectly correct and 
they form one of the great merits of the 
scheme ... one of our main objects is to 
split up and thereby weaken a solid body of 
opponents to our rule. 19
17 Minute by Curzon, June 1903, para 49, cited in John R. Mcl-c^Lane, 
'The Decision to partition Bengal in 1905', The Indian Economic and 
Social History Review (July 1965), p.223.
18  \ 1McjLane, *biCl ., pp. 22 2-22 3.
19 Quoted in Amales Tripathi, The Extremist Challenge: India between 
1890 and 1910 (Bombay: Orient Longman's, 1967), p.157.
28
Apart from dividing Bengal another way of minimising
bhadralok influence was to encourage the Muslims by giving
them a separate Province of their own. In fact Curzon
himself urged Nawab Salimullah of Dacca that
by means of their numerical strength and 
superior culture, the Mussa.lmans would have 
the preponderating voice in the province 
that would be created and that would invest 
the Mussalmans of Eastern Bengal with a unity 
which they had not enjoyed since the days of 
the old Mussalmans and k i n g s . 20
A period of good relations between the Raj and the 
Muslim leaders in Bengal began and the latter encouraged 
the establishment of the All-India Muslim League with its 
stipulation of loyalty to the Government.21 The anti-British
stirrings of the 19th Century among the Muslims were now
22calmed.
The Partition of 1905 was then the first significant 
step towards the recognition of the separate identity of 
the Bengali Muslims. It accorded a more definite shape to 
their growing 'community-consciousness1 by investing it with
20 Quoted in Abul Hayat, Mussalmans of Bengal (Calcutta: Zahed Ali,
1966), p.18.
21 . . . . .See Abdul Hamid, Musltm Separatism in India: A Brief Survey 1858-1947
(Lahore: Oxford University Press, 1967), p.78.
22 This period of inproved relations between the British and the Muslim 
community also saw a more intense development of the process of what 
Professor D.A. Low has described as the 1neo-darbari' politics, which 
involved, on the part of the British 'a multiplicity of initiatives to 
associate non-official Indian "notables" with the workings of the higher 
level of the Raj so as to extend the linkages through which Indian 
society could be controlled1. D.A. Low (ed), Congress and the Raj 
(London: Arnold-Heinemann, 1977), p.5. This process largely induced 
the growth of a selective leadership among the Muslims which resulted 
in a spell of harmonious relationship between the Muslim elites and 
the British, that continued even beyond, as will be seen shortly, the 
rescindment of the Partition of Bengal.
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a territorial content, which found ultimate fruition six 
and a half decades later in the creation of Bangladesh 
in 1971.
The Partition provoked convulsive outbursts from the 
bhadralok who often reached back into their mythological 
past and drew inspiration from Kali the goddess of destruction, 
which obviously did not find sympathy with the Bengali 
Muslims. The resultant polarisation politicised and 
galvanised Muslim opinion. An added impetus towards commun- 
alism was given by such journals as Lai  I s h t ih a r ('Red
23Pamphlet') and Krishak Bandhu ('Friend of the Peasants').
This polarisation was so complete that even when Partition 
was revoked in 1911, the deep sense of shock of the Bengali 
Muslims found expression, not in any anti-British fury, 
but in antipathy directed more towards the Hindu community 
in Bengal.
This suited the Bengali Muslim leadership, conservative 
and feudal in background. Nawab Salimullah had clearly seen 
the advantage of remaining on the right side of the authorities. 
The strategy was to secure as much advantage as possible 
by portraying the Bengali Muslim as the aggrieved party 
without resorting to any lawlessness. As a sop came the
23
Lai Ishtihar for instance urged the Muslims: 'In Bengal consider 
you are the majority; you are the peasant. From agriculture comes 
all wealth. From where did the Hindu get his wealth? He had nothing, 
he has stolen it from you and become wealthy ...' Bengalee, 5 May 1907 
cited in Sumit Sarkar, The Swadeshi Movement in Bengal 1903-1908 
(Delhi: Peoples' Publishing House, 1973), p.209. Similarly Krishak 
Bandhu attacked the Congress as a Hindu body and warned that 'Swaraj'
(self rule) implied Hindu domination. Sarkar, op.cit., p.214.
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University of Dacca.^ Secondly, the decision to shift
the capital from Calcutta to New Delhi was a blow to bhadralok
power, which was not unpalatable to Bengal's Muslim leaders.
Thirdly, the Indian Councils Act of 1909 recognised Bengal's
political maturity and signalled the commencement of a series
of reforms that could gradually lead to devolution of power
in Bengal as well as increased legislative politics. The
Muslims being the overall majority stood to gain from this.
For all these reasons it was the Hindu community, rather
than the British, which began to be perceived as a source
of threat, so much so the Bengali Muslim leadership reacted
adversely to the Lucknow Pact of 1916 between the Congress
and the Muslim League, which reflected an understanding
between India's two major communities at an All-India level.
The Lucknow Pact, basing itself on the principle that
minority communities ought to have weightage in representation,
granted the Hindus major concessions in the Muslim majority
province of Bengal where the Muslims with 52.6% of the
25population were to have only 40% of the seats. This was 
of course because Muslims were obtaining advantages in the 
provinces where they were minorities. Clearly this was 
against Bengali Muslim interest. Salimullah was now dead and the 
leadership passed to conservatives like Nawab Nawabaly 
Chowdhury who argued that the Muslim League could not and
24 . .On 31 January 1912 Salimullah and some other East Bengali Muslim
leaders like Nawab Ali Chowdhury and A.K. Fazlul Huq in an address to the 
Viceroy stressed the point that the annulment of Partition would retard 
progress in education of the Muslims. The Viceroy promised to recommend 
the establishment of a University in Dacca. On 2 February 1912 a communique 
to that effect was published, and the University was established by an Act 
on July 1, 1921. Abdul Hakim, 'University of Dacca', The Journal of the 
Pakistan Historical and Social Review, Vol.16 (January 1968), Part 1, p.50.
25 Broomfield, op.cit., p.114.
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2 6did not represent the interest of the Bengali Muslims.
This position stiffened with the Hindu-Muslim communal
riots in Bihar in 19 n and more significantly in Calcutta
27the following year. It was beginning to be perceived 
that the interests of the Bengali Muslims need not necessarily 
coincide with those of their co-religionists in Northern 
India, a matter of considerable significance for later 
political developments.
This partly explains the rather lukewarm response of the 
Bengali Muslims to the call for the 'Khilafat Movement'
(as a mark of protest against the dismemberment of the 
Ottoman Empire). Such All-India Muslim Causes still retained 
some support among the Urdu speaking Muslim Calcuttans 
like Mowlana Abul Kalam Azad, but were by and large of 
peripheral interest to those representing the more indigenous 
Bengali speaking Muslims of Bengal.
Finally, British policies with regard to the gradual 
devolution of power and the extension of legislative politics 
in Bengal were leading inexorably to the solution of the 
major problem that confronted the Bengali Muslims, the 
translation of their demographic majority into political 
power. The Reforms that came into operation in 1921 
introduced a system of 'dyarchy' in thè. Provinces v i z . t a
26
Octennial Report of the Central National Mohammedan Association 
1917-1924 (Calcutta, 1925), pp.35-37.
27 See J.H. Broomfield, 'The Forgotten Majority: The Bengal Muslims 
and September 1918' in D.A. Low (ed) , Soundings in Modem South Asian 
History (London: The Camelot Press Ltd., 1968), pp.196-220.
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division of powers between Executive Councillors responsible 
to the Governor administering 'reserved' subjects and Ministers 
answerable to the legislature controlling 'transferred' 
subjects. Besides the principle of transferring responsibility 
for certain functions while reserving control over others,
2 8the idea was to establish substantial provincial autonomy.
This autonomy worked to insulate Bengal somewhat from the 
rest of India, with communal politics there developing 
dynamics of their own. Muslim politicians entered into 
an alliance with the Swarajzsts on the eve of the 1923 
elections. But when the government was formed, two of the 
three Ministers turned out to be Muslims; so when the 
Swarajists assumed an opposition role and attacked the 
Cabinet, it was interpreted as a threat to a Muslim-majority 
Ministry from a Hindu majority Swaraj Party.® Ultimately, 
the government was defeated and the Governor suspended 
the Constitution until after the 1927 elections. The prospects 
of Hindu-Muslim unity received a severe jolt and Muslim 
politicians closed ranks for the elections, in which only
one out of 39 Muslims elected to the Bengal Council was a
31
S w a r a j i s t. The short-lived Swarajzst Muslim alliance
28
L.F. Rushbrook williams, India in the Years 1917-18. A Report prepared 
for the presentation to the Parliament in accordance with the 26th Section 
of the Government of India Act (Calcutta, 1919), pp.192-193.
29 This section of the Congress led by C.R. Das aimed at Swaraj (self rule) 
through participation in electoral bodies.
30 See Broomfield, Elite Conflict in a Plural Soctety, op.cit., p.253.
31
A Short History of Hind Pakistan (Prepared by Pakistan History Board, 
Pakistan Historical Society, Publications No.3, 1963), p.396.
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proved how brittle such understandings could be when 
confronted with communalist sentiments.
It was now clear that as the scope of legislative
politics broadened, Muslim domination of such politics was
32inevitable. This shift of power resulted once again in
the expression of bhadralok discontent with their old weapon,
33terrorism. In April 19 30 the Chittagong Armoury was raided.
The disturbances assumed communal proportions when a Muslim
police inspector was killed by a Hindu boy in August 1931
which led to rioting in the bazars.^ The District Magistrate
of Chittagong imposed a Curfew on 'Hindu bhadvalok youths'
who had organised themselves into a terrorist organisation
3 5named the 'Indian Republican Army (IRA). At the level of 
Constitutional Politics the bhadvalok demanded a Second
Initially, the Muslims seemed to feel that their interest lay in 
the continuation of 'consultative politics' rather than in the extension 
of legislative politics, and that any system of open elections could 
easily be dominated by the powerful bhadvalok. It was only a gradual 
realization on the part of their politicians that 'they had many 
technical advantages in the new system, and that the sheer size of 
their community gave them great agitational and electoral strength, 
which awaited only the perfection of those techniques for its realisation'. 
Broomfield in D.A. Low (ed), Soundings in South Asia, p.220.
33
India in 1931-1932. A statement pvepaved fov pvesentation to Pavliament 
in accovdance with the vequivement of the 26th Section of the Government 
of India Act (Calcutta: G overnment of India Central Publication Branch, 
1933), p.26.
34
Tevvorism in India 1917-1936. (Compiled in the Intelligence Bureau,
Home Department Government of India) (New Delhi: Deep Publications, 
Reprinted 1974), p.32.
35 .
Indzan Recorder, October-December 1932 (Calcutta: Indian Journalists
Association, 1932), p.32.
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Chamber 'to form a breakwater against sudden storms, sudden
3 6tidal waves', of extended franchise. In other words the
bhadralok were asking for an institutional check against
the power of the lower house being increasingly dominated
by the lower-caste Hindus and Muslims. Muslim leaders like
A.K. Fazlul Huq vigorously opposed it and when put to vote
3 7the motion was lost, 46 to 44.
The Government of India Act 19 35 enlarged the electorate 
manifold and further enfranchised the low-caste Hindus and 
Muslims. It was obvious that the Muslims would be the dominant 
force in legislative politics and that their energy would 
now be directed towards ameliorating the problems of the 
tenantry at the expense of the b h a d r a lo k. Under the Act 
which, on pursuance of the policy of separate electorates 
for Hindus and Muslims (separate electorates further engen­
dered separatist tendencies), gave in a House of 250, 117 
seats to Muslims, 78 to Hindus and 30 to 'Scheduled Castes'
(lower castes), the Muslims in Bengal received 'a built-in
3 8bias to power'.
An opportunity for improved communal relations was 
lost when after the 19 37 elections Fazlul Huq, who had floated 
the Krishak Praja Party (Peasants, Tenants, Party) in 1929,
36
Bhadralok leader S.M. Bose called for such a House 'representing an 
aristocracy of intellect, men of education and experience in the service 
of the state, men representing the great social and industrial interests 
in the country, men of sufficient strength to avoid the evils which might 
possibly flow from the unbridged powers of an autocratic lower chamber'. 
ibid., p . 813.
37 ibid., p.815.
38 Shapan Adnan, 'Fazlul Huq and Bengal Muslim leadership 1937-1943',
Bangladesh Historical Studies, Vol.l (Dacca: Journal of Bangladesh 
Itihash Samiti, 1976), pp.4-5.
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having fought the Muslim League led by Khwaja Nazimmudin, 
turned to the Congress for coalition. The Congress turned 
down this opportunity for an understanding with 'the most 
secular segment of Muslim leadership' as well as 'progressive' 
Hindu elements.^ Huq therefore sought Muslim League 
support for a coalition, a move that had significant long 
term impact on Bengal's future politics. Firstly, rebuffed 
by the Congress, Huq's alliance with the Muslim League once 
again led to a closing of ranks by the Bengal Muslims; 
secondly, the Muslim League , because of its association with 
the various reforms that followed, gained a radical flavour 
that it really never possessed, which aided its image as 
a friend of the impoverished Muslim tenantry; thirdly, because 
the Congress was unresponsive to Huq, the latter had to turn 
to more extremist Hindu groups for alliance when he fell out 
with the League, thus exposing himself to criticism from 
the Muslim majority.
The Muslim victory in Bengal led the Urdu Poet-Philosopher 
Sir Muhammed Iqbal to ask M.A. Jinnah why the Muslims of 
North-West India and Bengal should not be entitled to self
39 Though the League had 43 seats, and Congress 52, Fazlul Huq with 36 
KPP seats was best placed to lead coalition either in alliance with 
one of the above or with support from the 108 Independents, and some 
others (Statistics of result from Humaira Momen, Muslim Politics in 
Bengal: A Study of KPP and the elections of 10.37 (Dacca, 1972), p.77.
40 Shila Sen, 'Some Aspects of Muslim Politics in Bengal 1937-1946',
Bangladesh Historical Studies, op.cit., p.30.
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41government just as other nations. Huq, who had himself
joined the League in October 1937, was used by Jinnah in
March 19 40 to move the famous Lahore Resolution which demanded
that the areas in which the Muslims are 
numerically in a majority as in the North 
Western and Eastern zones of India, should 
be grouped to constitute independent 
states in which the constituent  units  
shall be autonomous and s o v e r e ig n. ^2 
[italics mine]
Two points emerge from this: firstly, that the Partition
should be on communal lines and secondly, the new units
should be 'autonomous' and 'sovereign' rather than part of
a single political entity. It can well be argued, therefore,
that the solution in the Subcontinent in 1971 was more in
conformity with the original Lahore Resolution than the
Partition of 1947. What eventually happened in 1971
(i.e. the emergence of Bangladesh) could therefore be viewed
as the second and final phase of the realisation of the
original Lahore Resolution.
When Jinnah wished for Huq's resignation from the
4 3Defence Council, the two leaders fell out.* Huq was now 
receiving threat perceptions from his co-religionists in 
Northern India. Prominent Muslim Leaguers like Suhrawardy
41 Iqbal asked: 'Why should not the Muslims of North-West India and 
Bengal be considered as nations entitled to self-government just as other 
nations?' (italics minel Kamruddin Ahmad, A Social History of Bengal 
(Dacca, 1970), edn.3, p.31. Iqbal's use of the plural 'nations' indicates 
that in his mind Bengal was a potential sovereign Muslim entity, rather 
than an integral part of a single Subcontinental Muslim State.
42 Quoted in Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada (ed), Foundations of Pakistan 
1924-1947 (Karachi: National Publishing House, 1970), p.341.
43 See m.a.h. Ispahani, Quaide Azam Jinnah as I  knew him (Karachi:
Forward Publications Trust, 1966), pp.48-49.
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and Nazimuddin quit the Ministry. Huq began to talk of
44Hmdu-Muslim Unity. Deserted by the Leaguers, rebuffed 
by the Congress, Huq turned to his extremist arch-rival 
Shyama Prasad Mukherjee for an alliance. Once again in 
order to counter threat perceptions from Northern co-religion 
ists and their allies in Bengal, the indigenous Muslim Bengali 
forged an alliance with a section of the Hindu b h ad r a lo k, 
a tactic that was to be repeated years later in 1971.
Mukherjee left the Ministry in protest against the
Government's failure to heed its advice on food procurement
prior to the 19 4 3 famine; Huq now unsupported by all major
elements was edged out of office by the Governor Sir John
Herbert in May 19 43. The Muslim League with Nazimuddin as
Premier was now in full command, and Bengal came into line
with All-India Muslim League Politics. In the 1946 elections
the Muslim League, basing its campaign on the All-India
Muslim demand for Pakistan, won all the six Muslim seats
from Bengal to the Central Assembly, and in the Province 113
out of 121 territorial Muslim seats. Shila Sen has argued:
The election result also proved that in 
Bengal the Pakistan Movement was mass based 
and democratic. They reflected the aspirations 
of Bengali Muslims for a Muslim majority 
state in Northern India.45
In June 1942 he said in Calcutta: 'Hindus and Muslims must realize .. 
that they have got to live together, sink or swim together, and if needs 
be lay down their lives together for the good of their common motherkind' 
(Hindustan Standard, Calcutta, 21 June 1942 cited in Shyamoli Ghosh: 
'Fazlul Huq and Muslim Politics in Prepartition Bengal', International 
Studies, Vol.13 (New Delhi, 1974), p.457.
45
Muslim Politics in Bengal 1937-1947 (New Delhi: Impex India, 1976), 
pp.197-198.
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However Suhrawardy, who succeeded Sir Khwaja Nazimuddin
as Premier in April 1946, had a vision of Bengal as an
independent sovereign unit. He was backed in this project
by some Bengali Muslim politicians like Abul Hashim and
Fazlur Rahman. Even a document was drawn up, a blue print
for a 'Socialist Republic of Bengal' (which implied they
had more than a Dominion status in mind for the proposed 
46unit). But opposition came from the bhadralok who, 
fearing a perennial Muslim domination of a United Bengal,
4 7preferred partition along the lines of the Radcliffe award,
and on 9 June 1947 the Council of the All-India Muslim
League in New Delhi accepted a partition of Bengal as a
compromise solution. East Bengal was to be separated from
48West Bengal and to constitute a part of Pakistan.
B. Developments within the two Communities:
The communal separatism in Bengal engendered over the 
decades by colonial policies periodically received simultaneous
46 Interview with M. Masood, Director Pakistan Institute of International 
Affairs, Karachi, 10 May 1978. Masood was a Private Secretary to Suhrawardy 
during that period. M. Ayoob however has argued that Suhrawardy's line 
for United Bengal was a direct outcome of his having been passed over for 
the leadership of the East Bengal Muslim League. Mohammed Ayooh, Indias 
Pakistan and Bangladesh: Search for a New Relationship (New Delhi:
Indian Council of World Affairs, 1975), p.4.
47 Shyama Prasad Mukherjee wrote to the Central Congress leader Sardar 
Patel: 'We demand the creation of two provinces out of the boundaries of 
Bengal, Pakistan or no Pakistan'. Shila Sen, Muslim Politics in Bengal3 
op.cit., p .227.
48 It seems for a while the fate of the bhadralok stronghold, Calcutta, 
was in doubt. A government Circular in February 1946 read: 'The question 
whether Calcutta should be included in Eastern Bengal is one which raises 
some very serious issues. If Calcutta is not so included Eastern Pakistan 
will obviously be a very poor thing and Pakistan as a whole will be heavily 
unbalanced as between agriculture on the one hand, and industry, commerce
(cont1d)
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impetus from certain developments within the two communities 
themselves during the Colonial Period. First was the series 
of revivalist movements in the latter half of the Nineteenth 
Century experienced by both. The whole of India was under­
going a spell of Hindu revivalism that found expression in 
the establishment of such institutions as the Arya Samaj in 
Bombay in 1875. The Samajists carried out Shuddhi (Purifi­
cation) and Shanghatan (union) programmes that naturally
49clashed with the proselytising work of the Muslim revivalists.
The conflict in Bengal would have been sharper had it not
been for the fact that there 'the need of a re-examination,
re-explanation and re-interpretation of the traditional
religion of the people by their contact with modern European
thought and culture and the conlfict between Hinduism and
the evangelical Christian missions had been very largely
'50met by the Brahma Samaj (a reformist movement started 
by Raja Rammohan Roy 177 2-1833) .
The Muslims had revivalist movements of their own. The 
Faraizi movement had a religious component as evidenced 
by the Dini (religious) branch in their organisation, as 
opposed to the S iy as i (Political) branch.51 Eventually
48 (cont'd)
and finance on the other1. Note by Pethick-Laurence, India Office, 13 
February 1946 in Nicholas Mansergh (ed), Constitutional Relations Between 
Pakistan and India: The Transfer of Power 1942-47, Vol.VI (London, 1976), 
p.953.
49 K.P. Karunakaran, Religion and Political Awakening in India (Calcutta: 
Minakshi Prakashan, 1965), p.99.
50 Bipen Chandra Pal, Memories of My Life and Times (Calcutta: Yugayantri 
Prakashak Ltd., 1951), Vol.2, p.71.
Muin-ud-din Ahmed, op.cit., p.195.
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this orthodoxy gave way to a more liberal trend initiated
52m  Northern India by Sir Syed Ahmed Khan. In Bengal
contemporary flag bearers advocating similar lines were
5 3Nawab Abdul Latif and Sir Syed Amir Ali. While the orthodox 
revivalists sought to restore Islam's 'lost glories', the 
modernists emphasised the material aspect of the competition 
with the Hindus. Both, however, had the same effect of 
acting as a catalyst to instil in the Muslim mind a feeling 
of distinctiveness from the Hindus.
A second development would be the rise of b h ad r a lo k,
the category from whom the Muslims were by and large excluded.
The attitude of this group towards the Muslims has been
summed up by the writer Nirad C. Chaudhury who, recalling
his boyhood days wrote:
In the first place, we felt a retrospective 
hostility toward the Muslim for his one 
time domination of us, the Hindus; secondly, 
on the plane of thought we were utterly 
indifferent to the Muslims as an element in 
contemporary society; thirdly, we had 
friendliness for the Muslims of our own 
economic and social status with whom we came 
into close personal contact; our fourth feeling 
was mixed, concern and contempt for the Muslim 
peasant, whom we saw in the same light as we 
saw our low-caste Hindu tenants, as in other 
words our livestock.54
52 See his passionate appeal to the Indian Muslims in 'In Support of 
Western education, art and science', Appendix F in Karunakaran, op.cit.
53 . . . .S.M. Ikram, Modern Muslim India and the Birth of Pakistan (Lahore:
Sh. Mohammed Ashraf, Second ed. 1970-) , pp.90-99.
54 Quoted in Sumit Sarkar, 'Hindu Muslim Relations in Swadeshi Bengal 
1903-1908', Indian Economic and Social History Review, Vol.9 (1972) , 
pp.167-168.
t
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A third development would be the migration of Muslims
from other Indian provinces into Bengal in the latter half
of the Nineteenth Century. They represented an extension
of Northern Indian Muslim ethos into Bengal, throwing into
relief certain intercommunal differences that had eroded
in Bengal over centuries but were very much alive in the
rest of India. One evidence is the sudden emergence of
'cow-sacrifice1 as a factor of dispute among the factory-
55hands in Calcutta.
A fourth factor was the Bengal Renaissance and certain 
directions that it assumed.^ It was largely expressed 
through literature, the luminaries being Henry Derozio,
Isvar Chandra Vidyasagar, Dinabandhu Mitra, Bankim Chatterjee, 
Debendranath and Rabindranath Tagore. Shahitya Shadhak  
Charitmala a collection of 102 literary figures of the 19th
and 20th centuries in Bengal includes only one Muslim, Meer
57 . . .Mosharaff Hussain. In the absence of Muslim participation,
many of these literary works were open to Muslim criticism. An
example was Bankim Chandra's Anand Math, a psuedo-historical
novel published in 1882 depicting the struggle of'Hindu patriots'
55 Dipesh Chakrabarty, op.cit., p.9.
^  Susobhan Sarkar has compared Bengal's role in the awakening of India to 
that of Italy in the European Renaissance. Bengal Renaissance and Other 
Essays (New Delhi: Peoples' Publishing House, 1970), p.3. It would be 
more correct to compare it to the English renaissance, which was literary 
in flavour (just like Bengal's) rather than the Italian counterpart, 
which concentrated on the fine arts and whose literary expression was only 
classical.
Sumit Sarkar, op.cit., p.166.57
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against 'Muslim intruders'. In the words of a later writer,
such authors 'instilled in the minds of the Muslims suspicion
and fear which subsequent events did not e r a d i c a t e
The symbols and heroes of the renaissance literature were
5 8alien to the Muslim tradition. Muslims of the day were
extremely sensitive to the treatment they received in
contemporary literature, and endeavoured to retaliate in
59their own, though minimal, literary activities.
The various economic, social and political factors gave
rise to the consciousness of the Bengali Muslim as being
distinct from the other major community in Bengal, the
Hindus. The identity of interest that appeared to exist
with their co-religionists outside Bengal in India led to
an alliance, the experiment of Pakistan, that flowed from
the Partition of the Subcontinent in 1947 which in reality
was a 'trifurcation of British India masquerading as a 
60bifurcation' .
57 T.W. Clark, 'The Role of Bankim Chandra on the Development of Nation­
alism' in C.H. Philips (ed), Historians of India, Pakistan and Ceylon 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1962), pp.439-40.
58 There was for instance adoration of heroes identified with the glories 
of Hindu history such as the Mahratta Chief Shivaji who opposed the 
orthodox Muslim Emperor Aurangzeb. B.C. Pal wrote of Shivaji: ' [He was] 
the symbol of a grand idea, the memory of a noble sentiment, the mouth 
piece of a great movement. The idea was the idea of a Hindu Rashtra 
[state] which would unite under one political bond the whole Hindu people 
united already by communities of tradition and scriptures'. Quoted in 
Nimai Sadhan Bose, The Indian Awakening and Bengal (Calcutta, 1969), p.245.
59 Ghulam Murshid, 'Coexistence in a Plural Society Under Colonial Rule: 
Hindu-Muslim Relations in Bengal 1757-1912', The Journal of Bangladesh 
Studies, Vol.l, No.l (Institute of Bangladesh Studies, University of 
Rajshahi, 1976), p.137.
60 Peter Lyon, 'Bangladesh Fashioning a Foreign Policy', South Aszan
Review (April 1972), p.231.
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III. The Pakistan Experiment
After partition, for the East Bengali Muslims the
central problem remained constant. This was the translation
of their demographic majority into political powery now
within the framework of Pakistan. From the very outset,
this proved to be a difficult task. Firstly, there was
the overriding personality of Pakistan's Karachi based
f\ 1Governor-General,Mohammed Ali Jinnah. Secondly, since 
the Central Constituent Assembly comprised entirely of 
Muslim Leaguers, all local aspirations were subordinated 
to the 'central theme of Pakistan'; also many of East Bengal's
representatives were not 'sons of the soil' but Muslim
6 2migrants from Northern India. Thirdly, in 'a society
6 3heavy reliant on its permanent bureaucracy', the East
Bengalis were disadvantaged by their minimal representation
64in the upper reaches of the Civil Service. Finally, the
A contemporary observer, Alan Campbell-Johnson, described Jinnah 
thus: 'If Jinnah's personality is cold and remote, it also has a 
magnetic quality - the sense of leadership is almost overpowering. He 
makes only themost superficial attempts to disguise himself ,as a 
constitutional Governor-General ...Here indeed is Pakistan's King-Emperor, 
Archbishop of Canterbury, Speaker and Prime Minister concentrated into 
one formidable Quaid-e-Azam [Father of the Nation]', Mission with Mount- 
batten (London: Robert Hale Ltd., Reprinted 1953), p.156.
6 2 Sisir Gupta, 'From Pakistan to Yahya Khan' in Pran Chopra (ed) , The 
Challenge of Bangladesh (New York: Humanities Press, Reprinted 1973), 
p.21.
6 3 Gunnar Myrdal, Asian Drama: An Enquiry into the Poverty of Nations, 
Three vols, Vol.2 (New York: Pantheon, 1968), p.318.
64 In 1959, out of 690 senior civil servants, only 51 were East Pakistanis. 
See Ramkrishna Mukherjee, 'The Social Background of Bangladesh' in 
Kathleen Gough and Hari P. Sharma (eds), Imperialism and Revolution in 
South Asia (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1973), p.410.
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focal point of political power, the capital (first Karachi 
and then later in the 1950s Rawalpindi-Islamabad) was located 
in West Pakistan, a thousand miles away from Eastern Bengal.
It was not, surprinsing, therefore, that the honeymoon period 
was brief.
The attempt to impose Urdu as the state language acted 
as a catalyst for East Bengali Protest, in very much the same 
way as the Partition of 1905 had done in Swadeshi Bengal.
As the Movement was brewing, a new Party, the Awami League 
was born under the aegis of Moulana Abdul Hamid Khan Bhashani. 
The Language Movement assumed significant proportions after 
police firing on students' demonstrations in Dacca on 21 
February 1952 . Anti-Muslim Le:ague feelings were running 
high. This encouraged Fazlul Huq to revive his old Krishak  
Proja  Party under the new name 'Krishak Sramik P a r t y' 
(Peasants, Workers Party), which combined with the Awami 
League as the United Front and dislodged the East Bengal 
Muslim League from the Provincial Government in the 1954 
Provincial Elections. The rejection of the Muslim League 
in East Bengal initiated a period of conflictual relations 
between the Provincial and the Central Governments.
The Provincial Governme.nt now representing the more 
indigenous urges of the East Bengalis became suspect in the
M. Rashiduzzaraan, 'The Awami League in the Political Development of 
Pakistan', Asian Survey, Vol.10, No.7 (August 1970), p.576. The Awami 
League was, therefore, the first major Opposition Party. The Communist 
Party was there but most of their following of 20,000 were members of 
the Communist Party of India and Hindus, at least two-third of whom 
migrated to India after the 1950 Communal riots. Marcus Franda, 
'Communism and Regional Politics in East Pakistan', Asian Survey,
Vol.10, No.7 (July 1970), pp.588-606.
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eyes of the Centre. Huq's coalition-cabinet was shortlived, 
soon to be dismissed by the Centre ostensibly for Huq's 
'treasonable' views.® Not long afterwards, the United Front 
disintegrated and eventually the Awami League, which had 
left the Front in 1955, emerged as the Party in power in 
East Bengal (East Pakistan since 1955). At the Centre, 
after a period of instability, the Awami Leaguer Suhrawardy 
held the Prime Ministership for a period of thirteen months 
in 1956-57.67
The Awami League, with its avowed policy of obtaining 
'autonomy' for the regional units was now caught on the
6 8horns of a dilemma, being in power in the Centre as well,
laying itself open to NAP criticism that the Party
69had failed to give autonomy to the Provinces. Provincial
autonomy became the major demand of both these parties which 
henceforth vied with each other with regard to its extent.
After a closed door meeting with the Prime Minister in Karachi Huq 
issued a statement to the Press stating that East Bengalis desired to be 
independent. New York Times, 23 May 1954.
67 .Around this time Bhashani left the Awami League m  protest against
Suhrawardy's pro-Western foreign policy and formed his own left-wing 
National Awami Party (NAP). M. Rashiduzzaman, 'The National Awami Party 
of Pakistan: Leftist Politics in Crisis', Pacific Affairs, Vol.XLIII, No.3 
(Fall 1970), p.395. Suhrawardy had justified his policies on the grounds 
that sentiments aside, 'zero plus zero equals zero', meaning Muslim states 
were insufficient to 'offset Indian power'. Wayne Wilcox, 'Pakistan', in 
Wayne Wilcox, Leo E. Rose, David Boyd (eds), Asia and the International 
System (Cambridge Mass.: Winthrop Publishers, 1972), pp.100-101.
68 Shyamoli Ghosh, 'The Awami League in East Pakistan's Political Develop­
ment' (New Delhi: Jawaharlal Nehru University, unpublished M.Phil thesis), 
p.16.
Pakistan Observer, 25 July 1957.69
The imposition of Martial Law in October 195 8 and the
assumption of power by General Ayub Khan had significant
impact in eroding the prospects of any such autonomy. If
legislative politics were allowed to run their course it
was likely that the Bengalis would have been able to achieve
power in the polity as Bengali Muslims had in pre-partition
Bengal. It was in the representative institutions where the
Bengalis with their majority could air their views. Now
in its place the Civil-Military bureaucracy clearly emerged
as the dominant Ruling Elite. The East Pakistanis with
their limited representation in this group were clearly
disadvantaged. ^
To Samuel Huntington, Ayub had come close to filling
the role of 'a Solon, or Lycurgus or Great Legislator on
71the Platonic and Rousseauan model'. Though it is indeed 
true that major reforms were initiated by the regime during 
the Martial Law period, there was unequal progress in
different regions creating an 'imbalance which inevitably
7 2 •intensified Bengali alienation'. In order to take politics
directly to the people, Ayub introduced the system of Basic
Democracy, 'the cornerstone' of his policy 'which also proved
73to be its tombstone'. Involving rural masses by superseding
70 Till 1956 there was not a single East Pakistani among the 24 Major and 
Lieutenant Generals in the Pakistan Army. Dawn (Karachi), 9 January 1956.
71 . .Quoted in Laurence Ziring, The Ayub Khan Era: Politics zn Pakistan
1958-69 (Syracuse University Press, 1971), pp.1-2.
72 . . . .Rounaq Jahan, Pakistan: Failure in National Integratzon (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1972), p.6.
73 . . .Mushtaq Ahmed, Polztics Wzthout Socval Change (Karachi: Space
Publishers, 1971), p.48.
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the cities did not appeal to the rising middle classes,
the new bhadvalok, of Dacca and Chittagong. By limiting
franchise to the Basic Democrats, which had developed into
a vested interest, Ayub ensured his return in the 1962
elections. The results in East Pakistan reflect a growing
disaffection among even the Basic Democrats there; for
although they had much to lose by dislodging Ayub, his margin
of victory in that Province was only 2,578 votes.
Ayub, who throughout his military career had been in
74favour of reducing 'provincialism' to 'the minimum',
inevitably headed for a collision course with the East
Pakistani leadership. Though the 1965 V7ar appeared to
paper over the differences, in effect, it exacerbated it.
The rising star of East Pakistan leadership, Sheikh Mujibur
Rahman (who succeeded Suhrawardy as the Awami League leader
after his death in 1963) was bitterly critical of the fact
that there had to be dependence on a foreign power, China,
for the defence of the Eastern Wing and argued for self
75sufficiency of his province in this regard. Secondly,
the closure of trade with India (especially West Bengal)
was perceived to have been detrimental to East Pakistan's
economy; it was alleged that it rendered East Pakistan
7 6a closed market for West Pakistani products. Thirdly, the
74 Mohammad Ahmad, My Chzef (Lahore: Longman's Green & Co., 1960), p.89.
75 D.N. Bannerjee, East Pakistan: A Case Study in Muslim Polities (Calcutta 
Vikas Publications, 1969), p.152
76 Interview with Dr Rafiqual Huda Chowdhury of the Bangladesh Institute 
of Development Studies, Canberra, 8 October 1979.
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West Pakistani sharp reaction to the Tashkent Declaration
of January 1966 that formally ended Indo-Pakistani hostilities
through Soviet mediation was not shared by the Bengalis who
felt that they had more to lose by the continuation of 
77belligerency. The feeling that the East Pakistanis had
a distinct set of interests intensifed and culminated in
Mujib's 'Six Point Programme' announced in Lahore in February
781966 .
The Central Government reacted by levelling charges 
of conspiracy against Mujib in what is known as the 'Agartala 
Conspiracy Case'. This led to a violent protest movement 
that obtained Mujib's release and also catapulted him to 
the position of East Pakistan's foremost political leader.
A combined movement against Ayub in both the Wings of Pakistan 
resulted in his resignation and the assumption cf his mantle 
by the Army Commander-in-Chief General Yahya Khan. Yahya 
promised elections on a 'one-man one vote' and adult franchise
77
Holiday (Dacca), 6 February 1966. Also The Economist (London),
21 May 1966.
78 Briefly, the salient features of the Six Points were demands for 
(i) a Federal Constitution and Parliamentary form of government with 
>erupremacy of Legislature directly elected on the basis of universal adult 
franchise; (ii) only two subjects, Defence and Foreign Affairs to be 
dealt with by the Centre and residuary subjects by the Provinces;
(iii) either two separate but freely convertible currencies for two wings 
or one currency to be maintained with effective constitutional provisions 
to check flight of capital from East to West Pakistan in which case 
Separate Banking Reserve to be made and separate fiscal and monetary policy 
to be adopted for East Pakistan; (iv) powers of taxation and revenue 
collection to vest in the federating units; (v) two separate accounts 
of foreign exchange earnings of the two wings, with the earnings of each 
Wing under its control with the requirements of the Centre being met either 
equally or in a ratio to be fixed; and (vi) a militia or a para-military 
force for East Pakistan. See Bangladesh Contemporary Events and documents 
(Dacca: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, u.d.), pp.16-28.
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basis to an Assembly that was to frame a new constitution 
for Pakistan. However he foreclosed the proposed Assembly's 
options by issuing a Lvgal Framework Order (LFO) that was to 
guide Constitution-making. This purported to ensure 
(a) Islamic ideology, (b) territorial integrity, (c) indepen­
dence of judiciary, (d) the federation principle, and (e) full 
opportunity for participation in government of all regions.
Also the new Constitution would have to be authenticated
79by the President. Clearly^now that the passage of power
to the demographically superior Bengalis was almost certain, 
steps were being taken to preserve West Pakistani interests. 
Mujib's Awami League considered the LFO 'restrictive' but 
nevertheless decided to participate in the forthcoming 
elections. ^
In the 19 70 elections the Awami League won 16 7 out 
of 169 East Pakistani seats in the National Assembly. In 
West Pakistan ZulfikarAli Bhutto's Pakistan Peoples Party 
(PPP) secured 85 seats, the largest number in that Wing. 
Neither Party won any seats in the other wing. Barnds points 
out that the elections demonstrated that Pakistan was 'two 
separate polities'J on the one hand there was the Awami League 
in East Pakistan with its advocacy of normalisation of 
relations with India, provincial autonomy and moderate 
socialism and on the other hand there was the PPP in the West
Rashiduzzaman, 'Awami League in the Political Dev elopment of Pakistan', 
op.cit., p.586.
Bangladesh: Contemporary Events and Documents, p.56.80
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with its manifesto of extreme socialization, a harsh anti-
81Indian policy, and a stronger Central Government.
Bhutto and Mujib fell out on the Six Points issue,
and Yahya postponed sine die the scheduled National Assembly
session on March 1 which triggered off a massive popular
Movement in East Pakistan where Mujib was in virtual control
of all sectors of public life. A well known academic at
the Dacca University wrote on Yahya's action:
Yahya's decision on March 1 to save Bhutto's 
crumbling position in the West by postponing 
the Assembly session sine die brought to the 
surface the fear that had been dormant in 
Bengal since the successful completion of 
the elections that the generals never really 
wanted to transfer power.82
Yahya initiated tripartite negotiations in Dacca between
himself, Mujib and Bhutto from 15 March 1971 which ended
83with the military crackdown in Dacca on 25 March. With
that began the War for a sovereign East Be-ngal, which was 
achieved with Indian assistance, in December that year.
While political development as analyzed above fanned 
the nationalist sentiments of the Bengalis, a deep sense 
of economic deprivation provided added fuel.
There were, firstly, complaints about the comparative 
minimal share of central government expenditure for East 
Pakistan. In spite of higher population, the East's share
81 William J. Barnds, 'Pakistan's Disintegration', Wovld Today, Vol.27, 
(1971), p.321.
8 2 Rehman Sohhan, 'Negotiations For Bangladesh: A Participant's View', 
South Asian Review, Vol.4, No.4 (July 1971), p.319.
83 For details of the negotiations, ibid., pp.315-326. Also see for 
a different view G.W. Choudhury, The Last Days of United Pakistan 
(London: C. Hurst & Co., 1974), pp.161-179.
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of central development expenditure over the First Five Year
Plan Period (1951-1955) was only 20%; there was an upward
trend in the Plans to follow but even during the Third Plan
Period (1965-1970) it did not exceed 36% with private
84investment being less than 25%.
Secondly, East Pakistan attracted only a small percentage
of the total quantum of foreign aid. For instance the bulk
85of $3 billion U.S. aid till 1969 went to the Western Wing.
Thirdly, East Pakistani economists pointed to a massive 
transfer of resources from Eastern to the Western Wing since
partition in 1947. One group suggested a figure of Rupees
8 631,120 million. A prominent Bengali economist has argued
that the rural population of East Pakistan were 'subjected
to a high rate of primitive capital accumulation which were
transferred to finance the growth of West Pakistani capitalism
87and industrialization1.
84
Reports of the Advisory Panels for the Fourth Five Year Plan 1970-1975 
(Islamabad, Planning Commission, Government of Pakistan, Vol.l, July 
1970), p.6.
85 See M.A. Sattar, 'United States Aid and Pakistan's Economic Development' 
(Unpublished Ph.D Dissertation, Tufts University 1969), passim. $ will 
indicate US$ throughout this thesis unless otherwise indicated.
Report of the Advisory Panels for the Fourth Five Year Plan, 
op.cit., p.75. Faaland and Parkinson, however, contend that this figure 
almost nearly represents the upper limit but nevertheless agree that 
the transfer was considerable. They suggest a figure between Rs.15,000m. 
and Rs.30,000m. which in terms of U.S. dollars range from US$1.5b. to 
$3b. (Just Faaland and J.R. Parkinson, Bangladesh: A Test Case for 
Development (Dacca: The University Press Ltd., 1976), pp.7-8.
8 7 Azizur Rahman Khan, The Economy of Bangladesh London: MacMillan,
1972), p.29.
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Fourthly, there was discontent regarding what was
8 8perceived to be 'internal colonialism' perpetrated in
East Pakistan by the Western wing. This was seen to assume
three principal forms: (a) utilising East Pakistan's cash
crops as the major foreign exchange earner and awarding the
province only 25-30% of the total imports; (b) 'penetration'
of 'West Pakistan based industry' to 'exploit East Pakistan's
raw material and cheap labour' and (c) use of East Pakistan
89'as a market for the mother country's manufactures'.
This feeling was current among Bengali higher officials
9 0serving the Pakistan Government.
Partha Chatterjee has argued that 'when there is 
perceptible uneven development within the political boundaries 
of a nation state' and 'the lines of division between the 
developed andbackward regions are perceived along the lines
This term connotes a process of domination and exploitation of one 
ethnic group by another within the same country. See Zillur Rahman Khan, 
'Leadership, Parties and Politics in Bangladesh', Western Political 
Quarterly, Vol.xxix (1976), p.102.
89 Feroz Ahmed, 'The Structural Matrix of the Struggle in Bangladesh , 
in Gough and Sharma (eds), Imperialism and Revolution in South Asia 
(Karachi: Monthly Review Press, 1973), p.423. .
90 A senior Civil Servant formerly of Pakistan and currently Bangladesh's 
Secretary for External Resources, M.A. Muhith, has observed: 'Through a 
system of tight control over trade a colonial relationship was established 
between the two regions. The policy of industrialization followed in 
West Pakistan demanded heavy import of capital goods, spares and industrial 
raw materials. Foreign aid as well as export earnings of the country were 
utilized to meet these demands. The products of these industries were 
marketed in Bangladesh under heavy protective cover. The export earnings 
of Bangladesh and its large market were harnessed for the development of 
West Pakistan's industries. Even-in the import of consumers' goods West 
Pakistan was given preferential treatment. By depressing consumption 
in Bangladesh and raising unduly excessive revenues from these the 
claims of Bangladesh were neutralised'. A.M.A. Muhith, Bangladesh: 
Emergence of a Nation (Dacca: Bangladesh Books International Ltd.,
1978), p.90.
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of division of the ethno-cultural communities of nationality',
91the result is 'the growth of separatist national movements'.
Michael Hechter has concluded that ethnic solidarity will
be bred in groups relegated to inferior cultural and economic 
. . 9 2positions. That has been the case with the growth of
Muslim Bengali Nationalism, through the colonial period
and the Pakistan experiment, springing from a 'sense of
alienation ... aggravated and strengthened by awareness
of economic differences but with its root in political and
9 3cultural discontinuities'. As the 1960s drew to a close
the new Bengali middle class were 'ready and willing to
accept the newly fashioned ... materially more relevant
asocial philosophy of modern secular, territorial nationalism
94bred on language and culture'.
IV. Conclusion
Historically, then, what is now the Bangladesh nation 
has had to deal with two other major communities in South 
Asia, the West Bengali Hindus under bhadralok leadership and
Partha Chatterjee, 'Stability and Change in the Indian Political System' 
(Calcutta: Center for Studies in Social Sciences, unpublished), p.8.
92 . . .Michael Hechter, Internal Colonialsim: The Celtic Fringe in British
National Development 1536-1966 (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975),
passim.
9 3 W.H. Morris-Jones, ' Pa Kv'bts'n Post-fAoi ttVT\ and the Roots of Bangladesh',
The Political Quarterly, Vol.43, No.2 (1972), p.192.
94 Mizanur Rahman, Emergence of a New Nation in a Multi-polar World: 
Bangladesh (Durham, North Caroline: University Press of America, 1978), 
p.132.
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their fellow Muslims in the rest of South Asia, the latter 
eventually assuming the form of Pakistan. After experience 
had indicated a distinct set of interests for them, their 
basic strategy in countering threat perception from one was 
to to seek an alliance with the other. It was in other 
words the principle of balance in a three-body system. This 
traditional behaviour has considerable role in conditioning 
their external attitudes after they became a sovereign 
international actor in their own right.
There were certain differences, however. In 1971 this 
balance was no longer one of a three-body system but that 
of a many body system. From the backyard of the Subcontinent, 
Bangladesh was cast out into the world beyond. But this 
behavioural inheritance, i.e. attempting to counteract 
potential source of threat by building external linkages, 
was too deeply rooted in their past • ethos to be easily 
shaken.
Secondly, the two essential attributes that distinguish 
the Bangladeshis from the major regional communities are a 
combination of their Muslimness and B engaliness . Both have 
relevant linkages in the region. These are invoked when one 
or the other attribute is threatened. That is,when their 
'Muslimness' is threatened,linkages with the Muslims of the 
rest of the Subcontinent are invoked and the Muslim character 
of the Bengali Muslim is emphasized. When their Bengaliness  
is threatened, there is a tendency to relate to the Hindu 
Bengalis and this linguistic attribute is underlined. This 
behavioural tradition also formed a part of the political 
heritage of the Bengali Muslims, and consequently of Bangladesh.
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INTRA-REGIONAL RELATIONS:
INDIA AND PAKISTAN
I . Introduction
As discussed earlier, these three countries, Bangladesh,
India and Pakistan, form the regional 'core' of the sub-
1continent. Their continuous interactions have bred cooper-
»
ation and conflict, and each is a significant factor in the 
external expression of the other. For Bangladesh this 'core' 
is the inner circle that largely determines her interactions 
with the 'outer areas' of her globe. This chapter will
concern itself with Bangladesh's relations with the two other
2actors of this regional -corral,, India and Pakistan.
II. India
A. India's role during the Bangladesh war:
India's role during the 1971 war was of prime importance 
to Bangladesh for three broad reasons: first of all, it 
largely helped the very emergence of the new state; secondly, 
it determined the initial international alignments of the 
new state actor and thirdly, the interactions between the
CHAPTER 3
See Chapter I ,
2 A similar concept of an 'Inner Area of Concentration' and 'Outer Area' 
found expression in a detailed appraisal of Britain's diplomatic universe 
undertaken in 1968-69, the so-called 'Duncan Report'. Sir Val Duncan,
Report of the Review Committee on Overseas Representation 1968-1969 
(HMSO, 1969), p.12.
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Government of India and the Bangladesh Provisional Government 
provided the Bangladeshis their first exercise in international 
relations.
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's policy towards the 
political agitation in East Pakistan clamouring for autonomy 
(swadhikar) was of utmost circumspection even before Yahya's 
military crackdown of March 25, 1971. There were three main 
reasons for this. Firstly, an intervention on behalf of a 
secessionist movement would be unpopular with other members 
of the International States System and would certainly be 
construed as a gross interference in the affairs of another 
country. Secondly, there was always the possibility that 
the leaderships of East and West Pakistan might indeed arrive 
at a rapprochement during the Yahya-Mujib-Bhutto tripartite 
talks that would make any Indian interference look somewhat 
foolish. At one stage it seemed that Mujib would emerge 
as the Prime Minister of all-Pakistan, which would be very 
welcome to India and Mrs Gandhi saw no reason to embarass 
Mujib at this stage by openly appearing to support him, 
which would only give credibility to the growing feeling 
in West Pakistani quarters that Mujib was an 'Indian Agent'. 
Thirdly, any encouragement to the incipient secessionist 
movement (or even 'autonomy') in East Pakistan could create 
difficulties for the Central Government, in New Delhi 
vis-a-vis such Indian states as West Bengal, Mizoram and 
Hariyana where some degree of separatist tendencies were 
latent.
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This caution was evident when India, though aware of 
the large movements of Pakistani troops into East Pakistan, 
made no attempt to forestall it either by initiating some 
sort of tension along the West Pakistani borders which would 
render the release of troops from West Pakistan difficult, 
or by giving Pakistani troop movements wide publicity to 
draw international opprobium.
Of necessity, therefore, the Indian strategies that 
evolved in 1971 were extremely complex. Broadly^two phases 
can be marked off: one was at the outset when a political 
settlement was considered desirable, and military action on 
India's part to force a settlement, an alternative option.
The second phase was roughly from August onwards, when the 
alternative option gained increasing salience, transforming 
itself into the principal strategy.
The political settlement, considered during the first
phase could consist of any of the wide variety of statuses
for the eastern wing of Pakistan between 'autonomy' and
'independence' that was acceptable to the elected Awami
League leadership. Indian Foreign Minister Swaran Singh
told the Lower House (Lok Sabha) of the Indian Parliament
on 2 8 March:
We naturally wish and hope that even at this 
late stage it would be possible to resume 
democratic processes leading to the fulfilment 
of the vast majority of the people there.^
Asian Recorder (May 14-20, 1971), p.10158.3
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While hoping for a settlement at this stage, the prospect 
of military intervention as an alternative was not ruled out. 
Mrs Gandhi issued formal directives in April to t^e Army Chief 
General S.H.F.J. Maneckshaw^to prepare for the eventuality 
of war. Maneckshaw was told if the Government's efforts to 
find a peaceful solution did not succeed, the armed forces 
would be ordered to achieve 'specific objectives of opening 
the door to the return of the refugees', and because of the 
international public pressure that India was likely to invite 
upon herself if she intervened, the A m y  could be given only
4'three to four weeks' to achieve those ends.
With the passage of time the option of military inter­
vention came to the fore and the desire to seek some sort of 
political settlement receded to the background. This took 
place around August when it was clear that Yahya's version 
of a political settlement involved Bengali 'collaborators' 
and obscurantists, something that was far from satisfactory 
to India, for it would not result in the return of the Hindu 
refugees. It would be a mistake to assume that Mrs Gandhi 
herself was transformed over time from a 'dove' to a 'hawk'.
At no stage was she either one or the other. Various options 
were being simultaneously considered by her, their pros and 
cons being continuously weighed. At the outset she moved 
a resolution that the Parliament unanimously passed. It 
said that
the House records its profound conviction 
that the historic upsurge of the 76 million 
people of East Bengal will triumph. The
4 Krishan Bhatia, Indira: A Biography of the Prime Minister Gandhi 
(London: Angus and Robertson, 1974), p.243.
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House wishes to assure tham that their 
struggle and sacrifices will receive the 
wholehearted sym and support of the
people of India.
It was still East Bengal rather than Bangladesh and she 
subtly avoided declaring support from the Government of
Pressure for formal recognition of Bangladesh came from
the provisional Government in-exile set up by the Awami
6League leaders. Such calls were also forthcoming from 
West Bengali leaders as Pranab Mukherjee M.P., Secretary 
of the Bangla Congress and Tridib Chaudhuri M.P., General
7Secretary of the Revolutionary Socialist Party of India.
A strike was observed in West Bengal on March 31 to express
8popular solidarity with the Bangladesh Movement. Mrs G^ nglhi: app­
eared to take the position that Indian recognition might 
hurt the Bangladeshi cause by seeming to substantiate the 
Pakistani allegations that the struggle was engineered by
9India and was being kept alive with Indian assistance.
The eventual option for Indian military intervention 
was influenced by certain factors. Firstly, there was 
tremendous economic pressure on New Delhi. The refugee
5
The Times (London), 1 April 1974.
6 In a letter dated 24 April 1971, the Acting President of the Provisional 
Government Syed Nazrul Islam requested the Indian President V.V. Giri 
that immediate recognition be given and envoys be exchanged. Indira 
Gandhi, India and Bangladesh: Selected Speeches and Statements, March 
to December 1971 (New Delhi: Orient Longman's 1972), p.180.
7
Tzmes of Indta, 28 March 1971.
8
Guardian (Rangoon), 2 April 1971.
9 Sydney H. Scanberg, 'India's Position is Wait and See on Recognition of 
Bangladesh', New York Times, 8 May 1971.
India.
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exodus into India that followed Yahya's crackdown threatened 
to stunt her economic development. The number of refugees 
were expected to swell to nine million by December and 
expenditure on this count in Fiscal Year 1971-72 was stipulated 
at US$700m. Foreign donors pledged only US$200 m. and even 
if this was entirely met, the Indian burden would remain 
at US$500m. The total Aid to India club commitment for 
that year was likely to be $lb. , of which $600m. was expected 
to be used for amortization and debt repayment. The balance, 
$400m. was obviously not enough to cover the refugee bill, 
and a large call on internal resources was anticipated.^^
Secondly, as the Civil War raged unabated, it was feared 
that the hold of the moderate pro-Indian Awami League would 
slacken and Maoists and left-wingers would gain ground, forging 
an alignment between extremist Bangladeshis and pro-Peking 
West Bengal e l e m e n t s . S u c h  developments were likely to 
have adverse effects from New Delhi's point of view and 
needed to be nipped in the bud. This called for intervention 
in favour of the Awami League before its grip on the Movement 
weakened.
Thirdly, by the autumn of 1971 it was becoming increas­
ingly clear that the U.S. and China, particularly the former, 
was urging Yahya to seek a solution to the East Bengal problem.
^New York Times, 16 September 1971.
11The Times (London), 26 April 1971. Also, 5 May 1971.
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Nixon had managed to establish links in India with certain
1 2exiled Awami League leaders. Yahya was already holding 
out the olive branch to acceptable sections of the Awami 
League. It was not unlikely that some sort of Bangladesh 
could emerge, under Sino-American auspices, which would serve 
their interests but would be contrary to India's. Such a 
political solution would be unacceptable to the Hindu refugees
who would remain a burden on India. It was therefore
13necessary to arrest this development by intervening.
Fourthly, the influx of refugees portended a threat 
to certain delicate balances in the Indian polity. Most 
of the refugees were Hindus, so as they poured into the 
Indian state of West Bengal, they upset the demographic 
balance of some of the Muslim-majority West Bengali border 
districts, increasing the likelihood of communal tensions 
there. Also since the refugees were Bengali-speaking, those 
who went to the states of Meghalaya and Assam threatened 
to heighten the dormant Bengal-Assamese conflict in those 
areas. In fact, Shillong, the capital of Meghalaya, observed 
a 12-hour General Strike on 9th June, in response to a call
given by the Tribal Youth Welfare Association to protest
14against Bangladeshi refugee presence m  that region.
12 . . . .Richard M. Nixon, U.S. Forezgn Policy for the 1970's: The Emergzng
Structure of Peace, A Report to the Congress, February 9, 1972, p.145.
13 . . .This point is elaborated in G.S. Bhargava's Indian Security vn the 1960s
(Adelphi Papers No.125). He argues that if East Bengali commandos remained 
in India they could pose a security threat to her. To him, the emergence 
of Bangladesh was not itself a security gain for India except in the 
marginal sense that sanctuaries for Mizos and other rebel tribes in the 
North-East would no longer be available (p.11).
14 Times of India, 10 June 1971.
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It was clear, therefore, that the refugees had to go back;
and they could only go back to an independent Bangladesh
achieved under Indian aegis.
Fifthly, there was growing pressure to act from the
general Indian community which a popular-based Government
could hardly afford to ignore. Almost without exception
all other political parties wanted Mrs Gandhi to extend
moral and material support to the Liberation Front and accord
15Bangladesh recognition. The Central Executive Committee
of the Communist Party of India regretted New Delhi's future
to 'discharge the responsibility in due measure to support
the freedom struggle in Bangladesh1."^ Demand for recognition
came from such varied quarters as Indrajit Gupta, the pro-
Soviet Communist leader ,^ -7 A.B. Vajpayee of the Hindu
Nationalist Jana Sangh P a r t y , P . C .  Chunder, President of
19the West Bengal Parliamentary Congress Committee, and
20Dinesh Singh, former External Affairs Minister. In fact, 
within Mrs Gandhi's own cabinet a 'hawkish' strain emerged.
A study of public statements shows that while Foreign Minister
 ^ One opposing voice was that of M.R. Masani, the Swatantra Party leader 
who commended Mrs Gandhi's 'policy of caution' and said that India 
should not be the first country to recognise Bangladesh, for 'besides 
the authority of the West Pakistan Government, what other authority 
is there in Bangladesh to recognise?' Times of India, 19 May 1971,
16ibid., 7 July 1971.
17Peter Hazelhurst, 'Mrs Gandhi refuses Bangladesh Recognition',
The Times (London), 8 May 1971.
18.ibid.
19 .
Tzmes of Indva, 16 May 1971.
2°ibid., 26 May 1971.
Swaran Singh toed the cautious line, Defence Minister .
21Jagjivan Ram pressed for early action.
Sixthly, there was the tremendous psychological satis­
faction in being able to hit that implacable enemy, Pakistan, 
where it hurt most, especially when from the debris of this 
enemy's defeat, a friendly neighbour would emerge. In New 
Delhi's calculation if the Movement came to fruition it
would negate the religion-based ideology of Pakistan and
2 2bolster the secular Indian ethos.
Seventhly, a research report from the prestigious 
Indian Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses, prepared 
by its Director, K. Subrahmanyam, urged that India would be 
well-advised to go to war. The Report, entitled, 'Bangladesh 
and India's National Security - the Options for India', 
suggested that India carve out a segment of East Bengal,
21The Swaran Singh line was clearly expressed in his forthcoming Rajya 
Sabha (Upper House) statement: 'If at any stage we feel that recognition 
is necessary, we will not hesitate to do so ... There are certain norms 
which have to be carefully weighed such as the extent of territory 
controlled by the quantum of support, the extent of writ, and the 
repercussion of recognising a country which was till now a part of 
Pakistan'; Times of India, 26 May 1971. As late as October, Singh 
argued at the All-India Congress Committee that the political solution 
of the Bangladesh issue which India had been advocating could take the 
form of a settlement within the framework of Pakistan, or an independent 
Bangladesh or a greater autonomy for the region. Times of India, 9 October 
1971. This was long after exiled Awami League leaders had publicly 
totally rejected as unacceptable anything less than independence.
Jagjivan Ram, on the other hand, held that it was true India was in favour 
of a political solution, but what this solution should be had already been 
spelt out by the elected representatives of Bangladesh, who had opted 
unequivocally for independence and sovereignty, Times of India, 10 October 
1971. Mrs Gandhi, who was earlier sympathetic to the Swaran Singh line 
and was gradually drawn towards Ram's over time, found it necessary to 
retract Singh's AICC statement saying that what Singh meant was if the 
Awami League leaders agreed to remain within the framework of Pakistan, 
the Indian Government would have no objection, Times of India, 14 October 
1971.
22 See Ajit Bhattacharya, 'Fumbling for a Policy: India and Bangladesh',
Times of India, 17 July 1971.
vest it with the attributes of de facto and de jure  
independence, relocate the refugees there, and attempt to 
win for it international recognition. The newly established 
state of Bangladesh could be thus made a recognised party 
to the dispute without whose approval no cease-fire could 
be agreed upon and which would not approve such cease-fire 
till all the objectives were attained. The Report argued 
that the chances of Chinese intervention were minimal. Even 
if China doubled her force strength of 100,000 that she 
retained in Tibet, the mountain passes would pose acute 
deployment problems, especially against the superior well- 
armed Indian presence in the region. If Chinese incursions
did take place in spite of these odds, they could hardly 
stay for long as Winter was forthcoming when snowed-in 
passes would render withdrawal impossible. Considering the 
limited Chinese stake in this issue, the report concluded 
that it would not be militarily meaningful for them to
intervene. Without Chinese intervention, the Indian military
n 2 3position vis-a-vis Pakistan was vastly superior.
Finally, what may have clinched the decision in favour 
of Indian military action was the evaporation of the hope 
that the international community would bring to bear pressure 
on Yahya for an acceptable settlement. In May Mrs Gandhi 
said she wanted the International Community to realise that 
what had begun as Pakistan's internal problem was gradually 
becoming an internal problem for India.^4 she wondered why
23Peter Hazelhurst, 'Shadow of War on the Indian Subcontinent', The 
Times (London), 13 July 1971.
24 . „
Tzmes of Indva, 19 May 1971.
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help was not forthcoming from the richer nations. At the
Lok Sabha she regretted that the Western countries, who had
allegedly fought the Second World War 'to save Democracy',
were not responding now when democracy was 'so flagrantly
25and so brutally being destroyed'. She was very critical 
of U.N. Secretary General U Thant's offer in July for the 
placing of observers on both sides of the border. She argued 
that in the first place it tended to equate India and Pakistan, 
implying part Indian responsibility for the crisis and 
secondly, it would support the Pakistani projection that
26the issue was a bilateral one between the two countries.
Mrs Gandhi was now convinced neither the world community 
nor the U.N. could be counted on, and India needed to act 
by herself.
The decision could not be acted upon at once. The 
Indian Armed Forces needed three to four months to make 
necessary preparations. Moreover the appropriate time to 
act would be winter when the Monsoons would not bog down the 
invading forces and the Northern passes would remain snowed-in 
reducing the probability of Chinese intervention. Mrs Gandhi 
had now some time to concentrate on politics, whose extension 
the forthcoming war was likely to be. She now had two major 
objectives: one was seeking a superpower deterrence to 
potential Chinese or American (or a combination of both)
25Indira Gandhi, op.cit., p.20.
26Peter Hazelhurst, 'Indian Anger at the U.N. Observer Plan for Both 
Sides of the Border', The Times (London), 27 July 1971.
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resistance to Indian plans and the second was the building 
up of favourable international public opinion to dilute 
as much as possible adverse reaction to future Indian 
intervention.
As to the first, the Sino-American rapprochement boded
ill for India. Concern was evident in Swaran Singh's
statement that India could not 'view it with equanamity if
it means the domination of the two superpowers over the region
27or a tacit agreement between them to this effect'. The
Soviet Union was the only possible counter to any potential
Sino-American entente. As yet the USSR had an ambivalent
attitude towards the South Asian Crisis. Mrs Gandhi calculated
that the best way to win Moscow over was to sign the Treaty
of Friendship and Cooperation which had been under discussion
for' two years now. She knew her offer to do so would be too
tempting for Moscow to resist.
The Treaty was thus signed in August. Indo-Soviet
consultations were held in terms of the Treaty thus signalling
to Peking and Washington that both signatories took the
Treaty seriously. The fact that in private the Soviets
2 8advocated 'restraint' did not matter so long as the world 
read into the pact a firm commitment to India's security 
by the Soviet Union. Though New Delhi had very nearly ruled 
out by this time the possibility of serious Chinese military
27The Times (London), 21 July 1971. 
2®See Chapter 4.
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intervention, especially in winter when the Indian initiatives 
were scheduled, the Indo-Soviet Pact was meant to be a 
reassurance.
The second objective of creating a favourable international 
public opinion was being simultaneously pursued. The means 
employed were the holding of seminars and conferences, and 
visits abroad by Indian leaders. The Gandhi Peace Foundation 
organised a three-day international seminar in New Delhi in 
September, attended by 60 unofficial delegates from 26 
countries. Memories of the Spanish Civil War were rekindled 
by such suggestions as the formation of an International 
Brigade and the staging of an international March to 
Islamabad.
As an additional public relations project, Mrs Gandhi 
undertook in October-November a three-week tour of Belgium, 
Australia, the U.K., the U.S.A., France and the Federal 
Republic of Germany. In her own words, she undertook this 
journey 'to leave nothing unexplored which might lead to an 
easing of the burden imposed upon us and to discourage those 
who are bent upon excuses to threaten our security'
The visits were only partially successful: firstly, 
because of her recent rejection of the U.N. offer and secondly 
because it was now clear that the solution acceptable to 
her implied the dismemberment of a recognised international 
State Actor, the leaders of the world seemed to shy away
29 .
Aszan. Recorder (October 8-14, 1971), pp.10396-7.
30 Indira Gandhi, op.cit., p.59.
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from the Indian point of view. Her dissatisfacttion was
evident, for on her return she said:
I must make it clear that we cannot depend 
on the international community, or even the 
countries which I visited to solve our 
problems for us. We appreciate their sympathy 
and moral and political support, but the 
brunt of the burden has to be borne by us 
and by the people o f  Bangladesh
There was some success, however. For instance though 
her personal relations with Nixon marked no improvement,^ 
she was probably able to take a reading of the attitudinal 
division in the American community on the South Asian crisis.
The Indian attempt was to deepen this division. The idea 
was to neutralise the strength of the U.S. Administration 
to militarily commit itself on the Pakistani side when the 
actual conflict occurred.
Sensing his deep danger Yahya mellowed and on 19 November
in his greetings to Mrs Gandhi on the Muslim festival of
3 3Eid, appealed for the easing of tensions. But New Delhi
34rejected the overture as the offer of a 'denuded olive branch'. 
For Mrs Gandhi it was too late to stem the tide of the urge 
towards the ultimate denouement. Her Armed Forces were ready 
awaiting the Green Signal. The entire nation was poised for 
action. The Provisional Bangladesh Government was getting
31 ibid., p.105. 'East Bengal' had now been replaced by 'Bangladesh' 
in her formal speeches.
32 Interview with Mrs Gandhi, New Delhi, 30 April 1978.
33Yahya's message read: 'India and Pakistan have long frittered away 
their energeis and resources arming each other, resources which should 
have been used to reap the real fruits of independence for our two people'. 
The Times (London), 20 November 1971.
Age (Melbourne), 22 November 1971.
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increasingly restive. Soon after the midnight of December 3,
Mrs Gandhi ordered troops into Pakistan's eastern wing
claiming that the Pakistan Air Force had already struck.^
Thus ensued the War that was to end in the emergence of
36Bangladesh on 16 December.
The big question remains: what sort of impact did the 
Indian policies throughout the unfolding crisis have on 
the Bangladeshi leadership? This is of cardinal importance 
as it has considerable bearing on future Indo-Bangladesh 
relations. Needless to say, the exiled leaders were all 
profoundly grateful to the Indian authorities for according 
them refuge, and letting them organise the government-in-exile, 
before India was able to formalise her attitude towards this 
problem. The Awami League leaders were, however, anxious 
to obtain formal Indian recognition, as evidenced by Acting
President Nazrul Islam's letter to the Indian President on
3 724 April 1971. Even when the main conflict seemed imminent 
and recognition was still being withheld, on 4 December
Indira Gandhi, op.cit., p.128.
36 War had become inevitable by early December because by now Pakistan too, 
was eager to broaden the conflict, primarily for two reasons: firstly, 
a full-scale bilateral War between India and Pakistan would attract inter­
national intervention, necessary for Pakistan because even without the 
War, the Pakistani troops were being badly mauled by the Mukti Bahini 
(Liberation Forces). Pakistan hoped that the outbreak of War would force 
on both parties a Cease Fire after which the Mukti Bdhini could hardly 
carry out their guerilla activities without international approbation. 
Secondly, by December there had already been considerable fighting 
involving both ground and aerial troops in the Eastern Sector. The 
Pakistanis, therefore, saw no reason not to extend the fighting to where 
they were comparatively stronger than in the East, i.e. in the Western 
Sector.
37 See f.n.6 ante.
Nazrul Islam and the Provisional Prime Minister Tajuddin
3 8Ahmed pressed again. Recognition finally came on 6 December.
However it does not appear that the Indian reluctance to
accord the Provisional Government formal recognition had any
substantial adverse impact on their mutual interactions.
In fact once the Indian decision to intervene had come
to the fore, there were numerous contacts at high levels
between the exiled leaders and Indian authorities. In
September the Indian Foreign Secretary T.N. Kaul visited
Calcutta to brief Bangladeshi leaders. D.P. Dhar, Mrs Gandhi's
close confidant, continued the liaison. Shortly after Dhar's
visit, three emissaries of the Provisional Government went
to New Delhi and attended meetings at the External Affairs 
39 .Ministry. Tajuddin Ahmed, who had earlier welcomed the
40Indo-Soviet Treaty had close personal relationship with
Indian leaders. Not all Awami Leaguers shared this close
rapport with the Indians. When Nixon made his contacts
41with some Awami League hierarchs, in particular Mushtaq 
Ahmed, the latter came to be viewed as veering close to the 
U.S. which might have been the reason for his removal from 
the Foreign Ministership immediately after Bangladesh's 
independence. Therefore it appears that by the concluding
38 Indira Gandhi, op.cit., p.193.
39 The three emissaries were Abdus Samed Azad (future Foreign Minister of 
Bangladesh) and two senior Bengali diplomats Abul Fateh and Mahbub Alam 
Chashi. Times of India, 8 September 1971.
40 ibid., 2 September 1971.
^ S e e  Laurence Lifschultz, Bangladesh: The Unfinished Revolution 
(London: Zed Press, 1979), p.115.
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phases of the Struggle, opinion among the Awami Leaguers 
vts-a-vzs India had dichotomised, though by and large a 
majority were sympathetic to New Delhi.
The bureaucrats of the Bangladesh Foreign Office set
up in Calcutta seem to have attempted a very cool assessment
of the Indian position. A Position Paper circulated in the
Office read, and is worth quoting at length:
India's support for Bangladesh basically 
comes out of her negative approach towards 
Pakistan. For political, historical, and 
economic reasons, India desires to weaken 
Pakistan, both West and East. It is not 
for her love of democracy or sense of 
brotherhood of the people of Bangladesh 
that India wants to uphold the cause of the 
liberation struggle of our people. The whole 
thing has a deep political motive...4
Another similar document warned:
[After independence] we may resign ourselves 
to a period of Indian influence but we must 
try to minimise it as much as possible. In 
this way the interest of both Bangladesh and 
India would be served.43
It appears, therefore, that Bangladeshi bureaucrats 
in exile, who were destined to play a key role in the shaping 
of their policies in the post-independence period were 
dispassionately calculating Indian actions as arising from 
their own-self interest rather than from any nobler motives.
Segments of the Bangladesh Armed Forces and Mukti Bahini
4 4 •were unhappy with the overall Indian strategy. This is
42 'Position Paper: Crisis of Bangladesh Movement1 (Calcutta), 23 September 
1971. This and some other similar papers, which were not official documents 
in any way but individual memos being circulated were handed to me as 
Private Collections of some of the participants in the Bangaldesh Movement.
43Position Paper: 'An Analysis of Indian Plans on Bangladesh', No.4/2 
Reference Coll (Calcutta), 2 October 1971.
44Laurence Lifscheltz, op.cit., p.1395.
partly evidenced by the fact that the Bangladesh Army Chief
Colonel (later General) M.A.G. Osmany was absent at the
ceremony when the Pakistanis formally surrendered in Dacca
on 16 December, even though the surrender was technically
made to the Allied Command.4^
The Indian authorities were unable to win over the
various shades of left-wing Bangladeshi political leadership,
except of course the moderate pro-Soviet Muzaffar NAP.
Moulana Bhashani, who had also sought refuge in India and
accorded strong support to the Movement had his freedom
4 6restricted. There were allegations that left-wing youths
were screened prior to being accepted as members of the
Mukti Bahini to weed out possible pro-Peking elements, or
even sympathisers of Bhashani NAP.47 On their part the
pro-Chinese left in East Pakistan were opposed to the Indian
4 8involvement from the very outset.
While the Indian decision to intervene had gratified
49a majority of the Awami League hierarchs (though it did
not come about without some promptings from the latter) some
5 0sections of the Awami League itself were not pleased.
45 The highest ranking military officer from the Bangladesh Forces present 
at the Ceremony was Group Captain (later Air Vice-Marshal) A.K. Khandker, 
who was to become the Chief of Staff of the Bangladesh Air Force.
46 • 0 0 0Ishtiaq Hossain, India and the War of Liberation in Bangladesh (Dacca:
Forum for International Affairs, August 1978), p.8.
47 .Discussions with Mr Rashed Khan Menon (now M.P.), London, 20 October 1978.
48Badruddin Omar, 1India-Bangladesh Relations', Holiday, Weekly (Dacca),
28 August 1972.
49E.g. Syed Nazrul Islam and Tajuddin Ahmed.
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E.g. Khandkar Mushtaq Ahmed.
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Even at that early stage important sections of the left-wing 
parties, the Mukti B a h i n i, and the Bengali bureaucracy were 
taking a dim view of Indian actions. While the Indian 
authorities invested heavily in some senior Awami Leaguers, 
they failed to win over other important elements. Though 
New Delhi was able to ensure a friendly Government initially 
in Bangladesh by assisting its allies within the Awami League 
to power, it left room for potential strains in case of any 
change of government in Dacca, and a future salience of any 
one or a combination of, the opposing, alienated elements.
B . Politics of Euphoria:
Even prior to the actual emergence of Bangaldesh on
16 December 1971, it was apparent that India would lend the 
future Government of Bangladesh a helping hand. It was 
announced that a number of senior Indian civil officers would
be seconded to Bangladesh and Orissa State Government in
51fact named three such civil servants. Immediately after
the Pakistani surrender India and Bangladesh pooled their
administrative resources to jointly work out a plan for
disarming and reorganising the guerillas as soon as possible.
India was, not surprisingly, the first foreign country
to host the Bangladesh Foreign Minister Abdus Samad Azad.
At the New Delhi Airport upon arrival he said, signalling
that the euphoric relations were well under way:
The Frontiers between the independent 
sovereign People's Republic of Bangladesh 
and India are just healed scars of the
51 The Times (London), 11 December 1971.
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events of 19 47 and there do not exist any 
frontiers on the hearts of the people of 52 
Bangladesh and the great people of India.
If the Bangladeshi leader Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (on his way
back from Pakistani prison via London) displayed a modicum
of caution by declining the offer of an Indian Airliner to
carry him home to Bangladesh after his release and choosing
5 3a British aircraft instead, it seemed to evaporate entirely 
when on his brief stop-over at New Delhi he described the 
'people of India' as 'the best friend of[his]country', and
5 4Mrs Gandhi, as 'not only a leader of men, but also of mankind'.
During his first official visit to India in February,
Mujib saw 'the friendship between India and Bangladesh as
everlasting' and that 'no power on earth will be able to make
55any crack in this friendship'. Two important decisions
emerged from Mujib's discussions with Indira Gandhi: one,
the withdrawal of the Indian Armed Forces was to be complete
by 25 March 197 2, and the other that trade between their two
countries should take place on state-to-state basis as far
5 6as possible. Both these decisions reflected a concern of
5 2 .
Tzmes of Indva, 6 January 1972.
53 Mu]ib was reported to have said that he owed too much to India and 
therefore it was advisable to strive for some balance. See Far Eastern 
Economic Review, 22 January 1972, p.5. The former Bangladesh Foreign 
Minister Kamal Hossain, who travelled with Mujib on the same aircraft said 
that the choice of aircraft was not deliberate and since they were anxious 
to get home from London soon, they took whatever was made available earlier, 
which was the British plane. Interview with Kamal Hossain, Oxford,
15 October 1979.
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Bangladesh. Documents, vol. I, No. I (Dacca: External Publicity Division, 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1972), p.2.
55 ;Address at a Public Meeting at Brigade Parade Ground, Calcutta on
6 February 1972. 1Banglabandhu Speaks: A Collection of Speeches and 
Statements Made By Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (Dacca: External Publicity 
Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs) n.d., p.33.
Bangladesh Documents, op.cit., p.6.
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the leaders lest there be criticism of the Indian troops over­
staying their welcome, or that of private Indian tradesmen 
exploiting their Bangladeshi counterparts. Such bilateral 
issues as the Indian construction of a barrage at Farakka 
to divert the water of the Ganges - a dispute dating back 
to the Pakistan era - assumed a low profile, and the announce­
ment simply said that Farakka and other problems relating 
to the development of water and power resources were discussed
The Indians decided to update the target date of troop 
withdrawals from 25 March to 12 March. This decision followed 
a visit to Dacca by the Indian Defence Secretary, K.B. Lall, 
in late February.58 Two considerations seemed to have weighed 
in favour of this decision: first, Lall may have detected 
a slight anxiety on the part of Bangladesh officials regarding 
the decline in the popularity of stationed Indian troops 
and secondly, it was thought politic that no Indian troops 
be present on Bangladeshi soil when Mrs Gandhi returned 
Mujib's visit on 17 March.59
Mrs Gandhi received a tumultuous reception when she 
arrived in Dacca for the visit in the course of which two
57 ibid.
58 Times of India, 2 March 1972.
59 Western sources however said that elements of two battalions of the
5 7th Division of the Indian Army began returning on March 16, and were 
soon participating in combing operations in the Chittagong Hill Tracts 
Region to weed out Indian Mizo rebels, sheltered and trained there by 
the Pakistan as well as the remnants of Pakistani paramilitary forces.
New York Times, 21 March 1972. India was reluctant to publicise this, 
firstly because continued Indian presence might be unpopular with some 
Bangladeshis and secondly, some countries, particularly the U.S. and 
China had made their recognition of Bangladesh contingent upon the 
withdrawal of Indian troops.
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important documents were signed. One was the Joint Declar­
ation of the Prime Ministers signed on 19 March. Three 
points in this were worth noting. First the decisions 
regarding the trials of Pakistani prisoners-of-war 'in 
accordance with international law'. Mujib apprised Gandhi, 
of the 'steps being taken' by his government 'to expedite 
the trials' and in return Gandhi assured cooperation. This 
was ample signal to her 'that Mujib gave the matter priority. 
Secondly, it was decided to establish a Joint Rivers Commission 
comprising experts of both countries on a permanent basis to 
carry out a comprehensive survey of the river systems of both 
countries,and, formulate and implement flow control projects. 
Farakka had not yet surfaced as an issue. Thirdly, the 
principles of Border and Transit Trade were approved and it
was stated that a Trade Agreement should be signed before 
60March.
The second document was 'The Treaty of Friendship,
Cooperation and Peace', whose operating clauses harkened
to the 1971 Indo-Soviet Treaty. Both parties agreed not to
enter into any military alliance directed against the other.
They were not to allow their respective territories to be
used in a manner constituting threat to each other's security.
Mutual consultations were to be held if either party was
61attacked or was 'threatened with attack'.
60 See Joint Declaration of Prime Ministers of India and Bangladesh on 
19 March 1972 at Dacca Bangladesh Documents, Vol.I, No.2 (Dacca:
External Publicity Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs), pp.5-7.
ibid.61
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Article 2 of the Treaty stipulated that 'The Parties 
shall cooperate with other s t a t e s ' in rendering support to 
the struggle against colonialism, racialism, and for national 
liberation. The expression 'other states' may have been a 
reference to the Soviet Union and her allies. This Treaty, 
then, not only formalised relations between India and 
Bangladesh but also to some extent drew the new State close to 
the Indo-Soviet Orbit. At the same time the Treaty also under­
lined Bangladesh's sovereign status in being treated as an 
equal by the Indians. In any case the Treaty was the high 
water mark of Indo-Bangladesh amity. Few doubted that there 
could be any breach in Indo-Bangla friendship. In the words 
of one analyst:
Aside from the long term treaty of friendship 
with India which India and Bangladesh have 
signed, it is manifest that Bangladesh will 
continue to rely on India for economic and 
defence purposes for several years to come.
Only developments of a radical nature, which 
might place anti-Indian leadership in power 
nad which drew its strength from the sources 
outside the nation's borders, could jeopardise 
the present friendship between the two countries. 
Current leadership in both countries was deter­
mined to prevent this from h a p p e n i n g . 6 2
C . Seeds of Discontent:
(i) Economic : The fact that the Joint Declaration 
emphasised that the Trade Agreement should be signed by the
r nend of March, gave ample indications that political
6 2 Sundershan Chaula, 'Indian Foreign Policy: Developing a New Role in 
World Affairs' in Peter Jones (ed) , Vol.I, The International Yearbook of 
Foreign Policy Analysis (London: Croom Helm, 1974), p.144.
see n.60 ante.
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considerations at this stage were directing the course of 
economic relations. During the euphoric stage of bilateral 
relations, both sides entered into economic contracts that 
were later to prove difficult to observe.
Even prior to the formal Agreement, there were economic 
interactions through Letters of Exchange. There was to be,
r 4from India to Bangladesh, a Rupees 25 crore commodity 
grant for the immediate procurement of such essential items 
from India as petroleum and petroleum products, fertilizer, 
cotton, cotton yarn, cement, oil seeds, steel products, 
chemicals, power equipment and vehicles. Simultaneously 
there was to be a credit of fc5 million to meet Bangladesh's 
foreign exchange needs, repayable in fifteen equal instalments 
commencing five years after the date of disbursement.^^
Initially prospects of mutual trade looked good. For 
Bangladesh there was a vacuum created by Pakistan's with­
drawal on the trade front especially with regard to her two 
primary commodities, jute and tea. In jute, Bangladeshi 
production rate was 6.5 million bales a year out of which 
3.5 million bales were used in domestic mills. Indian jute 
mills normally had a shortfall of 5 million bales annually.
It was therefore an attractive proposition for India to 
buy up the Bangladeshi jute surplus. As for tea, the average
annual production in Bangladesh was 31.5 million kg. Out of
6 6this 27 million kg were formerly sold to West Pakistan.
64 One crore = 10 million.
65
Tvmes of India, 18 January 1972.
66 Statistics from Far Eastern Economic Bevtew, 8 January, 1972, p.39.
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Now this massive surplus posed a problem not only to Bangla­
desh but also to Indian exporters, who had reasons to worry 
unless a joint tea export policy was worked out.
The Agreement signed on 28 March 1971 envisaged a three 
tier trade structure: (a) border trade to the tune of Rs.50 
crores; (b) rupee trade and (c) trade in hard currency.
It was generally expected that the Agreement would go a long 
way to achieve economic complementarity. For instance in 
India, now that a large portion of the required jute was 
available next door, part of the jute acreage could be 
released for more worthwhile and essential crops like rice. 
Though the Indian Foreign Trade Minister Mishra warned Indian
monopolists against abusing trade with Bangladesh, insisting
67that it should be at a State-to-State level, the Tzmes o f
I n d i a , later, more pragmatically argued that it was difficult
to do away with private trading altogether, particularly
along the sprawling border between the two countries. It
was, however, being optimistic when it added that 'such a
trade need not give rise to any unpleasant complications if
6 8it is kept within reasonable limits'.
Trade: It was on the Trade front that cracks in bilateral 
relations began to appear. Till June 197 2, trade was valued 
at only $13.7 million. Formal blame for the small size was 
placed on (i) disruption of transportation in Bangladesh 
during the War; (ii) absence of formalised banking arrange-
69ments; and (iii) procedural and administrative difficulties.
67 Pakistan Times, 1 April 1972. 
f i ft
Times of India, 21 March 1973.
New York Times, 12 June 1972.
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Feeling in Bangladesh was growing that the quantum of formal 
trade was reduced largely because themajor Indian import, 
jute, was finding its way into the Indian market illegally 
through smuggling. Analysts were predicting that the Bangla­
desh Government however unconcerned it might seem then, 
would find it difficult to become reconciled to the loss
of an estimated US$65 million in foreign exchange through
7 0the smuggling of jute. The Dacca Government might have
seemed unconcerned, but not so the Opposition  P a r t ie s , and 
soon Bhashani was complaining that jute mills on the Hoogly rivei 
(in the Indian State of West Bengal) 'had started in full 
swing with the jute from Bangladesh' .71 The Indian official import 
target of Rs.7.5 crores of jute was not materialising. While 
some Bangladeshis explained it as being due to smuggling
having met the requirement, the Indians were criticising
7 2high Bangladesh prices.
A Fish Trade Protocol, signed in August 1972, stipulated 
an export of fish worth Rs.9 crores into India. For this 
the Bangladesh authorities wanted 17 Centres to be set up 
along the border. The Indians considered it an impractical 
proposition, given the poor state of communications on the 
Bangladesh side, thereby laying themselves open to the charge 
that they were uninterested in formal institutional arrange­
ments, as their needs were being met in any case through
Far Eastern Economie Review, 11 March 1972. 
Quoted in Pakistan Times, 18 August 1972. 
Times of India, 18 September 1972. 
ibid., 4 September 1972.
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smuggling. The Indian Press noted that the common man in 
Bangladesh was critical of the protocol, because exports
of fish were likely to push up the local price beyond his
U 73 reach.
Trade in coal was also causing some heartburn on the
Bangladeshi side. The first coal supplies from India to
Bangladesh were made by the Minerals and Metals Trading
Corporation at a relatively high price. Several private
collieries offered a lower quote, and Bangladesh was
interested, but India insisted that trade be channelled
through the relevant Government Corporation as private
colleries often failed to adhere to quality specifications.
Ultimately, however, the Corporation agreed to reduce the
74price but there was some mutual bitterness already.
The Fish and Coal episodes were later to bring forth
complaints from the Bangladesh Commerce and Foreign Trade
Minister, M.R. Siddiqui, to the effect that Indian State
Corporations took a long time to organise trade and also
75charged higher prices than export houses. It was uncommon 
for a senior Awami League politician to be publicly critical 
of the Indian authorities. Strains on economic relations 
were obviously being felt. Siddiqui1s Ministry had already 
taken the initiative in October in scrapping the border trade 
agreement, since it felt that without adequate control 
measures along the borders, its meaningful implementation 
was impossible.
Times of India, 18 September 1972. 
ibid., 19 November 1972.
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Soon Bangladesh was running into large trade deficits,
which according to the Agreement would have to be paid for
in foreign exchange unless a mutually acceptable alternative
was found. By March 197 3 under the Limited Payments Agreement
(LPA) Bangladesh had contracted Rs.14.6 crores for exports
and Rs.19.4 crores for imports as against Rs.25 crores
7 fitarget each way. Since Bangladesh could not afford to
pay for her deficits in hard currency on March 17, 197 3
she asked for an extension of three months, eleven days
before the Agreement was due to expire.
After the March 197 3 elections in Bangladesh, Mujib
effected some cabinet changes. M.R. Siddiqui was replaced
as his Foreign Trade Minister by A.H.M. Kamaruzzaman.
Though trade problems with India, particularly Siddiqui's
views on the subject, might not have been the principal
rea£on for this change, Kamarruzaman was reputed to be
more favourably disposed towards India.
Kamaruzzaman visited India in June and held talks with
his counterpart, D.P. Chattapadhaya. On 5 July a new Rs.180
crore Trade Agreement was signed. This was to cover a period
of three years. It incorporated balanced trade and payment
arrangements. Annual exports from either country were
stipulated at Rs.30 crores. Bangladesh was to be allowed to
adjust her export shortfall of Rs.2 crores incurred in the
First Agreement (1972-73) in the first year of the new
Agreement instead of having to pay the deficit in foreign
. 77exchange, a clear concession by India.
76 .Statistics from Tzmes of Indva, 18 March 1973.
77 See The Statesman Weekly (Calcutta), 7 July 1973.
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The First Annual Trade Plan under the new Three Year 
Agreement met the same fate as the First Agreement. In 
Febraury 19 74 Kamaruzzaman handed over the Foreign Trade 
Portfolio to Khandokar Mushtaq Ahmed, whose political career 
so far reflected a less friendly attitude towards New Delhi.
The growing imbalance continued in India's favour and in 
October the first Annual Plan was extended by another three 
months. In December Mushtaq and Chattapadhaya scrapped 
the rupee trade arrangements. From 1 January 1975 all pay­
ments were to be made in freely convertible c u r r e n c y . 7 ^
From now on the special arrangements between India and 
Bangladesh disappeared and trade was to be conducted as 
between any two sovereign states. In the private trade 
sector, Indian businessmen (the so-called 'M a rw a ris') were
accused of dumping inferior goods upon a helpless Bengali
79population at exorbitant prices. Senior Opposition politician,
Mowlana Bhashani, was highly critical of the role of the
' Marutaris ' in an interview with an Indian analyst.8^
The following Table reflects annual trade patterns
81between the two countries between 197 3 and 1975.
Asian Almanao 1975, p.6832.
79 Shamsul Bari, 'Images and Realities of Bangladesh-India Relationship', 
Law and International Affairs, Vol.I, No.l (Dacca: Bangladesh Instiute 
of Law & Parliamentary Affairs, 1975), pp.41-45.
80 Basant chatterjee, Inside Bangladesh Today: An Eye-Witness Account 
(New Delhi: S. Chand & Co., 1973), pp.83-84.
Bangladesh Observer, 18 April 1971.81
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TABLE 3.1 
(in Bangladeshi Taka)
Year Imports (into Bangladesh) Exports
1973-74 75.38 Crores 14.52 Crores
1974-75 28.82 9.92
The Table shows that insoite of the very best efforts
made throughout this period to improve trade turn-overs,
as exemplified in the series of agreements and discussions,
there was a steady decline accompanied by a modicum of
bitterness. The euphoric friendship, when tested by realistic
factors governed by economic pragmatism, seemed to erode.
In December 197 4 Mushtaq was to warn that it would be a
mistake to expect the political relationship between the
two countries to be strengthened if a fruitful trade relation-
8 2ship could not be established.
Aid: On the other aspect of economic relationship,
the Aid front, the case was similar. There was initial
optimism and even in June 1972, India retained the status
orof Bangladesh's largest donor, having announced £jc6 the 
current Financial Year and the next, an aid quantum of 
$275 million (the U.S. came next with $214m)
Prior to the commencement of the following Financial 
Year, the Indian Planning Minister, D.P. Dhar, visited Dacca, 
and a Rs.60 crore short-term credit and grant to Bangladesh
82 Cited in Kukrit Bhoumik, Times of India, 19 January 1976.
o 3
New York Times, 12 June 1972.
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was announced. But there were built-in potential seeds
of conflict. The fact that procurement was tied to India,
which could enable Indian suppliers to charge higher prices,
was bound, in the long run, to displease Bangladeshi officials.
Dhar also announced Indian assistance in the setting
up of a few major projects. India was to provide 60% of
the plant and machinery for a fertilizer project with an
annual capacity of one million tons, and agreed to canvas
for third country loans. India was later to buy up the
production surplus on a long term basis. Help was also
promised in setting up a cement factory with an annual
capacity of 240,000 tonnes, and on the financial aspect of
a 500,000 tonne sponge iron project, subject to its techno-
economic feasibility. On his return to Calcutta Dhar told
reporters that only a small section of the people in Dacca
was moved by the 'subtle and invidious propaganda of the
85enemies of Indo-Bangladesh friendship'. The Indian Press
credited Dhar with having achieved a 'breakthrough' in
86economic relations between the two countries.
However, the proposed fertilizer project led to an 
internal debate among Bangladeshi decision-makers. Critics 
took the line that if the production was aimed at the Indian 
market, as was planned, it would create a 'structural' 
link that would be difficult to break should there be need 
to do so; secondly, if and when India attained self-
84
Statesman Weekly (Calcutta), 2 June 1972.
85 • • j ibid.
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ibid.
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sufficiency with regard to fertilizer, Bangladesh could be 
landed with a huge surplus without a market for it; thirdly, 
from experience, there was a risk that equipment procured
o 7from India could be deficient in quality. Contrary to 
the analysis in the Indian Press, therefore, the announcement 
of aid did*not necessarily signal a 'breakthrough'.
Bangladesh's aid requirements were far more than India 
could possibly hope to satisfy. An Aid to Bangladesh Group 
under World Bank auspices was therefore formed to meet the 
latter's needs in an institutionalised form in 1974. Though 
India was earlier invited to join the Group, she turned 
it down for a rather interesting reason: she feared domin­
ation of the Group by the U.S. (which was expected to cont­
ribute something like 50% of the total aid channelled through 
this body) and rather than be classified as a minor donor, 
opted out of the Consortium. She also felt that membership
would bind her to conform to Consortium decisions and deprive
8 8her of flexibility. The following table details Indian
8 9aid over the years:
TABLE 3.2
Commitment and Disbursement of Indian Aid 
(in Million US Dollars)
1971-72 1972-73 1973-74 1974-75 1975-76 1976-77
Commitment 111 23 52 18 7 ...
Disbursement 73 31 13 20 30 19
Interview with Dr Fakhruddin Ahmed, Section Chief and Joint Secretary 
External Resources Division, Planning Commission, Dacca, 19 July 1978.
go
Source: Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, Statistics Division, Ministry 
of Planning, Dacca.
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An analysis of the above table brings out certain 
features. First, there is a gradual tapering off of aid 
starting from $lllm. in 1971-72 to $7m. in 1975-76. Not 
surprisingly, the quantum is lowest when political relations 
are at their nadir. Secondly, the figures indicate a slow 
rate of disbursement. Out of a total of $211m. only $186m. 
were disbursed, an unhappy picture of aid utilisation, which 
could be for a number of reasons such as high prices and 
poor commodity quality, as indeed, the critics alleged.
To summarise, then, the reasons why Indo-Bangladesh economic 
relations had come to such a sorry pass were as under: 
firstly, long unpoliceable borders facilitated smuggling 
of essential Bangladeshi cash items as jute, fish and rice 
causing a decline these commodities in formal trade, and 
inflating their domestic prices. This alienated both 
Bangladeshi officials and the common man. Secondly, Indian 
insistence on trade on a state-to-state basis was unfavourable 
to the Bangladeshis who claimed that Indian State agencies 
were incompetent and charged higher prices. Thirdly poor 
quality procurements from India caused widespread reaction 
among the general Bangladeshi public with concomitant effects 
on trade relations. Fourthly, Indian 1Marwari.' businessmen 
were perceived as exploiters. Finally on the Aid front, 
Bangldeshi Planning Officials were critical of aid-tying and 
higher prices which led to slow utilisation and disbursement.
Broadly, then,the attempt to achieve complementarity 
between two competititve economies was doomed to failure.
Economic interactions with India seemed to alienate two 
important segments of the Bangladesh bureaucracy, the Ministry
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of Commerce which handled Foreign Trade and the Ministry 
of Planning which was concerned with aid relations.
(ii) Political: Dissatisfaction with economic relations,
now openly expressed from the Dacca end, led to a general
reassessment of political relations as well. The segment
of the bureaucracy in formal charge of conduct of foreign
relations, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (or the Foreign
Office) was slower to be converted to the points of view of
the Trade and Planning authorities (the economic bureaucracy)
because of two main reasons: firstly, India was the conduit
that linked Bangladesh with the International state system.
Indian assistance was essential in obtaining formal recognition
by other state actors necessary to underline Bangladesh's
sovereignty. The primary goal of Dacca's Foreign Office
was to ensure Bangladesh's status as a sovereign state.
Secondly, Bangladeshi diplomats were using facilities provided
by Indian Missions in various parts of the world, as those
90of the nascent Bangladesh Foreign Office were inadequate.
It was during the Simla Talks between Mrs Gandhi and 
Bhutto in June 197 2 that it began to emerge that Bangladeshi 
and Indian interests need not always coincide. In April that 
year Mujib had declared that India 'will not and cannot  
negotiate' any settlement with Pakistan concerning the 90,000 
Pakistani prisoners of war without the approval of Dacca and 
that the Bangladesh Government would try as many as 1,500
The use of telex and other communication facilities in Indian 
embassies abroad by Bangladesh officials is a good example. This was 
particularly useful when Bengali special envoys, travelling in countries 
that did not recognise Bangladesh, wanted to liaise with Dacca.
of them for war crimes, (later the figure was reduced to 
195). The Simla Talks brought to the fore the fact that 
the attitudes of Dacca and Delhi toward Islamabad were 
divergent. For Bangladesh the objective was total disentangle­
ment from Pakistan (a country with whom she shared no borders) 
and getting the latter to recognise that situation. For 
India, the problem was one of mending fences with a neighbour, 
and helping the latter recover from the wounds and shame
of defeat. From this flowed the difference that while the
<2POWs for India a source of embarrassment, for Bangladesh
they were a supreme trump card. To dispel any Bangladeshi
fear that New Delhi and Islamabad might reach an accord
at Dacca's expense, Mrs Gandhi's Principal Secretary,
P.N. Haksar, was despatched post-haste to brief Mujib on
9 2Simla. There was appreciation in the Indian Press that
'establishing a stable long term relationship with Bangladesh
is proving to be a far more delicate and complex affair
9 3than most Indians expected'.
In the elections of March 1973 in Bangladesh, Mujib'S'
Awami League won a sweeping victory capturing 292 out of
94300 parliamentary seats. Certain Cabinet changes reflected 
a more nationalist approach vis-a-vis India. The reputedly 
pro-Soviet, pro-Indian Abdus Samad Azad was replaced as
91
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Foreign Minister by the generally uncommitted Dr Kamal
Hossain. Tajuddin Ahmed, also known to have pro-Indian
sympathies, was relieved of the Planning portfolio which
went to Mujib himself. However neither was dropped from
the Cabinet and there were no major changes in the Awami
League hierarchy. When Haksar visited Dacca in April with
the message that the general atmosphere was conducive to
taking initiatives in settling outstanding problems with
Pakistan, he had to do his rounds calling on the same familiar
Awami League figures - Kamal Hossain, Mushtaq, Kamaruzzaman,
95Tajuddin and Samad.
A Bangladesh-India joint plan emerged out of Dr Kamal
Hossain's visit to India the same month. The two governments
called for a 'simultaneous repatriation', meaning a three
way^< exchange involving most of the POWs, the 175,000 to
200,000 Bengalis in Pakistan and 260,000 non-Bengalis
96('B i h a r i s ') in Bangladesh. While India had managed to
obtain Bangladeshi consent to return most of the POWs who
. 9 7  . .were by now proving to be a financial strain and political
embarrassment to her, Bangladesh, unwilling to surrender
her total leverage, was insisting on trying those with criminal
charges against them.
The rules for the three-way exchange were laid down
in the August Agreement between India and Pakistan (in the
95
Times of India, 6 April 1973.
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New York Times, 18 April 1973.
97 The cost to India by 31 December 1972 was computed at US$17m.y Far
Eastern Economic Review, 5 March 197 3, p.19.
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absence of Pakistani recognition Bangladesh could not be 
a formal party to the Agreement). All but 195 of the POWs 
(to be tried for war crimes) were to be repatriated and 
there was to be mutual exchange of hostage populations 
between Pakistan and Bangladesh. The fact that the question 
of Pakistan's recognition of Bangladesh was sidestepped, 
was a concession by the latter made at some political cost
9 8as evidenced by sharp adverse reactions in certain quarters.
There was, however, easing of tension in the subcontinent
and Pakistan's recognition of Bangladesh in February 1974
cleared the way for the Tripartite talks and Agreement
between India, Pakistan and Bangladesh reached after five
days of arduous deliberations on the 9th of April. Bangladesh
dropped the trials and Pakistan as a quid  pro quo agreed
to accept more Biharis. Mujib blessed the Pact during a
brief halt in Delhi on his way back from Moscow and pledged
99intensive drive for peace in the subcontinent.
Ironically, the relaxation of tension between Bangladesh 
and Pakistan had the effect of bringing to surface the bilateral 
issues between Bangladesh and India, on which the spotlight
Bhashani of NAP and Jalil of the Jatio Samajtantrik Dal (JSD) argued 
that the Agreement 'would not serve the interests of the people of 
Bangladesh' and that it was a further proof of Dacca's subservience 
to New Delhi. See TOI 3 September 1973.
99 _
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now t u r n e d . ^  Two such bilateral issues (Farakka and 
Territorial Waters) and two Indian unilateral decisions 
(the Nuclear Explosion and the Annexation of Sikkim) 
provided ample grounds for the seeds of discontent to 
germinate.
Farakka Barrage: The problem arose from the 
construction of a barrage by India across the Ganges at 
Farakka, eleven miles upstream of the border with Bangladesh, 
in order to divert the river flow into the Bhagirathi-Hoogly 
through a link canal. The purpose was to resuscitate the 
port of Calcutta by flushing out the deposits of silt in 
the Hoogly river, and combat saline intrusion and the 
frequent tidal bores.
Most of the Ganges water consists of monsoonal flows 
that run out to sea. During the lean period of March to May, 
the discharge at Farakka is insufficient, less than 55,000 
cubic feet per second (cusecs) in the last ten days of April. 
The Indians claimed that the purpose of flushing the Calcutta 
port required a diversion of at least 40,000 cusecs of water, 
thereby leaving only a small balance for Bangladeshi^
With the Pakistani recognition obtained, Mujib was increasingly 
anxious to project a 'non-aligned' image for Bangladesh between India 
and Pakistan. He was transmitting signals that he would like to see 
himself somewhere on neutral ground between the two subcontinental 
protagonists. He was willing he said, to contribute 'his bit' in his 
'own humble way' to help India and Pakistan sort out their differences.
The Times (London), 24 February 1974. India's disenchantment with 
the shift was reflected in the timing of the departure of the first 
Indian High Commissioner to Dacca, Subimal Dutt, who quietly left Bangla­
desh after relinquishing charge barely twenty-four hours before the 
arrival in Dacca in June 1974 of the Pakistani Prime Minister A.Z. Bhutto. 
Economic & Political Weekly (Bombay), 6 July 1974, p.1047.
Asia Week (Hong Hong), 11 November 1977.
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The Bangladesh case was that if India abstracted the
above quantum, the result would spell disaster for Bangladesh.
Water supplies were needed particularly during the dry period
from November to May (the problem during the Monsoon Period
from June to October was one of excess) for agriculture,
domestic and industrial purposes, for maintaining river
depths, for sustaining fishery and forestry and for preventing
102the inland penetration of salinity from the Bay of Bengal.
The key issue therefore, was how large the volume of diverted 
water should b e .
The adverse effects of the Farakka Project on the 
lower riparian regions were anticipated as early as 1951 
when the proposed plan was reported in the newspapers.
Pakistan took the matter up with the Indian authorities 
and protracted negotiations between the two countries followed, 
with no result. Meanwhile, India started construction of 
the barrage in 1961 and completed it in 1975. The issue, 
though live, was lost sight of temporarily during the post­
liberation euphoria, but attained salience with the turning 
of focus on Indo-Bangladesh bilateral problems following 
Pakistan's recognition as the proposed date for the completion 
of the barrage drew near.
The matter was broached with Mrs Gandhi by Mujib during 
their discussions in May 1974. The Communique signed at the 
end of the talks (which was delayed by five hours, presumably 
due to last-minute haggling) stated that the problem should
See Ganges Water: Crisis in Bangladesh (Dacca: Government of the 
People's Republic of Bangladesh) u.d. passim.
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be resolved 'with understanding so that the interests of
both countries are recognised and the d i f f i c u l t i e s  removed
103in a spirit of friendship and cooperation'. Both Governments
were now publicly admitting at the highest level that
'difficulties' existed that had to be 'removed'.
In April 1975 the Indians pointed out that while
discussions on allocation of water were continuing, it was
essential to run the feeder canal of the barrage during
the remaining lean period of the year. Accordingly on 18
April an interim agreement was signed allowing the Indians
to test the feeder canal for the period between 21 April
and 31 May with discharges varying from 11,000 to 16,000 
104cusecs. Bangladesh was to allege later that India
continued to withdraw water,in large quantums, even after 
the specified period.
Perhaps to signal a modicum of disaffection, Bangaldesh 
displayed a low level of enthusiasm at the,«inauguration of 
the Farakka Project on 21 May (even though it was within 
the period of the interim agreement) by cancelling the visit 
of Mujib's Water Resources Minister, Serneabat, who was 
invited to be present on that occasion. 105 The pill was 
sugar-coated by the announcement the following day that
106Bangladesh would be represented at official level instead.
The Times (London), 17 May 1974.
104
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With the Project commissioned, Bangladesh could only 
wait and see what its effects on her were likely to be.
Farakka remained a potential sore point between the two 
countries.
Territorial Waters: The second bilateral issue which
surfaced as a rather sensitive one in early 1975 inovlved
the demarcation of territorial waters in the Bay of Bengal.
The region was believed to contain undersea oil reserves.
Bangladesh had already signed contracts the previous year
with a number of foreign firms for oil exploration and
10 7development.
In March Dr Kamal Hossain, who, in addition to the Foreign 
Office, also held the portfolio of Oil and Natural Resources, 
arrived in India for a three day visit, primarily to discuss 
this issue .108 delayed his return to Dacca by a day
for further talks with Indian leaders on the disputed 
maritime boundary, for full scale off-shore exploration 
could not commence until the demarcation was settled.
Bangladesh argued that the definition of the Continental 
shelf be effected by a reference to international law and 
usage. Though the dispute still remains largely unresolved,
its importance has eroded with the lack of success in the 
exploration. It still remains a potentially contentious 
issue. But at that time it was not allowed to be blown up 
out of proportion as Kamal Hossain with his Foreign Office
The Times (London), 4 February 1975.
108
Strazts Tzmes (Singapore), 31 March 1975.
Pakzstan Tzmes, 12 April 1975.109
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was involved in negotiations, and they may have been 
persuaded of the political futility of taking on India on 
another issue, especially when some very intricate bargaining 
with Pakistan on assets and liabilities lay ahead.
The Indian Nuclear Explosion: This was the first of 
the two unilateral policy decisions of New Delhi that had 
some adverse effect on Delhi-Dacca relations. Though official 
quarters maintained a formal silence, no effort was made 
by Bangladeshi authorities to disentangle themselves from 
the spate of reactions in unofficial circles. Opposition 
politicians were whipping up anti-Indian sentiments by 
attributing aggressiveness to Indian policies with some impact.
Bhashani declared that the May 19 7 4 explosion was a 
'veiled threat' to 'India's smaller neighbours'.^"^ Even 
the normally pro-Moscow newspaper SANGBAD commented that 
it was 'a matter of grave concern' and raised the question, 
as to how the explosion was 'consistent with India's image'.
Official Bangladeshi reaction was muted because just 
prior to the explosion Bangladesh herself was engaged in 
negotiations with India on the exchange of nuclear 
technology. In April the Director of the Bhabha Research 
Centre in India, Dr Raja Ramanna has visited Dacca and signed 
an Agreement for cooperation in the peaceful uses of atomic 
energy. A Research Reactor which was set up at Roopur in 
the Pabna district of Bangladesh, was to be modelled after
Pakistan Times, 23 May 1974. 
Quoted in ibid.
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the Indian Apsara Research Reactor at Trombay. India was
112to provide computers and raw materials for the purpose.
The April Accord which was not initially disclosed, seems 
to have been timed to precede the Indian explosion, taking 
the wind out of the sails of the Bangladesh official reaction.
Silence was enforced on the Dacca Government for how 
could it be critical of the Indian decision when it could 
itself be accused by domestic Opposition of collaboration? 
Though Mujib's government was silent on this, it was not 
necessarily happy, for should India become a potential 
adversary (and the growing discontent did point to such 
a situation) any major accretion of power to India was for 
Dacca a source of worry.
Annexation of Sikkim: The other unilateral Indian
decision with some bearing on Indo-Bangladesh bilateral
relations was the one formally annexing Sikkim. Sections
of the Bangladesh Press were highly critical. One weekly
complained:
Without going into the possibilities which 
only the future can unfold, it can be said 
that the Indian action over Sikkim will 
throw a fresh spanner in the way of 
normalisation and understanding in the 
subcontinent.113
There was strong adverse reaction at the Dacca University. 
Some students demonstrated against the Sikkim action and a 
group of teachers, condemning it, issued a statement that
112
Times of Indza, 14 June 1974.
113 „ ~ ,
do Izday, 8 Sept ember 1974.
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' . . . this kind of expansionist policy is a serious threat
114to India's small neighbour'. The government reaction
was cautious. Almost as if it was an attempt to convince
himself a spokesman commented: 'We are larger than Sikkim,
and are a member o f  the United N a t io n s. So there is no
115need for us to be afraid'. The statement reflected a 
dependence on external safeguards as a measure of security 
against any potential Indian threat.
D. The Crisis-Slide
(i) Political:
Though discontent was by now apparent particularly 
on the Bangladesh side, given the virulent anti-Indian 
feelings in Opposition political quarters in Dacca, Mujib's 
government was still the best bet for New Delhi. When in 
early 1975 Mujib introduced a one-Party system in Bangladesh 
and consolidated his power, Mrs Gandhi sent warm greetings .116 
Her enthusiasm might have arisen from two calculations. 
Firstly, she may have analyzed Mujib's actions as a move 
to create a somewhat leftish United Front which would square 
Bangladesh on a pro-Moscow line, thereby easing the posture 
towards India, and secondly she may have hoped that a 
stronger Mujib would be more able to suppress the burgeoning 
anti-Indian feelings. These calculations were upset by the
Bangkok Post, 11 October 1974.
115 • -u • J ibid.
116 In doing so she opened herself to criticism from her Opposition 
who interpreted her enthusiasm as a sign that she planned to concentrate 
power in her own hands in a similar fashion. The Times (London),
4 February 1975.
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Coup in Dacca of 15 August 1975, led by some Army officers, 
in the course of which Mujib was killed and Mushtaq proclaimed 
President.
A crisis-slide leading to a rapid deterioration of 
mutual relations began with a series of political crises 
in Dacca, resulting in rapid changes of government between 
August and November 19 75. Dacca's anger was fanned to white 
heat with India's harbouring of dissidents, and continued 
withdrawal of waters at Farakka. Bad political relations 
had adverse effects on economic relations as well.
Changes of Government in Dacca:
Though the immediate post-Mujib government was still 
composed of Awami Leaguers, the leaders, particularly 
Mushtaq, belonged to the faction that the Indians had failed 
to cultivate even during the War of Liberation. There was, 
therefore, ample reason for New Delhi's concern. This was 
compounded by two factors; firstly, Pakistan's being the
first country to recognise Mushtaq's government, which it
117described as an 'Islamic Republic' and secondly, in 
Mushtaq's first radio broadcast he displayed eagerness to
cultivate relations with countries with which Bangladesh
118did not yet have formal relations. Both these factors
combined to project an impression that Bangladesh would be 
veering towards Pakistan in the Subcontinental System, and 
towards the Islamic group of nations and China at the global
Pakzstan Times, 16 August 1975.117
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level. Indian official reactions were circumspect. She
was 'carefully studying the reports' and 'watching developments',
119in the words of a spokesman.
Bangladesh made the first move to establish contact
following the Coup when on 19 August her High Commissioner
in Delhi, Shamsur Rahman called on the Indian Foreign Secretary
Kewal Singh at the former's request. High Commissioner
R&hman confirmed that Bangladesh had not transformed herself
into an 'Islamic Republic' (in other words, it was still
se c ula r ) and that the new government would abide by all
120existing international agreements. The following day
the Indian envoy in Dacca, Samar Sen, called on Mushtaq
121to convey Delhi's 'best wishes' to the new government.
On the 25th, Shamsur Rahman conveyed a message from Mushtaq
to Mrs Gandhi. Mrs Gandhi, in that meeting, expressed
122her deep concern regarding events in Dacca. The envoys 
helped to restore working contacts though it was obvious 
that it was a far cry from early 197 2 when Delhi and Dacca
handled relations directly, and saw no need to post Ambassadors
123in each other's capital.
119 .
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123 For the first couple of months Delhi-Dacca relations were conducted 
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After these conciliatory gestures, it was deemed natural 
that Delhi-Dacca links would continue, though not at the 
same level as before. However, in order not to fall behind 
Pakistan in according recognition to the new government,
India took the line that she continued to recognise Bangladesh
and therefore there was no need of a formal declaration
124to that effect.
In early November 1975 there were a series of complicated 
developments in Bangladesh. There was an abortive putsch
staged by Brigadier Khaled Mosharraf which was reportedly
125'India-backed'. While the Coup attempt was on^some prominent
Awami League leaders were killed in prison. Khaled's attempted
putsch was quashed, and around 7 November Major General Ziaur
Rahman emerged as the strongman. An Indian Foreign Office
spokesman said that India had been watching with
considerable anxiety the complicated 
situation which has developed in 
Bangladesh ... the developments in 
Bangladesh are its domestic affairs 
but India cannot remain in d i f fe r e n t  and 
unconcerned about developments taking 
place there.126
The statement had an ominous ring to it as far as
Dacca was concerned. Colin Legum of The Observer (London)
reported that since the Coup that killed Mujib there were
Indian military movements along the Bangladesh border. 1^ *7
124 Times of India, 28 August 1975.
1 95 See Talukdar Maniruzzaman: 'Bangladesh in 1976: Struggle for 
Survival in an Independent State', Asian Survey (February 1977), p.192.
126 Times of India, 8 November 1975.
1 o 7 Cited in Pakzstan Times, 19 November 1975.
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To compound the problems, some assailants in Dacca wounded
12 8the Indian High Commissioner in a kidnap attempt. It
seemed that the situation was nearing a flash-point.
That was when Bangladesh took some initiatives to defuse
the crisis. President Sayem, who had replaced Mushtaq
telephoned Mrs Gandhi to convey his 'regrets' at the kidnap
incident and eventually despatched a Special Mission to
. . 129Delhi to placate the Indian authorities. This particular
crisis-slide was thus arrested, but there were other issues 
resulting in mutual bitterness. These were border incidents 
and the continuing problem of Farakka.
Border Incidents and Bangladeshi Dissidents in India;
In April 1976 Bangladesh alleged that the Indians had 
been training and arming some Bengali civil and military 
dissidents who were sneaking back across the borders to 
fight units of the Bangladesh Army.-^O The same day Delhi 
lodged a protest with Dacca against what it described as 
an 'unprovoked shooting incident', it being the first official 
admission of border trouble since the creation of B a n g l a d e s h ; ^ !  
In May, the Indian Defence Minister, Bansi Lai, confirmed 
in Parliament that during the previous month there were four 
incidents of shooting across the border.1^2
1 28 Four of the six attackers were shot dead by Bangladeshi and Indian 
Security Guards. An Indian official statement said: 'The Government 
of India takes a grave view of this dastardly attack and condemns it in 
the strongest possible terms', New York Times, 27 November 1975.
129
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In September 1976, the leader of the Bangladesh
delegation to the United Nations, Admiral M.A. Khan, raised
the issue at a press conference in New York. His complaint
was that India was encouraging military ’border incursions'
133into Bangladesh. The two governments organised border
talks in late January 1977 but the Bangladesh Rifles Chief, 
General Dastagir alleged that India's refusal to 'accept 
the truth of harbouring dissidents' had made the situation 
difficult.134 .phg problem seemed intricately linked with 
the state of bilateral political relations. India found 
herself in an awkward position, unable to refuse refuge to 
the pro-Mujib forces that sought shelter. Nor was she 
particularly chary of doing so, given the sour bilateral 
relations, brought about largely by the continuing Farakka 
problem.
The Continuing Problem of Farakka:
The Dacca authorities alleged continued withdrawal of 
water by India even beyond the period specified in the Interim 
Agreement of May 1975. Several bilateral discussions
proved fruitless. In the meanwhile Bhashani initiated a 
public agitation against India. He organised what has been 
described as the 'longest' procession 'in living memory in 
the subcontinent'. 1^5 High Commissioner Shamsur Rahman was 
133 .
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134
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Straits Times, 17 May 1976.
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summoned to the Foreign Office in New Delhi and told of 
India's 'regret and concern' at the Dacca Government's
failure to check inflammatory propaganda against India over
. 136 Farakka'.
Bangladesh now saw -it fit to internationalise the issue.
At the 42 nation Islamic Foreign Ministers' Conference in
Istanbul in May 1976, the issue was raised by Dacca and
the joint Communique noted the Farakka project's adverse
137effects on Bangladesh. The Indian Foreign Minister Chavan
had earlier warned Bangladesh that its attempts to internat­
ionalise the issue would only complicate matters, and please 
only those who harboured ill will against the Subcontinent.138 
In August Bangladesh formally requested the Secretary 
General of the United Nations to include Farakka as a 
Supplementary item in the agenda of the General A s s e m b l y . 139 
In a Memorandum explaining the reasons for the request,
Dacca argued that Bangladesh was confronted with a 'problem 
of crisis proportions' and that 'the failure to resolve 
this issue expeditiously and satisfactorily carries with 
it the potnetial threat of conflict affecting peace and
136 Times of India, 14 May 1976.
137
Bangladesh Observer, 17 May 1976.
138
Pakzstan Tzmes, 9 April 1976.
13Q . . .  .The item was entitled 'Question of the Unilateral Division of the 
Waters of the International River Ganges in Contravention of all Inter­
national Laws and Regulations and Traditional Usages and in Violation 
of Solemn Pledges on the use of such Waters'. Ancillary Documents on 
Agenda Item 121: Thirty-First Session of the UN General Assembly 
(Bangladesh Mission to the U.N.) u.d. p.l. Dacca took the position 
that the Ganges was an international waterway and consequently Bangladesh 
was entitled to the rights of low riparian regions.
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security in the area and region as well1. To the
Indians, Bangladeshi action in involving the U.N. was
'unfortunate and regrettable' since such problems were
'amenable to a constructive solution which will take into
account the needs and rights of the two countries in a
spirit of mutual understanding and cooperation'. This
reaction was in conformity with New Delhi's principles as
explained by Mrs Gandhi in an interview with the Editor of
The Canberra Times on 12 May 1976. She said, 'We think
that bilateralism is the best way of doing things. We are
14 2capable of sorting out our relations with our neighbours'.
Bangladesh did not agree. At the U.N. the Chief of
the Bangladesh delegation, Admiral Khan, argued that without
third party intervention Bangladesh would be 'left with no
redress in the face of continuing injury' from her powerful
n e i g h b o u r  .^43 After one week's hard bargaining and mediation
mainly by four non-aligned states, Egypt, Sri Lanka, Guyana
and Algeria, both Parties, according to a statement read
by Assembly President Amarasinghe,
undertook to give due consideration to 
the most appropriate ways of utilising 
the capacity of the U.N. system. It is 
open to either party to report to the
140
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General Assembly at the 32nd Congress on 
the progress achieved in the settlement 
of the problem.144
There was a return to bilateralism, with a difference
that now it was with the sanction of the world forum,
which Bangladesh had already sounded on the issue, and to
which shejwas certain to go back if the renewed attempts
at talks failed. There were some fruitless discussions in
December 1976 and January 1977, but it was obvious that the
stalemate could only be cleared by a major political break-
1 4 R . . .through. However elections in India were due m  March
1977 and it was unlikely Mrs Gandhi could afford any
concessions on this touchy issue till afterwards.
(ii) Economic:
Economics had become inextricably linked with Politics
in Indo-Bangladesh relations as is evidenced in the period
of crisis slide on both Trade and Aid fronts.
Trade: In January 1976 after six days of talks,
Agreed Minutes were signed on coal trade. India undertook
to supply 500,000 tonnes over the next five years at what
the Indian Commerce Secretary, Alexander, described as
14 6'internationally competitive and advantageous price'.
The price must have been hotly disputed for Alexander's 
Bangladeshi counterpart, Nurul Islam, asked for a 'realistic 
approach' to the coal price, alleging that the sharp increase 
the previous year had adversely affected road transport and
Cited in Pakistan Times, 26 November 1976.
145 For Admiral Khan's disappointment with talks, see Times of India,
8 December 1976.
146 Times of India, 13 January 1976.
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and construction industry in Bangladesh. More pointedly,
Nurul Islam argued that with her substantial natural 
resources and large industrial base, unless India assisted 
Bangladesh to increase her flow of trade, trade would
147become one-sided. Underlying his statement was the theme
that India shirked the responsibilities that naturally 
devolved on her as the senior trading partner.
That mutual traide had reached a new low was evidenced 
by the statement made by Nurul Islam's successor as Commerce 
Secretary, Matiur Rahman, later that year. In Calcutta 
Rahman said that Bang ]adesh was committed to exporting fish 
to India worth Rs.3.5 crores that year but was unable to 
fulfil even a part of this commitment due to shortage in 
the home market. He referred to the failure to reach an
Agreement in this connection when a team of Indian officials
. .  ^ 148visited Dacca soon after.
The existing Trade Agreement was renewed for a further
three years in October 19 76. Agreed Minutes between the two
governments were signed in October 1979 following Trade
talks and the Indian side reaffirmed its commitment to
149intensify efforts for the promotion of imports from Bangladesh. 
By then, however, it had become evident that mere signing 
of Agreements were insufficient to bring about significant 
improvement in trade relations.
148 .ibid., 1 September 1976.
149
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Aid: Bangladeshi reaction towards future Indian aid 
was adverse. Reports from Dacca said that Bangladesh would 
summarily reject any offer of financial aid from India.
Since India's unilateral withdrawal of water from Farakka 
was bound to cripple Bangladesh's economy, Dacca thought
150that India's offer of aid at this juncture would be farcical.
/E . Detente
(i) Political:
Just as the change of government in Dacca in August
1975 initiated the stage of crisis slide, another such change
of government, this time in New Delhi in March 1977, portended
to reverse that trend.
Changes of Government in Delhi: With the assumption of
office by the new Janata Government of Desai, Dacca took
the initiative in attempting to break the ice. Ziaur Rahman
despatched the Presidential Adviser for Foreign Affairs in
Dacca, Professor Shamsul Huq to Delhi in April 1977, to
convey Dacca' 'warmest greetings' to the new Government in 
151India. Delhi responded eagerly and within days after Huq's 
Delhi's visit the new Defence Minister, Jagjivan Ram, arrived 
in Dacca,152 setting the tone for an upward trend in mutual 
relations. This movement received a fillip when Zia and 
Desai had t«J© sessions in London in June during the Queen's
150 BBC, cited in Pakzstan Tzmes, 6 April 1976.
151
Times of India, 6 April 1977.
152 ibid., 16 April 1977.
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Jubilee Celebrations. The improved atmosphere enabled the
Gordian knot of Farakka to be cut, thus paving the way for
a Subcontinental detente.
Mrs Gandhi's return to power in January 19 80 seems unlikely
to adversely affect the existing detente. In his address to
the first session of the Indian Parliament following elections,
the Indian President, Sanjiva Reddy, emphasized the continuing
need for regional stability and cooperation among Subcontinental
states especially after the recent developments in Afghanistan,
which according to him, highlighted the 'reemergence of Cold
15 3War'. Zia led a Bangladeshi delegation to New Delhi the
same month becoming the first head of State to visit India
after Mrs Gandhi's victory, and after discussions with the
Indian Prime Minister, described the bilateral relations as
154being 'very good'.
The Farakka Agreement: On 5 November 1977 the Agreement
on Farakka was signed in Dacca by Admiral Khan and the Indian
Irrigation Minister, Barnala. It allocated to Bangladesh
between 60 and 62 per cent of the total flow of the Ganges.
It was agreed that during the leanest period (April 21 to
30) India would divert only 20,500 cusecs out of a total
155flow of 55,000 cusecs. The Agreement was for five years,
to be reviewed by both governments at the end of a three 
year period. Barnala referred to the 'considerable sacrifice'
15 3
Hindustan Times (Overseas), 31 January 1980.
154
Bangladesh Observer, 24 January 1980.
155 .
Agreement between the Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh
and the Government of the Republic of India on sharing of the Ganges Waters 
at Farakka and on augmenting its flows (Dacca: Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
5 November 1977) .
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India had made in reaching the Agreement and anticipated
criticism by certain sections of the Indian Press and
156public. However, all that was stated on All-India Radio
was that the Ganges 'would no longer carry within its banks
15 7the waters of discord'.
Border Incidents & Bangladeshi dissidents in India: 
Anxious to please the authorities in Dacca, Desai and Foreign 
Minister Vajpayee made it clear to the Bangladeshi political 
dissidents in India, that they would not be allowed to carry
on political activities against India's neighbour while in
r  ^• 158 India.
Perhaps as a result of this, no further border incidents
were reported, for the first time since early 1976.
Visits by leaders: A favourable impact was created
by the visits to each other's country by the leaders. Ziaur
R&hman visited India in December 1977. The All-India Radio
saw the visit as drawing 'the curtain on a barren two year
long spell in the relations between the two neighbouring 
159countries'. Desai returned the visit in April 1979.
/By then the process of detente in South Asia was well 
under way. In May 1978 Vajpayee said in an address at the
India and Foreign Review (New Delhi), 15 November 1977. Barnala was 
not wrong in anticipating criticism (p.6.). Soon Calcutta Press was 
accusing New Delhi of sacrificing the interests of West Bengal for 
foreign policy aims of the new Janata Government. See Jugantar (Bengali)
7 November 1977. For reaction among West Bengal intelligentsia, see 
Jayanta Kumar Ray, 1Farakka Agreement1, International Studies (Jawarhalal 
Nehru University Quarterly, New Delhi), April-June 1978, pp.235-246 passim.
157 All-India Radio, Spotlight Talk, 7 November 1977.
158
Indian and Foreign Review (New Delhi), 1 December 1977, p.6.
159 Spotlight Talk, 1 December 1977.
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Jawarhalal Nehru University, New Delhi that 'the subcontinent
as a whole pulsates with a new confidence in peace and
, . . 4.- , 160 desire for cooperation'.
The political relations did create a framework which
was able to contain and absorb minor problems. This was
evident in Bangladesh-India cooperation in July-August in
1979 in avoiding escalation of religious tensions after
anti-Muslim riots in India. About 20,000 Indian Muslims
had crossed into Bangladesh from West Bengal in June-July
1979 creating a potentially dangerous situation. But the
Bangladesh Foreign Minister announced that India was willing
to take back her ' n a t i o n a l s ' , carefully eschewing terming
them as 'Muslims' or 'refugees ' . ^  Ordinarily, an issue
of this nature would have led to acrimonious exchanges between
the two governments. Bangladesh displayed her eagerness in
continuing this detente when in January 1980 President Ziaur
Rahman became the first Head of a foreign governemnt to
16 2visit New Delhi after Mrs Gandhi's return to power.
(ii) Economic:
The Economic Relations however could not keep pace 
with political developments. Trade was being conducted 
under the Agreement signed on 5 July 197 3, being renewed 
at the end of each three year period. Bangladesh continued
160
Indian and Foreign Review (New Delhi), 1 June 1978, p.14. Indo- 
Pakistan relations had considerably thawed as well and Vajpayee had 
visited Pakistan in February 1978, the first Indian Ministerial level 
visit there since Foreign Minister Swaran Singh led a delegation there 
in 1962 (Far Eastern Economic Review, 10 February 1978), p.
161
Far Eastern Economic Review, July 1979, p.
162 cSee f.n.154 ante.
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to face major imbalances, as indicated by the following
table: 163
Year
1975-76
1976-77
1977-78
TABLE 3.4 
(in Bangladeshi Taka)
Imports (Taka Crores)
68.62
32.72
67.70
Exports (Taka Crores
5.99
7.19
2.01
The poor performance of Bangladeshi export sector could
only be circumvented by massive purchases by India. Small
wonder, trade was the 'focal point', in the words of the
Indian Foreign Secretary during Zia-Desai talks in Dacca
16 4during the latter's visit to Bangladesh. This was in
recognition of the potential danger that poor economic 
relations could spell for political relations, as evidenced 
during the period of euphoric interactions.
III. Pakistan 
A . From Disentanglement to Recognition
Even after the surrender of the Pakistani troops to 
the Allied Command in Dacca on 16 December 1971, the new 
Pakistani President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto continued to make 
efforts to keep Pakistan united. He proposed to Mujib,
16 3
Bangladesh Observer, 18 April 1979. In fact in course of Bangladesh's 
First Five Year Plan (1973-1978) she faced an overall trade imbalance, 
totalling Taka 233.61 crores in her bilateral trade with India.
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President-in-absentia of Bangladesh, still in a Pakistani
prison, a loose confederation, similar to the one in which
Egypt, Libya and Syria had joined, with a formula envisaging
virtual independence for both regions, Pakistan and Bangladesh,
with separate economies, political institutions and foreign 
165relations.
The possibility of Mujib's acceptance was very limited. 
Even if Mujib agreed to consider it at all, which was again 
unlikely, given the mood in Bangladesh, it would mean 
political suicide for hifn. In any case it was naive to 
presume Mujib would accept it while still in a Pakistani 
prison. Bhutto's best bet would, therefore, be to let him 
go. In releasing Mujib, Bhutto also intended to appear 
to make a 'generous gesture' calculated to obtain such long 
term benefits as the return of Pakistani prisoners of war.
In London, on his way to Dacca, Mujib dispelled the 
notion of a confederation by stating in a press conference 
that the way West Pakistan had behaved had made it impossible 
to 'live together'.1^6 He did, however, seem to balance 
some sharp word about the Pakistan Army's brutality with a 
conciliatory gesture that he bore no ill-will toward the 
'p eople ' of West Pakistan.167 Pakistan interpreted this 
as not ruling out totally the hope of interactions, but 
Bhutto's Press Secretary, Khalid Hassan, held the view that
165
New York Times, 31 December 1972.
1 ^ ibid., 9 January 1972.
16 7
The Times (London), 10 January 1972.
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'the last word had not been spoken' on any future constitu­
tional links . ^ 8
The chance of any future link was pushed further back 
each time a country accorded formal recognition to Bangladesh. 
Moreover, theoretically to Islamabad, that territory still 
formed part of Pakistan. Bhutto, therefore, floated some 
sort of a Pakistani 'Hallstein doctrine', warning that 
diplomatic relations would be severed with any country 
recognising the Dacca Government. To enforce this, he
169broke off diplomatic links with Bulgaria, Poland and Mongolia.
170However, Bhutto was soon to soften this rigid attitude.
Bangladesh Foreign Minister Samad's proposals to
Islamabad to exchange Bengalis in Pakistan for non-Bengalis
in Bangladesh were carried there by the U.N. Secretary-
171General's Sepcial Representative Vittorio Winspeare. The
Pakistani Press reactionwas hostile. It was argued that
unlike the bulk of the Bengalis serving 
in West Pakistan, the non-Bengalis in the 
East are domiciled there. They migrated 
there from India, made their homes there 
and settled there permanently. They are as 
much a part of Bangladesh as any other 
people; the exchange, if at all, could only 
be voluntary and on a restricted scale. 172
168 ibid., 13 January 1972.
169
New York Ttmes, 14 January 1972.
170 As the number of countries recognising Bangladesh increased, Pakistan 
ran the risk of becoming diplomatically isolated. Secondly, Pakistan 
could hardly break off links with her major donors. The Head of the Press 
Department at the Islamabad Foreign Office admitted that Pakistan was 'too 
small to try to halt the spate of recognition of Sheikh Mujib's government' 
Times of India, 19 February 1972. The pretension to a Hallstein doctrine 
was, therefore, soon given up.
Times of India, 13 February 1972.
172
Pakzstan Tzmes, 17 February 1972.
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While Bangladesh was offering this exchange of hostage
poulation, she was reserving the more important lever, the
POWs, to obtain Pakistani recognition of her sovereignty.
Dacca was signalling, prior to Bhutto-Gandhi Talks in Simla
in June 1972, that India could not solely negotiate the
171POWs with Pakistan. Therefore it was essential that
Bangladesh be a party to such negotiations. Mujib was, 
however, insistent that Bangladesh could not talk to Pakistan 
without the latter's formal recognition. At the same 
time he was politically committed to try those POWs 
charged with war crimes.
The political equation stood thus: Bangladesh had about
730,000 non-Bengalis (Biharis) she was offering to exchange 
for 400,000 Bengalis in Pakistan. Pakistan, not unwilling 
to release the Bengalis, wanted the 9 3,000 POWs back. For 
this Dacca insisted on negotiations, but only after recognition. 
At the same time Dacca was committed to the trial of some 
of the POWs, though this could be a strategy to strengthen 
her bargaining position, for in the long run, the POWs 
would have to be returned.
Bhutto wanted the POWs back, and quickly, to sooth 
his sword-arm, the Punjab, which supplied most of the held 
soldiers. For this, he knew he had to accord recognition, 
which his political enemies, bent on degrading his effect­
iveness were out to block. At the same time, he did not 
want such a large number of 'Biharis', for they would
173 See f.n.9l ante.
1 7 4  Bangladesh Observer, 22 March 1972.
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invariably wish to settle in Karachi in Sind, thus exacerbat­
ing the Sindhi-non-Sindhi conflict there. Pending the 
return of the POWs, Pakistan was using whatever means she 
had, such as her influence with China (which vetoed Bangladesh's 
application for U.N. membership) to block Bangladesh's
major foreign policy goals such as admission to the United
175Nations.
For Bhutto, the question of recognition of Bangladesh
was complicated by its transformation into a major domestic
political issue. While he himself was willing to accept
17 6the separation of Bangladesh as a fait accompli, he was
opposed by the right wing parties, particularly the Islamic 
fundamentalist Jamat-e-Islami. The Jamat leader, Mowlana 
Moudoudi, believed that Bhutto wanted to recognise Bangladesh 
to justify his own assumption of power in December 1971, for
17 7if Pakistan remained united, power would have gone to Mujib.
Bhutto's argument for recognition was basically that 
it would be in Pakistan's interest in three ways. Firstly, 
of course it would mean a return of the POWs. Secondly, and 
this was to circumvent right-wing opposition, he argued that 
Bangladesh was a Muslim state and interactions with Pakistan
The Pakistani position was explained by her leader of the U.N. delegation, 
Raja Tridiv Roy, who said that Pakistan would favourably consider not 
only the recognition of Bangladesh but also her entry into the U.N. only 
after the repatriation of POWs from India and after Bangladesh gives 
up her stand on the War-Crimes trials. Pakistan Times, 13 October 1972.
176 He had begun to advocate the acceptance of the 'reality of the 
situation'. The Times (London), 28 October 1972.
177 Pak%stan Tzmes, 12 November 1972.
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would minimise Indian influence there. Thirdly, he held that
the recognition issue involved the repayment of foreign
debts, the total burden of which would otherwise fall on 
179Pakistan.
Bangladesh seemed to receive the signals of Bhutto's
awkward domestic situation, and relaxed her own rigid stance
when in April 197 3 Foreign Minister Kamal Hossain, along
with his Indian counterpart came up with the proposal of
'simultaneous repatriation' of hostage populations including
POWs except for the 195 Pakistanis who were to be tried.
This was still unsatisfactory to Bhutto, for trials were
unacceptable to' Pakistan's powerful military constituency.
He therefore seemed to tighten the screw by threatening
180to 'react accordingly', implying that many Bengali officials
in Pakistan were likely to be similarly tried for 'treason'.
There was taking place in the subcontinent in the 
meanwhile a subtle change in the political slimate. First, 
the warmth was ebbing away from Indo-Bangladesh amity, 
slowly but surely. Secondly, vis-a-vis Pakistan's new 
aid donors, the Muslim states of the Middle East, Pakistan's 
rapprochement with Bangladesh, one of the largest of Muslim 
countries in terms of population, was a preferred development. 
Recognition was increasingly becoming a matter of mutual 
interest. The calculation that under the circumstances, war
178 ibid., 21 December 1972.
179 Bhutto's speech on 3 January 1973 at the Nishtar Park in Karachi, 
ibid., 4 January 1973.
180
17 8
New York Ttmes, 29 May 1973.
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trials might only be of chimerical value to Bangladesh 
and also that it might be an additional lever that Bangla­
desh would give up when a more favourable climate was 
achieved, played a large part in the Agreement between 
India and Pakistan on 2 8 August 197 3 (which Bangladesh 
backed) by which Pakistan agreed to accept a 'substantial 
number of Biharis' and to detach the question of the trials 
of the 195 officials from the repatriation of the PQWs.l^l 
In fact reports were soon appearing in the Pakistani Press 
that Bangladesh might not actually hold the trials at all
TOOas she was anxious to improve relations with Pakistan.
On 30 November Dacca helped to improve the climate 
further by declaring a general amnesty for about 40,000 
Bangladeshi prisoners who were detailed on various charges
1 o oof 'collaboration' with the Pakistanis. This prompted
the Pakistani Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Aziz
Ahmed, to indicate to the Parliament that Bangladesh was
well on the way to fulfilling the three preconditons for
recognition, viz. (a) repatriation of POWs, (b) abandoning
war crimes trials, and (c) stopping the 'persecution' of
184those who sided with Pakistan m  1971.
By January 1974 the climate of Bangladesh-Pakistan 
relations had improved considerably, though formal contacts 
were still lacking. All Bangladeshi defence and civil service
181 cSea f.n.96 ante.
See, for instance, Pakistan Times, 12 October 197 3.
183 ibid., 7 December 1973.
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personnel who had opted for Bangladesh had been repatriated,
in response to Dacca's request that their cases be dealt
with on a priority basis. 49,608 POWs were returned to
Pakistan, and 42,000 awaited repatriation. The total number
of Biharis repatriated to Pakistan stood at 63,180. Pakistan
had also cleared an additional 59,394 Biharis for repatriation,
and was expected to clear a further 25,000 persons on grounds
185of hardship. Such was the state of affairs when Pakistan
issued a formal invitation to Bangladesh to attend the Islamic
Summit Conference scheduled to be held in Lahore on 23 February
1974. But Dacca could not attend without formal recognition.
There was some hectic mediation by the Secretary-General
of the Islamic Secretariat Hassan el-Toamy and representatives
to the Conference from Kuwait, Lebanon, Somalia, Algeria,
Senegal and the Palestinian Liberation Organization. On
2 2 February Bangladesh and Pakistan accorded each other
mutual recognition, the former undertaking to sympathetically
186consider dropping the war crimes trials, (which was now
a foregone conclusion). The next day Mujib flew to Pakistan
to attend the Islamic Summit Conference.
The use of the Islamic Summit for formal rapprochement
had some significant implications. Firstly, it underlined
a common characteristic of both these countries, i.e. their 
i ,Muslimness, that set them apart from India; secondly, it
185 Statement by Islamabad Foreign Office Spokesman on 16 January 1974, 
reported in ibid., 17 January 1974.
186 See Times of India, 22 February 1974 and 23 February 1974.
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helped Bhutto silence the Jamat-i-Islami Opposition which 
was against recognition; thirdly, Mujib was able to widen 
his constituency to embrace those elements opposed to his 
secularist principles, and, finally it provided a new 
dimension in Bangladesh's foreign relations,by opening up 
for interactions the Muslim Middle East and Pakistan's friend 
China.
Recognition, however,did not entail complete rapproche­
ment. There were major pending issues such as (a) the 195 
POWs; (b) the repatriatio of Biharis; and (c) the division 
of assets. REcognition only made bilateral negotiations on 
these issues possible. There were however two major implicat 
ions of the recognition. Firstly, the disentanglement of 
Bangladesh from Pakistan was formally seen to be complete 
which further confirmed Bangladesh's sovereign status. 
Secondly, it helped create an atmosphere of goodwill. At 
the same time it brought to salience the unresolved issues, 
i.e. the three noted above.
B . The Salience of Issues - Some hard bargaining
The 19 5 POWs: The path was now cleared for tripartite 
discussions between India, Pakistan and Bangladesh which 
were held in April and led to the signing of an Agreement.
At issue lay two major problems; first, the fate of the 195 
POWs awaiting trial and second, the repatriation of the 
Biharis. Pakistan ^deeply regretted'the'war crimes', agreed 
that'excess and manifold crimes' were committed by the 195 
POWs but appealed to the people of Bangladesh to forgive 
and forget the mistakes of the past in order to promote
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reconciliation. In the light of all this, Bangladesh
agreed to drop the plans for war-trials 'as an act of
187clemency'. The POW issue was thus resolved.
The 'Biharis': Pakistan agreed to accept four categories 
of 'Biharis': (a) those of West Pakistani origin;
(b) those with family links in West Pakistan; (c) former 
Central Government employees and (d) 'hardship cases', generally 
meaning those whose lives were in danger in Bangladesh 
because they supported the Pakistan Army during the war.
Also the Pakistanis agreed to 'upon request, provide 
reason why any particular case has been rejected' and any 
aggrieved applicant could, at any time, seek a review of 
his application provided he was able to supply new facts 
or further information to the government of Pakistan.
This implied increase in the numbers of Bihari intake.
More than 500,000 had applied for repatriation; till 
then Pakistan had accepted around 70,000.188
This issue was not as easily soluble as the one of 
the POWs. The Pakistanis were unwilling to accept them, 
as they swelled the ranks of refugees in Karachi, exacerbating 
local-non-local conflicts in the Sind Province. Pakistan's 
Aziz Ahmed was quite blunt about it to the Bangladesh 
Foreign Minister.1  ^ The problem revolving round the 'numbers 
game' dragged on, and was given a fillip by the general failure 
of Bhutto's forthcoming visit in June. At that point, during
187
New York Tzmes, 8 April 1974. 
ibid.
Interview with former Foreign Minister, Dr Kamal Hossain, op.cit.189
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Mujib-Bhutto talks, the latter showed unwillingness to
accept a larger figure than 115,000 out of the 400,000
190eligible Biharis, according to the Bangladesh side.
Bangladesh raised it in the Third Committee of the
United Nations General Assembly in December 197 4. When the
Bangladesh representative Fazlul Karim pointed out that
400,000 Biharis still awaited repatriation, his Pakistani
counterpart Hassan Mahmud said that while his country
would be willing to receive some more of the 'hardship
cases', it would be 'too much to expect Pakistan to accept
191from Bangladesh every domiciled non-Bengali'. Mujib raised
it again at the Commonwealth Leaders Conference in Jamaica
in May 1975 when he criticised Pakistan's failure to take
back 63,000 Bihari families.
Even in the late 1970s there were Biharis who were
anxious to settle in Pakistan and rejoin their kin, many
of whom had been repatriated earlier.
In 1977 Pakistan agreed to take back 25,000 Biharis.
Out of these 4,790 were repatriated by sea, till the process
was halted due to the disturbed political situation in
Pakistan. Following fresh talks between the two governments,
and agitation by the stranded Biharis in Bangladesh, repat-
193n a t i o n  by air was resumed in September 1979. The issue
has now lost its urgency.
1 9 0  New York Times, 27 June 1977.
191
Pakzstan Tzmes, 2 December 1974.
192 ibid., 7 May 1975.
19 3
Bangladesh Tvmes, 15 September 1979.
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Division of assets: This emerged as the most intract­
able of the three major issues, and is still largely, unresolved. 
It also halted the rapidly developing rapprochement between 
the two states and led to the failure of Bhutto's visit to
Dacca in June 1974.
. . 194The visit, which was to be a 'journey of amity',
proved to be a failure mainly on this score. In the course
of their talks, Mujib proposed the following: (a) Pakistan
should agree in principle that former assets and liabilities
should be shared equitably; (b) that a joint commission
should examine the details, and (c) that Pakistan should
make a 'token payment' within two months, consisting of
Bangladesh's share of quantifiable assets (such as gold
resources, ships, aircraft) to meet her increasing needs.
Bangladesh's demand of the share of Pakistan's gold and
foreign exchange reserves came to $ 1 1 ,0 0 0 , 0 0 0  and other
assets totalled $4,000 million. Bhutto rejected the proposal
for an immediate payment and suggested that the question
be referred to an expert committee which would report within
1 9 5 19 6six months. To this, Dacca did not agree. The progress
towards complete normalisation of Dacca-Islamabad relations
19'was thus abruptly halted, with the failure of talks on assets.
194 Dawn (Karachi), 29 June 1974.
195
Keesings Contemporary Archives (August 19-25, 1974), p.26680.
196
Straits T%mes (Singapore), 17 January 1975.
197 Dr Kamal Hossain was expressing his government's 'feelings' when he said: 
'We are disappointed that a great opportunity has been missed in taking a 
giant step forward in reconciliation ... We found a total lack of response 
to the problems that are basic'. New York Times, 30 June 1974. His views 
were not shared by his Pakistani counterpart, Aziz Ahmed, who saw two
(cont'd)
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With the pressure from the Muslim countries of the
Middle East to establish diplomatic relations growing,
Pakistan at this stage was anxious to do so. But Bangladesh
19 8now linked this to the question of division of assets.
Bangladesh strategy was as follows: Kamal Hossain went to
the Islamic Foreign Ministers' Conference in Jeddah in July
1975 with complete authority from Mujib to establish diplomatic
relations with Pakistan. There he proposed arbitration on
the question of assets by Saudi Arabia, the U.A.E. and Kuwait
or any one of the three, and announced his government's
decision to abide by the outcome. By transferring the onus
to the Arab states, Hossain achieved three things: firstly,
the Arabs were forced into a position of neutrality from
that of identity with Pakistan; secondly, by placing complete
confidence in the Arabs, especially Saudi Arabia, he earned
their gratitude and cleared the way for Saudi recognition
which was still pending and thirdly, he placed Pakistan in
an awkward position from which she would find it difficult to
extricate herself without making some substantial concession.
It was agreed that the matter would be settled after the
forthcoming non-aligned conference in the following months,
199i.e. August 1975.
197 (cont'd)
principal achievements: (i) resumption of trade and (ii) cessation of mutual 
hostile propaganda. To Azis Ahmed, Kamal Hossain's disappointment with the 
talks arose presumably because Dacca had 'set its expectations in the 
matter of some of its proposals too high. Dawn, 1 August 1974.
198 The question of liabilities (as opposed to assets) was settled not 
through bilateral negotiations between Pakistan and Bangladesh but through 
separate discussions between Pakistan and external donors on the one hand 
and Bangladesh and external donors on the other, whereby Bangladesh accepted 
liability for projects visibly located in her territory.
199 The account is based on the interview with Dr Kamal Hossain, op.cit.
Also see Chapter 6.
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On 15 August the Mujib government was overthrown in
a Coup, and the new Mushtaq e government projected strong
Islamic characteristics. Pakistan made early overtures
and following a meeting between Aziz Ahmed and the new
Bangladesh Foreign Minister Justice Abu Sayed Chowdhury
200m  New York, diplomatic gelations were established.
The question of division of assets receded into the back- 
201ground. Soon Pakistan herself was immersed m  a
political turmoil, and the Bhutto government was in no 
position to negotiate on this issue. The asset question 
remains unresolved to date and is a potential bone of dis­
content, that is likely to become salient should any future 
government in Dacca choose to make it so.
/C . The Detente
(i) Political relations; Perceiving the strong Islamic 
tenor of the new government in Bangladesh, and wrongly assum­
ing that an Islamic' Republic ahd been proclaimed in Dacca 
(something that Dacca denied to the Indians forthwith),
Bhutto announced fresh recognition (taking the credit of 
being the first to recognise the new regime) and urged
202others, particularly the Islamic countries to do likewise. 
Mushtaq, the President in Dacca, who had on the day of his
200
Paktstan Tzmes, 5 October 1975.
201 The Mushtaque Government apparently paid a higher priority to the 
establishment of diplomatic relations, largely due to the fact that 
relations with India had deteriorated.
Pakzstan T^mes, 16 August 1975.
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inauguration spoken of normalising relations in the Sub-
7 0 3continent, had a message to Bhutto delivered through the
Swiss Embassy in which he said his government looked forward
'with confidence to the earliest opening of a new chapter
between [our] two countries, the normalisation of relations
and the forging of friendly and brotherly ties between
[us] ' .204 Thereafter Mushtaq sent a personal emissary to
205Bhutto, Pir Mohsenuddin.
The first official high level meeting took place when
the Foreign Minister of the Mushtaq Government, Abu Sayeed
Chowdhury, met Aziz Ahmed in New York on 25 September during
206the U.N. General Assembly session. Following A.S.
Chowdhury-Aziz Ahmed talks, on 4 October, it was jointly
announced that diplomatic relations at the level of Ambassadors
207would be stablished.
The Coups in Dacca in November 1975 delayed the imple­
mentation of this decision as perhaps fresh choices needed 
to be made. On 9 December Pakistan announced the appointment 
of M. Khurshid, who presented his credentials in January 1976. 
The envoy from Bangladesh, M. Zahiruddin, left Dacca for
t , , 208Islamabad on 29 December.
203
New York Tvmes, 17 August 1975.
204 „ , •Pakzstan Tzmes, 26 August 1975.
205 Interview with Dr Kamal Hossain, op.cit.
206
Paktstan Tzmes, 26 September 1975.
207 The announcement was made at a Press Conference by the Pakistani and 
Bangladesh Ambassadors to the U.N., Iqbal Akhund and S.A. Karim. Pakistan 
Times, 5 October 1975.
208 . . ibid., 10 Decemberl975 and 29 December 1975. Khurshid, a retired civil
servant had a long career of service in the Eastern Wing of Pakistan.
Zahiruddin, a senior politician was once a Minister in the Central 
Government of Pakistan.
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When Bangladesh took the Farakka issue to the U.N.
in 1976, Pakistan accorded her support. The Pakistani
Ambassador to the U.N., Iqbal Akhund, underlined the common
problem of weaker countries like Pakistan and Bangladesh 
\
vis-a-vis powerful neighbours like India when he said:
In the absence of respect for the decisions 
and resolutions of the U.N. and of effective 
machinery for enforcing settlements the 
more powerful state can always make its will 
prevail over the less-powerful - even without 
the use of force.209
The displacement of Bhutto, did not make any difference
to 'the framework of harmonious relations' that had already
been established. President Ziaur.Rahman of Bangladesh
visited Pakistan in December 1977, and with the new Pakistani
strongman General Ziaul Huq 'reiterated [their] conviction
that the continuance of [bilateral visits] would promote
closer bilateral cooperation and strengthen their historic
, ^ . 2 1 0  and cultural ties'.
There was in the meanwhile a general easing of tension
between India and Pakistan as well, resulting in the Indian
. . .  . 2 Foreign Minister Vajpayee's visit to Pakistan in February 1978.
This on the backdrop of improved Indo-Bangladesh relations,
/provided a modicum of general detente in the Subcontinent.
An illustration of this significantly-.changed atmosphere was
ibid., 26 September 1976.
210 Joint Commumque issued at the end of the visit of H.E. President Zzaur 
Rahman of the People's Republic of Bangladesh to the Islamic Republic of 
Pakistan on 22nd-23rd December 1977 (Dacca, Ministry of External Affairs), 
December 1977.
211 Far Eastern Economic Revzew, 24 February 1978. There was obviously 
the hand of Iran in encouraging this Subcontinental detente between India, 
Pakistan and Bangladesh in furtherance of the Shah's pet project of the 
regional 'common market1 stretching from Dacca to Tehran. See Asia Week 
(H6ng Kong), 24 February 1978.
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provided in October 1978 when Pakistan and India both supported
Bangladesh's candidature for the United Nations Security
Council, when for the first time since 1971 a major foreign
policy aim of one of the three countries was supported by
the other two.
In reacting to the developments in Afghanistan in late
1979, Bangladesh's views were in concert with those of
Pakistan, which felt threatened by the proximity of the Soviet
presence. Bangladesh, at the Islamic Foreign Ministers
Conference held in Islamabad in January 19 80, strongly
voiced her demand for withdrawal of 'foreign troops' from 
212Afghanistan. Such reactions, naturally, were pleasing to
Pakistan.
(ii) Economic Relations:
Aid: The major area of economic coopration between
Bangladesh and Pakistan has been in that of trade
relations, rather than aid relations. Given Pakistan's
own security of resources, Pakistan did not, as expected,
emerge as a major external donor, as regards Bangladesh.
There were small allocations made, in grant form, from time
to time, however, which had more demonstrative rather than
substantive effects.
Till 30 June 197 8 the total amount of aid received
213from Pakistan had been $33,520 all as grant. The
entire amount had also been utilised. There had been
212 Bangladesh Observer, 28 January 1980.
213 A.M.A. Muhith, 'Is Foreign Aid Essential for Development in Bangla­
desh?' Paper delivered at a Seminar organised by the Dacca University 
Arthaniti Charcha Kendra, December 1978.
129
no serious problems with the utilisation of this comparatively 
small amount of Pakistani aid.
There were some other areas of increased contact in 
the economic sector. In November 1976 the Bangladesh Rail­
way Secretary visited Pakistan to finalise the details of 
the supply of railway coaches worth US$5 million. A
Memorandum of Understanding was signed involving the transfer
214of 28 carriages manufactured in Turkey and in Pakistan.
As a gesture of goodwill, Bhutto decided to make a gift
215of a Boeing 707 aircraft to Bangladesh. This helped to
mollify Bangladesh somewhat, though the latter had made 
formal claims on a larger share of the Pakistan International 
Airlines' assets including planes.
Trade: Even prior to the signing of the Trade Agreement 
between Bangladesh and Pakistan in May 1976, there was 
considerable trade between the two countries as the following 
table reveals:21^
TABLE 3.5
(in million Pakistan Rsi
Year Imports into 
Bangladesh
Exports from 
Bangladesh
Total Balance of 
Trade
1974-75 138 34.06 172.6 (-) 103.4
1975-76 2 2 0 70.75 297.05 (-) 149.25
1976-77 73.22 256.76 329.98 (+) 183.54
214 , .
Pakzstan Tzmes, 5 November 1976.
215
Dawn,(Karachi), 3 November 1976.
216 Figures obtained from the Bangladesh Trade Commissioner's Office, 
Karachi.
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The table reveals an adverse balance of trade for 
Bangladesh in the first two years, but a considerably favour­
able balance in the third. There is a greater scope for
increase in the exports from Bangladesh especially in tea,
217pharmaceutical products, hides and skins and teakwood.
There is a possibility therefore that economic relations
with Pakistan will continue to grow, if the political climate
remains stable. Various kinds of accords continued to be
signed between the two governments, such as one in November
1979 for the avoidance of double taxation of income between
218Bangladesh and Pakistan.
IV. Conclusions
The late 1970s witnessed a growing spirit of detente
in the Subcontinent with marked improvement in the mutual
relations between the three actors of the Subsystem, India,
219Pakistan and Bangladesh. India continued to occupy the
pivotal point in Bangladesh's external relations. Though 
some basic problems have come close to being solved, three
Interview with Mr Quamrul Huda, Bangladesh Trade Commissioner,
Karachi, June 1978.
218 Bangladesh, Vol.Ill, No.9 (Dacca), 15 November 1979.
219 While Mrs Gandhi's return to office does not immediately portend a 
reversal of detente, the process may come under severe strain in the 1980s, 
if the U.S. mounts any. arms aid programme to Pakistan in reaction to Soviet 
presence in Afghanistan. Such aid has been assured by President Carter 
in his State of the Union Message to Congress in January 1980. Pakistan 
is reportedly pressing for such sophisticated items as A-7 and F-15 air­
craft (Time, February 1980) and India is not likely to look upon this 
kindly for, while this may be initially directed against possible Soviet 
threat, it is bound to have implications for regional strategic balance.
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factors in Indo-Bangladesh relations are likely to inspire
growing concern. Firstly, future changes of government in
either country. Traditionally changes of govern®fints have
played crucial roles in setting the tone in mutual relations.
While Dacca may have good working relations with a government
in New Delhi, Bangladesh will need to be in ready preparation
for a successor Indian government which may not be as friendly
(the same would of course be true of Delhi). Secondly,
the economic relations have not kept pace with the political.
There is therefore the constant risk that at any point in
time the former may affect the latter adversely. Thirdly,
domestic political situations in both countries tend to
affect their bilateral relations. Communal riots are one
example. When the inter-religious communal harmony in
either state breaks down, for whatever reason, it is likely
to have implications for inter-state relations. For all
these reasons Bangladesh continues to seek a balance against
2 20any potential sense of threat from her powerful neighbour.
Traditionally, this balance was obtained by a coalition 
with the community now represented by Pakistan. But vis-a-vis 
any potential threat from India, Pakistan no longer constitutes 
a sufficient deterrent. This is for three main reasons: 
firstly, the 19 71 war had left her militarily by far the 
weaker; secondly, Pakistan herself was acknowledging Indian
220 For a senior academic's reaction to the present state of inter-State 
affairs in the region, see Professor M.A. Aziz, Can There Be a Durable 
Peace in the Subcontinent? (Dacca: Dahuk Publishers, 1978), passim.
Dr Aziz argues that there cannot be a durable peace though obviously 
this represents an extreme, but powerful, viewpoint.
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pre-eminence if not predominance in the region; thirdly,
Pakistan was becoming more involved with the Muslim Middle
222East and turning away from South Asia.
As a structural response to India, Bangladesh sees
it necessary to build external linkages to bolster
her sense of security. This policy continues even in the
absence of specific threats. Regional detente might moderate
the intensity of the search for linkages but does not
eliminate it. At the same time the process of detente is
fed by the satisfaction of this sense of security, as in
the period following the Farakka Agreement.
Farakka remains the crucial issue upon which the structure
of Indo-Bangladesh relations hinges. With Mrs Gandhi's return
to power in 19 80, a reappraisal by her of her predecessor's
policies on this matter cannot be ruled out. If her government
effects any significant change of posture, it might provoke
Dacca's adverse reactions, and thereby, upset the apple-cart 
/
of detente in the Subcontinent.
Bangladesh's search for extra-regional linkages involves 
her in interactions with several actors in the global arena, 
in particular, the two superpowers, China and the countries 
of the Middle East.
221 William J. Barnds, 'United States Policy toward South Asia: Shifting 
Perceptions and Policy Choices', Pacific Community, Vol.8, No.4 (July, 
1977), p.656. This will only change if there is considerable accretion 
to Pakistan's strength because of the promised American military assistance 
in the 1980s.
222 . . Mohammed Ayoob, 'India and Pakistan: Prospects for Detente', Paczfzc
Community, Vol.8, No.l (October 1976), pp.149-169, passim.
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EXTRA-REGIONAL RELATIONS: THE SUPERPOWERS
I . Introduction
In one crucial aspect Bangladesh's relations with
the Superpowers differed from that of Pakistan in the
previous years. Pakistan was linked to the Dominant System
as an ally of one of the Central Protagonists, the U.S.A.
For Bangladesh such a linkage with the global Dominant
System was not practicable, for two broad reasons. Firstly,
it is difficult for a minor power to break into the
Dominant System on its own without invitation. With the
heat of the Cold War gradually cooling with the resultant
change in the global politico-strategic situation, such
an invitation was unlikely.
Secondly, even if it was forthcoming, it was unlikely
that Bangladesh herself would accept it. Traditionally,
the region that is Bangladesh was opposed to alliances , 1
and the Awami League was publicly committed against such 
. . 2military pacts. Hence neither Superpower could be looked 
upon as a possible source for accretion of military power.
Even then, the Superpowers remained important for 
Bangladesh. Firstly, both Superpowers have constituencies
1 See Iftekhar A. Chowdhury, 'Pakistan's Western Alliance in the 1950s 
and 60s' (Unpublished M.A. Dissertation, A.N.U., 1977), p.33.
2
Our Struggle Must Go On: Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's Pre-electzon Speech3 
Public Relations Department, Government of Bangladesh, u.d., p.14.
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in Bangladesh, though the reverse is not so. The Soviet 
Union has a sympathetic segment among the left wing parties 
(e.g. NAP Muzaffar and the pro-Soviet Bangladesh Communist 
Party (Moni Singh Group)). The United States holds 
significant interest for the Middle Class, structurally
3linked to her economically and culturally. For these 
reasons for a small power like Bangladesh, the U.S.A. and 
the U.S.S.R. are not just two other State Actors to be dealt 
with in accordance with the ordinary rules of inter-State 
relations. Relations with each have dimensions that have 
considerable domestic relevance. Secondly, both were 
important sources of much-needed material assistance.
It was, however, unlikely that Bangladesh could involve 
either Superpower to her advantage in the major preoccupation 
of her foreign policy, i.e. relations with India. What
Vsort of policies could and did Dacca evolve vis-a-vis those 
two countries, given the above constraints? This chapter 
attempts to make a detailed examination of this question.
II. The U.S.S.R.
A. Soviet Role during the Struggle for Bangladesh:
(i) The Background
Several factors determined the Soviet attitude towards 
South Asia on the eve of the 1970s. Firstly, it was felt in 
Moscow following British withdrawal from 'East of Suez 1
3 /For a theoretical expose of how the local elites in the developing
world become thus linked see Susan George, Hou the Other Half Dies: The 
Real Reasons for World Hunger (London: Pelican, 1977), pp.69-88. Also 
Chapter 10 of this thesis.
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that the U.S., Australia and Japan were casting longing
4glances at the area. This, together with the growing
rivalry with China, occasioned Brezhnev to announce at
the World Communist Party Conference in June 1969:
We are of the opinion that the course 
of events is putting on the agenda 
the task of creating a system of 
Collective Security in A s i a . 5
Both Pakistan and India were looked upon as potential allies
in such a scheme. An essential requirement of its success
was stability in the Subcontinent.
Secondly, not only did the Soviets favour Subcontinental
stability but they also viewed themselves as the guardian
of such stability, having initiated the peace-talks between
India and Pakistan following the 1965 war leading to the
conclusion of belligerency by the Tashkent Declaration of
January 1966. The Tashkent Declaration symbolised the
mediating and peace-keeping role of the Soviet Union, and
this was demonstrated by the regular observance of its
anniversary by the Soviet authorities. On the eve of such
an anniversary on 9 January 19 71, Tass wrote:
The spirit of the Tashkent Declaration 
confirmed that in the present conditions 
the only possible appraoch to the settle­
ment of disputes between states is the 
renunciation of force and the settlement 
of these problems at a Conference Table . 6
4 V.V. Matveyev, 'A Filled Vacuum1, Izvestza, 29 May 1969; Current Digest 
of the Soviet Press (CDSP), XXI, 22(1969), 14.
5 Tass, 7 June 1969, CDSP, XXI, 21(1969), 16.
Quoted in Asian Recorder, 29 January-4 February 1971, p.9987.
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The Soviet aim therefore was to bring India and Pakistan 
together. The Soviets were happy with Mrs Gandhi, who 
credited the U.S.S.R. with being more interested in economic
7cooperation than in military alliances. The Indian Foreign
Minister Di^nesh Singh was reported in the Russian Press
as saying that the
essence of the Soviet [security] plan 
is the development of cooperation among 
Asian countries for strengthening of peace . 8
Small wonderIzvestia exulted in Mrs Gandhi's election victory
in March 1971 as
another convincing evidence of the 
fact that the Indian people came out 
consistently for strengthening their 
national independence for social 
progress and for peaceful foreign policy.^
Up|to that point, the Soviets were also happy with the 
political developments in Pakistan, where after the election 
victory of December 19 70, Mujib's Awami League was poised 
for victory. Over the years Moscow had altered her former 
unfavourable attitude towards the Awami League"^ and had 
now begun to see it in a more favourable light, since the 
more left-wing parties in Pakistan were assuming a pro-Peking
7 Robert H. Donaldson, Soviet Policy Towards India: Ideology and Strategy 
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1974), p.220.
8 'Pravda', 29 September 1969. CDSP, XXI 38(1969), 16.
9
Astan Recorder, 16-22 April 1971, p.10102.
^  Suhrawardy, the Awami League Prime Minister of Pakistan during 1956-57 
had close links with the West. The Soviets had seen the Six Points 
Programme of the Awami League, enunciated in 1966, as 'separatist 
tendencies' which were being fanned by 'American agents'. Radio Peace 
and Progress, 16 Marcj§ 1967, quoted in I. Clark, 'Soviet Policies 
Towards India and Pakistan, 1965-71', Unpublished Ph.D Thesis, A.N.U.,
1972, p.101.
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colour. It was argued on a theoretical plane that the most 
radical parties objectively aided reactionary forces by 
narrowing the united front, and that the correct path of
non-capitalist development was through bourgeois democratic
11 12 reforms. Seen as a 'centrist' party in March 19 70, the
Awami League within months was raised to the status of a 'left'
force with reforming tendencies and desire for friendship with
13the Soviet Union, conforming to the Soviet ideal of the
'correct path to non-capitalist development'. Mujib, to
Moscow, was 'the Nehru of Pakistan - a votary of non-alignment,
14secularism, socialism and democracy'.
(ii) Initial Soviet Appraisal: Pakistan's 'Internal 
Affairs'?
Moscow's hopes were rudely jarred by Yahya's military
crackdown of 25 March 1971, the imprisonment of Mujib, and
the escape to India of the Awami League leadership. On
2 April 19 71 Podgorny sent a message to Yahya which is quoted
in detail because of its importance:
... We have been and remain convinced that 
the complex problems that have arisen in 
Pakistan of late can and must be solved
politically without use of force.
Continuation of repressive measures 
and bloodshed in East Pakistan will 
undoubtedly make the solution of the
11 I. Borisov, Pravda, 10 October 1971. CDSP, XXIII, 41(1971), 1.
12 V. Nakargakov, Izvestza, 12 March 1970, cited in Bhabani San Gupta,
Soviet-Asian Relations in the 1970s and Beyond: An Inlerperceptional 
Study (New York: Praeger, 1976), p.198.
A. Filippov, Pravda, 14 August 1970, ibid.
14 Vijay Singh Budhraj, 'Moscow and the Birth of Bangladesh', Astan 
Survey (May 1973), p.489.
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problem and may do great harm to the 
vital interest of the entire people of 
Pakistan.
We consider it our duty to address 
you ... with an insistent appeal for the 
adoption of the most urgent measures 
to stop the bloodshed and repression 
against the population of East Pakistan 
and for turning to methods of peaceful 
political s e t t l e m e n t .15 [emphases mine.]
The letter is most significant in that while urging 
'peaceful political settlement' which would no doubt mean 
transfer of power to the Awami League, the use of words as 
'bloodshed' and 'repression' (twice each) were calculated to trans 
mit Soviet firmness and cognizance of Pakistan's brutal policies 
though the mention of the 'entire people of Pakistan' seemed 
to favour a solution that retained territorial integrity.
Yahya's reply was sharp. He asked the Soviet Union to 
use her undeniable influence over India to prevent the latter 
from 'meddling in Pakistan's internal affairs'. No country, 
including the U.S.S.R., could allow 'anti-national and 
unpatriotic elements to proceed to destroy, or to countenance 
subversion'. Mujib's rival, the pro-Peking West Pakistani 
Peoples' Party leader Bhutto described Podgorny's letter 
as 'blatant interference' and found it regrettable 'that 
the Soviet Union could have forgotten Lenin's socialist
Asian Recorder, 14-20 May 1971, p.10160.15
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principles, the foremost of which was to refrain from
16interference in the affairs of other countries'.
The Soviet Union reacted strongly to this attempt to
tutor her leadership on the principles of Leninism. But
this was confined to unpublished confidential notes between
Moscow and Islamabad, which, according to a former Minister
in Yahya's Cabinet, were more acrimonious than the published 
17exchanges. However, in the interest of maintaining the
unity of Pakistan, the Soviets publicly continued their
efforts to convince Yahya of the need for 'a political
18settlement' rather than a 'military solution'. Reiterating 
Soviet support for the territorial integrity of Pakistan, 
one journal warned that 'the imperialists would not be averse
ibid., p.10158. Bhutto may well have been wrong in analyzing how 
Lenin would have viewed the situation. The other side could have, 
as they indeed, did, quoted Lenin more justifiably. For, 'On the 
National Question' Lenin held that 'the masses know perfectly well, the 
value of geographical and economic ties and the advantages of a big 
market and a big state. They will, therefore, resort to secession only 
when the national oppression and national friction make joint life 
absolutely intolerable and hinder any and all economic intercourse. In 
that case, the interests of capitalist development and the freedom of 
the class struggle will be best solved by secession'. V.I. Lenin, 
Collected. Works, Vol.20 (Moscow: Progress Publishers), p.17. Lenin 
would have encouraged the demand of national self-determination of the 
Bengalis (Lenin referred not only to nations but also to nationalities), 
because he saw the demand for such right, and the consistent struggle 
to achieve it, as being in the interest of the class struggle of the 
proletariat for the victory of socialism, since it facilitated the 
differentiation of the classes [in any given country] raising the class 
consciousness of the proletariat and promoting international solidarity 
and unity of all workers of different nations against domestic and 
foreign exploiters. See V.V. Zenin, 'Lenin on the National and Colonial 
Question', Lenin: The Great Theoretician (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 
1970), pp.316-317.
17 G.W. Choudhury, India, Pakistan3 Bangladesh and the Mac or Powers: 
Politics of a Divided Subcontinent (New York: The Free Press, 1975), 
p.205.
18 I. Ratnikov, Pravda, 1 May 1971. CDSP, XIII (18), 28.
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to taking advantage of the situation in Pakistan to further
19their selfish neo-colonial aims'.
So far the Soviets while disapproving strongly of 
Yahya's methods, were addressing only Islamabad in urging 
solutions. Implicit in this was the Soviet view that this 
was an internal affair of Pakistan. Moreover, Moscow was 
firm in reiterating the need to retain the unity of Pakistan 
as a single state, lest 'imperialists' and China take 
pickings from any disintegration of that country.
(iii) Soviet Reappraisal: More than 'An Internal Affair'
Till May 19 71 the Soviets were content to treat the
troubles in Pakistan as the latter's internal affair. Little
note was taken of the fact that in April the Bangladeshi
leadership-in-exile had constituted a separate government.
The nascent Bangladesh provisional government sought
and obtained the support of pro-Moscow Bengali left wing
parties who were now appealing for Soviet support. Muzaffar
Ahmed of NAP (Pro-Moscow) combined his declaration of
allegiance to the new government with an appeal to Moscow
20on 20 April 19 71. A few days later Abdus Salam, Secretary
of the. Communist Party of East Pakistan (Bangladesh)
emphasised their struggle as one 'against a ruthless and
barbarous enemy armed to the teeth by the imperialists and
21having the support of the Maoists of China'. Even the
^  New Times, No.15, 14 April 1971, pp.8-9.
20 Bangladesh Documents (Madras: Ministry of External Affairs, India, 
u.d.), pp.228-229.
21 ibid., p.317.
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pro-Peking Bhashani sent cables to the Soviet leadership
22appealing in Lenin's name. In May the Communist Party of
Bangladesh (pro-Moscow) adopted an 18-Point Programme whose
salient features concerned the complete 'liberation' of
Bangladesh, as an 'independent, sovereign, democratic,
republican state with a view to advancing along the path
23of socialism'.
The pro-Moscow Bangladesh parties were pointing out 
three things to the Kremlin. Firstly, the newly formed 
Bangladesh Government in exile conformed to'the correct 
path within the framework of a broad united front; secondly, 
that the situation exemplified a classical Leninist scenario 
that called for support to the struggle for self-determination 
and thirdly, that China was beginning to be seen as being 
ranged on the other side. These were powerful arguments 
before the Soviet leadership who claimed ideology as the 
basis of state policy. Then there was of course the added 
opportunity to wean away some pro-Peking sympathisers, 
notably Bhashani and his followers.
The Soviets were therefore constrained to make a 
concession, but not directly to the Bangladeshi leadership- 
in-exile but to India. On 8  June, following the visit of 
the Indian Foreign Minister Swaran Singh to Moscow, the 
Joint Communique noted that both the Soviet Union and India 
considered it necessary that Pakistan should take urgent 
measures 'to stop the flow of refugees from East P a k i s t a n'
22 ibid., pp.300-301.
23 . . .Eric Stromquist, Yearbook of International Communist Affazrs (Hoover
Institute Press: 1972), p.567.
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and 'that further steps be taken to ensure that peaoe is 
restored for the safe return of the refugees to their 
homes'. Furthermore, Moscow and Delhi agreed to hold
24'exchange of views' in the future in this connection.
[Emphases mine.]
*An analysis of the communique shows that the Soviets 
now recognised the refugee issue as having drawn India 
into what was formerly Pakistan's internal affair. Promise 
of future interactions on the subject pointed to more of it. 
However the Soviets, while reappraising the situation were 
refusing to draw India into discussions, beyond the refugee 
problem, on the substantive issues. The steps to be 'taken 
to ensure that peace is restored' were related only 'to 
the safe return of the refugees' (in which India was involved) 
and not to the ultimate political solution (in which I odia 
was not). Reference to the troubled province as East Pakistan 
in the communique must have been on Soviet insistence, as 
the Indians would have liked to call it 'East Bengal'.
The Indians, however, played their cards well. For 
years the Soviets had been anxious to formalise their close 
ties with India, and the increasing possibility of a Sino- 
American entente, Kissinger's initiatives to that end 
having already begun with the secret trip to Peking in June, 
heightened its need. India now indicated her willingness to 
sign a Treaty, and in course of Gromyko's visit to New Delhi 
on 9 August 19 71 the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship 
and Cooperation was signed.
24
Pravda, 9 June 1971. CDSP, XIII (23), 17.
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It is likely that in signing this treaty Moscow was 
motivated by three considerations: firstly, to formalize 
bilateral links with India; secondly, to checkmate Chinese 
diplomatic and political intrusion into the Subcontinent 
and thirdly, to restrain both India and Pakistan from 
adventurist actions. While the Agreement may indeed have 
signalled the recognition by the Soviets of 'the possibility
25that stability and status quo could no longer be reconciled',
the Soviets seemed to have succeeded in convincing the
Pakistanis what Pravda did indeed argue on 11 August, that
2 6the treaty was not directed at any third party. The 
Pakistani Foreign Secretary S.M. Khan, while justifying 
such an agreement between two states as sanctioned by the 
U.N. Charter, did indeed hope that the Soviet Union would
27use her influence to prevent India from attacking Pakistan.
But given Pakistan's strong links with China, such a 
view could not be sustained for long. The Pact had obvious 
anti-Chinese implications. Moreover, whatever the Soviet 
Union's objective might have been, India had managed to 
convert her into an ally; Pakistan was now left to seek out 
hers and the obvious candidates were China and the U.S. The 
Treaty therefore had the effect of deepening the division 
in the Subcontinent and dichotomising major power attitudes.
25 . . . .G. Jukesj The Sovzet Umon zn Asza (Sydney: Angus and Robertson,
1973), pp.134-135.
26 Quoted in Times of India, 12 August 1971.
27 Kayhan International (Tehran), 25 August 1971.
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Soviet hopes of a united Pakistan under Awami League
government were fast eroding, as were prospects of peace in
the Suncontinent. The actions of the Pakistani government
were running contrary to Soviet advice. Mujib's trial
2 8reportedly opened on 11 August. Secondly, Yahya installed
. . . . . 2 a Civilian Government of his own choice in Dacca on 31 August,
making it obvious that Yahya's kind of 'political solution'
was one that did not involve the Awami League. Thirdly,
Mrs Gandhi visited the Soviet Union in September and sought
Soviet support in the conflict that looked increasingly
imminent. Fourthly, Soviet initiatives undertaken by
Podgorny, during the celebration of the Iranian monarchy's
2,500th anniversary, in course of which he met both Pakistan's
Yahya and the Indian President Giri in order to bring upon
31a rapprochement,failed. Fifthly, the Bangladeshi leader­
ship was adamant in its claim to independence and Firyubin's 
efforts of 24 October, when he met such Bengali leaders as
Tajuddin Ahmed and Mahbub Alam Chashi, to persuade them to
32scale down their demands, did not succeed. There was no 
doubt that the events in the Subcontinent were rushing towards 
a denouement. It would be necessary for Moscow to choose 
sides. Events were soon closing off the options.
B.B.C., Radio Accra, Radio Cologne and Radio Australia announced the 
opening of the trial but without quoting any source. Asian Recorder, 
17-23 September 1971, p.10366.
29 ibid., 1-7 October, 1971, p.19389.
p . ■ antfi dl£_Ae*£-cL
The Times (London), 18 October 1971. 
ibid., 25 October 1971.
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(iv) Soviet Support to India and Bangladesh
The last straw on the camel's back was Pakistan's
public and explicit courting of Chinese support when Bhutto
led a military mission to Peking in November. In a banquet
speech on 7 November Bhutto spoke of some countries having
succumbed to Indian pressure, which was interpreted to be
33critical of the Soviet Union. Pakistan further gave
Moscow cause for annoyance, by refusing to permit Marshal
Kutakhov's aircraft to overfly her territory during his
34visit to India in November. Also unless the Liberation
War ended successfully soon, there was a danger that more
radical pro-Peking groups would come to lead the struggle.
As the December hostilities began, the Soviet stratagem
came out in relief. In a public speech to the Sixth Congress
of the Polish United Workers' Party Brezhnev analysed the
conflict as being caused by the 'bloody suppression of the
basic rights and clearly expressed will of the population
of East Pakistan'. Brezhnev suggested what was to be the
theme of Soviet argument at the United Nations. He called
for a cease-fire and insisted that Pakistan simultaneously
take effective action aimed at a political settlement based
on the will of the East Pakistani people 'as expressed
in the December 1970 elections'. He insisted that these
35two points were inseparably linked.
33 Aszan Almanac, 1972, p.5004. Also see A. Yakubov, 'Conflict in 
Hindustan and the Mao Group's Provocation Role', Pravda, 28 December 1971. 
CDSP, XXII (52), 2.
^  The Statesman (Calcutta), 5 November 1971.
35 For complete text of speech, Pravda, December 8, pp.1-2. Also see
Yurr$ Zhukov, 'Where is the Way Out?', Pravda, 10 December 1971. CDSP, 
XXIII (49).
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In the same vein, a Soviet analyst argued:
It was impossible to separate the 
question of cessation of military 
operations from a political 
settlement in East Pakistan. These 
are the two aspects of the same problem.
Anyone who insists on resolving the 
first question while brushing aside 
the second question, is whether he wants 
or not, objectively preserving the 
causes of the current conflict and 
facilitating its resumption, sooner or 
later.36
This stand deserves some analysis. On the surface 
it appeared that by urging cessation of hostilities and 
political settlement the Soviets wanted to stop short of 
complete independence for Bangladesh. But by linking 
the two 'inseparably', the Soviets vetoed the prospects of 
the first preceding the second. Thereby, by allowing the 
fighting to continue (since settlement was impossible while 
the fighting lasted) the Soviets ensured the ultimate end 
of the drama, the surrender of the Pakistani troops and 
the creation of Bangladesh. This was contrary to the U.S. 
stand in the Security Council which called for the cease­
fire to be effected first and which was opposed by the Soviet 
Ambassador Yakov Malik for evading the root cause of the 
fighting West Pakistan's military suppression of East
Pakistan/and for equating the two belligerents India and 
Pakistan.^
Though Brezhnev called for a settlement according to 
the will of the East Pakistanis as expressed in the 1970
36 V. Kudryavtsev, 'Flames Over South Asia', Izvestia, 12 December 1971. 
CDSP, XXIII (50), 9.
37 Astan Recorder, 1972, pp.5014-5015.
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elections (which should have implied not independence for 
Bangladesh, but transfer of power to the Awami League within 
the framework of Pakistan), the line was taken that the 
'will' had now transformed into a'demand*for independence 
'in reaction to the massive repressions the [Pakistani] 
Government employed to impose its will on the absolute 
majority of East Pakistan's people'. Independence was 
endorsed as it was 'a reflection of the peoples' indignation 
at the policy of the ruling circles which had trampled
3 8the elementary human rights of the East Pakistani population'.
While, at the United Nations, the Soviets assisted the 
fulfilment of Indo-Bangladesh aims by preventing a cease­
fire and allowing a fight to the finish, direct support 
was also being rendered close to the theatre of conflict.
As a signal to the world, and more specifically to the 
Chinese and the Americans, of firm Soviet commitment to 
the Indo-Soviet pact, the first Deputy Foreign Minister
V.V. Kuznetsov arrived in New Delhi on 11 December 1971
39when the war was being fiercely fought. Reassurance came
from the Soviet Ambassador to New Delhi, N. Pegov, who
told Mrs Gandhi on 13 December that in case of Chinese
intervention, the Soviets would open diversionary action
40in Sinkiang, an assurance that boosted the Indian morale. 
Finally, the Soviets reacted to the American fleet in the
38 V. Shurigyn, 'For Peace in Hindustan', 16 December 1971. CDSP,
Vol.XXIII (50) , p.9.
39 Pran Chopra, India's Second Liberation (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT,
1974), p.199.
40 Basant Chatterjee, Indo-Soviet Friendship: An Analytical Study 
(New Delhi: S. Chand & Co., 1974), p.138.
Ocean with their own presence, precluding the former's inter­
vention in Pakistan's favour which would have triggered off
41a conflict of global dimensions.
Soviet support was therefore invaluable in bringing 
to fruition Bangladesh's emergence.
B . Post-Independence Bangladesh and the Soviet Union:
(i) Initial Soviet and Bangladeshi circumspection 
Despite Soviet support to Bangladesh at the time of her 
birth, the nascent state did not receive immediate Soviet 
recognition. The U.S.S.R's policy was once again couched in 
utmost circumspection, just as it was when the struggle for 
Bangladesh's independence had commenced in 19 71. There were 
three-fold reasons for this delay.
Firstly, Soviet support to the newly emergent state 
was so obvious that they could afford to delay formal 
recognition in order to gauge the international reaction 
without offending Dacca. Secondly, the Soviets were hoping 
that Yahya's successor in Pakistan, Bhutto, could be
persuaded to either recognise Bangladesh or drop the
' • '42Pakistani version of the Hallstem Doctrine. Once that
happened Moscow could accord her recognition without
annoying Islamabad. Now that the fear of possible Chinese
41 . .U.S. Task Force 74, comprising the Enterprise, helicopter Carrier Trzpolt
and seven destroyers and frigates, detached from the Seventh Fleet sailed 
through the Strait of Malacca on their way to the Bay of Bengal on 14 Dec­
ember 1971. They were followed three days later by six Soviet ships includ­
ing one Kresta and one Kynda-class frigates. Hearings before the Subcommittee 
on the Near East and South Asia of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Ninety 
Third Congress, Second Session, February/March 1974,p .205.
42 The Soviets lost no time in their efforts to befriend Pakistan. That they 
had regained some of their lost influence is evident from the fact that 
Moscow encouraged Bhutto to release Mujib in early January. Reportedly the 
Soviet Ambassador flew especially to Lahore to deliver a note from his 
government to Bhutto. The Times (London), 4 January 1972. Bhutto was also 
invited to visit the Soviet Union. New York Times, 10 February 1972.
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influe.nce in Dacca was absent (due to the Chinese role during 
the war), and Dacca was already under considerable debt 
to Moscow, the importance of winning Pakistan back assumed 
salience in Soviet policy. Finally, another cause for 
Soviet delay must have been the opposition that the 
dismemberment of Pakistan aroused in the Middle Eastern 
countries Moscow was courting.
In any case to put the Bangladesh authorities at ease, 
the Soviet Ambassador to India Pegov stated on 25 December 
1971 that the Soviet Union would recognise Bangladesh at
4 3'an opportune moment' in consultation with 'Indian friends'.
In »Dacca, the head of the Soviet Trade Delegation, V.V. Zurev, 
met the Bangladesh Trade & Industry Minister, Mansur Ali,
44and informed him of his country's desire for a trade pact,
which implied recognition. When the Bangladesh Foreign
Minister, Abdus Samad AzaJ, visited Delhi in January, he
was formally met at the Airport by the Soviet Ambassador
with his colleagues from Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary,
45Bulgaria, GDR, and Mongolia. Considerable public
enthusiasm had been generated in Bangladesh for the Soviet
o*Union, exemplified by the setting upAa Bangladesh-Soviet
46Friendship Society in Dacca on 15 January 1972.
^  Times of India, 26 December 1971.
44 ibid., 29 December 1971.
45 The Tzmes (London), 8 January 1972.
46 G.W. Choudhury, 'Moscow's Influence in the Indian Subcontinent1,
The World Today (July 1972), p.310.
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The Kremlin watched Bhutto's sharp opposition to 
external recognition of Bangladesh gradually blunt.
Initially Bhutto had broken off diplomatic relations with
47Bulgaria, Poland and Mongolia for recognising Bangladesh.
But for others, like Nepal and Burma, his measures were
less drastic and were confined only to the recall of
4 8Ambassadors. As Pakistan was obviously employing different
yardsticks for different countries (relations with India,
for instance, was formally intact), it was unlikely that
Islamabad would react to Moscow's recognition of Dacca
too hastily. Satisfied of this, on 24 January 1972 Moscow
formally recognised Bangladesh.
Bangladesh, on her part, did not take the Soviet delay
amiss. It was becoming obvious to her that in order to gain
admission into the 'Club' of States, mostly hostile till
then, the Soviet linkage could be a liability rather than
an asset. Mujib did not want to lean too heavily on Moscow,
especially now that 'non-alignment' was the cornerstone
of his policy. Also there was China to be borne in mind,
and Bengali leaders were anxious for their acceptance by 
49China.
(ii) Political Relations
On 5 March Kosygin and Mujib signed a Joint Declaration 
in Moscow - the Soviet Union was, not unnaturally, the
^  See Malcolm Browne, The New York Times, 14 January 1972.
48 Times of India , 18 January 1972.
49 A.L. Khatib, 'Mujib Sets a Limit on Gratitude', Far Eastern Eeonomzo
Review, 1 April 1972, p.14.
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second country Mujib visited, the first being India - in 
which Mujib expressed gratitude for the 'consistent 
support' of the Soviet Union and Moscow announced its 
intention to endorse Bangladesh's entry into the U.N.
The political element of Mujib's visit was underscored 
by the presence during some of the discussions of Boris 
Ponomarev, the senior CPSU official who was responsible
51for liaison with fraternal parties outside the Soviet Union.
This also indicated that while the Soviets preferred to
deal with Bangladesh on a state to state basis, their
political party of choice was the Awami League, which, in
52Soviet assessment had assumed a 'progressive' role.
Moscow's connections with the pro-Soviet left wing
parties were of a level lower than those with the Awami
League. Of two such parties one, Muzaffar Ahmed's NAP,
in any case seen as a 'B' team of the ruling Awami League,
5 3because of its 'me too-ism', was of peripheral value to 
54Moscow. The other, the Communist Party of Bangladesh,
~So Foo+vvok .
51 The New York Times, 6: March 1972.
52 Note 12 ante.
53 Rounaq Jahan, 'Bangladesh in 1972: Nation Building in a New State',
Asian Survey (February 1973) , p.207.
54 From the Soviet standpoint, Muzaffar Ahmed had respectable credentials. 
He had previous CPI contacts. In Pakistan he had joined the Awami League 
but broke away in 1957 with Bhashani1s radical followers who formed 
the National Awami Party (NAP). As the Communist Party has been 
banned in Pakistan since 1954, it was NAP that provided legal cover for 
the left. Within the NPA Muzaffar Ahmed led the pro-Moscow group.
When the Party finally split along Moscow-Peking lines in December 1971, 
Ahmed became the President of the pro-Moscow NAP. See Asian Analysis, 
(March 1972), pp.2-3.
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led by Moni Singh had more autonomous existence. A 
delegation from it visited Moscow in August 1973 and reportedly 
emerged with a model of government from their discussions 
with the CPSU leadership, which prescribed a presidential 
system of government with 'progressive efficient and honest
56persons' at the helm drawn from 'national patriotic parties'.
However, the relative insignificance of both these parties
was confirmed in the March 19 7 3 elections, when they failed
to capture any seat in the Bangladesh Parliament.
Calculating that the Awami League's power base would
not be eroded by a semblance of the traditional United Front
tactics, and that it would have the benefit of Moscow's
blessings, Mujib initiated a three party alliance in October
1973 called the Gono Oikko Jote (Peoples' United Front),
which was welcomed by the Soviets as 'the result of a
consistent policy of the Communists designed to rally all
political groups that oppose imperialism and champion
57national independence and social progress'.
Mujib was, soon enough, about to embark upon constitut­
ional reforms of much greater significance, i.e. a one party 
system on largely Tanzanian model. The Party was to be
55
55 In pre-independence India, Moni Singh was one of the first Marxists.
In the 1920s and 1930s, he was involved with organising the Kidderpore 
dock hands, Calcutta jute workers and peasants in the East Bengal district 
of Mymensingh. He joined the CPI in 1937 and the Communist Party of 
Pakistan (CPP) after the 1947 Partition. When the CPP was banned in 1954 
Moni Singh went underground. Arrested by the Ayub regime in 1967, he was 
released in 1969. He was an exile in In:dia in 1971 where* he was an 
ardent advocate of a United Front. See ibid., p.3.
^  Bhabani Sen Gupta, op.cit., pp.160-161.
57 Moscow Radio in English for South and South East Asia, 10 December
1973.
called the Bangladesh Krishak Sramik Awami League (BAKSAL), 
which was to be launched the following year. Mujib had had 
ample opportunity to discuss these plans with the Soviet 
leadership during his long stay in the U.S.S.R. in March- 
April 19 74 for medical treatment. The Awami League was 
really the core of BAKSAL and though it was not strictly 
a fraternal party, the Soviets preferred it to most others, 
given that the actual pro-Moscow parties were not significant 
enough to be at the helm.
Though Soviet-Bangladesh political relations during 
the Mujib era remained correct, they were never euphoric 
at any stage as was the case, for however brief a period, 
with Indo-Bangladesh relations. This point is illustrated 
by the story of the Soviet presence in Chittagong between 
the years 1972 and 1974.
When the Chittagong port needed to be cleared of mines 
and sunken ships in the aftermath of the 1971 war, the 
possible source of assistance was the Soviet Union, the 
only friend which had the technological know-how. Even^ 
then, chary of too great a reliance on the Soviets, Mujib 
endeavoured to obtain help from the U.N. prior to his visit 
to the U.S.S.R. in March 1972, but met with failure.
Kosygin's offer of help in this connection in course of 
the visit somewhat upset him, and he took time to reply, in 
the meanwhile making another unsuccessful bid for U.N.
5 8 Meaning Bangladesh Peasants, Workers, National League. For details 
on the Constitution of BAKSAL see Bangladesh Gazette (Bengali),
Special Issue (Dacca: Ministry of Law and Parliamentary Affairs,
7 June 1975).
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assistance. But when that was not forthcoming, Mujib was
59left with no option but to accept the Soviet offer.
Obviously, therefore, Bangladesh's acceptance of the Soviet
offer did not imply any pro-Soviet posture in the strategic 
60arena.
The government in Dacca was sensitive to any criticism
of the decision to engage the Soviets. In August 1972,
Foreign Minister Samad said:
I would like to declare here categorically 
that the mischievous propaganda launched 
by certain interested quarters about the 
so-called Soviet base on the soil of 
Bangladesh is malicious and is 
completely unfounded and the Government 
of Bangladesh will never allow any foreign 
base on our soil.61-
Soon afterwards in London he reiterated Dacca's policy
'to retain the Indian Ocean, and the Bay of Bengal area
as a region of peace, free from rivalry among big powers,
6 2and foreign military bases'.
In spite of the government's strong denials of any 
Soviet bases there were critics who objected to the very 
presence of the Soviets.. An article in an influential 
Dacca Weekly stated in January 1973, that 'the continued
59 .Discussions with Mr S.A.M.S. Kibria. Bangladesh Foreign Secretary,
London, 30 August 1978.
60 It is noteworthy that the contract to clear the other port, Chalna, 
was awarded later that year through the U.N. to a Consortium of four 
salvage companies headed by a Dutch firm, to be paid through funds 
provided by the U.N. Relief Operations. New York Times, 25 October 
1972, p.3.
61 Address at a Joint Meeting organised by Rotary International Zorta 
International and Apex Clubs, Dacca, 9 August 1972, p.5.
Bangladesh Documents Vol.l, No.5 (Dacca, 1972), p.17.6 2
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presence of the Soviet Union in Chittagong has been causing
uneasiness and resentment among a large section of the
6  3people of Bangladesh'.
Though the Soviet presence was increasingly becoming
a source of public embarrassment to the government, their
work was actually yielding substantial results (seventeen
vessels were salvaged), so much so that they were in effect
persuaded to stay on for a further period of six months
64by a Protocol signed on 20 December 1973. By June 1974 
the last batch of the Soviet team had returned h o m e . ^
Though Mujib remained non-commital on Brezhnev's 
'Collective Security' scheme, he was a known quantity to 
the Soviets, and was therefore preferable to other unknown 
quantities. The Soviets, as a result, worried when the 
latter surfaced to pre-eminence following the Coup in 
Dacca on 15 August 1975. Two days later Pravda made a 
cautious comment: 'How difficult the processes of national 
liberation are shown by the happenings of Friday in the
6 6overthrow of the government in the Republic of Bangladesh'.
By referring to the country as simply the 'Republic of 
Bangladesh', the Soviets seemed to avoid being drawn into 
the controversy, then raging, as to whether Bangladesh 
remained a 'Peoples' Republic' or had transformed into an 
'Islamic Republic'.
6  3 Anjali De,'Soviet Strategy in Bangladesh1, Holiday, 21 January 1973, p.2.
64 Charles C. Petersen, 'The Soviet Port-clearing Operations in 
Bangladesh' in Michael MccGwire, Ken Booth, John McDonnell (eds), Soviet 
Naval Policy: Objectives and Constraints (New York: Praeger Publishers, 
1976), p.332.
6 5  Pakistan Times, 2 July 1974.
66 Quoted in Times of India, 18 August 1975.
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Moscow was more sure of the nature of the regime in
Dacca when a few days later the Soviet media expressed that
'the friends of Bangladesh people hope that the Peoples'
Republic [emphasis mine] of Bangladesh will be loyal to the
principal trends of its foreign policy and continue the
line of cooperation with its neighbours and other countries
6 7in the interest of security and peace the world over'.
That the Soviets would like the new regime in Dacca to have
good relations with India is stressed by their urging for
'cooperation' with 'neighbours'. The Soviets had little.
reason to be pleased with the reputedly West-leaning new
President in Dacca, Mushtaq, who was also eager to cultivate
6 8China! They were soon wondering whether 'forces hostile'
to the aspirafltions of Bangladesh people now exerted 'an
69influence on future development ...' However, Moscow
informed Mushtaq through the Soviet Charge d'Affaires that
70the U.S.S.R. recognised the new regime.
Sensing potential Soviet hostility which Mushtaq had 
no wish to heighten, he sent a Special Envoy to the U.S.S.R. 
in September - Mohiuddin Ahmed, a former Vice President of 
the Awami League and a moderate left-wincer, likely to be 
acceptable to the Soviets. But Mohiuddin could cut no ice.
fi 7
Pravda, 22 August 1975. Quoted in Times of India, 23 August 1975.
6 8 Mushtaq had had a brief meeting with Chinese officials in Baghdad in
1974, which received publicity. Also as Commerce Minister, he was 
instrumental in sending a Trade delegation to China in 1975.
69 Cited in New York Tzmes, 27 August 1975.
70 Bangladesh Radio, 24 August 1975.
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He was unable to meet any prominent Soviet leaders, and
handed Mushtaq's letter to Podgorny to A.M. Klychev, a
71Vice Chairman of the Presidium.
Mushtaq's term of office lasted only three months
and in the first week of November 1975, Major General Ziaur
Rahman emerged as the strongman under the formal presidency
of Justice Sayem. There was a rapid decline of the
72Indo-Soviet influence. This aroused considerable Soviet
ire. The Leftists were criticised as a proxy-target, and
the Dacca Government was advised to distance itself from
the extreme Right and Left. On 23 November Pravda warned
the situation [in Bangladesh] is developing 
in such a way that if the Right Wing and 
Leftist forces are not rebuffed, the democratic 
gains of the Bangladesh people and the 
results of many years of struggle for national 
liberation and state independence would suffer 
badly.^3
This warning was repeated a few months later by
Z. Kondrashev in an Izvestia article on 23 March 1976 where
he argued that the purpose of the extremists was to make the
Bangladesh authorities abandon the implementation of
74progressive social and economic transformation. Without 
directly criticising the Dacca Government the Soviets were 
time and again signalling their sensitiveness to any extremist
71 See Tass statement on M. Ahmed visit to the Soviet Union, cited in 
R.K. Jain, Soviet South Asian Relations 1947-1978, Vol.2 (Oxford:
Martin Robertson, 1979), p.198.
72 See Ravan, 'Bangladesh Leftists Ally with Dacca Rulers Against USSR', 
Guardian (New York), 1 June 1977.
73 Quoted in Paktstan Times, 4 November 1975.
74 Quoted in Tzmes of India, 26 March 1976.
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influence on the Bangladesh authorities. At the same time
the Soviets had no reason to be happy with the increasing
rapport between Dacca and Peking.
If the Soviet attitude towards Bangladesh was linked
to the state of Indo-Bangla relations and conversely to
Sino-Bangla ties, Bangladesh wanted a delinking of such,
and the placing of Dacca-Moscow connections on a bilateral
basis. Just as Mushtaq had sent a special envoy to Moscow
the Sayem-Zia government also despatched an envoy, Foreign
Secretary Tabarek Hossain, in December 1975. Tabarek Hossain
had had previous experience of dealing with Moscow as the
Director General for Socialist Countries in the Pakistan
Foreign Office and was successful enough in his mission
to restore bilateral relations with the U.S.S.R. to a more
even keel. There were, however, some murmurings in the
Dacca Press about the fact that in December 1975 S. Huq,
the Bangladesh Ambassador to Moscow, presented credentials
to Michael Yashov, the Deputy President of the Soviet Union
75rather than to President Podgorny. There is no evidence 
to suggest that the Dacca Foreign Office took any serious 
notice of it.
That the Soviets subordinated their policy towards 
Bangladesh to their India policy was attested by the Soviet 
Deputy Foreign Minister Firyubin's pointed insistence on
75 •Achinta Sen, 'Queer Diplomacy', Rolzdaij, 21 December 1975, Sen's
criticism might, however, have been based on incomplete knowledge
of the system of Soviet Protocol.
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negotiations with India on the Farakka issue during his
7 6visit to Dacca in December 1976. This, one may recall,
was more in line with Indian demands, for Bangladesh was then
eager to internationalize the issue. However, publicly
7 7Firyubin extolled Soviet-Bangla friendship. Firyubin's
visit was an important indication of renewal of Dacca-Moscow 
ties, as he was the most senior Soviet politician to ever 
have visited Bangladesh.
Political relations have since remained correct. 
Ministerial visits, at least from the Bangladesh end, con­
tinued. In August 1979, the Minister for Information,
7 8Habibullah Khan visited Moscow. This was assisted by
the improvement in Indo-Bangladesh relations that followed 
the assumption of office in India by Prime Minister Desai 
in 1977. While remaining a close friend of China, Bangladesh
has so far been successful in avoiding being drawn into
i no ,the Setvet-Soviet dispute in any large measure.
However, Moscow is unlikely to look kindly upon Dacca's
reactions to Soviet actions in Afghanistan in late 1979 and
early 1980. The Bangladesh Foreign Office called for
79'immediate withdrawal of all foreign troops from Afghanistan'. 
The fact that the statement refrained from mentioning the 
Soviet Union by name might be interpreted as an attempt to
76 Interview with officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dacca,
12 November 1978.
77
Bangladesh, Vol.l, No.3 (Dacca, Ministry of Information & Broadcasting)
1 January 1977.
78
The Bangladesh Observer, 14 August 1979.
79
The Bangladesh Observer, 1 January 1980.
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soften its impact on the Kremlin. Also Bangladesh might
have hoped to stave off possible Soviet ire by seeming to
act in the guise of Third World international 'Trade 
8 0Unionism'. More serious problems lay in the sphere of 
economic relations.
(iii) Economic Relations
Aid: There was an early realisation on the part of
the Soviets that they were not equipped to meet the massive
81aid requirements of Bangladesh. Secondly, the Bangladesh
leadership had made it obvious in the First Five Year Plan
(1973-78) that its socialist goals would be achieved through
a Western parliamentary system which would preclude the
Soviet model calling for total mobilisation. Thirdly,
Bangladesh's agreement to the formation of an Aid Club
under World Bank auspices, showed a willingness to be mostly
dependent on sources other than the Socialist countries
for external assistance. Because of these reasons the
Soviets maintained a very businesslike attitude towards
8 2their economic relations with Bangladesh.
This point whereby small states may obtain indulgence from the Great 
Powers is made elsewhere in the thesis. See Chapters 8 and 9.
81 Bhabani Sen Gupta, op.cit., pp.158-159.
82 It is noteworthy that the theoretical basis of the U.S.S.R's policy of 
giving aid is derived from a resolution of the Twenty-second Party Congress 
in 1961 which stated that 'the CPSU regard it as its international duty 
to assist the peoples who have set out to win and strengthen their national 
independence, all peoples who fight for the complete abolition of the 
colonial system' [The Road to Communism: Documents of the 22nd Congress 
of the CPSU (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1971), p.491]. 
Apart from this, Soviet aid has also been meant to stimulate 'interest 
in socialism and engender a desire to use socialist methods in order to 
build a thriving economy'. [B.N. Ponomarev, 'Some Problems of the Revol­
utionary Movement', World Marxist Review, No.12 (Prague, 1962)] On both 
these counts, the evolving policies of the Bangladesh Government must 
have been distressing to the Soviets.
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As of 30 June 1978 the total amount of Soviet assistance
received was $229,895 million of which $199,895 was in loans
and only $30 m. in grant. This was less than the amounts
received during the same period from the US ($1101.267m.),
Japan ($506.399m.), West Germany ($413.258m.), Canada
($358.244m.), U.K. ($347.049m.) and India ($301.447m.).
The undisbursed amount in June 1978 was $63,132, a large 
8 3figure. Also, most of the Soviet aid was received prior 
to 1976.
These figures illustrate several features. Firstly, 
the smallness of the grant component, which meant an erosion 
of the value of the aid received. Secondly, the large 
undisbursed amount shows inefficient utilisation, which 
could be either due to higher Soviet prices (since procure­
ment was tied to Soviet sources, an additional disadvantage) or 
due 'to the hesitancy of Bangladesh to procure inferior 
quality Soviet goods. One could conclude that since the 
utilisation of Soviet credit was difficult, recipient 
agencies in Bangladesh could not have been happy to receive 
allocations from Soviet aid.
Trade: The first Trade Agreement between Bangladesh 
and the U.S.S.R. was signed on 31 March 1972, during a visit 
to Moscow by Dacca's Foreign Trade Minister, M.R. Siddiqui, 
who signed it along with his Soviet counterpart Nikolai
Patolichev, extending to each other 'a most favoured nation'
84status. This Agreement was for a period of three years
83 Statistics from A.M.A. Muhith, 'Is Foreign Aid Essential for Develop­
ment in Bangladesh?', op.cit.
84
Ttmes of India, 2 April 1972.
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to be extended automatically for a similar period, as indeed
was the case. Under the broad umbrella of this Trade
85Agreement, six annual barter protocols were signed.
On an average it seems that Bangladesh under barter 
agreements initially exported slightly more than what she
imported. For instance, in 1973-74 she exported goods
Or _ , o.rwith 151.168 million takas and imported goods with 1511.64 mill­
ion takas. The figures for 1974/75 were 256.877 million
takas worth of exports and 223.174 million takas worth of 
8 6imports. Under normal trade this would have meant a 
favourable balance of trade for Bangladesh. But in barters, 
since goods are paid for in kind, it meant the Soviet Union 
was paying Bangladesh (since Bangladeshi imports were less) 
less, and therefore owed her some amount. Under barter 
agreements such owed amounts have a minimal rate of interest.
In other words by exporting more and importing less,
Bangladesh was ironically in effect creating 'soft 1 credit 
for the more affluent partner, the U.S.S.R.
Secondly, it was felt in Dacca that the Soviets were 
charging higher prices for their commodities under barter.
This became evident when the sale of pig iron (Bangladesh 
made some cash purchase of this commodity) under barter was 
priced higher than the cash sale. While Bangladesh had to
85 Barter 1, however, was signed in Dacca earlier on 8 February 1972, 
in anticipation of the formal Trade Agreement.
86 Figures from Table 1 in Abdul Ghafur, 'Barter T rade Between Bangladesh 
and East European Countries: Some observations', in Mohiuddin Alamjir 
and Sultan Hafeez Rahman (eds), The New International Economic Order and 
Unctad II: Proceedings of the Bangladesh National Seminar (Dacca: 
Bangladesh Institute of Development Economics, May 1977), p.165.
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procure through Soviet State Agencies, the latter were
able to make purchases at competitive rates from the open
8  7market in Bangladesh.
Thirdly, while Bangladesh made cash purchases outside
8 8the scope of the barter from the Soviet Union, the
latter made no such reciprocal cash procurements. This led
to an unfavourable balance of trade for Bangladesh in free
convertible currency.
Fourthly, it was generally believed in Bangladesh that
Soviet banks imposed heavy bank charges for advising,
issuing, and negotiating letters of credit. The burden of
such excessive charges were passed on to Bangladesh exporters
8  9and importers.
C . Some General Points:
From the outset it would seem that Soviet-Bangladesh 
relations were fraught with certain built-in difficulties. 
Firstly, if the grand design of the Soviet policy towards 
the Third World was to detach these countries from alliance 
with either the West or China, Bangladesh posed some 
difficulties because of her heavy economic dependence on 
the former and psychological closeness with the latter. 
Secondly, the higher priority the Soviets placed on India,
Discussions at M/Foreiftg) Trade, Dacca, 12 November 1976. Also with 
Mr Walial Islam, then Deputy Secretary, Foreign Trade, Bangladesh, 
Melbourne, 28 September 1979.
88 The value of such purchases in 1973/74 being Taka 722.53 lakhs and 
in 1974/75 being Taka 970.75 lakhs. Abdul Ghafur, op.cit., p.165.
89
Interview with Dr F. Ahmad, Joint Secretary, External Resources 
Division, op.cit.
164
tended to affect at times their relations with Bangladesh 
because of the fluctuating nature of Indo-Bangladesh ties. 
Thirdly, in spite of serious endeavours, the cultural 
penetration of the Soviets into the Bangladeshi elite was 
difficult because of the latter1s heavy Western orientation.
Because of all these perhaps the Soviets may have felt 
that Bangladesh was not worth investing in to ariy large 
extent politically or economically. Politically it is 
significant that not a single Soviet Cabinet Minister had 
ever visited Bangladesh. Economically, Moscow tended to 
adopt a very businesslike attitude in matters of aid and
4- * 9 0trade.
It is noteworthy, however, that it was Bangladesh which 
was more eager to maintain friendly links. The Soviet Union 
was the first country that a Bangladeshi Head of Government 
visited outside the Subcontinent. Whenever good relations 
were threatened it was the Dacca Government that sent envoys 
to Moscow to explain its position. In spite of close 
Dacca-Peking relations, Dacca has been careful to avoid 
giving Moscow any offence on larger global questions. The
stand on the Afghanistan issue in 1980 is a chance that Dacca 
risks, hoping to be seen as acting in concert with a host
90
The Soviets do not seem to have taken the opportunity of extending 
goodwill gestures in this area. This is illustrated by the following: 
in 1973 the Soviets had diverted 200,000 tons of wheat procured abroad 
to Bangladesh to help bridge the latter's food gap on the understanding 
that it would be returned. Eventually Moscow was approached to defer 
repayment or convert it into grant. The Soviets agreed to neither, 
and Bangladesh, in spite of her perennial food shortages, had to commit 
herself to return the amount in five instalments. Discussions at the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dacca, 12 November 1978.
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of other Third World and Muslim countries and thereby 
reducing its adverse significance in bilateral relations.
III. The U.S.A.
A. U.S. ROle during the Struggle for Bangladesh
(i) The Background
The South Asian Crisis of 1971 was unfortunately
timed for the U.S. In what was considered to be a ‘watershed
year', there appeared to be considerable hope of success
in America's foreign policy both globally and at a regional
level in South Asia; globally the U.S. Administration saw
'the beginnings of a new relationship between the United
States and the Peoples' Republic of China; concrete progress
on important issues in U.S.-Soviet relations; a maturing
relationship between the U.S. and East Asia as the Nixon
Doctrine took effect and the U.S. sharply reduced its military
involvement on Vietnam ... and efforts among industrialised
nations to create new economic relationship increasing the
91trade opportunities of the developing world'.
As for Pakistan, Yahya's continuation as the head of 
government would have been ideal for the Americans. Firstly,
he had an 'extraordinary relationship' with the American
92Ambassador, Joseph Farland. Secondly, he was being of
93invaluable help as a conduit linking the U.S. to China.
91 Richard M. Nixon, op.cit., p.7.
92 Jack Anderson with George Clifford, The Anderson Papers (New York: 
Ballantine Books, 1974), p.274.
93 See Henry Kissinger, White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown and 
Co., 1979), p.714.
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However, if there was a peaceful transfer of power to
the Awami League, the U.S. would also have no cause for
worries. Firstly, an Awami League government in Pakistan
would have augured well for Indo-Pakistan relations thus
reducing tension and thereby the scope for intervention by
unfriendly Powers; secondly, an Awami League government
was likely to tack close to the U.S. After all, it was
an Awami League Prime Minister of Pakistan, Suhrawardy
(1956-57) who had justified their Western alliance on the
grounds that 'Zero plus zero equals zero' - suggesting
that friendship with Muslim countries alone would not
9 4sufficiently offset Indian power. Suhrawardy's disciple
Mujib's policies might be slightly different, but not much.
In fact what the Americans needed to watch out for
was the possible resurgence of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the
leader of the Pakistan Peoples' Party. Bhutto had never
95warmed to the Americans and there was no reason why he
should in the near future.
In other words, on the eve of the 1971 crisis, U.S.
interests dictated a united Pakistan preferably with
Yahya at the head, failing which, with Mujib at the helm.
What the Americans most needed to avoid was yet another
ctension spot that was likely to attract adversary attention 
which would adversely affect 'the emerging structure of 
Peace' of the 1970s.
Wayne Wilcox, 'Pakistan' in Wayne Wilcox, Leo E. Rose, David Boyd (eds), 
op.cit., pp.100-101.
95 Bhutto's anti-Americanism finds ample expression in his book,
'The Myth of Independence (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), passim.
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(ii) Role of the Administration
When the Crisis broke out it had three levels in the
U.S. Administration's perception: (a) the humanitarian
problem of the Bengali refugees on India and the millions
who remained in Pakistan, (b) the problem of political
settlement between West and East Pakistan, and (c) the
96danger of war between Pakistan and India.
In response to the first level, Nixon claimed that 
the U.S. committed $91 million through the U.N. for the 
refugees in India and $158 million both through the U.N. 
and bilaterally for Pakistan. At the second level he 
claimed that he was able to obtain assurance from Yahya 
that Mujib would not be executed, that Civilian Government 
in East Pakistan would be restored and rapprochement sought 
with the Awami League. To that end, the Americans were 
able to establish contact with some prominent Awami Leaguers 
in Calcutta. Vzs-a-vzs the third level, Nixon stated that 
he sought to avert the War by keeping India constantly 
in the picture regarding U.S. initiatives, talking to the 
Soviet Union, and finally, culminating in a desperate move 
with Secretary Rogers informing the Indian Ambassador on
11 August that the U.S. would not continue economic assistance
97to a country that started the war - a clear warning 
to India.
Unfortunately for the Administration, their sets of 
responses at all three levels backfired. Firstly, the
96 Nixon, op.cit., p.143.
97 ibid., pp.145-146.
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assistance to India for refugees did not receive the
gratitude that the U.S. had hoped for; the aid was, after
all, a response to the call of the U.N. Secretary General
and as an act to discharge what was in reality an internat-
9 8ional obligation. The relief to East Pakistan channelled
through the Government of Pakistan evoked Bangladeshi
criticism and the raising of such queries as whether the
distribution of humanitarian assistance could be effected
without discrimination and whether their use by the Pakistani
9 9Armed Froces could be prevented.
Secondly, the attempt to bring about a political 
solution came too late .when independence had become the 
irreducible demand of the Bangladesh Government-in-exile.
On June 6 , 1971, the Acting President, Syed Nazrul Islam, 
dismissed any settlement within the framework of Pakistan
by declaring that Pakistan was 'dead 1 and that 'free
.100  . . .  Bangladesh was now a 'reality'. The U.S. Administration
did in fact succeed in contacting the Foreign Minister of
the Provisional Bangladesh Government, Khondekar Mushtaq ,
Ahmed. But this was done over the head of his Prime Minister
Tajuddin Ahmed, whose sympathy with the Americans
reputed to be minimal. But these contacts only succeeded
in alienating Tajuddin from both Mushtaq ; and the Americans,
9 8 Secretary General U Thant on 19 May 1971 appealed to all nations for 
contributions, in cash and kind, to help meet the needs, on an emergency 
basis, of the Bengali refugees. Asian Recorder, June 18-24, 1971, p.10219.
99
Asian Recorder, August 6-12, 1971, pp.10298-9.
100 .ibid., p.10299.
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leading to Mushtaq -'s exclusion from the Provisional
Government's delegation to the U.N., and following independence,
his loss of the office of Foreign Minister.
As the crisis deepened, there was considerable evidence
of Washington's leanings in favour of Pakistan.
First, though on 20 April the State Department had
assured Senator Kennedy that there were no arms supplies in
102the pipeline for Pakistan, a Pakistani ship PADMA sailed
10 3from New York on June 21 with arms for Pakistan. The
Indian Foreign Minister Swaran Singh told an angry Parliament
that India had urged the U.S. Administration to stop the
104ship from proceeding to its destination. On 26 June,
Charles Bray, a State Department spokesman said that it
105was legally impossible to do so. Not only was the ship­
ment not prevented, there is no record of any pressure 
to dissuade the Pakistanis from using American arms from 
their operations in the Eastern Wing.
Second, the Administration was anxious to continue 
economic assistance to Pakistan, thus seeming to indirectly 
prop up the Yahya regime. In June the Aid to Pakistan 
Consortium under World Bank aegis met to consider a Bank 
report that suggested that contrary to Pakistan's protes­
tations, the situation in the East was far from normal, and
Lawrence Lifschultz, Bangladesh: The Unfinished Revolution, op.cit., 
pp.113-116.
102 See Bangladesh Documents, op.cit., p.556.
103
New York Tzmes, 22 June 1971.
1 ° 4 „ •Astan Recorder, 23-29 July 1971, p. 10269.
105 ibid., p.10270.
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under these conditions further assistance could not be
106fruitfully utilised. Ten of the eleven Consortium
members concurred with the findings, but the U.S. did not.107 
Later on 3 August when the House of Representatives passed 
the Foreign Aid bill including the ,Gallagher amendment 
for stoppage of assistance to Pakistan, Nixon protested 
that engaging in 'public pressures' on Pakistan would be 
'counter-productive' and the crisis demanded discussions
1 n o'in private channels'.
Third, the Administration, even when the matter became
public knowledge, did not disapprove of the Pakistani use
of American aircraft to shift troops from West to East
Pakistan. The carriers in question were two Boeing 707
airplanes, under lease from World Airways, which reportedly
did half its business with the U.S. Armed Forces. It was
revealed that the lease was arranged with the knowledge
and explicit authorisation of the State Department, the
Commerce Department and the Civil Aeronautics Board. The
State Department described the deal as a 'commercial matter'
but the Commerce Department sources revealed that the
licenses, renewed on 18 June (over two and half months
after the military crackdown in Dacca) were subject to
revocation and the leases would be invalid without the
1 0  9licenses
106
New York Times, 13 July 1971.
107 . .ibid., 14 July 1971.
108
Baltimore Sun, 5 August 1971.
109 Lewis M. Simons, 'Pakistan Using U.S. Jetliners to Help Move Men 
to Bengal', Washington Post, 19 August 1971.
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Fourth, more positively, U.S. concord with the Pakistani
official line was evident in Secretary of State William
Rogers' address to the U.N. General Assembly on 4 October.
Secretary Rogers insisted that 'the events in East Pakistan
are internal events with which the people of Pakistan must
deal'^  ^ which was entirely in accord with the Pakistani
point of view.
When Mrs Gandhi visited the U.S. in November, the
ensuing talks did not bring them any closer to each other.
Nixon derogated the Indo-Soviet Treaty signed in August
that year, by publicly stating that India and the U.S.
were bound together by a 'higher morality that did not
need legal d o c u m e n t s - an obvious reference to the i
August Treaty.
The series of evidence cited above demonstrates that
even if the Administration believed in the inevitability of
Bangladesh's independence, as Kissinger claimed it did, in
112The White House Years, it seems to have made little 
effort to befriend, or at least alleviate the suspicions 
of, the leadership that was likely to be in power in 
sovereign Bangladesh.
When the actual hostilities broke out in December 1971, 
the Administration laid the blame for war squarely on Indian
ashoulders with immediate cancellations of arms supplies
Richard P. Stebbins and Elaine P. Adam (eds) , American Foreign 
Relations 1971: A Documentary Record (New York: New York University 
Press, 1976), p.226.
Asian Almanac, Vol.10, No.3 (1972), p.4988.
112Quoted in Tzme (15 October, 1979), p.54.
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and economic aid to India. At this time, the Washington
Special Action Group (WSAG) held some secret sessions in
the White House chaired by the National Security Adviser,
114 , „ .Kissinger. On 3 December, Kissinger complained:
I am getting hell every half hour from 
the President that we are not being tough 
enough on India ... He wants to tilt in 
favour of Pakis tan [emphasis mine] .
Then again on 8 December Kissinger said:
There can be no doubt what the President 
wants. The President does not want to 
be evenhanded. The President believes 
that India is the attacker. We are 
trying to get across the idea that India 
has jeopardized relations with the United 
States. We cannot afford to ease India's 
state of mind. The lady [Mrs Gandhi] is cold­
blooded and tough and will not turn into 
a Soviet satellite merely because of pique.
Washington's 'tilt' towards Pakistan was confirmed in
a series of actions by the U.S. at the U.N. On 4 December,
the Security Council met on U.S. request and voted 11-2
for an immediate cease-fire and withdrawal of foreign forces
117which the U.S.S.R. vetoed. When the General Assembly
proceeded on 7 December to adopt a 14 nation draft resolution 
calling for cease-fire and withdrawal of forces, which was
113
113
New York Times, 7 December 1971.
114
The proceedings were leaked to the Press and published in the New 
York Times on 6 January 1972. Later these were incorporated in Jack 
Anderson with Georqe Clifford, op.cit., pp.281-284.
115 Jack Anderson, op.cit., p.281.
116 ibid., p.282.
117 Nixon, op.cit., p.147. At that stage a cease-fire would have 
prevented the creation of Bangladesh.
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carried by 104 votes to 11, the U.S., along with China, 
voted for it. The U.S. Representative, Ambassador Bush,
&laid that blame for war squarely on India's shoulders by
stating that the latter
bears a major responsibility for broadening 
the crisis by spurning efforts of the U.N. 
to become involved, even in a humanitarian 
way in relation to the refugees, spurning 
the proposals such as the proposal of our 
Secretary General's offer of good offices, 
spurning proposals that could have begun the 
process of a dialogue toward political 
accommodation.-^®
When the recommendation of the General Assembly for
a Ceasefire and withdrawal of forces was rejected by India,
the U.S. requested another meeting of the Security Council
on 12 December, where Bush criticised the 'action of India
to intervene militarily and place in jeopardy the territorial
integrity and political independence of its neighbour,
1 1 QPakistan'.
As a final act of support for Pakistan, the U.S.
Administration ordered a Task Force of the Seventh Fleet
including the nuclear powered aircraft carrier ENTERPRISE
120into the Bay of Bengal on 10 December. The Task Force
entered the Bay on 15 December, too late to save the situation, 
at least in the Eastern Sector.
118 .Cited in Stebbins and Adam, op.cit., p.237.
119 .ibid., p.241. It has been reported that Nixon personally instructed 
George Bush to be firm with India. See T.V. Kunshi Krishnan, The 
Unfriendly Friends: India and America (New Delhi, Indian Book Co., 1974), 
p.29. The resulting Security Council resolution was also vetoed by the 
U.S.S.R. and the War ended with the surrender of the Pakistani Eastern 
Command to the Indian and Bangladeshi allies on 16 December 1971.
120 Stebbins and Adam, op.cit., p.239. Also see f.n.41 ante.
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The reasons for the Administration's 'tilt' towards 
Pakistan can be broadly analysed at two levels, regional 
and global.
At a regional level, first, there was the possibility,
at least at the initial stages, that Yahya might succeed
in quelling the Bangladesh movement, in which case it was
wise to avoid any action (such as display of sympathy for
the Awami League dissidents), that might offend Yahya.
Secondly, if Bangladesh came to fruition it was possible
that the territory would withdraw from the American alliance
and pass under Soviet influence. Thirdly, there was Nixon's
strong personal predilections shaped by mutually hostile
121relations with Indira Gandhi, and equally positive
122relations with a succession of Pakistani leaders.
There were some globally relevant reasons as well,
that some of Nixon's aides, in particular National Security
Adviser Henry Kissinger, found compelling. First, the
Subcontinental crisis had relevance to the politics of
Superpower relations, between the Soviet Union and the U.S.
Kissinger saw a sinister Soviet design in breaking up the
American alliance system as well as demonstrating Chinese
impotence, by supporting India's efforts to exploit Pakistan's 
123travails. Secondly, Pakistan was an American ally, a
121 Mrs Gandhi stressed this point in the interview with her on 30 April,
1978, op.cit.
122 Nixon, who was instrumental in the conclusion of the 1954 U.S.-Pakistan 
Mutual Security Pact, was assiduously cultivated by Pakistan, which 
he visited on several occasions as a private citizen in the 1960s, even 
when his political fortunes in the U.S. were at a low ebb.
Whzte House Years, op.cit., p.886.123
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member of the Western Alliance, whose existence was now
threatened by a powerful neighbour with support from
a Communist Superpower. Washington ought not to, according
to Kissinger, ignore its commitments. As he said,
the image of a great nations conducting 
itself like a shyster looking for legal­
istic loopholes was not likely to inspire 
other allies, who had signed treaties 
with us or relied on our expressions in 
the belief that the words meant approxi­
mately what they s a i d . 124
Thirdly, Pakistan was 'a friend of China and in close touch
with Peking that was gingerly feeling its way towards a
new relationship with [the U.S.] based on the hope that
12 5[the U.S.] would maintain the global equilibrium1.
(iii) Voices of Dissent
A large segment of the American body politic did not 
share the views of the Administration. Dissent was voiced 
in the media, the legislature and the Campuses. They 
acted to build up pressure on the Administration gradually. 
On 1 April 19 71, Senators Edward Kennedy and Fred Harris
126criticised the role of the Administration in the crisis.
127On 7 April they were joined by Senator William Saxbe.
On 6  May ten Senators cabled Secretary of State William 
Rogers, urging the refusal of further assistance to Pakistan
124 ibid.., p.895
125 ibid.
126
Asian Recorder, May 14-20, 1971, p. 10162 and Bangladesh Documents, 
op.cit., pp.521-522.
127
Aszan Recorder, May 14-20, 1971, p.10162.
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unless measures Ate taken by the latter to alleviate the
12 8sufferings of 'millions starving in East Pakistan ...'
On several occasions Senators Frank Church and J.W. Fulbright
129lent their powerful voices to the Pro-Bangladesh lobby.
Apart from individual legislators, the Congress as a 
body on several occasions indicated a favourable attitude 
towards the Bangladesh Movement. In the House of Represent­
atives the Asia-Pacific Subcommittee of the Foreign Affairs 
Committee commenced a hearing on the South Asian situation 
on 11 May when Congressman Cornelius E. Gallagher described
the situation as 'potentially equal in terms of human misery
130to a combination of Vietnam and Biafra'. In the Senate,
the Subcommittee on Refugees of the Judicial Committee,
chaired by Kennedy, held three hearings on the matter,
between June and October. Both the House and the Senate
passed amendments to the Foreign Assistance A^t urging the
cutting off of further aid to Pakistan on 3 August and
13111 November respectively.
Prominent members of the intelligentsia joined the 
large number of legislators either by counselling Pakistan 
moderation directly or by bringing to bear pressure on the 
Administration to do so. On 12 April, some intellectuals
The Senators were: Walter F. Mondale, Clifford P. Chase, Fred R. 
Harris, Thomas E. Eagleton, George McGovern, William Proxmire, H.E. Hughes, 
Hubert H. Humphrey, Birch Bayh, and Edmund S. Muskie. 'Congressional 
Records' cited in Bangladesh Documents, op.cit., p.536.
129 ibid., pp.581-582.
130 ibid., p.542.
131 A.M.A. Muhith, op.cit., p.329.
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who described themselves as 'Friends of Pakistan' made a
Press statement, urging on the Pakistani authorities that
no government had the right 'to impose its will by force
of arms on a populace that has spoken so unanimously as the
people of East Pakistan and whose aspirations are so
132reasonable'.
Important sections of the Press took a similar stance,
and they are too numerous to mention here. As early as
31 March, there were editorials in prominent newspapers
urging up©» the Administration to withhold military aid to
133the Yahya Government.
Within the American bureaucracy there were some
opposing voices, particularly from the officials in the
State Department involved with South Asia. The U.S.
Ambassador to India, Kenneth Keating, was urging a position
134of genuine neutrality. Unlike the Administration, who
initially saw the crisis as an internal affair of Pakistan, 
Keating stated that it could be described such 'only to
135the limited extent that it [was] happening in Pakistan'.
132
Washington Post, 12 April 1971. The signatories were Frank C. Child, 
Edwin H. Clarke II, Paul G. Clark, James Coleman, Edward C. Dimock Jr., 
Robert Dorfman, Walter P. Falcon, John C.H. Fee, Richard W. Guble,
Robert Gomer, Gary Hufbauer, John Isaacs, Kirmitsu Kaneda, Maurice D. 
Kilbridge, Stephen R. Lewis Jr., Edward Mason, John W. Mellor, Gustav G. 
Papanak, Hanna Papanak, Stefan H. Robock, Peter Rogers, James A.F. Stoner, 
John W. Thomas, Wynne Thorne, Barbara Ward, Stanislaw Wellisz, Jerome 
B. Weisner and Wayne Wilcox.
133 E.g. New York Tzmes, 31 March 1971.
134 See W. Norman Brown, The United States and India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, 
Third Edition (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972), p.414.
135
Asian Recorder, May 14-20, 1971, p.10162.
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Dissent in much stronger terms was expressed by Americans
posted in the Consulate General at Dacca, particularly the
Consul General Archer Blood, who sent a cable to the State
Department on 6 April which read
With the conviction that U.S. policy related 
to recent developments in East Pakistan 
serves neither our moral interests, broadly 
defined, nor our national interests, 
narrowly defined, numerous officers of the 
Am Con Gen Dacca, US AID Dacca, and USIS 
Dacca consider it their duty to register strong 
dissent with fundamental aspects of this policy.
Blood was later punished by being transferred and given less
137responsible posts. Within the State Deaprtment in
Washington as many of thirty officials joined the 'internal 
debate' on the side of dissent. But ultimately the White
House prevailed.
The views of the prominent legislators, academics,
sections of the media, as well as many officials of the
State Department had a two-fold effect: first, they
moderated the extent of the U.S. tilt. This was evident
when American authorities gave a visa to Justice Abu Sayeed
Chowdhury, then Chairman of the Bangladesh Action Committee
in London, for unrestricted entry into the U.S. for a period
139of five years. The dissent therefore deterred larger
U.S. involvement in the crisis.
Lawrence Lifschultz, op.cit., p.157.
137 Interview with Dr Walter Anderson, Department of State, Washington,
15 September 1978. Later Blood appears to have been rehabilitated and given 
a posting in New Delhi.
138 'Lawrence Lifschultz, op.cit., p.159.
139 Interview with Justice Abu Sayeed Chowdhury, former President of 
Bangladesh, London, 1 November 1978.
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Secondly, the views of these liberal Americans helped 
to moderate the anti-Americanism of the Bangladeshi leader­
ship for it led the Bangladeshis to separate informed 
American public opinion from the official stance adopted 
by Washington. The Bangladeshi leadership was kept informed 
of this division and internal debate within the U.S. 
by the large number of Bengalis including former Bengali
diplomats at the Pakistan Embassy who had defected and were
140working as emissaries of the Bangladesh Government.
Because of this dissent, potential good relations between
the U.S. and Bangladesh were not eliminated, in spite of
the attitudes adopted by the Administration. In fact,
after independence, the Bangladesh Government took the
line that while the U.S. Government had not approved of
them, they were grateful to the American people for support.
This was underlined by the Acting President of the Provisional
Government, Syed Nazrul Islam, when he said: 'We have
been disappointed in the United States' but 'we do not
141hold this against the American people'.*
B . Post-Independence Bangladesh-U.S. Relations
(i) The Establishment of Diplomatic Links 
With the emergence of Bangladesh, there seemed no 
immediate prospects of the U.S. recognition of the new State.
140
M.A. Muhith, Bangladesh: Emergence of a Nation, op.cit., pp.265-267.
141
New York Times, 29 December 1971.
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First, out of sheer gratitude to the U.S.S.R. and India, 
Bangladesh was likely to be a close ally of the two. 
Secondly, the U.S. with considerable Pakistani assistance, 
was mending fences with China and therefore did not want 
to involve herself with a state whose existence was dis­
approved of by both China and Pakistan. That is why perhaps 
Secretary of State Rogers declared at a news conference
on 23 December 1971 that no consideration had yet been
142given to recognition. Rogers soon reiterated that there
were a lot of areas in the world where secession, if
supported and if it were to become a way of life, could
i 143be very very dangerous to the rest of the world1.
However, though formal diplomatic relations did not
exist, the U.S.A. continued to retain its Consulate General
in Dacca. It was Bangladesh which initially moved for
U.S. recognition; a request to that effect was made by
Foreign Minister Samad to the U.S. Consul General, Herbert 
144Spivak. Though Bangladesh was taking the line that
there was a perceived distinction between the American
government and people, Mujib was bitter with Washington
when in early February he said: 'While today I express my
gratitude to the many countries who have recognised us, I
. 145cannot express my gratitude to the U.S..
142 Stebbins and Adam, op.cit., pp.243-249.
143
Neu York Times, 7 January 1972, p.3.
144
Stravts Tzmes (Singapore), 5 January 1972.
145 „
Age, 8 February 1972, p.7.
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Gradually the pressure for recognition within the
United States was growing. Senator Adlai Stevenson argued
that 'it serves no purpose to pretend that the eighth largest
146country in the world does not exist'. Senator Edward Kennedy
announced in Dacca on 14 February: 'The people of America
were with you in recent months, though our Government was
not. We are with you in spirit and our own government will
not be far behind'.147 The Senate Foreign Relations Committee
backed the Hollings-Saxbe resolution urging Nixon to recognise
Bangladesh. Senator Frank Church, who presided over the
committee's hearings on the question, described the resolution
as 'a vehicle for expressing the widespread sympathy and
understanding that exists in the Senate and throughout the
148United States towards the new democracy'.
The Administration finally relented for several 
reasons. Firstly, the Nixon trip to China in February 1972 
resulted in a vigorous attempt to exclude, if possible, 
increasing Soviet influence in the Subcontinent^and not 
according recognition to Dacca at all at this stage would 
have been writing it off totally to Indo-Soviet influence; 
secondly, it was evident that Dacca was willing to overlook 
the U.S. role during the 1971 war; it had initiated giving 
feelers to Washington and it was only rational that the latter 
should reciprocate (Dacca was obviously signalling its
146 Tzmes of India, 9 February 1972, p.2.
147
The Times (London), 15 February 1972, p.6.
148
Tzmes of India, 11 March 1972, p.9.
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reluctance to be totally drawn into the Indo-Soviet orbit).
Thirdly, by then, the U.S. had invested heavily financially
in Bangladesh by responding with $95m. in cash since U.N.
Secretary General Kurt Waldheim's appeal in February for
149$560m. aid to Dacca that year. The acceptance by
Bangladesh of this large sum indicated a realisation on 
the part of the latter that the U.S. would have a role 
in rebuilding the shattered economy. Fourthly, the pressure 
for recognition among popular American leaders was growing. 
Finally, Washington was taking a hard look at its position 
in Asia, trying to pick up as much as possible from the
post-Vietnam debris, for which studies of 'all the relation-
,• . . ,150ships in South Asia were under way'. For these reasons
Washington announced its recognition,on 4 April 1972.
In a deliberate attempt to keep this at a low key, Secretary
151Rogers left an aide to make this announcement though he
himself stated immediately afterwards: 'I want to reaffirm
our intention to develop friendly relations and to be helpful
as Bangladesh faces it immense task of relief and reconstru- 
152ction'. However, Pakistan still had priority and the
announcement was made with the consent, though reluctant,
153of Ambassador Aziz Ahmed of Pakistan.
149
New York Ttmes, 24 March 1972, p.9. Kathleen Teltsch.
150 Dr Kissinger's statement reported in The Age, 11 February 1972, p.6.
151
New York Times, 9 April 1972, p.4.
152 ibid., 5 April 1972, pp.l and 4.
153
Times of India, 5 April 1972, p.l.
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A jubilant Mujib hoped that this would 'open a new
chapter in the development of friendly cooperation and
understanding between the U.S. and Bangladesh for the
mutual benefit of our two peoples' and Foreign Minister
Samad described it as 'a victory of the freedom loving
154people of America'. The fact that the U.S. and Bangladesh
were coming to terms with each other was in line with the
Bangladesh policy of 'balanced relationship with all major 
155powers'.
(ii) Political Relations
The fact that the Bangladesh-Pakistan differences
were nowhere close to being reduced did not seem to have
affected the U .S .-Bangladesh bilateral relations. It became
evident in Washington that Pakistan had moved toward
acceptance of Indian preeminence, if not predominance, in
156the Subcontinent. If India was the recognised pre­
eminent power, and Pakistan had ceased to look upon itself 
as a counterweight, there was no further point in the U.S.
V.siding with Pakistan vis-a-vis India and giving the latter 
unnecessary offence. A natural corollary was a desire 
by Washington to have smooth relations with Dacca, and not 
to let the latter's adverse relations with Islamabad affect 
them. The waning ardour of the U.S. for Pakistan was
154 Sydney Schanberg, The New York Times, 6 April 1972, p.3.
155 Foreign Office Spokesman, quot_ed in FEER, July 2, 1972, p.
William J. Barnds, 'U.S. Policy toward South Asia: Shifting 
Perceptions and Policy Choices', Pacific Community, July 1977, Vol.8,
No.4, p.656.
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evident in that there was no immediate replacement for
Ambassador Joseph Farland when he moved to Tehran from
Islamabad, and in the appointment of an important political
figure, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, as Ambassador to New Delhi.
At the same time a decline in Bangladesh-India relations
also did not affect the bilateral the U.S.-Bangladesh relations
Washington was perhaps only interested in seeing that
relations did not deteriorate to an extent that would
warrant direct Indian intervention in Bangladesh, which
would open South Asia to further big power involvement. It
was made quite clear, however, that India came ahead in
priority because of its 'new stature and responsibilities1.!^
The U.S. continued to pump aid into Bangladesh, as
promised time and again. Between December 16, 1971 to
March 31, 1974, U.S. aid totalled $451.94 million, 24%
of the total foreign assistance of $1,903.37m. given to
15 8Bangladesh. This placed the U.S. way ahead of other
159donors. But as we shall see in our analysis of economic
relations, Washington never ceased to use strong economic 
leverage to attain poitical ends which Bangladesh was 
quite powerless to resist.
Richard Nixon, U.S. Foreign Policy in the 1970s: Shaping a Durable 
Peace, A Report to the Congress, May 3, 1973, p.147.
158
Asian Recorder, Vol.XX, No.25, June 18-24, 1974, pp.12053-54.
159 India was, till then, next with $339.9m. (18% of total aid), IDA 
with $276,07m. was third (14%), Canada with $155.87m. fourth (8%) and 
the Soviet Union fifth with $134.83m. (7%). Other 29% were accounted 
for by FRG ($122.43m.), U.K. ($97.83m.), Japan ($64.83m.), Sweden 
($59.48m.), Czechoslovakia ($42m.), Asian Development Bank ($33.70m.), 
Australia ($21.40m.) and others ($103m.). ibid.
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At this time Mujib was quite keen to show genuine 
'non alignment' in his foreign policy with implied indepen­
dence of Delhi and Moscow. While he was visiting New York 
to address the United Nations in October 1974, Bangladeshi 
officials, not without difficulty, obtained an invitation 
for him to visit Washington and meet President Ford."^^
During this visit Mujib also cemented links with sympathetic 
political figures like Kennedy and George McGovern and
addressed meetings organised by the Senate Foreign Relations
161committee and House Foreign Affairs Committee.
Kissinger called on Mujib on 30 September 1974. In 
the 40-minute discussions’Kissinger approved of the current 
trends in Bangladesh's external relations and encouraged devel­
opment of relations with China. He assured Mujib that though the 
U.S. no longer had the capacity to launch a prototype of 
the Marshal Plan in Bangladesh, all possible assistance 
would be provided. To assuage Mujib Kissinger explained 
away the lack of U.S. official support for Bangladesh as 
his country having some difference of opinion with India 
over 'China, not over Bangladesh'. Kissinger added that 
his forthcoming October visit to the Subcontinent underscored
U.S. interest in that a r e a .  162
That Mujib placed ample importance on his relations 
with the U.S. is illustrated by his decision to despatch a
Lifschultz, op.cit., p.138.
■I C. I
The Pakistan Times, 4 October 1974, p.4.
Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dacca.162
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former senior Awami League Minister, M.R. Siddiqui, who
had many friends in Washington, as Bangladeshi Ambassador
there, following certain constitutional changes in the
country, leading to one party rule, which was likely to
erode the interest in Bangladesh of some prominent American 
163sympathisers.
Post-Mujib Era
Washington had no reason to be unhappy over the change
of government on 15 August 19 75. The new President Khandokar
Mushtaq was known to be pro-West, and the U.S. had every
reason to be pleased with his early statement of desire to
164mend fences with Pakistan, China and Saudi Arabia.
The only potential problem was the rapid deterioration of 
relations with India, but by the end of the year Bangladesh 
was displaying enough initiative to defuse the situation 
by personal approaches of President Sayem (in November) 
to Mrs Gandhi and the despatch of special envoys to New Delhi .  ^
The initial fear that there might be chronic instability 
in the Subcontinent was soon dissipated, and the U.S. 
endorsed the various developments that led to the lessening
163 The new regime after August 1975 saw no reason to alter Siddiqui's 
proposed appointment. In fact, the Zia-Sayem regime in early November 
1975 also saw fit to retain it and Siddiqui finally presented his 
credentials to President Ford on 24 November 1975. (Pakistan Times,
25 November 1975, p.7.) This shows the eagerness of all the three 
regimes to keep Washington pleased.
164 Immediately after assumption of power Mushtaq had announced: 'We 
will maintain close relations with the Islamic Grouping, the Commonwealth 
and the Non-aligned ... we will strive to establish, with the grace of 
God, our relations with those countr&is with which we could not so far 
build friendship'. (Asian Almanac, 1975, p.73449.)
165 See Chapter 3.
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of tension between Bangladesh and Pakistan on one hand and
Bangladesh and India on the other.^^
The Carter Administration initially assigned a low
priority to South Asia. This general attitude of the U.S.
has been summed up by a Bangladeshi analyst as under:
The undeniable reality determining the 
U.S. interest in Bangladesh has seemed 
to be the fact that located on an 
inessential 'backwater' of the Indian 
Ocean and with no deepwater port, 
the country is much too far away from the 
strategic Indian Ocean lanes to be of 
any great improtance. 167
However, the U.S. was likely to continue rendering economic
assistance to keep the local elites satisfied. American
political interest only heightens in the event of any
serious instability in South Asia, as it indeed has in the
aftermath of the crisis in Iran and the Soviet actions in
Afghanistan. This is evidenced in Carter's State of the
Union Message to the Congress in January 19 80 when he asserts
U.S. determination 'to cooperate with all the states of
the region in this regard [ the situation posed by Soviet
action in Afghanistan ] - with India and Pakistan, with
16 8Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Nepal'. By a strange irony,
a stable Bangladesh in a stable South Asia is unlikely to attract 
the U.S. politically.
^  Interview with Dr Walter Anderson, Department of State, 
op.cit.
167 Mizanur Rahman, op.cit., p.126.
168 President Carter's State of the Union Message, Official Text, 23 
January 1980 (American Centre, Canberra), p.11.
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From the Bangladeshi side, efforts are being directed
to keep the relations at a very correct level. The despatch
as Ambassador in 1978 of an official who had been Foreign
Secretary, Tabarek Hussain, denotes an intention to maintain
a stable, almost apolitical relationship. The fact that
the Bangladesh Ambassador in Tehran, Humayun Kabir, met
with the most senior American diplomat held hostage, the
Charge d'Affaires Bruce Laingen, no doubt was designed to
169obtain US appreciation.
(iii) Economic Relations
Up to March 31, 197 8  the total resources received
from the U.S. amounted to $1,045.142m. out of which
170$299.795m. was grant and $745.347m. was loan. These funds
were provided for Relief and Rehabilitation, PL480 Title II
Grant (Food Aid), PL480 Title I loan, Project loan and 
171Project grant. Project assistance concentrated on such
areas as Agriculture and Rural Development, Population and
172Family Planning, Water Resources, Education and Social Welfare. 
In 1978 the U.S. indicated the likelihood of her providing 
Food Aid under the recently enacted PL480 (Title III), which 
is basically a loan, and with the proviso that the counter-
169 Bangladesh Observer, 21 December 1979.
170 See Table 9.1 in Chapter 9.
171 Public Law 480 is the major legislation under which American food aid 
is given. Under Title I of PL480 food aid is sold on concessional terms 
for distribution through voluntary agencies and under Title II which is 
pure grant, the recipient government handles the distribution.
172 Interview with Mr Lutfullahell Majid, Joint Secretary, ERD, Ministry 
of Planning, Dacca, 2 November 1978.
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part funds generated from sale proceeds be used up for
173approved projects and further grain imports.
But this massive economic cooperation was not without
attendant problems. Certain instances will underline the
inability of a newly recipient like Bangladesh to stand up
to such powerful donors as the U.S., who did not hesitate
to use the badly required food aid for political purposes.
In fact in the case of Bangladesh in 1974 it had led to
her own 'Cuban Crisis' which led ultimately to thousands
of deaths in the Autumn Famine.
A critical food shortage was expected in Bangladesh
during the period from August to October 1974, to overcome
which a food aid agreement was to be signed with the U.S.
in mid-1974. But before the Agreement could be signed,
Bangladesh Planning chief, Professor Nurul Islam, was
requested by the American Embassy under instructions from
the State Department to cease exporting jute to Cuba, as
under a PL480 amendment a*-countrv that traded with such black-
174listed countries as Cuba could not be a recipient.That a powerful 
donor like the U.S. could actually insist that a poor 
recipient should curtail its already small export, surprised 
and shocked Nurul Islam, but the signing of the Agreement 
was delayed till the last contracted shipment to Cuba left 
Bangladeshi port in October 1974. By then one of the most 
disastrous famines in the history of Bengal had struck.
173 Interview with Mr Abidur Rahman, Economic Minister, Bangladesh Embassy, 
Washington, 13 September 1978.
174 The story is cited in Donald F. McHenry and Kai Bird, 'Food Bungle 
in Bangladesh', Foreign Policy, No.27 (Summer 1977), p.82.
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Bangladeshi authorities felt that the U.S. could have taken
recourse to the limited exception to the law which permitted
a Presidential waiver in respect of the sale of non-strategic
agricultural commodities and non-strategic raw materials
for agriculture or medical supplies, provided the waiver
was in American national interest. However, they had
very little leverage on Washington to obtain this Presidential
175waiver.
That American domestic politics generated certain
pressure on Bangladesh authorities which the latter was
unable to resist is exemplified by the case of arrangements
of shipping facilities for the food aid given. The
Bangladesh Ambassador in Washington was urged to appoint
a particular agent for chartering ships largely because,
reportedly, the company hailed from the constituency of the
Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee on Foreign
Assistance, Otto E. Passman. The agent was hired because
the Bangladesh Government was afraid to annoy this influential
176Congressman who could act to reduce food aid to Bangladesh.
Also, large deliveries of U.S. FOod Aid had the 
paradoxical effect of depressing the prices received by 
wheat and rice farmers in Bangladesh while helping American 
growers dispose of unsold surpluses. In fact this led to 
a debate within the American donor agency. This hurt the
175 Discussions with Professor Mosharaf Hussain, former Member Bangladesh 
Planning Commission, Oxford, 11 October 1978.
176 ibid.,
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Bangladesh farmers who expected to receive the equivalent
of 800 a pound but local traders paid them as little as 
177-
2 0 0.
(iv) Some General Points
In spite of these problems in aid relations, Bangladesh 
remains a major recipient of the U.S. aid. Bangladesh 
will continue to require high levels of economic assistance 
and the U.S. will remain a major source. Unless there is 
a drastic change in her ideology, all shades of governments 
in Dacca would need to retain a satisfactory level of 
relations with Washington. This has been, and is likely 
to be, the case in spite of the strains from various pressures, 
political and otherwise, that the American Administration 
(or the System, as evidenced in the Passman case) continued 
to exert. Two things will make it possible. Firstly, 
barring very radical changes in Bangladesh or general 
instability in the South Asian region, Washington will 
probably continue to accord low priority to Dacca politically. 
Consequently, the likelihood of America being a scapegoat 
in any domestic political issue is minimal. In the absence 
of any major violent anti-American public feeling, it would 
not be difficult for a government in Dacca to continue to 
take the initiative in retaining a satisfactory relationship 
with Washington as has been the case, especially when the 
former perceives it to be in its own interest. Secondly, 
culturally the U.S. has made deep penetration into the
Dan Morgan, 'U.S. Aid Hurts Bangladesh Farmers', Washington Post, 
Washington, 25 November 1976.
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Bangladesh elite society. Most senior officials in
Bangladesh have at some time been trained in the U.S.
Most academics who from time to time are involved in policy-
1 79making have been to American Universities. More 
political leaders and journalists journey to the U.S. more 
often than to the Eastern bloc countries. As a result 
the elite has a broad cultural, if not always ideological, 
sympathy with the general American ethos, which has a 
positive impact on bilateral relations.
IV. Concluding Remarks
It is obvious that for Bangladesh, historically,
there has been a general swing away from the Soviet Union
to the United States. The governments that followed the
Awami League and 'Baksal' since August 1975 were not
restricted by the same degree of gratitude to the Soviet
Union as was the Awami League. This has rendered the shift
easier. The Soviet Union was unable to supply the large
quantums of external assistance essential for Bangladesh.
The West in general, and the U.S. in particular, was the
alternative source Dacca had to turn to. Besides this
economic dependence, there is a cultural linkage of the
180domestic elite to the West. It is therefore unlikely
1 7 P
All Bengali members of the former Pakistan Foreign Service till 1960, 
like their Pakistani colleagues, received their training at the Fletcher 
school of Law & Diplomacy, Tufts University, See Chapter 10.
179 It is true of the two prominent former academics in the Zia Cabinet: 
Prof. Shamsul Huq (Foreign Minister) and Dr M.N. Huda (Minister for 
Finance & Planning).
180 See Chapter 10.
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that the U.S.S.R. will attain a priority over the U.S. 
to Bangladesh policy-makers.
This phenomenon, however, is unlikely to be given any
rhetorical or formal expression. A sense of inherent Bengali
opposition to the Western Alliance coupled with the fear
of giving Moscow offence, reinforced by the fact that the
articulate elite aspires to a kind of leadership position
in the Third World, has caused and will cause Bangladesh
to actively espouse 'non-alignment'.
/In order that a global detente at the Centre does not
push down superpower conflict to the peripheral areas of
the world, such as their own country, the Bangladeshis
cultivate both Moscow and Washington, taking care not to
give either any cause for dissatisfaction. In spite of
Washington's opposition to Bangladesh's very emergence,
Dacca took the initiative to establish bilateral links.
Though obviously a low-priority subject with Moscow, Dacca
endeavours to keep relations with the Soviet Union on an
even keel. Bangaldesh cannot afford to be drawn into a
confrontation situation with either, or to be locked into
a situation where alliance can be sought with only one
Superpower. As an influential member of the Bangladesh
Cabinet put it:
... Since Bangladesh cannot afford to 
offend any bi§ power it is necessary 
to maintain reasonable, respectable 
relations with each. Relations with 
one may be more emphasised than relations 
with the other at any one point in time
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but we cannot afford to sustain such 
emphasis at the expense of our links 
with the other. 181
Bangladesh's position vis-a-vis the Superpowers does 
underline the loss of manoeuvrability of the small power 
due to the global detente. Her position is very different 
from that of say Afghanistan in the 1960s, that is, being 
able to play off one Superpower against the other. Many 
problems that Bangladesh has had in her dealings with the 
Superpowers have been so trivial that their occurrence 
in a Cold War situation would have been unlikely (such as 
the linking by U.S. authorities of food aid with trade with 
Cuba, or the forced repayment of Soviet wheat). The price 
that countries like Bangladesh have to pay for Global Detente 
is a loss of manoeuvrability leading to a substantial 
erosion of their 'power'. Bangladesh, therefore, aspires 
to make up for this loss of 'power' by increased activity 
in international forums and by endeavouring to attain a 
leadership role among developing states.
181 Interview with Mr Moudud Ahmed, former Deputy Prime Minister of 
Bangladesh (then Minister for Posts, Telephones and Telegraphs), Dacca,
19 June 1978.
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CHAPTER 5 
EXTRA-REGIONAL RELATIONS: CHINA
I . Introduction
The progress of global detente precluded Bangladesh 
from following the 'Pakistan model' of behaviour vis-a-vis 
India, i.e. obtaining counterweight to the powerful neighbour 
by entering into military alliance with a superpower.^ As 
analysed in Chapter 3, Pakistan was unable to 
provide much assistance to bridge this substantial power-gap. 
The obvious actors to turn to were those,including the 
Superpowers, interested enough in the affairs of 
the region to fill the role of protagonists. China obviously 
fitted the bill. The state of the Sino-Indian relations were 
an added advantage. It was natural, therefore, for Dacca 
to attempt linkages with Peking. It was ironical as well, 
given China's adverse role during the emergence of Bangladesh.
II. Chinese Role During the Bangladesh Struggle
A. Chinese position on the eve of the crisis:
The subcontinental crisis placed China between the 
devil and the deep blue sea. For China, a united Pakistan, 
given that the cozy bilateral relations of the 1960s existed, 
would be ideal. This would continue to be true even if the
! For an exposition of the 'Pakistan model' see Stephen P. Cohen and 
Richard L. Park, India: Emergent Power? (New York: Crane, Rusak and 
Co., 1978), pp.38-39.
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Awami League came into power at the all-Pakistan level,
because individual Awami League leaders had good rapport 
2with Peking.
What was disturbing to China, was a potential conflict 
within Pakistan between the Awami League and the Pakistan 
People's Party. That could provide the Soviet Union, and 
to some extent India, an opportunity to exploit the situation 
by picking up clients from among the disputants. Chou's 
concern was evident in the letters he wrote both Bhutto and 
Yahya after the 1970 elections in Pakistan, urging them to
3come to satisfactory terms.
On the eve of the Crisis the two major pro-Peking 
political parties of then East Pakistan, Bhashani's National 
Awami Party (NAP Bhashani) and the East Pakistan Communist 
Party led by Mohammad Toaha and Abdul Huq (EPCP Marxist- 
Leninist) had developed their own attitudes towards the 
issue of separation from Pakistan. Abdul Huq was stronger 
in his view that this would aid 'Indo-Soviet expansionism', 
than Toaha who later initiated a two-way war against both
2 Even though President Ayub Khan (1958-1969) was the architect of Pakistan's 
policy of friendship for China, the process was initiated even earlier 
by Suhrawardy, the Awami League Prime Minister of Pakistan, who had 
visited China as early as 1956 and played host to Chou En-lai. The Awami 
League's pro-Indian .bias was not particularly disturbing to Peking 
because firstly, in 1970-71 the latter was in any case reassessing its 
relations with former enemies, and secondly, it was possible that Mujib's 
Awami League could play the role of a conduit between China and India 
as the previous Pakistani governments had done between the US and China.
3G.W. Choudhury, op.cit., p.211.
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the Pakistan Army and the Awami League. There was a
consequent split between Toaha and Huq, somewhat similar
in vein to that between Charu Majumdar and Ashim Chatterjee
in the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist). The
Huq-Chatterjee line seems to have attracted Peking's favour
as their views were broadcast on Radio Peking and Radio 
5Tirana. Bhashani on the other hand sent impassionate 
appeals to Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai seeking assistance 
in the Movement for separation. There is, however, no 
evidence to show that either Huq or Bhashani wielded much 
influence on Peking's policy makers.
B . China's role as the Crisis unfolds:
The first Chinese public reaction following the Pakistani 
military crackdown on Dacca on 25 March 1971 came as a 
letter from Chou to Yahya written on 11 April and published 
in the Pakistan Times on 13 April. On the surface, the
7le.tter appeared to express strong support for Pakistan:
Your excellency may rest assured that should 
the Indian expansionists dare to launch 
aggression against Pakistan, the Chinese 
government and people will, as always, firmly
4
4 For a study of attitudes of radical Bengali parties towards the issue 
see Talukdar Maniruzzaman, Radical Politics and the Emergence of Bangladesh 
(Dacca: Bangladesh Books International, 1978), pp.51-52.
5 Tariq Ali, 'Pakistan and Bangladesh: Results and Prospects' in 
Robin Blackburn (ed), Explosion in a Subcontinent, op.cit., p.318.
Mowlana Abdul Hamid Khan Bhashani’s Appeal to World Leaders (Dacca:
Public Relations Department of the Government of the People's Rkpublic 
of Bangladesh u.d.), pp.2-3.
7 For the text see J.A. Naik, India, Russia, China and Bangladesh (New 
Delhi: S. Chand and Co., 1972), Appendix 7, p.138.
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support the Pakistan government and people 
in their just struggle to safeguard state 
sovereignty and national independence.
Such support was, however, confined to the potential
threat from India, and seemed not to apply to threats to
Pakistan emanating domestically. On the domestic situation
the letter was far more ambiguous:
We believe that through the wise con­
sultations and efforts of Your Excellency 
and the leaders of various quarters in 
Pakistan, the situation in Pakistan will 
certainly be returned to normal [emphasis mine].
China, by exhorting negotiations with 'leaders of various
quarters', was encouraging talks with the dissident Awami
Leaguers as well. However, support for a united Pakistan
was expressed thus:
In our opinion the unification of 
Pakistan and the unity of the people 
of East and West Pakistan are the basic 
guarantees for Pakistan to attain 
prosperity and strength.
A Bengali foreign language expert in Peking who had 
translated the letter into Bengali for a Radio Peking broad­
cast, said later that the Pakistan Press deleted what could 
be the most important sentence of the letter in which Chou 
said 'the question of East Pakistan should be settled
g
according to the wish of the people of East Pakistan'.
Three aspects of the Chinese stance emerge from this 
letter; firstly, China would support Pakistan in case of 
external threat; secondly, ifr China's calculations a united 
Pakistan was more desirable and thirdly in their view, the
0
'A Bengali's Grandstand View', Far Eastern Economio Review, 11 October 
1974, p.7.
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way to normalcy lay through negotiations with the dissidents. 
The third point indicated the disinclination of the Chinese 
to fully endorse Yahya's methods. With some deviation 
this was to broadly to remain the Chinese position till there 
was a definite veering towards Yahya in reaction to the 
Indo-Soviet entente.
On a theoretical plane Peking believed the Bangladesh 
Movement to be one of Bengali elite interests rather than
9a genuine grassroots peasant movement. They had no 
ideological motive, therefore, to support its cause.
Though they would rather see the issue peacefully 
resolved between the disputants at this stage, and therefore
v. #took no sides in the domestic scene in Pakistan, vis-a-vts
India Peking was rendering strong verbal support to Islamabad.
In April a Renmin Ribao commentator wrote:
Of late the Indian government has 
redoubled its efforts to interfere 
in Pakistan's internal affairs in dis­
regarding of repeated stern protests of 
the Pakistan Government. The overbearing 
action of the Indian Government cannot 
but arouse the indignation of all 
justice-upholding countries . 1 0
Also, on 21 May 1971 at a banquet given by the Chinese 
Foreign Ministry on the anniversary of the establishment 
of Sino-Pakistan diplomatic relations, the Vice-Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, Han Nien-Lung assured 'firm support to the
9 Shirin Tahir-Kheli, 'The Foreign Policy of "New" Pakistan', Orbis,
Vol.20, No.3, (Fall 1976), p.735.
^ 'What are the Indian Expansionists Trying To Do?' Peking Review,
Vol.14, No.16, (16 April 1971), p.7.
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Pakistan Government in their struggle to safeguard state
sovereignty and national independence and oppose foreign
aggression and interference.^^
While support was being given as against India, at
another level the Chinese were urging negotiations. Chou
sent back a two member Pakistani delegation comprising
Foreign Secretary S.M. Khan and General Gul Hassan with a
12request for political settlement. The Chinese opposition 
to Yahya's suppressive measures was-indicated in an 
interview given much later in 197 3 to a group of Australian
National University scholars by the Chinese Assistant Foreign
. . 13Minister Chang-Wang Chin. Obviously, the Chinese feared
Indo-Soviet. involvement if the situation deteriorated.
Even though Yahya paid little heed to Chinese counsel aga­
inst the use'.of force (though this is important in terms of 
Bangladeshi perception of Chinese role), the Chinese may 
have calculated they would have little to lose whether Yahya 
successfully crushed the movement (in which case Pakistan 
remains intact) or whether the movement become transformed 
into a protracted War of Liberation (in which case there 
was likelihood of the leadership of the Movement passing 
into Maoist hands). The Chinese, therefore, kept a low 
profile till India's intervention abruptly negated the prospects
!! Peking Review, Vol.14, No.22 (28 May 1971), p.
12 G.W. Choudhury, op.cit., p.212.
13 James David Armstrong, 'The United Front Doctrine and China's Foreign 
Policy' (Unpublished Ph.D thesis, A.N.U., July 1975), p.238.
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of a prolonged struggle and the emergence of a Bangladesh
under Indo-Soviet auspices seemed to be in the offing.
Their decision to lie low is evidenced by the fact
14that no arms were sent to Pakistan until October, i.e. until 
after the Indo-Soviet treaty. Also, the failure (from the 
Pakistani point of view) of Bhutto's military mission to 
China in November 1971 supports this. At a banquet in honour 
of the Pakistani leader who was sent to Peking by Yahya, 
the Chinese Acting Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei urged 
that 'a reasonable settlement' should be sought by 'the 
Pakistani people themselves'. Support was assured for the 
defence of Pakistan's state sovereignty and national indepen­
dence, but mention of support for 'territorial in t e g r i t y' was
15conspicuously absent. In the return banquet given by
Bhutto which Chou also attended, the Chinese Prime Minister
dwelt on Sino-Pakistan bilateral relations and made no mention
of external threats to Pakistan.^ Bhutto was so disappointed
that he later admitted to a journalist that 'Pakistan can
17hope for little real help from China'.
14 T.J.S. George, 'Peking's Prewar Message to Bhutto', Far Eastern 
Economic Review (5 February 1978), p.8.
15 For a full text of the Speech, see Pekvng Revzew,vol.l4, No.46,
(12 November 1971), p.5.
16 ibid., p.23 . That Bhutto's visit to Peking was essentially a 
failure from Yahya's point of view was confirmed inan interview with the 
then Pakistani Ambassador to Peking, K.M. Kaiser, New, 8 September 1978. 
Kaiser observed that the Chinese told Bhutto in no uncertain terms to 
make up with the Bengalis.
17 Kalim Siddiqui, Conflict Crisis and War in Pakistan (London:
Macmillan, 1972), p.174.
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However, if India's intervention foreclosed the poss­
ibility of a radical leadership of the Bangladesh movement, 
the Chinese would have much to lose. The Indo-Soviet Treaty 
of August 1971 as well as Mrs Gandhi 1s support-seeking travels 
abroad confirmed that fear. China began to stiffen her 
pro-Pakistani posture on an international level. On 24 
November Chou En-lai expressed his concern to the Pakistani
Ambassador over India's military'provocations' along the
18border. Public assertion of support to Pakistan was made
by Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien on 29 November on the anniver-
19sary of the Albanian Liberation.
China^s hope of a protracted struggle leading to a 
radical transformation of the character of the movement 
evaporated as actual hostilities between India and Pakistan 
broke out in early December 1971. In the United Nations 
the Chinese Chief delegate Huang Hua trenchantly criticised 
the Indo-Soviet 'singing in a duet' and noted that the 
Soviet representative 'M i s t e r ' (not 'Comrade') Malik's 
speech had confirmed his suspicion that 'the Soviet social- 
imperialists are carrying out aggression, interference, 
subversion and expansion everywhere' . ^
On 6  December Huang Hua compared the nascent Bangladeshi 
Government to the 'puppet Manchukuo' regime, and opposed
18 Peking Review, Vol.14, No.49 (3 December 1971), p.5.
19 ibid.
20 . .ibid., Vol.4, No.50 (10 December 1971), pp.8-10.
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the presence of a Bangladeshi representative on the Security 
21Council. What the Chinese were virulently opposing was 
obviously the extension of Soviet influence, particularly 
in the Inidian OOean Region.
If the Chinese opposition found such vigorous expression 
in the United Nations debates, why was not their verbal 
support to Pakistan backed militarily? The reasons can 
be analysed as under: firstly, there was the possibility 
of a Soviet counteraction. China was militarily simply 
not strong enough to take on India and the Soviet Union 
simultaneously. Secondly, China was herself passing through 
a series of political crises that involved the purging of 
Lin Piao, Huang Yang-shem (Chief of Staff of the Armed
Forces), Wu Fa Hsien (the Air Force Commander) and forty
2 2  . . .  other top military men that precluded serious military
engagement at that point in time. Thirdly, at a tactical
level Winter was a most inconvenient season for military
manoevres in the Himalayas as passes were likely to remain
snowed-in. Finally, the Chinese may have simply given up
on Yahya who had adamantly paid no heed to their counsel
for moderation.
Though the Chinese did make a rather mild protest about 
the intrusion into Chinese territory on 15 December of 
'eight armed Indian personnel' at the China-Sikkim boundary
^ ibid., Vol.14, No.51 (17 December 1971), pp.15-16.
22 Anwar Syed, China and Pakistan: Diplomacy of an Entente Cordzale 
(Amherst: The University of Massachusetts Press, 1974), p.152.
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2 3and an airspace violation over the Tsayal area in Tibet, 
there was no ultimatum delivered as had been the case during 
1965 Indo-Pakistan War.
C . Bangladeshi Perception of the Chinese role:
A survey of the Bangladeshi perception of China's role 
during the war should be concerned with reactions at two 
levels, political and bureaucratic.
At the political level, the pro-Peking parties were 
confused at China's support for Yahya which was apparently 
in conflict with the principle of contribution to revolu­
tionary social changes everywhere. If in Maoist terms the 
irresistible trend of history was 'countries want independence, 
nations want liberation and people want revolution', then 
was not the Bangladesh Movement theoretically justified
% / , V /as a nation seeking liberation? In the words of a Bengali
analyst in a reputedly pro-Peking weekly:
Does not Leninism enshrine the fact that 
when a nation is confronted with a 
colonial type domination it is entitled 
to wage war first against the nationalist 
enemy, then against the class e n e m y ? 2 4
While resenting Indian domination many pro-Peking
Bengali leaders like Bhashani and Toaha opted for a position
23
Pektng Revzew, Vol.14, No.53, (31 December 1971), p.4.
24 Naushad Al-khair,Holiday (Dacca), 6 February 1972. The Chinese 
theoretical stance, of course, was that the Movement represents elite 
interests rather than those of the grassroot peasantry. See footnote 9 
ante.
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of full support to the Bangladesh Movement, thus loosening
25their bonds with Peking.
Those less ideologically inclined towards China were 
better able to appreciate Chinese motivation arising from 
the needs of raison d'etat and national security together 
with the twists, turns and manoeuvres necessitated by the
changing world and China's domestic scenes. Among these were
2included Awami Leaguers at the political level and officials
of the wartime Bangladesh Foreign Office in Calcutta at
2 7the bureaucratic level. Officials of the Bangladesh
Government-in-exile also made note of unconfirmed reports
that the Pakistani Ambassador to Peking, K.M. Kaiser, who
was a Bengali, had been briefing Chou En-lai sympathetically
2 8about Bangladesh.
In late 1971 Bengali authorities were also confirmed 
that China would not back Pakistan militarily and that the 
Bhutto Mission to Peking had failed. A cable containing this
See Talukdar Maniruzzaman, op.cit., pp.51-52.
26 Some Bangladeshi politicians might have contacted the Chinese had it 
not been the disapproval it was bound to attract from their Indian 
hosts. Interview with Mr Moudud Ahmer, Minister Posts, Telegrams and 
Telegraphs, Dacca, 19 July 1978.
27 . . . .  . .A Government-in-exile Circular issued in the Bangladesh Foreign Office
Calcutta noted that 'Peking Review' No.37 of 1971 had pointed in full
an article from the North Vietnamese monthly Hoc Tap on the dangers of
Japanese policies of expansionism in Asia, and which towards the end stated
that 'the peoples of Thailand, the Philippines, Malaya, India and Pakistan
are waging heroic revolutionary struggles'. The Circular argued the
reference to Pakistan was significant which no doubt referred to the
Struggle for Bangladesh. Also China was avoiding direct criticism
of the Bengalis and were concentrating on India and the Soviet Union
('Crisis in Bangladesh Movement', Bangladesh Foreign Ministry, 25 September
1971), pp.5-6.
28 • i_ ■ jibid., p .6.
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invaluable information, sent by the Pakistan High Commission 
in Kuala Lumpur to their Embassy in Washington was inter­
cepted by the Bengali employees of the Washington Embassy
29and passed onto the Bangladeshi authorities. The Bangla­
deshis were aware therefore that the Chinese support to 
Pakistan in conflict-situation would be limited.
The appreciation of China's role in 19 71 by sections 
who were to later shape Bangladesh's external relations had 
potentially positive bearings on future state level inter­
actions .
III. Post-Independence Relations
A. From Chinese Opposition to their Acceptance of Bangladesh:
The appreciation of China's 1971 role among Bangladeshi
policy-making circles led to a China-policy by Dacca whereby
all criticism of Peking was carefully eschewed by Bengali
leaders in the immediate post-independence period. Chinese
officials in the Consulate in Dacca (closed since the
surrender by Pakistan) were given complete safe conduct
30out of the country. Mujib's early public expression of
high regard for the Chinese leadership seemed designed to
31mollify Peking. More directly, the Bangladesh Foreign 
Minister Abdus Samad Azad said in August 1972:
29 Discussion with the Bangladesh Foreign Secretary, S.A.M.S. Kibria, 
London, op.cit.
30 . . .  .Interview with former Foreign Minister Dr Kamal Hussain, op.cit.
31 In a Press Conference in Dacca he said: 'We have great regard for 
the people of China. We admire their leaders and supported their 
revolution', Far Eastern Economic Review (1 April 1972), p.14.
207
We have extended our hands of friendship 
towards China and we sincerely hope that 
this will be reciprocated by the Chinese 
leaders who, I am sure,will find profound 
goodwill and respect for them among
the people of Bangladesh.32
But the reciprocation was slow in forthcoming. In 
fact it was China who stood in the way of the acceptance of 
Bangladesh by the United Nations. When Bangladesh applied 
for U.N. membership in 1972 Huang Hua, the Chinese represen­
tative in New York vetoed the application and moved a 
separate resolution that consideration of the application 
be delayed until all the Pakistani prisoners-of-war were
repatriated and all 'foreign soldiers' (meaning Indians)
33were removed from Bangladesh soil. The Soviet Union and 
India were subjected to virulent attack. 'Soviet Socialist 
imperialism' was playing a 'most insidious role in South 
Asia', in Huang's words^and India^in concluding 'an aggressive 
military alliance [with the USSR] had stripped off its own 
cloak of non-alliance'. It was alleged that 'the sole 
purpose of Soviet Social imperialism was to expand the
34spheres of her influence and to bully Pakistan at will'.
Bangladesh was able to take the following readings from 
the Chinese position. Firstly, since China had been unable 
to render military support to their closest ally Pakistan
'Address in a Joint Meeting of the Lions International,Fonta Inter­
national and Apex Clubs', Bangladesh Documents, Vol.7, No.4, (July- 
September 1972), p.4.
33 New York Times, 26 August 1971.
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when the latter surely needed it, diplomatic support was
now being given her to make up for it. Secondly, China was
not fundamentally opposed to the concept of Bangladesh,
and when the situation in the subcontinent untangled itself,
35China would eventually accept the new state. Bangladesh,
therefore, desisted from affronting China by criticising
3 6her action publicly.
The strategy that Dacca followed was that while a way
out of the political impasse in the Ind.o-Pakistan-Bangladesh
relations was being sought, feelers should continue to be
37sent to Peking. This was done by the following means: 
first, by the placement of the old China-hand, K.M. Kaiser 
as Ambassador to Rangoon, obviously with the task of liaising 
with Peking (Kaiser would normally have been otherwise 
considered too senior for the Rangoon job); secondly, 
by forging close links with China's socialist neighbours 
like the Democratic Republic of Vietnam to which Kamal Hassain 
paid a visit in July 1973; third, by direct appeals to 
China herself, as at the Algiers Non-aligned Conference in 
September 1979, to take note of the overwhelming support 
of the non-aligned nations for Bangladesh.
Interview with Dr Kamal Hossain, op.cit.
36 . . ibid.
37 At an earlier stage Dacca had, however, failed to follow up on a 
lead given by China. Peking, through K.M. Kaiser, had offered to 
initiate trade relations through the purchase of a quantum of Bangladeshi 
jute in May 1972. The Bangldesh Government actually accepted the 
proposal in principle, (Times of India, 12 June 1972) but perhaps 
from fear of annoying India delayed its reactions. By the time it 
sent a representative to China to pursue the offer, China had cast in 
veto, and the decision was overtaken by events. The official was unable 
to make any worthwhile contact in China. (Discussions with Foreign 
Secretaty S.A.M.S. Kibria, op.cit.)
209
Success was minimal on all three counts. Kaiser failed
to make a breakthrough and his attempts to get Hanoi to
3 8intercede on Dacca's behalf also failed. Kamal Hussain's
trip to Vietnam achieved little beyond bilateral relations,
and direct appeals to China seemed to fall on deaf ears.
The Chinese position, as expressed by Vice Foreign Minister
Chiao Kua Hua remained firm:
The Chinese Government holds that the 
question of admitting Bangladesh into 
the U.N. can be considered once the 
relevant resolutions of the General 
Assembly and the Security Council are 
implemented without qualification.
But this can be done only after the 
thorough implementation of the U.N.
Resolution and definitely not before.
In other words, the return of the POWs was the principal hurdle.
There was, therefore, a modicum of desperation implied in
Mujib's statement on the subject in Tokyo the same month
when he said that 'independent Bangladesh' had consistently
reaffirmed the desire to develop friendly relations with
Mour great neighbour ' 1 China, and it was now China who should
make the positive move now since to date she had churned
Dacca's overtures: *'We have our self respect1' he said,
40"we are not going to beg". However, it was obvious that 
unless the Gordian knot of the subcontinental impasse was 
cut, the Chinese position would remain unaltered.
Interview with Professor Sisir Gupta, former Indian Ambassador to 
Hanoi, New Delhi, 30 April 1978.
39 Pakzstan Times, 4 October 1973.
40 Japan Tzmes, 24 October 1973.
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The softening of Peking's position began with the 
mutual recognition of Pakistan and Bangladesh in February 
1974, and on 7 June when the Bangladesh application to the 
U.N. was unanimously approved by the Security Council, the 
Chinese delegate Chung-Yen expressed gratification at the 
settlement of Bangladesh's dispute with Pakistan and on
41the tripartite agreement between the two countries and India.
The changing Chinese attitude was also evidenced by 
Peking's announcement of a donation of relief goods worth 
$4 million to Bangladesh following the 1974 floods. Also, 
China did not oppose Bangladesh's U.N. admission. To thank 
the Chinese on both these scores, Dr Kamal HQssain met 
the Chinese Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Chou Kuang Hua 
in New York on 30 September 1974 in what was a most significant 
political meeting.
In that meeting Chou Kuang Hua stressed that as far as 
personal relations were concerned there was no gap between 
the Bangladeshi and the Chinese leaders (Kamal HOssain had 
conveyed to him Mujib's concern about Chou En-lai's health). 
Chou Kuang Hua added that China had nothing but goodwill 
for the people, and leadership of Bangladesh though she had 
reservations about India and the Soviet Union, particularly 
the latter. A large part of the meeting was taken up by 
discussions on the state of Bangladesh-Pakistan relationship.
4 1  Keesing's Contemporary Archives (July 8-14, 1974), p.26610.
42 Details of this meeting were obtained in interviews with Dr Kamal 
Hussain, op.cit., and Ambassador F.A. Chowdhury (who was 
also present), Abu Dhabi, 29 July 1978.
China was obviously disappointed by the result of Bhutto's 
visit to Dacca. Though Chou Kuang Hua indicated a more 
flexible Chinese position by his statement that China was 
telling Pakistan to improve relations with Bangladesh, 
the meeting brought out two things into relief. First, 
though the theoretical barrier to China's acceptance of 
Bangladesh no longer existed, the actual recognition and 
diplomatic links were linked to the solution of outstanding 
issues with Pakistan. Secondly, though China was far too 
committed to Islamabad to establish links with Dacca without 
the latter's approval, it was likely that to an extent 
Peking could be used by Dacca to apply some pressure on 
Pakistan for the solution of such outstanding issues as 
the settlement of assets.
The stage was set for links, even economic, without 
formal diplomatic relations. In May 1975 a three member
trade delegation was sent to China by the Bangladesh Commerce
. . 43 . . .  . . . .Ministry. K.M. Kaiser visited Peking and met Vice Minister
44for Foreign Affairs Han Nien-lung.
The Chinese saw Mujib's overthrow in August 1975 as
45having 'embarrassed India and the Soviet Union'. Though 
there had already been considerable contacts between Dacca 
and Peking, the new impetus of Dacca towards improved
43 The delegation comprised the Director-General of Dacca's Expert 
Promotion Bureau, Mr E.A. Chowdhury, a retired Civil Servant, Mr A.K.M. 
Moosa and a private businessman M.L. Rahman. The visit was kept a 
secret till their return. Apart from initiating initial trade contacts, 
the visit had significant political implications. Interviews with 
Mr E.A. Chowdhury, London, 15 October 1978 and discussions with 
Mr A.K.M. Moosa, Dacca, 3 November 1978.
44 Pakzstan Times, 6 June 1975.
45 Li Hsien-nien, Chinese Vice Premier, quoted in The Japan Tzmes,
10 September 1975.
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relations with Pakistan and the Middle East and the 
simultaneous deterioration in Dacca-Delhi relations seemed
to have a positive impact on the links between China and
46Bangladesh. On 6 October 1975 Hsinhua New Agency announced
the decision for establishment of diplomatic relations
47between the two countries? which were implemented in January 
1976 .
B. Resumption of China's balancing role in South Asia:
With the establishment of diplomatic relations between 
Bangladesh and China, the Chinese traditional role of 
according support to smaller South Asian powers vis-a-vis 
India was resumed. While attempts to mend fences with 
India were in progress, China's strategy was to continue 
to humour the smaller subcontinental actors like Pakistan, 
Nepal, Sri Lanka, and now Bangladesh.
(i) Bilateral Political Relations:
Bangladesh's primary interest in China is as a source 
of support in case of potential threat from India, for this 
would mean a significant accretion of power for Bangladesh. 
Though strictly speaking the two countries do not possess 
a common border, the gap is small enough to be insignificant 
should the situation call for a linkage. When the relations 
with India were at their nadir Dacca obtained such support
212
China's formal recognition came on 31 August.
The Pakistan Times, 7 October 1975.
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at a diplomatic level. Ziaur Rahman visited Peking on
January 19 77 and at a banquet in his honour, Vice Premier
Li Hsien-nien stated that 'China firmly supports the
Government and people of Bangladesh in their just struggle
to safeguard national independence and state sovereingty
48and resist foreign interference'.
More directly, on Farakka, China's support for Bangladesh
was evident, for instance, in a speech by the Chinese Charge
d'Affaires, in Dacca, Mau Ping, who declared in March 1977
that 'we firmly support the reasonable stand taken by
Bangladesh on the question of sharing the waters of the
49Ganges River'. ' From the Chinese side Zia's visit was 
reciprocated by Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien in March 1978.
Domestically, Bangladesh Government gains by the Chinese 
connection by injecting a 'progressive' view into their 
external policy. The support of pro-Peking elements in the 
foreign policy area is sometimes likely to spill over into 
other areas as well.
In return for China's support vis-a-vis potential 
threats from India, the most Bangladesh can offer Peking 
is a veiled support in the latter's struggle against 'hege- 
monism'. In other words, support to Peking on 'hegemonism' 
is traded with support from Peking on 'expansionism'. But 
this of course is not an exact quid pro quo,. While it is
48 Bangladesh, Vol.2, No.4 (Dacca, m/Information and Broadcasting,
15 January 1977), p.5. Though Zia was No.2 in the Bangladesh Government 
when he went to Peking in January 1977, Chairman Hua Kuo-feng broke 
protocol and personally received him at the Airport.
49 . .ibid., Vol.2, No.9, p.2.
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not difficult for China to continue to be critical of
India's^expansionism/ Bangladesh support for 'anti-hegemonism',
50for fear of alienating Moscow, can be only very subtle.
It appears,however^that China is able to appreciate Bangla­
desh's dilemma in this regard. Bangladesh support to the 
Chinese point of view is more outright when there is less 
fear of the alienation of a superpower. For instance, at 
the non-aligned conference in Havana in September 1979,
Foreign Minister Shamsul Huq stressed the right of the 
Kampuchean people 'to freely choose a government without
any external interference or foreign military presence or
51zntervention' [emphasis mine]. The reference was obviously 
to the Vietnamese involvement. This was no doubt designed 
to please China.
(ii) Bilateral Economic Relations:
Aid: Though the total quantum that China gives as 
aid to the Third World countries is comparatively smaller 
than that given by the industrialised West, the amount 
usually only tells half the story. Chinese assistance, 
because of its high political component, is usually geared
50 During a visit to Peking in November 1979, the Bangladesh Foreign 
Minister, Shamsul Huq, praised Chinese opposition to 'all forms of 
colonialism, neo-colonialism, hegemonism and domination' as a 'major 
contribution to world peace, avoiding mention of specific Bangladesh 
support, though implying it', [emphasis mine], Bangladesh Observer,
17 November 1979.
51
Bangladesh Observer, 3 September 1979, Dacca recognised the Pol 
Pot regime and not the Samarine Government. See statement of Bangladesh 
Foreign Secretary S.A.M.S. Kibria, Bangladesh Obvserver, 31 August 1979.
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to the benefit of the recipients. The terms of the repayment 
are extremely favourable and Chinese expatriate experts
5 2claim no higher emoluments than their local counterparts.
The first formal bilateral contact on economic assistance
was established in April 1976 through a discussion between
the Bangladesh Secretary for External Resources Division and
the Chinese Charge d'affaires which was followed by Memos
to the Chinese Ambassador in Dacca and Bangladesh Ambassador
to China in June. Eventually when Zia visited Peking in-
January 19 77 an Agreement on Economic and Technical Cooper-
ation was signed.
During Li Hsien-nien's visit to Dacca in March 1978
two Agreements were signed: the first, an economic and technical
agreement under which China provided approximately 850
million taka interest free loan, repayable in ten years with
a twelve year grace period for the purpose of a Urea Factory^
a Water Conservancy Plant, and some commodity procurements.
The second was a Scientific and Technological Agreement
valid for five years providing for the exchange of experts
and expertise on these fields. Future Chinese assistance
was promised in the fields of road building, agriculture
'5 4and rural electrification. In November 1978 a Shipping
55Agreement was also signed.
52 See Wolfgang Bartke, China's Economic Aid, Trans. Waldraut Jarke,
(Hamburg; Institute of Asian Affairs, 1975), pp.9-23.
53 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dacca.
54
Bangladesh in International Affairs, Vol.l, No.3 (Dacca: Institute 
of Law and International Affairs, March 1978), p.4.
55 . .
Dazmk Bangla, 1 December 1978.
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The total quantum of Chinese aid commitement as on
31 March 1978 was $US1 million as grant and $US58.3 million 
in the form of loans. The grant was entirely utilised.
Of the loan only $1.3 million had been utilised till then, 
but the large balance was partly because the loan agreements 
had just been signed and partly because even for the ones
signed before, the gestation period of selected projects
56were long.
Trade: As in the case of aid relations the 
qualitative features of trade relations are more significant 
than actual quantums, as the experience of Bangladesh shows 
This was evidenced by the following. The Chinese bought 
up products of poorer quality (e.g. sugar and newsprint) 
than they would like to use thus helping Bangladesh diversify 
her exports; secondly, they displayed increased interest 
in non-traditional items, thereby assisting Bangladesh's goal of 
diversification of exportable goods; finally, all Chinese goods 
were available for export under barter trade at prevailing market 
prices, a sharp difference from other Centrally Planned
c nEconomies. Because of these factors the Chinese have been, 
and still are, attractive trade partners for Bangladesh.
Trade was through barter Agreements as well as in 
free foreign exchange. The first annual barter Agreement 
signed on 4 January 1977 provided for a trade of $US20 million
^^See Table 9.3 Chapter 9.
-57 . .Ministry of Commerce, Dacca.
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each way, a marked 44% higher than the last one. Apart 
from traditional Bangladeshi export items like jute and jute 
goods such non-traditional items as shelled cashew nuts, 
particle board and hard board were included. In the free 
foreign exchange trade in 19 76-77 Bangladesh exported goods 
worth Taka 120.81 million and imported goods worth Taka 
110.54 million, thereby maintaining a small favourable
c obalance of trade.
It was agreed in July 1979 during the visit to China 
of the Bangladesh Commerce Minister Saifur Rahman who held 
talks with his Chinese counterpart Li Chiang, that the two 
countries would conclude a long-term trade Agreement covering 
five years from 19 80 and envisaging exchange of goods worth 
$US400 to $500 million . 5 9  This was confirmed during a visit 
to Dacca in February 19 80 by China's Deputy Foreign Trade
r nMinister, Wang Rung-shen.
IV. Conclusions
Bangladesh's principal interest in China is as an ally 
to bolster her sense of security vis-a-vis a perceived 
historical sense of threat from a powerful neighbour. In 
Bangladeshi calculations, despite the recent thawing of
5 8 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dacca.
5 9
Bangladesh, Vol.Ill, No.2 (Dacca, Ministry of Information and 
Broadcasting, 1 August 1979), p.12.
6  0
Bangladesh Observer, 29 February 1980.
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Delhi-Peking relations, India and China, being Third 
World protagonist powers of comparable size but divergent 
values and systems, are likely to have an essentially 
adversary relationship, though the degree of competition 
and antagonism may vary from time to time.
Dacca's China-policy is facilitated by certain factors. 
Firstly, at the political level, there is a broad consensus 
of attitude towards China among major political parties, 
whether they are the conservative Muslim League, the moderate 
Awami League or pro-Peking Leftists. Pro-Moscow left wing 
parties may be an exception but their effectiveness in any 
case is minimal.
Secondly, at bureaucratic levels, senior officials in 
Dacca have had long experience of association with China 
dating back to Pakistan days and they found no difficulty 
in reverting back (after the initial period) to a policy 
they had always been used to. Even the Armed Forces have 
had experience of Chinese hardware and China once more became 
quite easily, as she traditionally had been for Pakistan, 
a source of procurement.
Thirdly, Chinese Aid and Trade policies were such that 
they won easy approval of the Bangladeshis, both official 
and private. This was markedly different from aid and 
trade relations with other Centrally Planned Countries.
61 Indian Foreign Minister, Vajpayee paid a visit to Peking in January
1979.
0 2 For a sympathetic view of China by a senior Civil Servant see 
A.Z.M. Obaidullah, Yellow Sand Hills (Dacca, 1978) , passim.
6 1
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Fourthly, China's refusal to be drawn into Bangladesh's 
domestic political issues, even intra-Left squabbles, 
creates favourable impressions on incumbent governments 
who feel encouraged to maintain close links with Peking 
without the fear that China would get involved with political 
dissidents.
There is, however, one issue on which Bangladesh must 
tread a sticky wicket. China would expect, as indeed she 
does, Bangladesh's political support for'struggle against 
[superpower] 'hegemonism' in lieu of China's support 
against [Indian] 'expansionsism'. But Bangladesh's commitment 
on this score can only be vague for there is the risk of 
gravely alienating Moscow, while on 'expansionsim' Chinese 
and Bangladeshi policies have always converged. But there 
are reasons to believe that China does not apply much 
pressure on this score as the issue of 'struggle against 
hegemonism' does not find place in the Communique/ issued 
following Li Hsien-nien's visit to Dacca in March 1978/-^
Because of the reasons enumerated above, all govern­
ments in Dacca are likely to place premium on good relations 
with Peking. A pointer is the fact that while the Mujib 
government launched the China initiative, the Mushtaq 
government gave it further impetus and the government of 
Ziaur Rahman carried it to fruition.
Though Shamsul Huq made praise of China's opposition to 'hegemonism' 
during his visit to Peking in November 1979, the effect was diluted 
by mentioning 'hegemonism' alongside 'colonialism', 'neo-colonialism' 
and 'domination'.
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EXTRA-REGIONAL RELATIONS: THE MIDDLE EAST
I. Introduction
There are several reasons why the Middle East engaged
Dacca's early attention. First, the Arabs, traditionally,
have held a fascination for the Muslims of the Subcontinent.
As one analyst has written
there is a romantic view [in Pakistan] 
of the Arabs as the original Muslims, whose 
language is the language of the Quran, and 
whom many [Pakistanis] tend to associate 
with the 'Golden Age of Islam’. 1
Many Bangladeshis feel the same way.
Secondly, Bangladesh was in dire need of resources,
both petroleum and otherwise, and the Middle East was an
obvious source. The requirement for oil was ever
increasing. Estimates showed an increase in monetary
terms, from $35 million in 1973 to $95 million in 1974, a
2jump of $60m. Besides Arabs were seen as possible donors, 
helping meet Bangladesh's massive aid requirements.
Finally, the increased economic and political clout 
of the Middle Eastern countries in the 1970s enhanced their
 ^ Beverley M. Male, 'Pakistan's Relations With the Middle East', A.N.U. 
Unpublished Ph.D thesis, November 1969, pp.x-xi.
2 Frank Ellis 'Statistical Background' in Frank Ellis (ed), Oil and 
Developmenti Special Issue, Institute of Development Studies Bulletin, 
Sussex, Vol.6, No.2 (October 1974), p.36.
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prestige. Their support was therefore likely to facilitate
the acceptance of Bangladesh by countries who had not yet
done so. The Muslim states were institutionalising their
links through such bodies as the Islamic Foreign Ministers'
Conference and the Islamic Secretariat. For Bangladesh,
it would obviously pay dividends to belong.
She did not, however, find ready acceptance by the
Muslim Middle East. Firstly, the latter did not endorse
the dismemberment of a fellow-Muslim State Pakistan. Some
made no effort to conceal their early hostility towards
Bangladesh. During the 1971 war Jordan actively aided the
Pakistani military by making third country transfers of ten
3American F-104 aircraft. Even after the emergence of Bangla­
desh as a formal state entity, at the Islamic Foreign Ministers' 
Conference held in Jeddah in February 1972, Libya called
upon Muslim States not to recognize Bangladesh except within
4the framework' of Pakistan.
5Secondly, the emphasis placed on secularism, as opposed 
to Islam, by the Dacca Government (in its effort to encourage 
a communalism-free nationalism, with the sympathy of its 
principal external source of support, India) was displeasing 
to the Arabs. Pakistan also maintained a sustained effort
3 Jack Anderson with Ceorge Clifford, op.cit., p.9.
4 Pakistan Times, 2 March 1972.
5 See Article 8(a) of The Constitution of the People's Republic of 
Bangladesh (Dacca, Constituent Assembly of Bangladesh), p.5.
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to prevent any reversal of this negative Arab attitude,
kept up through visits to the Middle East by Bhutto's special
6emissaries.
Thirdly, the Bangladesh Movement had attracted Israeli
support and Yigal Allon had voiced sympathy for the new
7Republic over state radio. This was sufficient to arouse 
considerable Arab ire.
Soon, however, it became evident that the Ar^abs were 
not all agreed Q.n their attitude towards Bangladesh. There 
were firstly, the 'rejectionists', mainly fundamentalist 
states with close links with Pakistan,such as Saudi Arabia, 
the U.A.E. and Libya; secondly, there were the 'moderates', 
Algeria, South Yemen, and Egypt; thirdly, there were the 
'sympathisers', mainly Iraq, which, largely due to close 
connections with the Soviet Union, tended to look upon Dacca 
with more favour than other Arabs;and finally, there was 
Iran, a non-Arab Middle East state whose attitudes vis-a-vis 
Bangladesh were conditioned more, by geo-political factors 
than by religious.
II. Bangladesh's Strategy and Arab Recognition
Bangladesh attempted to break the back of Arab resistance 
through the following strategems: first, by direct appeals 
g
In August 1972, the Pakistani Food and Agriculture Minister Ghaus Baksh 
Raisani was sent to the area. On his return he declared that Qatar, 
Bahrain and North Yemen had assured him that they would never recognize 
Bangladesh. The following month Islamabad's Foreign Secretary Iftekhar Ali 
carried special messages from Bhutto to Libya's Gaddafy and the Egyptian 
Foreign Minister Zayyat with a request for stalling the recongition of 
Bangladesh. Times of India, 11 September 1972.
 ^ibid.
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to the Arabs themselves; secondly, by using the South East 
Asian Muslim states as intermediaries; thirdly, by projecting 
a posture of unswerving support to the Arabs on the Palestine 
issue; and, finally, (and this was to come last of all) by 
proposing arbitration by the Arab states in Bangladesh's 
dispute with Pakistan regarding division of assets.
A . Direct Appeals:
These were initiated at a very early stage, even prior 
to the actual emergence of Bangladesh. In May 19 71, when 
the struggle for Bangladesh was still in progress, a represen­
tative of the Provisional Government, Abdus Samad Azad, at 
the Budapest World Peace Council Conference, pointed out 
to the Muslim delegations in a passionate appeal, that 
Pakistan was using religion as a means of 'perpetrating 
inhuman suppression'.^
Immediately after independence, a Bangaldeshi politician, 
MQllah Jalaluddin}was sent as a roving envoy to the Middle 
East. He emphasized Bangladesh's unwillingness to have any
9relations whatsoever with Israel. Later official level 
delegations, such as the one headed by a senior diplomat,
Iqbal Athar, were also sent to various Arab capitals to 
lobby Bangladesh's case.^
Q
Speech by Abdus Samad Azad, head of the delegation from the Bangladesh 
Provisional Government, World Peace Council Conference, Budapest, May, 1971.
9
Times of India, 27 December 1971.
^  Interview with Mr R. Amin, a member of the Athar delegation, Canberra,
5 February 1979.
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Mujib, who attended the Non-Aligned Summit Conference 
at Algiers in September 1973 made personal calls on such 
participating Arab leaders as Saudi Arabia, Faisal, Egypt's 
Sadat and Libya's Gaddafy. Mujib's efforts met with some 
result as shortly afterwards two Arab states, Egypt and Syria, 
announced their recognition of Bangladesh.^
B . Use of South East Asian Muslim States as Intermediaries:
Bangladesh was more easily acceptable to the Muslim
countries of South East Asia, Malaysia and Indonesia. Malaysia
12had bitter memories of Bhutto. Indonesia's Suharto did
not share his predecessor Sukarno's foreign policy orientations,
13including the strong bias for Pakistan. On 26 February
141972 both Malaysia and Indonesia recognized Bangladesh.
This was significant for Bangladesh as Indonesia was the 
largest Muslim state in terms of population>and Malaysia, 
whose former Prime Minister Tunku Abdur Rahman was the 
Secretary General of the Islamic Secretariat, had close links 
with the Arab countries.
The fact that they served as conduit between Dacca and 
the Arab capitals was evident in a speech by the Bangladesh 
Foreign Minister Abdus Samad Azad at a banquet in honour of 
his Indonesian counterpart Adam Malik: he said
^  Times of India, 17 September 1973.
12 Bhutto, as Pakistan's Foreign Minister, was responsible for breaking 
off Pakistan's diplomatic relations with Malaysia following a speech by 
a Malayan diplomat at the U.N. which was critical of Pakistan's role 
in the Indo-Pakistan War of 1965.
13 Sukarno had actively supported Pakistan during her 1965 war with India.
14 Ttmes of India, 27 February 1972.
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We welcome you in our midst not only as 
a Foreign Minister but as the representative 
of the largest Muslim populated country in 
the world ... it [Indonesia] was the first 
Muslim country to accord recognition to our 
new state ... We are aware that you personally 
projected the cause of Bangladesh in the 
Middle East and thereby paved the way for the 
development of better understanding between 
Bangladesh and the countries of that region.15
C . Support to the Arabs on the Palestine issue:
Bangladesh projected a posture of total support to the
Arabs vis-a-vis Israel on the Palestine issue. The earlier
Israeli support to Bangladesh was pointedly ignored by Dacca.
Mujib declared (as reported in the Middle East Press)
Israel sent us her recognition and 
we did not respond. She wanted to 
send us weapons but we declined to 
accept.16
At the Non-Aligned Summit in Algiers, Mujih in his 
speech regretted the fact that Arab territories still remained 
under the 'illegal occupation of Israel' and that the people
17of Palestine continued to be denied their 'fundamental rights'.
At the Islamic Summit Conference in Lahore in February 1974
18he said: 'We must regain our right over Jerusalem'. By 
using the first person plural he was totally identifying 
himself with the Arab cause.
Earlier, the Arab-Israeli War of 1973 had provided 
Bangladesh with an opportunity to vigorously project her pro-
15
Bangladesh Documents, Vol.l, No.4 (Dacca: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
July-September 1972), pp.7-8.
16 Al-Gorrihouria (Cairo), 6 April 1972.
17 Bangladesh Documents, Vol.2, No.l, op.cit., July-September 1973, p.18.
18 ibid., Vol.2, No.3, January-March 1974, p. 22.
226
Arab stance. She despatched 100,000 pounds of tea to
Egyptian and Syrian soldiers as 'a token of love' for the
'Arab brethren', followed by a decision to send an Army
medical mission to Syria. The support the Arab cause had
received from diverse political quarters in Bangladesh was
noted with satisfaction by the Arab world, and, within a
week of the War, 'in gratitude for Dacca's support to the
Arab War effort and opposition to Israeli aggression', Jordan,
Kuwait and North Yemen decided to establish diplomatic relations
19with Bangladesh. Indeed by December, Mujib was able to
report to his people that among the Arab states Iraq, Egypt,
Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Kuwait, South Yemen, North Yemen,
Syria, Sudan and Jordan had accorded Bangladesh formal
20recognition.
D . The Suggestion for Arab Arbitration Between Bangladesh 
and Pakistan
Some Arab States, particularly Saudi Arabia, however,
continued to withhold recognition. Eventually, the Bangladesh
Foreign Minister, Dr Kamal Hossain was able to mellow the
Saudis down considerably at the Sixth Islamic Foreign Ministers'
Conference in Jeddah in 19 75, when he suggested that the
Saudis by themselves, or together with the U.A.E. and Kuwait
arbitrate between Bangladesh and Pakistan on the issue of
21the division of assets. Thus by indicating that Bangladesh
19 Impact Intematzonal, Fortnightly, London (23 November-13 December
1973), p.10.
20 Mujib's Addtess on the National Day of Bangladesh, 16 December, 1973.
Bangladesh Documents, Vol.2, No.2, October-December 1973, p.14.
21 Interview with Dr Kamal Hossain, op.cit.
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was willing to repose complete confidence on these countries, 
even though they had adopted a pro-Pakistan posture, Kamal 
Hossain was able to neutralise their hostility to a very 
large extent.
III. Some Selected Case Studies
This section will examine Bangladesh's relations with 
five selected Middle Eastern Muslim countries, Saudi Arabia, 
the United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.), Egypt, Iraq and Iran.
Saudi Arabia has been selected, not only because of her economic 
resources but also because of the special status she enjoys 
among the Muslims as the guardian of Islam's holy shrines;
the U.A.E. as being representative of the conservative states,
\ / s as well as for being an original rejectionist vis-a-vis Bangla­
desh; Egypt, because of her international political importance; 
Iraq, as an Arab socialist state which was sympathetic from 
the beginning, and Iran, as a non-Arab Muslim state from 
the region.
A . Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia was initially opposed to the creation of 
Bangladesh, and sustained this opposition over a period 
longer than that from any other Arab state. This was because, 
firstly, Pakistan had many friends in the Saudi ruling circles 
and was able to ensure that Bangladesh was excluded from 
Saudi favour; secondly, the Saudis, who perceive themselves 
in many ways the leaders of the Muslim world, could not 
condone the acceptance of 'secularism' as a principle of 
state by the government of a Muslim country; thirdly, Bangla-
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desh was suspect in Saudi eyes because of the support the
Israeli leadership originally accorded her, and finally
being politically conservative, Saudi Arabia had no sympathy
for a state whose very emergence was so unconventional.
King Faisal made no secret of his feelings when while
inaugurating the Islamic Foreign Ministers' Conference in
Jeddah in March 197 2, he prayed for the early 'reunification'
22of 'both wings of Pakistan'. There was no change m
the Saudi attitude throughout 1972 and a visiting Pakistani
Cabinet Minister, Ghaus Baksh Raisani, was assured that
Saudi Arabia would never recongize Bangladesh unless Pakistan
23did so. At the Algiers Non-Aligned Conference in September
241973 Mujib was granted an audience by King Faisal. Though
the S.audis continued their opposition to Bangladesh by raising
objection to a political declaration of the Conference supporting
25Bangladesh's entry into the United Nations, some link
between the two leaders was now established.
The major breakthrough in Bangladesh's relations with
the Arab states came following Bangladesh's support to the
2 6latter in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. Though Saudi recognition 
of Bangladesh did not follow, her attitude was moderated.
After Pakistan's recognition of Bangladesh in February 1974,
22 Paktstan Ttmes, 2 March 1972.
23 ibid., 19 August 1972.
24 See Section IIA ante.
25 Pakistan Times, 13 September 1973.
26 Footnote 19 ante.
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Dacca hoped that the Saudi recognition was only a matter of time.
In fact Saudi Arabia displayed a considerable softening of
attitude when King Faisal announced the donation of $10 million
27to Dacca on 19 April 1974 as disaster relief. But the
Saudis continued to stall according Dacca formal recognition,
obviously under Pakistani influence, as a sudden hiatus in
Dacca-Islamabad relations came about following their failure
to cut the gordian knot of the issue of division of assets.
The Bangladesh Foreign Minister, Kamal Hdssain, however,
was able to mellow down Faisal by suggesting Saudi arbitration
2 8of the issue. It now only took the emphasis on Islamic
features, which was laid by the post-Mujib government, to
bring about Saudi recognition. The new President of Bangladesh
29Mushtaq, received messages of felicitations from Faisal.
Bangladesh took the initia tive in establishing diplomatic
links by opening a Mission in Saudi Arabia on 18 January 1976.
The first Bangladesh Ambassador, Humayun Rasheed Chowdhury,
presented his credentials on 20 October of the same year, and
30was assured of Faisal's support against 'external threat'.
General Ziaur Rahman made a brief stop-over in Saudi 
Arabia in 1976 and then paid a formal official visit as 
President in July 1977. In December 1978, in course of a
27
Times of India, 20 August 1974.
28 Footnote 21 ante.
29 Pakzstan Tzmes, 17 August 1975. It seemed that Saudi action was 
synchronised with that of Pakistan, which also accorded Mushtaq Government 
immediate recognition.
30 Bangladesh, Fortnightly, Vol.l, No.l (Dacca: Ministry of Information 
and Broadcasting, 1 December 1976).
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Footnote 21 ante.
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synchronised with that of Pakistan, which also accorded Mushtaq Government 
onmediate recognition.
Bangladesh:, Fortnightly, Vol.l, No.l (Dacca: Ministry of Information 
and Broadcasting, 1 December 1976).
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visit to Bangladesh by the Saudi Minister for Finance and 
National Economy, Sheikh Aba al-Khail, a joint commission
for 'promoting bilateral relations and strenghtening cooper-
. 31ation' was set up.
As of 31 March 1978} Saudi Arabia was the largest donor
among the Arab countries. Till then she had committed $ 8 8
million as grant and $50 million as loan, out of which $73,375
32million of the grant component has already been utilised.
Saudi Arabia has so far pledged a total amount of $300 million
to assist Bangladesh's economic development, half of which
33is to be m  grant and the other half, interest-free loan.
Saudi assurances of help towards the funding of the Bangladesh
Second Five Year Plan (1980-85) was reiterated by King Khalid
to the visiting Bangladesh Minister for Rails and Highways,
Abdul Alim, when the latter led a delegation of pilgrims in
November 1979.34
Saudi Arabia also employs a large number of surplus
semi-skilled and skilled labour as well as many Bangladeshi
professionals such as engineers, doctors and teachers. In
the month of January 1978 out of a total number of 1661 persons
who left Bangladesh for foreign employment, 256 went to Saudi
35Arabia. Considerable amounts, $1,431,265 in the first
31 Bangladesh Observer, 23 September 1979.
See Table 6.5 below.
33 Same as footnote 31 ante.
3 4  Bangladesh Observer, 17 November 1979.
35 See Table 6.6 below.
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three months of 1978 were remitted home by these persons,
thus contributing to Bangladesh's foreign exchange reserves.
B . The United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.)
The U.A.E. represented the typical Arab initial attitude
to Bangladesh. For very much the same reasons as Saudi Arabia,
she was unsympathetic to Bangladesh at the outset. In fact,
her resistance did not wear out till after Pakistan had
recognized Bangladesh. Then on 10 March 1974, the U.A.E.
Minister of State for Foreign Affairs sent a telegram to the
Bangladesh Foreign Minister announcing Abu Dhabi's recognition 
37of Dacca.
Almost immediately afterwards, the Bangladesh Foreign
Minister, Kamal Hossain, was in Abu Dhabi. In course of
his discussions with his hosts, the decision was taken to
exchange Ambassadors. It was also agreed that delegations
would be exchanged periodically 'with a view to expanding
areas of cooperation in education, cultural, scientific,
3 8economic and other fields'. Mujib paid a formal visit to 
Abu Dhabi in December 1974.
The Zia government kept up the attempts to maintain 
political relations at the highest level. To that end Zia
visited Abu Dhabi in March 1978, in course of which he reiter-
39ated Dacca's adherence to Islamic principles. It was
36 Ex Source: Exchange Control Department, Bangladesh Bank, Dacca.
37 •Pakistan Tzmes, 11 March 1974.
38 Joint Communique, Bangladesh Documents, Vol.2, No.3 (January-March,
1974) , p.23.
39
36
Ermrates News (Abu Dhabi) , 9 March 1978.
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decided that the two countries would initiate immediate
action for exchanging delegations to identify projects in
Bangladesh for possible U.A.E. support and that a joint
commission would be set up to review, periodically, the
40progress of bilateral cooperation m  all fields. Zia made
a brief stop-over at Dubai in October 1978 when he held
talks with the U.A.E. Communications Minister, Saeed al- 
41Mullah.
High level visits from the U.A.E. to Bangladesh, on
the other hand, have not been frequent. The most significant
one was by a non-political person, the Chief Justice of the
Sharia Court, Sheikh Ahmed Abdul Aziz al-Mubarak in March
4219 77. This, together with the fact that Bangladesh appointed
a full-fledged Ambassador to Abu Dhabi as early as November
1974, while the latter reciprocated belatedly only in January
1978, that too with a comparatively junior offical as Charge7^
d'affaires, point to a greater eagerness of Dacca to maintain
close links, than that of Abu Dhabi.
Major economic interactions began simultaneously with
political relations, though there was some minor trading even
4 3earlier. In September 1974 Bangladesh sent a seven-member 
economic delegation to Abu Dhabi, led by Professor Nurul Islam, 
the Chief of the Planning Commission. The delegation met
40 . . .Joint Communique issued at the Conclusion of the State Vzsvt of
President Ziaur Rahman to the U.A.E. from March 6 to March 8, 1978 (Dacca: 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 10 March 1978), pp.2-3.
41 .Khaleej Times (Dubai), 7 October 1978.
4 2  Bangladesh, Fortnightly, Vol.l, No.9 (Dacca: Ministry of Information 
and Broadcasting, 1 April 1977), p.2.
43 See Table 6.1.
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and discussed with the U.A.E. Planning Minister, Khalifa 
44
A l - K m d i .  Professor Islam's visit was returned in November
by the Managing Director of the Abu Dhabi Fund, Dr Hassan
Abbas Zaki, and the following month during Mujib's official
trip to the U.A.E., a sum of approximately $50 million was
45
made available to Bangladesh.
The U.A.E. eventually emerged as the second largest 
Middle Eastern aid donor for Bangladesh. Till 31 March 1978,
46
she had given a total of $85,400 million in loans and grants.
Of these, $10 million offered on 26 June 1976 is being used
for a Machine Tool Factory and $15 million for an electrical
works, which indicate that the assistance is being used to
4 7
fund sophisticated and modern projects. During 1977 the 
U.A.E. committed herself to supplying Bangladesh with 600,000 
tons of jrfurban oil on short term credit, thus helping satisfy 
an urgent requirement. ®
49
The following table gives a picture of bilateral trade:
44
Pakvstan Ttmes, 16 September 1974.
45
Interview with Ambassador F.A. Chowdhury of Bangladesh, Abu Dhabi,
29 July 1978.
^  See Table 6.5.
47
Same as footnote 45 ante.
48
Bangladesh, Fortnightly, Vol.l, No.3 (1 January 1977).
49 . .
Ministry of Commerce, Trade 1 Section, Dacca.
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Table 6 .1
[in 000 takas]
Year Export from Bangladesh Import from Bangladesh
1972-73 274
6601973-74
1974-75 462 120,395 (petro­
leum)
1976-77
1975-76 2,507 
3, 834 384,003 (petro­
leum)
The table shows a steady increase in exports over the
last three years. Though the sole item of import was
petroleum, the exports covered a wide variety of items such
as tea, vegetable, incense, cables and wires, films, handi-
cract, fish, fresh fruits, live animals, and confectionary,
which was in conformity with Bangladesh's aim of encouraging
a wide diversification of exportable goods. In spite of
her small population, given the much higher purchasing power,
the U.A.E. has the potential for developing into a good
50
market for Bangladeshi products.
The U.A.E. is also an important source of employment
for Bangladeshi surplus labour. Out of the 1,661 persons
who left Bangladesh for overseas employment in January 1976,
276 went to the U.A.E., 20 more than the number to Saudi Arabia
51
m  that particular month. A large sum of money continued 
to be remitted home by the Bangladeshis. The amounts in the
50
Interview with Mr Helaluddin Akbar, Commercial Secretary, Bangladesh 
Embassy, Abu Dhabi, 30 July 1978.
51
See Table 6 . 6 .
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first three months in 1978 totalled $2,301,556, a considerably 
larger quantum than that remitted by Bangladeshis from Saudi 
Arabia [Source: same as footnote 36],
C . Egypt
There are two broad reasons why Egypt was important to 
Bangladesh: first, she was politically a very significant 
entity not only regionally, but globally as well, and secondly, 
not being a fundamentalist or a conservative state, she was 
likely to accept Bangladesh early, which was aqain likely to 
provide the latter with a foothold in the region from which to 
attempt the cultivation of other Arab states.
Even in 1971 there were moves from Cairo which could
be deemed as being sympathetic to Bangladesh. Some newspapers
such as Al-Ahram had pleaded for moderation by Pakistani troops
in Dacca and President Anwar Sadat had written a letter to
5 2
General Yahya Khan urging restraint.
Egypt, however, was unwilling to risk the alienation 
of Pakistan to any significant extent, which a formal 
recogntion of Dacca by Cairo at an early stage would have 
certainly brought about. At the same time, she saw no reason 
for not being pragmatic enough to accept the f a i t  accompli  
in South Asia. Ideally, Egypt would have welcomed an early 
rapprochement between Dacca and Islamabad, but since it seemed 
unlikely to happen in the near future, she tried to devise 
a working relationship with Dacca sans formal recognition.
Interview with Ambassador Abdus Sultan of Bangladesh, Cairo, 1 August 
1978.
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To that end in 1972 Sadat sent a verbal message to Mujib
through Dr Tewfiq Oweida, the Secretary-General of the Supreme
Council of Islamic Affairs in Cairo that Egypt acknowledged.
[not recognized] the emergence of Bangladesh as a reality
and was in the process of consulting with other Arab states
5 3
regarding formal recognition.
Bangladesh built up a gradual pressure on Egypt to
secure her recognition. She despatched Iqbal Athar to Cairo
54
m  August 1972, followed by a visit there by the Foreign
Minister Abdus Samad Azad, indicating Bangladesh's eagerness
55
for early links. A further proof of such eagerness was 
that Dacca quite willingly signed a Trade Agreement with Cairo 
in December 1972, while earlier, the same year it had declined 
a barter protocol with Rumania, because Bucharest was yet 
to recognize Bangladesh. Egypt also provided positive gestures 
by sending important personalities to Dacca, such as Hassan 
el-Heikel, the Editor of Al-Ahram in January 1973 and 
Dr Zayyat, the Foreign Minister in March that year.
By the time the Indo-Pakistan Agreement of August 1973 
had been signed, Pakistan had already learnt to live with 
the increasing international acceptance of Bangladesh.
With this hurdle to recognition now removed, Egypt recognized 
Bangladesh after the Sadat-Mujib meetings during the Algiers
53
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dacca, 27 November 1978.
54
Same as footnote 10 ante.
55
There was some suggestion made to Iqbal Athar by the Cairo leadership 
that Mujib visit Egypt but the Foreign Office in Dacca discouraged a 
Prime Ministerial visit without formal recognition of the host. Same 
as footnote 53.
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Non-Aligned Conference. The growing rapport was aided by
Bangladeshi support to Egypt during the Arab-Israeli War of
1973. There were further meetings between Mujib and Sadat at
the Islamic Summit in Lahore in February 1974, when Sadat
made a goodwill stop-over in Dacca the same month and Mujib
visited Cairo in November, the same year.
Given the close personal links between Sadat and Mujib,
Dacca had reasons to fear Egyptian hostility following Mujib's
overthrow. Therefore, the Special Presidential Assistant
Justice Abdus Saltar was sent to talk to the Egyptian leader-
57
ship in January 1976. Sattar was received by Foreign
5 8
Minister Fahmy as well as by Sadat. Once again Egypt 
found it necessary to accept a f a i t  accom pli . Sadat may 
have drawn some consolation from the fact that Bangladesh 
appeared to be veering away from the Soviet Union with whom 
his relations had also soured.
The government of Ziaur Rahman continued striving to 
retain high level links. Zia visited Cairo in September 1977
\ 59
and stressed Bangladeshi support to Egypt vis-a-vzs Israel.
The visit was seen by the Egyptian press as
not a mere confirmation of the close 
relations between the two countries but 
[as coinciding] with the historical 
circumstances through which the Middle
^  Same as footnote 11 ante.
5 7
Al-Akhbar (Cairo), 30 January 1976.
58
Al-Ahram (Cairo), 1 February 1976.
59
5 6
Al-Musawuar, Weekly (Cairo), 30 September 1977.
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East area is passing and with the 
Islamic p r o p l e s ' drive to further 
their solidarity and cohesion.60
Bangladesh has had to tread her grounds very carefully
following Sadat's peace venture with Israel. She has avoided
taking any sides in the intra-mural Arab disputes that had
arisen as a result. Bangladesh has not publicly either
criticised or condoned Sadat's initiatives. What has enabled
her to succeed in this delicate policy of non-reaction is
an overall Arab appreciation of her position, and the lack
of pressure for support from the involved parties.
Economic relations with Egypt preceded formal political
links. But this was in the area of trade rather than aid.
Egypt was not a major source of aid, mainly due to her own
61
resource constraints. Some technical assistance was
rendered through scholarships; 25 such offers were received
in 1977-78 for studies in the fields of medicine, engineering,
6 2
agriculture, and Arabic language and literature.
There were significant trade interactions, however.
Even prior to the establishment of embassies, Egypt maintained
a Trade Office in Dacca. Trade is conducted through barter
6  3
agreements as well as in free foreign exchange. The first
60
Al-Ahram (Cairo), 25 September 1977. In course of this visit Ziaur 
Rahman was decorated by Sadat with the 'Collar of the Nile'. Al-Gomhouria 
(Cairo), 25 September 1977.
^  However there have been some arms transfers over the years, including 
some tanks and military hardware.
6 2
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dacca.
6 3
Following details obtained from Mohammed Rizk Mohammed Heiza, Represen­
tative Egyptian Trade Centre in Dacca: 'Bangladesh-Egypt Trade Relations 
at a Glance', Bangladesh Times Special Supplement, 27 July 1978. Also 
interview with Mr M.A. Chowdhury, Embassy of Bangladesh, Cairo, 2 August 1978.
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barter agreement was signed on 15 December 1972 and provided 
for an exchange of £9.5 million worth of commodities each 
way. However, the utilization fell short of the maximum 
and the amount was reduced to £6.07 million when the second 
barter agreement was signed on 27 December 1975. Though a 
third barter was signed in 1977, by then it was obvious 
that this was not the best form of trading. Of much greater 
success was the commercial intercourse in free foreign exchange. 
In 1977-78 the volume of business transaction amounted to 
$20 million. For Bangladesh traders Egypt is an important 
source for certain essential commodities like raw cotton, 
cotton yarn and rock phosphate. Egypt, in turn, is the 
largest buyer# of Bangladeshi tea.
D . Iraq
Iraq's initial assessment of Bangladesh was coloured
more by political than religious motives. The ruling Baath
Socialist Party was sympathetic to the Awami League which
had similar socialist overtones. Iraq had also close
links with the Soviet Union, a major source of external support
for Bangladesh. These factors prompted the early acceptance
of Bangladesh by Iraq, which on 8 June 1972 became the first
. . 64
Arab country to accord Bangladesh recognition.
Dacca obviously hoped that Iraq would be the conduit 
linking Bangladesh to other Arab countries. The Iraquis 
were, therefore, assiduously cultivated.
64
Tzmes of Indta, 9 June 1972.
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Prior to the Islamic Summit in Labore, Dacca sent Foreign
Minister Kamal Hossain to Iraq with a message from Mujib
to President Hassan ai Bakr. While seeking Iraqui assistance
for obtaining Pakistani recognition, Kamal Hossain also used
the visit to focus sharply on Bangladesh's general pro-Arab
stance for the Arab world to see. The Joint Communique issued
after his meeting with his counterpart said:
The two Ministers reiterated their 
Governments' absolute support for the 
right of self-determination of the Arab 
people and for regaining full rights 
as well as exercising full sovereignty over 
their territory ... the two sides reviewed 
the situation in the Arabian Gulf [emphasis 
mine] and the Indian Ocean and agreed that 
security and peace of the two areas are 
interlinked.65
The use of 'Arabian Gulf' in place of 'Persian Gulf'
as is commonly used in the Subcontinent denoted a clear
desire of the Bangladeshi side to placate the Arabs. The
bilateral links were strengthened by Mujib's visit to Iraq
in October 1974. Agreements for cultural and economic cooper-
6 6
ation were signed in course of that visit.
However, Iraq had certain strong misgivings after the 
Coup of August 1975 in Dacca. The Iraqui reaction was once again 
as in 1971-72, in line with that of the Soviet Union. Just 
as in 1971-72 Iraq had stood apart from most Arab states by 
sympathising with Bangladesh, yet once more she projected a 
different attitude from those of most other Arab states who
^  Bangladesh Documents, Vol.2, No.3 (January - March 1974), pp.20-21.
66
Interview with Mr Ruhul Amin, then an official of the Bangladesh Embassy 
in Baghdad, Canberra, 26 February 1979.
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were pleased with the Islamic overtones of the newly installed 
government of Mushtaq. Iraq's misgivings must have been fed 
by the resignation, in reaction to his recall, of the Bangladeshi 
Ambassador to Baghdad, K.G. Mustafa, a close confidant of 
Mujib's who had powerful friends in the upper reaches of the 
Baath Party.
There was consequently a brake on further developments 
in bilateral relations. Time and a further change of government 
in Dacca acted as healers, and in April 1977 a Bangladeshi 
Cabinet Minister, Kazi Anwarul Huq, visited Baghdad. The 
old links were restored and in July 1978 the Iraqui Vice 
President Taaha Mohiyuddin Maarouf came to Dacca,1hcvi<sil lay
r 7
Ziaur Rahman in February 1979, immediately after the election 
victory of his Bangladesh Nationalist Party.
Iraq is the third largest Arab donor for Bangladesh, 
coming after Saudi Arabia and the U.A.E. Till 31 March 1978 
she provided a total sum of $51 million, $44,737 million on
r  O
credit and $6,263 million as grant. On the Trade side, 
a General Trade Agreement between the two countries was signed
on 18 February 1974. The following table indicates the volume
. . .. 69
of transactions.
6 7
Bangladesh High Commission, Canberra.
68 See Table 6.5.
69
Ministry of Commerce, Dacca.
242
Table 6 .2
[in 000 Taka]
1973-74 1974-75 1975-76 1976-77 
Import from Iraq 139,496 40,695 149,001 10,203
Export to Iraq 15,886 152,563 121,546 14,071
An analysis of the above shows a steep decline after
1975-76, which conforms to the low in political relations.
So far, import from Iraq has remained confined to crude and
partly refined petroleum, sulphur, and dates. Exports have
comprised traditional items like jute and jute goods, hides
and skins and spices. Endeavours in Dacca are being made to
expand the range of goods to include a variety of non-traditional
items as well. Being an oil-rich state, Iraq is seen as a
good market, potentially.
Iraq has currently approximately 6,000 Bangladeshi
expatriates employed there and plans to recruit a further 8 , 0 0 0
70
semi-skilled workers shortly. The amount of foreign exchange
they remitted home during the first three months of 1978
71
totalled $844,170. The amount is expected to rise following 
the proposed recruitment of the additional work force, 
increasing Iraq's significance to Dacca on this count.
70
Bangladesh Observer, 20 October 1979.
71
On this score, Iraq, among the Middle Eastern countries came after the UAE, 
Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait and Iran. Source: Bangladesh Bank, Dacca.
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E . Iran
Iran had been too much of a traditional ally of Pakistan
for Bangladesh to consider any close relations with her till
the climate of Dacca-Islamabad relations showed some signs
of improvement. But even though Iran's sympathies lay with
Pakistan, with her burgeoning wealth and power, she had begun
to develop in the early 1970s a broader perspective in the
assessment of her interests in her eastern flank. This
included improved relations with India.
However, the territorial integrity of what was left of
Pakistan in 1971 continued to be of primary interest to Teheran
for any further balkanization of the former would spell
problems for the latter, for instance vis-a-vis the Baluchis
of Iran. It was, therefore, only logical for the Shah to
hope for better Itsdo-Pakistan relations.
The Indians were at pains to put across to the Shah
that they did not wish for the disintegration of residual
Pakistan. There were visits to Teheran by Mrs Gandhi's
envoy, P.N. Haksar, in early 1973, followed a few months
72
later by that of Swan Singh to explain this viewpoint.
Convinced of this, the Shah was now in a better position to
prod a subcontinental detente, particularly as the region
\r
promised to be a sizeable market for If^n.
Therefore, though Iran's formal recognition of Bangladesh 
had to await Pakistan's, Iran was never unfavourably disposed
72
M. Ayoob, Indo-Iranian Relations: Strategic3 Political and Economic 
Dimensions, Reprinted from India Quarterly (Hew Delhi: Indian Council of 
World Affairs, ii.d.), p.10.
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towards Bangladesh. Dr Kamal Hossain visited Iran in June 
1974. He was given an audience by the Shah and he held 
discussions with Prime Minister Hoveida and Foreign Minister 
Khalatbary. Since Kamal Hossain had taken along with him 
Bangladesh's planning chief, Professor Nurul Islam, the
73
discussions had a strong bias towards economic matters.
Successive Bangladesh Governments continued the policy
of close links with Iran. When the Farakka dispute portended
to become a major issue between Bangladesh and India, an
influential Iranian newspaper Kayhan supported Bangladesh
by arguing that things had come to such a pass over Farakka
74
that Bangladesh could no longer remain silent.
Ziaur Rahman visited Iran in March 1977 and in October
that year the Iranian Labour Minister Abdul Qasim Moini
signed in Dacca a Memorandum of Understanding that would take
to Iran a large surplus of Bangladeshi manpower, envisaging
75
a transfer of over 24,000 workers.
Following the advent of Ayatollah Khomeini to power in 
February 1979, the Bangladesh-Iran relations did not undergo 
change in any major way. The Bangladeshi Foreign Minister 
Shamsul Huq welcomed Iran as a new member of the Non-Aligned 
Movement at the Conference in Havana in September 1979, and 
stated that Bangladesh-Iran ties were rooted in history and 
cul t u r e .^
73
Bangladesh Documents, Vol.2, No.4 (April-June 1974), pp.22-23.
See Bangladesh, Fortnightly, Vol.l, No.l, (Dacca: Ministry of Information
& Broadcasting, December 1976), p . 4.
75 . .
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dacca.
76
Bangladesh Observer, 2 September 1979.
245
The fact that one of those taken hostage at the American 
Embassv in Teheran in November 1979 was a Bangladeshi also did not 
affect bilateral relations adversely. His release was soon 
effected and as the U.S.-Iranian relations reached their 
nadir, Bangladeshi approach to the crisis, as reflected in 
deliberations at the U.N. Security Council, was of utmost 
circumspection.
For instance, Bangladesh abstained from voting on the
draft resolution tabled by the U.S. on 31 December 1979 calling
for economic sanctions against Iran if the hostages were not
released immediately. While supporting
the UN resolution for the release of the 
American diplomatic personnel [emphasis 
mine] held in Teheran according to the 
principles of immunity as assured to such 
personnel under international law and 
convention
and appreciating 'the desire of the U.S. Government for action
within the framework of international law and under the
auspices of the United Nations', the Bangladesh delegate
argued that
the decisions to use sanctions on a 
specified date would only result in 
dividing the international community 
and may be prejudicial to the Secretary- 
General 's [forthcoming] m i s s i o n . 77
Bangladesh was toeing a very cautious and low-key line, 
unwilling to offend either Iran or the U.S. Though she has close 
links with both -Jashington and Teheran, she does not seem to have
'Statement by Bangladesh at the Security Council Meeting on 31 December 
1979', Bangladesh High Commission, Canberra.
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seriously considered mediating between the two parties
on the issue of hostages.
This disinclination for involvement was also evident
in the fact that when Justice Abu Sayeed Chowdhury, a former
President of Bangladesh, was selected a member of the U.N.
commission of inquiry into Iran's grievances, he turned it
7 8
down on the ground of 'illness'.
In spite of the fact that Bangladesh's interests in
Iran were largely motivated by the compulsions of economic
needs, Iran has not been a major donor. Till March 31, 1978
Dacca obtained only $12.5 million as loan, less than from any
79
other Middle Eastern OPEC state except Libya.
Trading predated diplomatic relations between the two
countries. Two tables are placed below indicating the year-
8 0
wise breakdown in the volume of transactions:
Table 6.3 
EXPORTS FROM BANGLADESH TO IRAN
[Figure in 000 Taka]
I terns Year
1972-73 1973-74 1974-75 1975-76 1976 -77
Jute goods 31,344 55,029 118,493 90,635 189, 756
Raw j ute 4,892 - 4,822 2,635 17, 199
Rayon - 2,266 - - -
Jute screen cloth - - 132 - -
Tamarind - - 48 - -
Leather - - 2 0 13 42
Newsprint - - - 652 648
Turmeric — — — — 291
Total 36,236 57,295 123,515 93,934 207, 936
78
Newsweek, 25 February 1980.
^  See Table 6.5.
80 . .
Ministry of Commerce, Dacca.
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Table 6.4 
IMPORTS FROM IRAN TO BANGLADESH
[Figure in 000 Taka]
Items Year
1972-73 1973-74 1974-75 1975-76 1976-77
Petroleum
products - 47,675 16,832 253,966
Oil seeds, nuts - 255 179 259
Coffee, Cocoa,
spices - 25 42 187
Dairy products - 3 5 -
Fruit &
Vegetables - 7 - -
Oil, fats & wax - 45 - -
Chemicals &
compounds - — - 16
Total - 48,000 17,058 254,428 733,137
The tables indicate the importance of Iran as an important
source of petroleum products, whose import into Bangladesh 
show a steady increase as of 1975-76. Despite recent cutbacks 
in their oil production, Iran continues to remain an important 
source of this item for Bangladesh.
IV. A General Survey
Broadly, all governments in Dacca have endeavoured to 
establish and retain close links with the Muslim States in 
the Middle East. Even when 'secularism' was considered a 
major principle of state policy, as during the Mujib era, 
sustained efforts were being made by Dacca to cultivate 
the Middle East. When the Islamic features of Bangladesh
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were outlined in broader relief by the Mushtaq Government, 
reactions from this area in general became even more favourable. 
The Zia government continued to value close relations with 
the Middle East, whose assistance could be invoked whenever 
there were threat perceptions from Bangladesh's neighbours, 
all of whom are non-Muslim state actors.
The policy of creating rapport by personal contacts 
through high level visits by the Bangladeshi leadership 
continues. From time to time public pronouncements of close 
relations with the Middle East are made. In May 1976 at 
a public meeting Zia declared that 'we have religious, histor­
ical, cultural relations with all the Muslim countries of
the world and we want to further strengthenour relations with
8 2
t h e m ' . Solidarity with the Arab cause on the Palestine
8  3
issue is frequently reiterated by the leadership. The
decision to set up an Islamic University was given ample
84
publicity by the government.
Certain amendments to the Bangladesh Constitution were 
effected in 1977, which were likely to find favour with the
81
The Mushtaq Government also set up an Islamic Foundation in Dacca with 
a view to consolidating friendship with Muslim countries. Impact Inter­
national, Fortnightly (London), 22 August-11 September 1975.
82
Address at Suhrawardy Uddyan by Major General Ziaur Rahman, Chief of 
Staff and Deputy Chief Martial Law Administrator, 1 May 1976 (Dacca: 
Department of Publications, Ministry of Information & Broadcasting, 1 May, 
1976), p . 3.
83
For instance by Vice President Saltar at a seminar organised by Bangladesh 
Council on World Affairs in observance of Jerusalem Day. Bangladesh 
Observer, 22 August 1979.
84 . .
ibid., 1 September 1979.
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Middle Eastern Countries. Secularism was replaced as a 
fundamental principle of state by Absolute Trust and Faith  
in the Almighty A l l a h . Also, the following clause was added 
to the Article in the Constitution relevant to external 
relations:
The State shall endeavour to consolidate, 
preserve, and strengthen fraternal relations 
among Muslim countries based on Islamic 
solidarity.85
In return, these countries have often given their support 
to Bangladesh when the latter has required it. For example, 
they expressly backed Bangladesh's candidature to the 
Security Council in November 1978 on the basis of an endorse­
ment at the Islamic Foreign Minister's Conference held in 
Dakar in April 1978.®^
The region is viewed as a good source of material support.
A 1978 publication of the Bangladesh Planning Commission said
A new group of donors has emerged in 
the recent past in the Middle East.
Assistance from OPEC sources has been 
increasing substantially. A large 
part has been on grant terms and the 
remainder has been on soft to medium 
terms.87
The following table indicates the actual amounts
8 8
received from the Middle East till 31 March 1978.
85
Bangladesh, Vol.l, No.11, 1 May 1977.
86
Discussion with Mr Anwarul Karim Chowdhury, Director General, Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, Dacca, 27 November 1978.
87
Seven Years of External Assistance to Bangladesh, op.cit., p . 3.
88 . .
ibid., p . 35. Apart from these a sum of $17,400 million was received 
as loan multilaterally from OPEC.
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Table 6.5 
FUNDS FROM THE MIDDLE EAST
[in $ million]
Country Commitments Disbursement
Grant Loan Total Grant Loan Total
Iran - 12.500 12.500 - 2 . 2 0 0 2 . 2 0 0
Iraq 6 .263 44.737 51.000 6 .263 24.737 31.000
Kuwait - 29.350 29.350 - 13.139 13.139
Libya 1 . 0 0 0 - 1 . 0 0 0 1 . 0 0 0 - 1 . 0 0 0
Saudi
Arabia 8 8 . 0 0 0 50.000 138.000 73.375 - 73.375
UAE 1 0 . 0 0 0 75.400 85.400 1 0 . 0 0 0 55.613 65.613
Total 105.263 211.987 317.250 90.638 95.689 186.327
An analysis of aid from various other sources reveal
that the grant component of $105,263 million is far in excess
of that of $36,872 million received from the Centrally Planned
countries, though the loan component of $229,380 million
falls short of the figure of $467,593 million obtained from
8  9
the socialist states. The primary Arab donor, Saudi Arabia,
90
comes ninth as a source of bilateral assistance. However 
Saudi Arabia is expected to go up a few positions higher with 
her fresh commitments for the Second Five Year Plan. It 
must also be remembered that the Middle East is a comparatively 
late comer as aid donors since political relations with the
89
See Table 9.3 in Chapter 9.
90
After the U.S. ($1045.142m.), Japan ($528.312m.), West Germany 
($412.258m.), Canada ($358.771m.), the U.K. ($283.200m.), the U.S.S.R.
($228.580m.), Sweden ($150m.) and the Netherlands ($148.782m.). Seven 
Years of External Assistance, op.cit., pp.30-35.
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region were established much later than with other major 
donor g r o u p s .
Because of the tightening of immigration control by such
traditional sources of employment of surplus Bangladeshi
manpower such as the U.K., and the U.S.A., the importance of
the Middle East in this respect has sharply increased. Dacca
does not discourage it for mainly two reasonsJ one, domestically
it relieves the pressure of unemployment, and the other, it
adds to foreign exchange earnings; the Bangladeshi
workers, because of the nature of the basic social fabric
that places special responsibilities on earning individuals
to their dependents whose number in joint families may be
large, tend to remit home sizeable segments of their earnings.
The increasing primacy of the Middle East as a souróe of
employment is evidenced by the fact that in January 1978, out
of 1,681 persons that left Bangladesh for overseas employment
91
a ll went to the Middle East. Thè countrywise
92
breakdown is given below:
Table 6 . 6
Country No. of Persons
U.A.E. 276
Saudi Arabia 256
Bahrain 77
Kuwait 389
Oman 14 5
Iran 129
Iraq 27
Qatar 81
Libya 281
91
Bureau of Manpower, Employment and Training, Government of the People's 
Republic of Bangladesh.
92
ibid.
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Bangladesh is dependent on the Middle East for her 
total crude oil requirements. In 1977 the necessary 
import requirement of 1 ,2 0 0 , 0 0 0  tons was purported to be met 
by short-term credits from three sources, the U.A.E., Iran 
and Saudi Arabia, enabling the procurement of 600,000 tons
from the U.A.E., 400,000 tons from Iran and 200,000 tons
9 3
from Saudi Arabia.
V. Conclusion
The Middle East has been, and is likely to remain, 
a major preoccupation with Bangladeshi policy-makers. There 
are several reasons for it. Firstly, the Middle East 
connection enhances Bangaldesh's sense of security against 
her powerful neighbour; to that end, it fills the role in 
the Subcontinental balance that was played by the North 
Indian Muslims or Pakistan. Secondly, it assures for Bangla­
desh firm support from a group of countries in her various
diplomatic manoevres such as the bid for the Security Council 
94
seat in 1978. Thirdly, close links with the Middle East 
satisfies a powerful domestic constituency that takes pride 
in identity with Islam and its current resurgence. Finally 
the linkage has strong economic imperatives as a source of 
aid, employment of surplus labour, and oil.
93
Bangladesh, Vol.l, No.3, 1 January 1977.
94
Middle Eastern support was also invoked during the refugee dispute 
with Burma. See Chapter 7.
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THE REGIONAL PERIPHERY: BURMA AND NEPAL
I. Introduction
Apart from India and Pakistan there are two other 
states in the region that engage the attention of Dacca's 
foreign policy makers: Burma and Nepal. True, they do not 
form the immediate hub of the subsystem that comprise India, 
Pakistan and Bangladesh. But they come easily into the 
picture as the smallest power of the hub attempts to broaden 
its range of interactions beyond it. Burma is the only 
other neighbour of Bangladesh apart from India. Though 
Nepal is not a contiguous neighbour, this very fact of 
her not being one is of central significance, as it brings 
into play a complex situation, that is, the necessity of 
India's assent for Bangla-Nepal interactions through land. 
Bangladesh shares with both these countries the fact that 
China and India are central to the foreign policies of all 
three states.
Having dwelt at length on Bangladesh's relations with 
the two other states of the core of the subsystem, i.e. India 
and Pakistan, it should be interesting to examine how she 
relates to fellow-smaller states of peripheral South Asia 
and in what ways this is dissimilar to her behaviour pattern 
vis-^a-vis the more powerful neighbour, India.
CHAPTER 7
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The significance of Burma to Bangladesh lies in the 
fact that apart from India^ Burma is the only country with 
which Bangladesh shares common borders. Secondly, Burma 
is located to the South-East of Bangladesh, linking the 
latter with that region. This is important., for Bangladesh 
sees herself as the 4 bridge* that connects South and South 
East Asia.'*' Thirdly, Burma is a traditional supplier of 
rice to Dacca during periods of grain shortage in Bangladesh. 
Fourthly, Burma is a fellow small-power in the region, a 
partner whose support or at least neutrality is required 
in any situation of confrontation between Bangladesh and 
her powerful neighbour, India. Last but not least, there 
is a large ethnically Bengali-Muslim population in the 
Arakan region of Burma.
For the same reasons perhaps Bangladesh is also of
considerable importance to Burma, except that Burma had another
2
powerful neighbour to worry about, China. Burma's attitude 
during the 1971 war was therefore one of caution. Initially 
her support for the independence movement was sharper. 
Immediately after the Army crackdown in Dacca on 23 March
3
1971, Burma stopped the supply of fuel to Pakistani aircraft.
1
See Chapter 1, f.n.16.
2
China has been a central issue in Burma's external policy. See Ralph 
Pettman, Small Power Politics and International Relations in South East 
Asia (Sydney: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1976), p . 77.
3
I I .  Burma
Ttmes of India, 14 January 1972.
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Secondly, Burma provided refuge to many Bengalis who fled
4
to escape from Pakistani military action. Later however 
possibly under Chinese influence, Burma also became a 
sanctuary for Pakistani civil and military refugees. The 
Pakistan International Airlines took out their aircraft 
via Rangoon when the fall of Dacca was imminent in December 
1971.
On 13 January 1972 Burma accorded recognition to Bangla-
5
desh, being the seventh country to do so. This was 
significant as Burma was likely to, as indeed she did, provide 
a link for Dacca with Peking. An official delegation from 
Dacca led by Foreign Secretary S.A. Karim visited Rangoon 
in February 19 72. The mission had a threefold purposei 
f i r s t ^ o  establish contact with Burmese leadership; second, 
to gauge the possibility of recovering some of the aircraft 
flown out to Rangoon by the PIA'and third,to purchase rice. 
Karim met the Burmese Foreign Minister Hla Han and Deputy 
Foreign Minister Hla Phone, but was told that none of the 
aircraft remained on Burmese soil. However a Memorandum 
of Understanding for Dacca's purchase of 65,000 tons of wheat 
under a barter agreement was initialled.
There was a high level contact in April 1974 when the 
Burmese President Ne Win visited Bangladesh between April 26 
and 29, 1974. The Joint Communique issued at the end of
This group included some Bengali Members of Parliament from the Sub­
division of Cox's Bazar as well as some senior Bengali military officers.
5
Tvmes of India, 14 February 1972. The other countries to accord recog­
nition so far were India, Bhutan, GDR, Bulgaria, Mongolia and Poland.
£
Discussions with officials of Foreign and Commerce Ministries, 7 and 8 
November 1978.
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the visit was not unusual of two 'friendly neighbours' who 
till then had no conflicting interests. For instance there 
were broad agreements on political stability in the Sub­
continent, support for Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, 
expression of hope for a lasting peace in Cambodia and 
Vietnam, reduction of tension in the Middle East and welcoming
7
the Special U.N. Session on raw materials and development.
/
An analysis of the Communique reveals that neither Bangladesh 
nor Burma considered the latter a part of the South Asian 
Subcontinent which assisted the Burmese cautious and neutral
g
line in the complex intra-Subcontinental relations.
After the relaxation of tension between Bangladesh 
and Pakistan following the exchange of diplomatic recognition 
in February 1974, Dacca began to focus on the outstanding 
issues with the more immediate neighbours. The question of 
boundaries with Burma was yet unresolved. Moreover, Bangaldesh 
was hoping for some oil finds in her territorial waters.
This needed demarcation of water frontier with Burma. With 
that end in view a four member delegation from Dacca visited 
Rangoon in September 1974. The specific matters for discussion 
were (a) territorial waters and (b) the economic zone and 
continental shelf.
The negotations were smooth and the demarcation of 
territorial waters posed no problem. On the question of
7
Bangladesh Documents, Vol.2, No.4, April-June 1974. (External Publicity 
Division, M/Foreign Affairs, Dacca), pp.8-9.
8  ✓
For instance in the communique there were references to the 'three
countries' of the Subcontinent meaning India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, 
ibid., p.8.
i
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economic zone both sides agreed on the definition and
characteristics of the legal regime of economic zone and
continental shelf, but the details were deferred for
solution at a later date. The Bangladesh delegation came
away with the impression that there is no likelihood of
9
a potential dispute on this score. In July 1977 M a j . General
Ziaur Rahman visited Rangoon.
It was not on water but on land that a problem was
brewing, though just before the issue blew up, the visiting
Foreign Minister of Burma Myint Maung had described the
border between the two countries as 'a border of p e a c e 1
On the Burmese side of the border in the Arakan province,
there was, and is, a sizeable Bengali-speaking Muslim
population known as the 1Rohingas 1 who had lived there for
periods ranging from three generations to three centuries.
The Rohingas were mostly small traders and businessmen,
and though only a few were rich, they dominated the economic
life of Arakan to the chagrin of the original Burmese in
the region."^ Secondly, these Burmese Muslims were allegedly
12
thick with the local communists and a linkage was suspected. 
Both these factors contributed to their alienation from 
both the indigenous population and the authorities. Around 
this time the Burmese government introduced an immigration
9 .
Interview with Mr F.A. Chowdhury, a member of the delegation, Abu Dhabi,
5 October 1978.
1 0  FEER, 19 May 1978, p.5.
11 •i* n ibid.
1 2  FEER, 26 May 1978, p . 7.
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check code-named 'Dragon-King 1 purported to update its 
demographic information, to classify the residents as 
Burmese citizens or foreigners, and issue them with regis­
tration certificates. There was a consequent influx of Burmese 
Muslims into Bangladesh, numbering nearly 200,000 who
arrived with complaints of atrocities perpetrated by the
. . 13 
Burmese authorities.
Bilateral relations rapidly deteriorated. Bangladesh
14
accused the Burmese with firing on refugees. She 
also gave wide publicity to the influx, especially among
Muslim countries. A four member delegation from the Islamic
. . 15
Nations Secretariat visited the refugee camps. However
negotiations at bilateral levels were held and the government
in Dacca was careful to avoid high level criticism of the
Burmese Government. Heading a nine member delegation for
talks in Rangoon, Bangladesh Foreign Secretary Tabarek
Hussain said:
We have taken a very reasonable and logical 
stand to solve the problem through b i l a t e r a l  
negotiations and we hope the other side will 
respond for an amicable and speedy s o l u t i o n .
It is interesting to note that while Dacca avoided 'bilater­
alism'in disputes with the more powerful neighbour, India, 
it was eager to apply it to the comparable neighbour, Burma. 
But obviously Bangladesh saw it in her interest to resolve 
the dispute as quickly as possible.
^  Asiaweek, 19 May 1978, p p . 21-22.
^  The Times (London), 1 June 1978.
15
Daily Telegraph, 1 June 1978.
16
Herald. Tribune, 7 June 1978, p .7.
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The fact is attested by the unwillingness of;the Dacca
government to take a very hard line attitude by encouraging
any secession movement by the Burmese Muslims in Arakan.
There could have been a temptation to do so with material
support from other Muslim countries. Such ideas were indeed
floating about at lower levels in the decision-making
17
machinery. The principal reason was perhaps that having 
to contend with such a powerful neighbour as India in any 
case, Dacca saw it more worthwhile to resolve disputes 
with other neighbours amicably and quickly, so as not to 
have to take on too many regional antagonists at the same 
time. Finally with an eye to the elections for the Security 
Council scheduled for October/November that year, Bangladesh 
wanted to project the image of a peaceful state ready to 
solve issues with neighbours through negotiations.
Burma, too, tended to lose by the perpetuation of the 
dispute. Firstly, as it is the control over the Arakan 
region of the Rangoon government was not such that it could 
withstand a local armed uprising actively espoused by 
Bangladesh and possibly some Arab states, some of whom like 
Libya have been known to get rapidly involved in comparable 
situations as in the Philippines; secondly, adverse inter­
national publicity could hurt Burmese credit line vis-a-vis 
the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank and other major
financial institutions, just when Burma had opened herself
18
to the world economy; thirdly, it was not unlikely that
17
Aszaueek, o p .c i t . ,  p . 21.
18
Discussions with Mr S .A . Karim, former Bangladesh Ambassador to Burma, 
New York, 10 September 1978.
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China was encouraging a speedy agreement between two of 
her 'friendly 1 countries on the fringes of India.
As a result of these factors an agreement on the 
refugee issue was reached between the two countries . in July
1978. By the end of December 1979 all the Rohinga refugees
19 . .
were repatriated to Burma. Bangladesh Home Minister
Mustafizur Rahman called it 'a success of b ila te ra l ism
20
between two friendly c o untries'.
There was considerable warmth that proceeded from the
amicable settlement of July 1978. In May 1979 President
Ne Win of Burma returned Zia's 19 77 visit. An Agreement
21
on border demarcation was signed, and in the. joint
communique that followed?the repatriation agreement was
described as one of 'utmost significance for regional
22
stability and peace'. That very month in an agreement
signed in Rangoon Bangladesh purchased 100,000 tons of rice 
2 3
from Burma. Burma continued in her role as a supplier
of rice for Bangladesh. A Burmese Trade delegation visited
Dacca in December 1979 and signed an 'Agreed Minutes on
24
Discussions' with Bangladesh Authorities.
19
Bangladesh Observer , 31 December 1979. 
ibid.
21
Dainik Bangla (Bengali), Dacca, 24 May 1979.
22 ibid., 25 May 1979, p . 8.
23 ibid., 26 May 1979.
2 4  Bangladesh Observer, 7 December 1979.
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Bangladesh continued to attach high priority to her
relations with Burma. Dacca's Ambassadors to Rangoon have
25
been very senior diplomats f which illustrates that fact.
An analysis of Bangladesh-Burma relations brings out 
Dacca's concern in not alienating any of the regional small 
powers, for this would certainly erode her capability of 
marshalling counterpoise against bigger neighbours. Apart 
from that, speedy solutions of differences with neighbours 
redounds to Bangladesh's benefit in giving her the image 
of a peace-loving international actor necessary for attaining 
such political goals as election to the Security Council 
(in 1978) and economic aspirations as enhancing credibility 
with major donors who tend to frown upon belligerence, 
especially in regions where in the past it has led to 
significant economic reverses.
III. Nepal
Nepal's position during the Bangladesh War was one of
studied neutrality. There may have been some sympathy for
the Bangladeshi cause, but traditionally Nepal has always
avoided taking a stance on an issue in which China and India
2 6
were deeply involved on opposite sides. However Nepal
25
The first two, K.M. Kaiser and S.A. Karim, were very senior career 
officials and the current envoy Zahiruddin (who was Ambassador to 
Pakistan till mid-1978) is a very renowned political figure.
26
The evolution of Nepal's foreign policy is interesting in that it 
has always endeavoured and managed to steer herself carefully between 
China and India.
262
had no reason to crow over India's triumph because it did
indeed adversely affect her policy of using Pakistan to fend
off Indian influence. The break up of Pakistan and the
emergence of Bangladesh signalled Indian pre-eminence in
the region for sometime to come.
So long as Bangladesh and India remained on euphoric
terms Bangladesh and Nepal did not have much to do with
each other. Neither bothered to raise its diplomatic
27
representation to Ambassador level. There were Cabinet
level visits either way but nothing of any substance emerged
from these. Nepal was traditionally interested in getting
a second outlet to the sea through Bangladesh (the first
was through Calcutta) but if Dacca and Delhi pursued
identical policies there was precious little to gain from
such a second outlet.
When King Birendra floated his 'Zone of Peace' proposal
for Nepal at the Algiers Summit Conference of 197 3 stating
that Nepal, situated between two of the most populous
countries in the world, wishes to be declared a 'zone of
peace', this had support from such countries as Pakistan
and China and was opposed by India, whose traditional
military cooperation with Nepal would be hurt by such a
2 8
policy. Bangladesh, perhaps not to give India offence 
at that point in time, maintained a studied silence.
2 7  / e.txcVi i
Both Dacca and Kathmundu maintained Charge d'Affaires in*otiierscapitals.
28
See Rishikesh Shaha, 'Nepal as a Zone of Peace', Pacific Community,
Vol.8, No.l (October 1976), p . 171.
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Bangladesh's interest in Nepal grew just as her
relations with India were deteriorating. Also when the
Farakka issue came to the fore, Bangladeshis were arguing
for Nepalese participation in that reservoirs of water
would be needed to be erected on Nepalese territory. On
March 31, 1976 Dr M.N. Huda, Adviser to the Bangladesh
President on Planning arrived in Kathmandu^and on 2 April
four protocols, on trade, transit, technical cooperation
29
and air agreement, were signed.
When the Indo-Bangla Agreement on Farakka was finalised 
in October 19 77 following a change of government in New 
Delhi, the Nepalese Press welcomed it hoping that the new India 
government would display a similar spirit of cooperation 
and understanding in concluding trade and transit treaties 
with Nepal. ^
Both Prime Minister Desai of India and President Ziaur
Rcihman of Bangladesh visited Nepal soon afterwards. Desai's
visit went off less favourably than Zia's. Desai was
unenthusiastic about the concept of a Himalayan 1 zone of
peace' and at the same time was anxious to elicit Nepalese
support on the issue of Hindu refugees spilling into India
31
from Bangladesh, which Nepal failed to render. On the 
other hand Zia welcomed the Nepalese 'Zone of Peace' proposal 
as a 'laudable move' towards peace and stability in the
ibid., p . 178.
30
Himali Bela (Kathmandu), 3 October 1977.
31
Astaueek (Hong Kong), 13 June 1978.
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region. Zia also hinted at the possibility of a Bangladeshi-
Nepal-India accord on harnessing water resources and
facilitating overland transport of goods to and from Nepal,
33
a perennial source of headache for the Nepalese. These
pleased the Nepalese no end.
King Birendra and the Queen of Nepal reciprocated
Zia's visit in January 1978. In the joint communique Nepal
and Bangladesh agreed that the question of the development
of water resources was one in whith all the countries of
34
the region could cooperate closely, in other words
indicating NepaIs approval to being a party to the water-
sharing issues. Bangladesh reiterated its support for
the 'Zone of Peace' proposal. So the visit, in the words
of King Birendra
opened up new horizons for greater 
cooperation to be worked out at 
several levels for the benefit of the 
people of Nepal, Bangladesh and the 
region as a w h o l e . 35
Later that year, in order to facilitate Nepal's overland
trade with Bangladesh, India and Bangladesh signed a
Memorandum of Understanding to open the Biral (Bangladesh) -
Radhikapur (India) railway route for traffic in transit
for Nepalese export and import cargoes through Bangladesh
and Indian territories to come into force from September
32
Times of Indva , 30 December 1977.
33
Aszaueek, 13 June 1978.
3 4  The Rising Nepal (Editorial), 17 June 1978.
32
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that year. This would facilitate both way traffic
between Bangladesh and Nepal under the separate agreements
that were signed in April 19 76.
In a continuing bid to maintain friendly links with
Nepal, Professor Shamsul Huq, the Bangladesh Foreign Minister,
went to Nepal in January 1979 and reiterated support for
37
the Nepalese 'Zone of P e a c e 1 proposal. For the second 
time within a space of two years, King Birendra paid a formal 
visit to Bangladesh in March 1980, when at a Civic Reception 
he cited Bangladesh as a good example of a small power that
3 8
has been able to resist domination by more powerful states.
It seems that Bangladesh will always attempt to be 
on the right side of Nepal. The former's complex relations 
with India dictates a policy of tacking close to the other 
neighbours, especially those with whom the likelihood of 
any conflictual issue developing is minimal. Bangladesh 
has little to lose by providing Nepal an outlet to the sea 
(which will in fact favourably improve her own trade with 
Nepal) and voicing support for Nepal as 'Zone of Peace'
(which will please the Chinese, which is to Dacca's benefit).
In return, she can count on Nepalese assistance 
in helping to harness water resources and hope for Nepalese 
support, both tacit and overt, specifically in case of any 
future conflict situation with India, or more generally, 
in her other external initiatives. Perhaps the primary
36
Bangladesh (Fortnightly) (M/Information and Broadcasting in collaboration 
with M/Foreign Affairs, Dacca), Vol.11, No.3, 15 August 1978, p.l.
37
Bangladesh Observer, 24 January 1979.
38
3 6
Azad (Dacca) , 6 March 1980.
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reason why Nepal and Bangladesh will continue their friendly
links is the absence of any contrary interest as indicated by
the Nepalese Foreign Minister Krishna Raj Aryal when he
said: 'There is hardly any issue of international importance
on which Nepal and Bangladesh hold differing or opposing
39
v i e w s '.
IV. Conclusions
The model that Bangladesh conforms to in her links 
with the peripheral South Asian small states, Burma and 
Nepal, is dissimilar to that of Dacca-Delhi relations.
While vts-a-vzs India, Bangladesh attempts to ensure 
her security by building extra-reg^Lonal linkages, with 
Burma and Nepal this is not so. Even though disputes occur, 
as with Burma over the Rohinga refugees and border 
demarcation, Dacca is anxious to either settle them 
bilaterally (as distinct from issues with Delhi) or confine 
the dispute to narrower limits. For instance, on the 
issue of Burmese refugees, only the Muslim states were 
involved to any significant extent. Dacca's theme seems 
to be that small states in the region should club together,
Bangladesh Observer, 24 January 1979.
39
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not necessarily with a view to a conflictual relationship 
with India, but certainly with an eye to the regional
40
pre-eminent power.
It was in a further projection of this theme that Bangladesh 
despatched an envoy to the Himalayan kingdom of Bhutan in January 1980 
to be permanently stationed at Thimpu. Up until then, Dacca's High 
Commissioner to New Delhi was jointly accredited to Bhutan. Bangladesh 
thus seems keen on delinking her bilateral relations with Thimpu from 
those with New Delhi, even though Bhutan traditionally orchestrates 
her foreign policy with India's, largely in conformity with the Indo- 
Bhutan Agreement of 1949.
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CHAPTER 8  
THE RELEVANCE OF THE UNITED NATIONS
I . Introduction
This chapter seeks to examine the relevance of the 
United Nations to Bangladesh's external policy. It attempts 
to study the role the latter plays in that forum, the 
various attitudes she adopts in this relationship, and the 
linkages these attitudes have to the broader aspects of 
the total gamut of her foreign relations.
II. Efforts at Seeking Entry
Being a breakaway state endeavouring to confirm her 
sovereign status, for Bangladesh membership of this world 
body implied a final seal of international recognition.
The task was rendered difficult because it was precisely 
this recognition that some states, in particular Pakistan 
and China, were anxious to deny her. Entry into the United 
Nations was therefore a matter of signal importance and 
was accorded high priority by the policy-makers. This is 
attested by Bangladesh's insistence on early application 
for membership despite advice to the contrary from several 
close quarters.
On 9 August 1972 when Mujib was convalescing in London, 
the Belgian Ambassador called on him to discuss the matter. 
Belgium was then the President of the Security Council.
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The Ambassador suggested deferment of application.'*' The
British Prime Minister Edward Heath tendered similar advice
on 12 August, mentioning the possibility of a Chinese veto,
and pointing out that once that occurs, it would be more
difficult to get a second application through in the absence
2
of a significant change in the situation in South Asia.
Even some Bangladeshi diplomats in Washington, entrusted
with the responsibility of lobbying for the application
for membership in New York, expressed fears that one reason
why the Soviets encouraged early application was that they
would in fact like a Chinese veto, if only to 'expose'
3
China to Bangladesh.
Bangladesh now sought legal counsel. The Ministry 
of Law in Dacca consulted a leading authority on international 
law relating to State succession, Professor D.P. O'Connell 
of Australia. Based on these consultations, the advice 
the Law Ministry tendered the Foreign Office in August 
was that in the event of such obstruction by Pakistan, 
Bangladesh should contend that upon dissolution of Pakistan, 
West P a k i s t a n , though it continued to call itself P a k i s t a n , 
was no longer the same country and therefore ceased to exist 
as a member of the LJ .N. It was pointed out that even though 
the opinion rendered by the Assistant Secretary General for
Bangladesh High Commission, London.
2 ibid.
3 . .
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dacca.
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Legal Affairs of the U.N. on 8 August 1947 held that post­
partition India had retained the international personality 
of pre-partition India, he had still advised that in view
of the change of sovereignty new credentials were to be
4
submitted by the Indian representative m  the U.N. On 
12 August Mujib wrote to Indira Gandhi seeking her advice 
if Bangladesh should spread the word that Dacca intended to
5
take such action. But judging from future events it must
have been dropped as unfeasible.
Bangladesh went ahead with the application for membership,
which met with Chinese veto. It was nearly two years later,
after the Pakistani recognition and Tripartite Agreement
in the Subcontinent in 1974 that the Chinese were to withdraw
their objections. On 17 September 1974, a draft resolution
(Resolution 3202 (XXIX)) for Bangladesh's membership,
co-sponsored by 6 8 countries, was unanimously adopted. Foreign
Minister Dr Kamal Hossain expressed his gratitude to the
General Assembly, saying:
this marks the fulfilment of the aspiration 
to take our place in the organization as a 
sovereign independent state indicating the 
right of self-determination for which 
millions of our people laid down their lives 
in the struggle for liberation.^
4 ibid.
^ Letter from the Prime Minister of Bangladesh to the Prime Minister of 
India, 12 August 1972.
 ^Bangladesh in the United Nations (New York: Permanent Mission to the 
U.N. of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, March 1975), p.l.
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III. Benefits Derived from U.N. Membership
A . Enhancement of the sense of security
Bangladesh's perception of the U.N. as a guarantor
of security was evidenced in the comment made by a government
spokesman after the Indian annexation of Sikkim in 1974 to
the effect that there was no reason to be afraid, as
Bangladesh, besides being larger than Sikkim, was a member
of the U .N .^
When Bangladesh felt her security, economic and
political, threatened, she did indeed make use of the world
body, as during the Farakka dispute in 1976. The chief
of the Bangladesh delegation that year, Admiral Khan,
explained that
We have raised this issue in this Assembly 
also because of our belief that no state 
should be denied the right of a fair and 
impartial hearing by this world forum 
which constitutes for smaller states not 
only the most objective but in fact the 
only forum to air their grievances . 8
Bangladesh, therefore, supported both the strengthening
of the U.N. as well as her increased role as an arbitrator
in international disputes. At the 1975 seesion of the
General Assembly the then Foreign Minister Justice Abu Sayeed
Chowdhury, speaking on the relevance of the U.N. to weaker
states said
For small developing countries such as 
Bangladesh the U.N. provides not only 
the best but the only forum for making
7
See Chapter 3, footnote 112.
0
Statement by the Chairman of the Bangladesh delegation in the Special 
Political Committee, Thirty-first General Assembly Session on item 121, 
Press Release by the Bangladesh Mission to the U.N., 15 November 1976, 
p p .22-23.
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their voices heard. Therefore Bangladesh 
has from its very inception as a sovereign • 
independent nation pledged its total 
allegiance to the purposes and principles 
of the U.N. charter. We support all measures 
which strengthen the U.N.9
Besides the general strengthening of the U.N. Bangladesh
sought the expansion of its role as an arbitrator, viewing
it as a guardian of international morality among the nations.
To that end, Dacca emphasized the potential of the International
Court of Justice (ICJ). She advocated the increase of ICJ's
role in rendering advisory o p i n i o n . ^  A Bangladesh delegate
to the Sixth Committee in 1975 asserted
The effectiveness of the International .
Court of Justice should be increased and 
it should be made to play a more active 
role in the process of peacemaking.H
B . Forum for stance on international issues
The U.N. provided Bangladesh with a convenient forum
for airing her views on major international issues. On
one hand it enabled her to publicly identify herself with
weaker Least Developing Countries (LDCs) , on the other
prevented her from giving direct annoyance to big powers
which could have occurred if she were to present her views
bilaterally on these issues. In other words views that
would be unpalatable to countries that Bangladesh sorely
needed to cultivate could be aired under the umbrella of a
9
United Nations General Assembly, A/PV 2371, 2 October 1975, p . 3.
United Nations General Assembly, Official Records, Session 29, Sixth 
Committee, SR 1460-1521, 1467th Meeting 1977, pp.22-23.
^  United Nations General Assembly Official Records, Session 30, Sixth 
Committee SR 1522-1582, 1570th Meeting 1975, pp.224-225.
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grand forum, where these opinions would blend with those of
many others and would not stand out annoyingly in sharp
relief. These major issues are the non-aligned movement,
Indian Ocean as a zone of peace, Disarmament and the New
International Economic Order.
(i) The Non-Aligned Movement
In the post Cold War era the Non-aligned Movement may
12
have lost much of its meaning, but for Bangladesh the 
otherwise rather vacuous term was useful to project that 
though one of the Superpowers (the USSR) might have supported 
her emergence and the other (the US) opposed it, she was 
not keen on being bracketed with one against the other.
Her espousal of the non-aligned movement was therefore a 
signal of the will to conduct an independent foreign policy 
despite the heavy debt to the Soviet Union. Mujib, in his 
first speech on the floor of the General Assembly, made a
public commitment to the pursuit of a non-aligned foreign
, . 13 
p o l i c y .
Bangladesh used her 'non-alignment' to further her own 
foreign policy interests. For instance, during her bid for 
the Security Council seat in October 1978 she argued that 
'the ideal objective would be to increase the overall number
12 .
It can well be argued that 'non-alignment', like 'neutralism', is
not necessarily relevant only to cold war situations and could mean
different things at different times. See Peter Lyon, Neutralism
(Leicester University Press, 1963), pp.15-21.
United Nations General Assembly A/PV 2243, 15 September 1974, p .8.
274
of non-aligned representatives', and on that score sought
the support of other non-aligned countries against Japan.
(ii) Zone of Peace in the Indian Ocfcean
Mujib outlined Bangladesh's position on the issue
during his 1974 speech in the General Assembly. He said
that his country welcomed
every effort aimed at advancing the 
process of detente, relaxation of tension, 
limitation of armaments and promotion of 
peaceful coexistence in every part of the 
world, whether in Asia, Africa, Europe or 
Latin America. In purusance of this policy 
we have consistently supported the concept 
of the Zone of Peace in the Indian Ocean 
area.15
Mujib was putting across the view that a detente 
between the Soviet Union and the USA, while welcome was not 
sufficient to achieve global peace. It could even have 
the adverse effect of inflating tension in the more peripheral 
areas of the globe if the superpower conflict continued by 
proxy. It was therefore necessary to set up regional zones 
of peace in such peripheral areas, i.e. in Asia, Africa and 
Latin America. A follow up of this line of thinking was 
Bangladesh's support to the Zone of Peace in the Indian Ocean.
Initially, the Bangladesh position on this was more 
in line with India's rather Pakistan's, as evidenced in 
the deliberations of the 29th session of the General Assembly. 
On Pakistan's request, the item entitled 'Declaration and 
Establishment of a Nuclear Free Zone in South Asia' was 
included in the draft agenda of that session.
14
Ambassador K.M. Kaiser's speech to the Non-Aligned Group, New York,
2 October 1978, p . 4.
15
United Nations General Assembly, Provisional A/PV 2243, 25 September 
1974 (UN/SA Collection), p.8.
14
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When the item was considered in the First Committee,
two draft resolutions were introduced: one by India stressing
that the initiative of creating a nuclear free zone in Asia
should come from the states of the region, and the second
introduced by Pakistan which took note of the affirmation
by the states not to acquire nuclear weapons (with the Indian
explosion of May 1974 in mind) and inviting the states of
South Asia to initiate consultations under the U.N. Secretary
General's auspices with a view to establising a nuclear free
zone. Bangladesh voted for the Indian resolution and
abstained when the Pakistani one was put to vote, arguing
that the Pakistani proposals containeielements which should
be discussed during consultations first among the South Asian
countries, or else the Secretary General's task would be
16
rendered extremely difficult.
As with the salience of Farakka issue, and with the 
increasing border conflicts, threat perceptions from India 
increased, Bangladesh began to worry more about conventional 
naval build-up in the region than Great Power presence.
Her delegate to the First Committee in 1976 pointed out 
that the
disappearance of great powers does not 
automatically secure tranquillity in the 
area. While it would complement such a 
process, it cannot substitute for the 
obligations to be contracted by the 
countries of this region themselves to 
ensure their security. We therefore 
subscribe to the view that states in 
this region cannot in all earnestness 
advocate such a peace zone without 
themselves practising what they p r e a c h . ^
16 Bangladesh in the United Nations , op.cit., p . 24.
17
United Nations General Assembly, First Committee UN/SA Collection 
(New York: Dag Hammarskjöld Library, 1976), p.6.
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Clearly, he had India in mind. In order that the 
Declaration may be effective, Bangladesh advocated commit­
ment of the regional states to a yet higher ideal, i.e. to the 
principles of a Universal Collective Security without 
military alliances under the umbrella of the U.N. Charter,
including the renunciation of the threat to use force against
18
each other, 'whether nuclear or conventional ' . [emphasis 
m i n e .]
(iii) Disarmament
Closely linked to the above attitude was the Bangladesh
posture on disarmament.
On the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) between
the Superpowers, the general Bangladesh line was that 'it
was a step in the right direction^ though a far cry from
the ideal of disarmament. Commenting on these terms, the
Bangladesh Foreign Minister Abu Sayeed Chowdhury asked in
the General Assembly in October 1975:
Of what use is limitation, or to be hopeful, 
even reduction of the number of weapons when 
those which remain are made more sophisticated 
in their variety, accuracy and striking power, 
with the result that the aggregate destructive 
capacity becomes far greater than it would 
have been without limitation or r e d u c t i o n ? ^
The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was regarded as a
positive measure, though initially Bangladesh had certain
18
Statement of the Chairman of the Bangladesh delegation to the 32nd 
Session of the U.N. General Assembly (Press Release of the Bangladesh 
Mission to the U.N., 5 October 1977), p . 10.
19
United Nations General Assembly - Provisional A/PV 2371, 2 October
1975, pp.6-7.
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reservations. Her observations on the NPT centred on three
connected issues. First, it was the fear that the Treaty
could be a discriminatory mechanism dividing nuclear 'haves'
and 'have nots'. It was argued that the primary reason for
the weakness of the treaty was that the nuclear weapon parties
failed to fulfil their main obligations to take effective
measures towards nuclear disarmament. Secondly, a major
incentive to the adherence to the Treaty would be the assurance
of the security of non-nuclear states against any actual
or threatened aggression. The third issue (and this with
an eye to the Indian explosion) was the need to clarify
the problem of 'peaceful nuclear explosions' (PNE) , i.e. finding
20
some suitable safeguards with regard to this.
The above statement implied certain reservations 
about the NPT nurtured at that point in time. But a change 
of attitude, encouraged by the nuclear 'haves', was brought 
about in four years' time. Having no possibilities of 
nuclearization, unlike India or Pakistan, it was probably 
considered unfeasible to demur for long, and finally, on
23 August 1979 Bangladesh finally signed the NPT 'in the
21
interest of global peace and in larger national interest'.
Dacca, understandably, continued to emphasize the need 
to focus attention on limitation of conventional weaponry.
After all, as the Bangladesh Foreign Minister stated at the 
U.N. in October 1977, all armed conflicts since 1945 have
Ambassador S.A. Kaiser's speech. United Nations General Assembly, 
Provisional A/C.l/PV 2086, 13 November 1975.
21
Bangladesh, Vol.Ill, No.5 (Dacca, Ministry of Information & Broadcasting),
15 September 1979, p.l.
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been fought with conventional weapons. This was important
as conventional conflicts in the Third World could escalate
dangerously. In Dacca's view,
In a world where the most pronounced phenomenon 
is the unequal relations among states, local 
wars arising from fear of domination, 
exploitation and interference in internal 
affairs constitute a continuing danger, 
particularly since they can and do draw 
into their vortex the bigger nations of
the w o r l d . 2  3
In order to reduce local wars, therefore, a halt to 
the conventional arms race was essential. This is typical 
of the fear of a weak state where potential sources of 
threat are more likely to be conventionally armed than 
with nuclear weaponry.
(iv) New International Economic Order (NIEO)
If the U.N. had such a significant role to play 
in the prevention of international anarchy and providing 
for the security of the weak, Bangladesh also saw for it 
a positive task in reshaping the world economic order in 
such a way as to benefit the underprivilieged. To that end 
Bangladesh took a line in the U.N. than was congruous to 
that normally espoused by the 'South', in what is known 
as the 'North-South Debate' between the world's developed 
and developing countries.
The Sixth Special Session of the General Assembly, 
called in 1974 to discuss the international economic situation
22
Statement by the Chairman of the Bangladesh delegation to the 32nd 
Session of the U.N. General Assembly on 5 October 1977 (Press RElease 
of the Bangladesh Mission to the U.N.), p.5.
23
Statement by the Bangladesh delegate to the First Committee, 29 November
1976, United Nations General Assembly (UN/SA Collection), pp . 7-8.
22
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was described by Foreign Minister Kamal HQssain as 'historic'?^
The Head of the Bangladesh delegation in 1976 reiterated
that
real progress can be achieved only if the 
rich are prepared to concede that economic 
justice is not a slogan only for the poor 
but the only means by which a real and 
stable world order can be a c h i e v e d . 25
In 1979 the Bangladesh Foreign Minister Professor Shamsul 
Huq made an elaborate set of suggestions, a 15 point 
programme, in his address to the General Assembly on 11 
October, so that the NIEO could be achieved the third U.N. 
decade of development, the 19 80s. These were, broadly, 
as follows: (1 ) a firm political and moral commitment on 
the part of the industrial nations to reanchor international 
relations to values and principles enshrined in the U.N. 
Charter; (2) the recognition by the international community 
of human rights, particularly with regard to food, clothing, 
shelter, health, education and employment; (3) transfer 
of adequate resources to the developing countries; (4) massive 
supply of inputs for increase in agricultural production;
(5) development of a food security system with an adequate 
food reserve built up through contribution from surplus 
countries; (6 ) transformation of the socioeconomic structures 
through decentralization to ensure widest possible popular
24
United Nations General Assembly, A/PV 2262, 9 October 1974, pp.7-8.
25
Official Records of the General Assembly, 31st Session Plenary 
Meetings, Vol.l (of three volumes), Verbatim Records of the 1st to 32nd 
Meetings, 21 September-14 October, 22nd Meeting, 2 October 1976, p.437.
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participation in development activities; (7) increasing
assistance to projects and programmes with quick returns;
(8 ) gearing of the plan strategy to the productive utilisation
of women in socio-economic development; (9) redefinition of
international policies to ensure transfer of resources;
(1 0 ) increasing economic co-operation among developing
countries with special stress on investment of surplus income
of oil rich countries in joint ventures in the developing
world; (1 1 ) removal of tariff and non-tariff barriers by
industrial countries and the extension of General Stheme of
Preference (GSP) beyond 19 81 on non-reciprocal and non-
discriminatory basis; (1 2 ) diversion of resources now
wasted on arms build-up to the Third World for development
purposes; (13) increasing application of science and
development to the productive development efforts in the
Third World countries including pre-disaster planning;
(14) united determination by the international community
to deal with the energy crisis with a view to developing
alternative energy sources; and, finally (15) ensuring full,
equitable and effective participation of the developing
countries in the formulation and implementation of decisions
2 6
in all fields of international co-operation.
A good deal of the above sounds rhetorical but confirms 
an unmistaken empathy with the demands of the developing 
countries that industrial nations undertake major initiatives
26
Bangladesh, Vol.Ill, No.8 (Dacca: Ministry of Information & Broad­
castings, 1 November 1979, p.4.
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in ensuring a more equitable sharing of the world's resources. 
At the same time, because the stand was taken in such a 
wide forum there was no fear of giving direct offence to 
any one or several major powers.
C . Source of Economic Assistance
The United Nations was, and continues to remain for 
Bangladesh, a major source of economic assistance. Different 
U.N. agencies are involved in the process, the most prominent 
being: (1) Food and Agriculture Association (FAO);
(2) United Nations Relief Operations in Bangladesh (UNROB);
(3) United Nations Emergency Operations (UNEO); (4) United 
Nations Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF); (5) United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) and (6 ) United Nations Family 
Planning Association (UNFPA).
These agencies committed large sums as grants for 
development purposes. A detailed account of such commitments, 
till March 31, 1978, are as follows:2^
Table (in U.S. $million)
Agency Amount Committed Amount Disbursed
(1) FAO 14.000 14.000
(2) UNROB 182.050 182.050
(3) UNEO 46.995 46.995
(4) UNICEF 88.731 72.671
(5) UNDP ) 37.500 23.498
(6 ) UNFPA )
This aid is still continuing and the rapid disbursement, 
as shown above in the table, indicates satisfactory 
utilization.
2 7
Seven Years of External Assistance to Bangladesh, op.cit., p . 32.
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U.N. involvement in Bangladesh's economy began early,
long before the country became a member of the International
Organization. The former United Nations Relief Organization
for Dacca (UNROD) subtly changed its name to UNROB ('B' now
standing for Bangladesh), and continued to operate in Dacca
after independence to participate in the massive post-war 
2 8
relief work. In Febraury 1972, the U.N. Secretary General,
gave a tentative list of Bangldesh's immediate requirements
and made an appeal for international assistance. He said:
'Never in the history of the UN has international assistance
29
been needed so urgently and in such great amounts'. The
U.N. made requests to the U.S. for help, and though the U.S.
had not till then recognised Bangladesh, obtained from the
Deputy Director of the U.S. Agency for International Development,
Maurice J. Williams, assurance that the matter would be
30
sympathetically considered. The U.N. request seemed to
be effective> for only three days later Maurice Williams
announced the despatch of 175,000 tonnes of wheat and rice
31
valued at $21m. from the U.S. The U.N. authorities continued 
to make such efforts in obtaining U.S. assistance, though 
not always successfully. In April, the UNROD Administrator,
Tony Hagen, contacted Ellsworth Bunker, the U.S. Ambassador 
to South Vietnam, for some surplus cranes and other American
28
For a detailed report on its operations see Thomas W. Oliver, The 
United Nations in Bangladesh (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University 
Press, 1978), passim.
29
See Pakvstan Times, 18 February 1972.
^  New York Times, 23 February 1972.
31
Times of Indta, 27 February 1972.
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equipment lying idle in Vietnam. Bunker referred the matter
32
to Washington which refused. The UNROB officially declared
its relief operations closed on 31 December 1973 having
fulfilled the task entrusted to it by the Secretary General.
With the UNROB operations closed, the U.N.'s economic
programmes now centred around the UNDP which set up office
in Dacca in April 1973. According to the agency, the UNDP
programme 'is intended to ensure the smooth transition from
relief activities, launched and supported by the United
Nations Relief Operations, to project activities having a
33
longer term development impact'. The UNDP was joined by 
other U.N. agencies listed above.
The U.N. also provided assistance in the undertaking of a 
review of the state of the economy. In April a United 
Nations mission to Bangladesh headed by the Austrian 
Ambassador to New Delhi, Erna Sailer, prepared a detailed 
report, submitted both to the U.N. and to the Bangladesh 
G o v e r n m e n t . ^
The Report stressed the need for Bangladesh's access 
to the World Bank and emphasized that the relationship 
with India would be crucial for the success of the rehabili­
tation programme, whose principal goals were the restoration 
of the economy at least to the standard attained in 1970. 
Though the general level of administration in Bangladesh 
compared well with that of other developing countries, trained
32
New York Tzmes, 30 April 1972.
33
United Natvons Development Programme, DP/GC/BGD/12.1, 11 February
1974, p.6.
34 o
Popularly known as the Sailer Report. Features of the Report that
follow were obtained from Times of India, 29 April 1972 Also see 
Chapter 9.
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foreign experts were required in certain specialised fields
such as agriculture, transport and communication. So as
not to appear to be suggesting any erosion of sovereignty,
the Report was careful to point out that the aid should be
forthcoming 'without impinging on the right of the Bengalis
35
to make their own decisions'. It set the figure of 
required grain imports over the next twelve months to 2.3 
million tons at a total cost of $230m.
The Sailer Report also made certain long term suggestions 
such as emphasis on the need for the following priorities:
(1 ) establishment of a viable machinery of government;
(2) reabsorption of the returning refugees (from India);
(3) rehabilitation of the transportation and communication 
system, the building of food stocks and the feeding of the 
population; and (4) the revitalization of the economy and 
the creation of employment opportunities. The Report pointed 
to the direction that its authors thought Bangladesh ought 
to take in her future economic planning.
The U.N. was also involved in another major enterprise, 
the salvage operations of sunken ships at the Chalna port, 
a major nerve centre of jute trade. The other major port, 
Chittagong, was being cleared by the Soviets, whose offer was 
accepted by the Bangladesh autha-rities after appeals made 
by them to the U.N. were unsuccessful for want of funds.
For Chalna, the U.N. decided to fund the project from avail­
able resources, rather than trying to raise the sums. The
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result was a speedy award of a $ 8 m. U.N. contract, announced 
on 24 October 1972, to a consortium of six private firms
which completed the task ahead of the target date, May 1973.
The primary advantage of the U.N. as a source of 
economic assistance is its perception in the eyes of the 
recipient as being apolitical. Objectively speaking, it 
may not always be so that U.N.'s economic co-operation is 
totally devoid of political content. The Sailer Report 
for instance, mentioned India as being crucial, for the 
success of Bangladesh's relief programme, thus advocating 
a particular mode of international interaction. The Chalna 
Salvage operations under U.N. auspices seemed to be in a 
competititve relation with the Soviets in Chittagong.
But Mujib's anxiety to secure U.N. assistance in clearing
37the Ports rather than that of any Superpower protagonist, 
indicates a definite preference for the former.
IV. Concluding Remarks
Bangladesh was born in a breach of international 
convention, being the product of a War of secession (even 
if it be of the majority from the minority) brought to 
fruition with external assitance. Her emergence required a 
breakdown of 'international o r d e r'. Yet, soon after her 
birth she seemed anxious to preserve 'international o r d e r '. 
This was exemplified by her eagerness to get into the U.N.
3 6
See Peterson in McGwire e t .a l . , o p .c it ., p . 334.
37
See Chapter 3.
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She saw her interests, and those of many like her, linked 
to an orderly structure of harmonious state to state relation­
ship sustained by such institutions as the U.N. Born of 
Hobbesian circumstances, she needed a Lockeian international 
environment to sustain herself. There is indeed a modicum 
of irony in it.
The explanation lies in four things that she saw the 
U.N. offering her.
First, the seal of legitimacy. As a break-away state 
she appeared to have contravened the 'Club Rules' governing 
the relationships within the Global States-System. Eager 
for acceptance within the System, she 'lived down' the radical 
nature of her emergence and signalled willingness to conform 
to the 'Club Rules'. In fact she was arguing that since 
her population constituted a majority within former Pakistan, 
she was not a 'secessionist' state for the break-away of 
a majority could not be described in those terms. Bangladesh 
was eager not to seem to support the theoretical preposition 
that the States-System was breaking down or that the ex-colonial 
Third World countries were on the threshold of redrawing 
their political maps. On the contrary, she was emphasizing 
her uniqueness, and putting across the view that there 
was much to say for the well-ordered, conventional state- 
system. She was not, in any way, justifying Biafra. She 
was too weak to challenge the prevalent norms. Her seeking 
of entry into the U.N. was in reality a request for approval 
by the Global States-System and a commitment on her part 
to obey its 'rules'. This ruled out very radical or flashy 
behaviour-pattern as an international actor.
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Secondly, a sense of security. There were neighbours, 
one of them very powerful, who, however friendly at times, 
remained potential sources of threat. Bangladesh needed 
peace badly to rebuild her society after the shattering 
economic, psychological and emotional experience of the 
struggle for independence. Her tolerance limit for any 
further damage from external stimuli was very limited.
She needed a peaceful region for her proposed reconstruction, 
and better still, a peaceful world. If the U.N. was designed 
to ensure it, and Bangladesh's invoking the forum on the 
Farakka issue showed that she believed it was, Bangladesh 
would render the world body her total support.
Thirdly, as providing a forum for her to outline the 
sum-total of her external attitudes to global problems. 
Whenever her principles, commitments, or even narrow 
interests required her to take a stand, on international 
issues at variance with that taken by any major power with 
whom she had good bilateral relations, the General Assembly 
was a convenient forum to do so. There she would be seen 
to be acting as 'one of many' without being singled out.
Finally, as a good source of aid. The multilateral 
nature of the U.N. embracing the widest spectrum of 
ideologies, maker it a non-controversial source, most welcome 
to a community historically suspicious of 'attached strings'. 
The U.N. as a donor is acceptable to sections of opinion dom­
estically, including the different ideological constitu­
encies within her.
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Bangladesh, therefore, is likely to c o n t i n u e  working 
in close co-operation with the U.N. and her agencies in 
the future, as in the past.
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CHAPTER 9 
THE POLITICS OF EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE
I. Introduction
Of the declared aspirations of Bangladesh's foreign 
policy, apart from the 'consolidation of hard earned 
independence by safe-guarding sovereignty and territorial 
integrity*, the other is 'securing international cooperation 
for accelerating the pace of economic and social development 
of the country'.'*' It is only to be expected, therefore, that 
much of Dacca's energies are expended in obtaining such 
international cooperation, a euphemism for 'foreign aid', 
ferns largely shaping the nature and the course of the 
country's external interactions.
II. The Need for External Assistance
The economy of Bangladesh had suffered severe damage in
the 1971 war. In material terms it was computed to be in
2
the vicinity of $1200m. There was an immediate need to 
repair some of this damage and provide short term relief 
in the form of food and medical supplies. The Secretary 
General of the U.N., in an appeal to governments and 
voluntary agencies all over the world, stated that $620m.
^ Statement by the Bangladesh Foreign Minister, Professor Shamsul Huq,
Bangladesh Times, 11 September 1979.
2
A Survey of Damages and Repairs (United Nations Relief Operations, 
Dacca, 1972).
would be needed in 1972 alone, along with, among other 
things, the requirement to bridge the domestic food gap,
which amounted to 2 0 0 , 0 0 0  tons of food grains every month.
In his first press conference as Prime Minister,
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman appealed to all countries and inter-
4
national humanitarian organizations for assistance. It 
was obvious that Bangladesh considered the .obtaining of 
resources for post-war relief an apolitical and humanitarian 
matter. She was prepared to accept such assistance from any 
source. But once the immediate need for relief was satisfied 
and Dacca began to concentrate on development plans on a 
long-term basis, the matter demanded more serious consider­
ations. The philosophical and ideological framework that 
the leadership had in mind for Bangladesh became an important 
relevant factor.
The leaders had, in their rhetorics, announced their
5
intention to build a 'socialist society'. The nature of 
sources of aid was, therefore, important as there was an 
obvious contradiction in building a socialist system with 
non-socialist assistance. This was a dilemma that the 
economic planners of the country confronted while formulating 
the First Five Years Plan (1973-78).
Earlier, during the Pakistan era, the strategy followed 
was influenced by the Harrod Domar model, i.e. one of 
promoting rapid industrialization under the ownership and 
control of the rising capitalist class with assistance from
3
See Pakzstan Ttmes, 18 February 1972.
4
Tzmes of India, 15 January 1972.
5
See, for instance, Bangabandhu Speaks: A Collection of Speeches 
and Statements made by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (Dacca: External Publicity 
Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, u.d.), pp.56-63.
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the government. It was presumed that the benefits of growth
would 'trickle down' to the more depressed sections of the
community. The Pakistani planners believed, in the words
of Mahub ul Haq, that
it is well to recognise that economic 
growth is a brutal, sordid process.
There are no short-cuts to it. The 
essence of it lies in making the labourer 
produce more than he is allowed to consume 
for his immediate needs, and to invest and 
re-invest the surplus thus obtained ...^
The Bangladeshi planners did not succeed in producing
anything that showed a very different frame of mind at work.
The Harrod-Domar model continued to influence the Bangladeshi
planners. Rigour was added to this model by complementing
it with a multi-sectoral input-output table and linear
programming techniques. The planners stated that
[The Five Year Plan] is thus based on 
realities and capabilities of Bangladesh 
today. It does not assume that within 
five years we can approximate to the social 
structures prevailing in the other socialist 
countries, nor does it assume that the 
experience of the post-liberation period 
disqualifies us from all attempts to 
organise production forces more efficiently 
and with a view to realising socialist 
objectives.?
In fact, in a memorandum presented before aid donors 
in 1974, the Planning Commission admitted that 'the Plan does
g
not envisage a sharp structural change'. The realisation 
of socialist objectives promised to be a very gradual process.
g
M. Haq, The Strategy of Economic Planning: A Case Study of Pakistan 
(Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1963), p.l.
7
The First Ftve Year Plan 1973-1978 (Dacca: Planning Commission, 
November 1973), p.6.
0
Memorandum for the Bangladesh Consortium 1974-75 (Dacca: Planning 
Commission, October 1974), p.6.
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The mode of development that the Plan proposed required 
high saving and investment, nearly 15-20% of the gross 
domestic product (GDP). In Bangladesh, where domestic 
savings were below 5% of the GDP, it was essential that at 
least 1 0 % of the investible funds had to be attracted from
9
abroad. The Plan therefore was structurally geared towards 
the requirement of foreign aid. In fact, the Plan estimated 
that a net capital inflow of $2.4 billion would be required, 
during the five-year period, derived from import payments 
of $5.4 billion less export-receipts of $2.84 billion."*^
Direct appeals for international assistance were made and 
Bangladesh made it known that she expected the international 
community to take up the challenge of treating her as a 
'test case for development’.'*''*'
Thus, if there was any doubt in the minds of the 
Bangladeshi policy-makers whether foreign aid should or 
should not be accepted, it was now dispelled by the planners. 
It is not that, as this chapter will show, it did not 
generate any debate within the community. In the context 
of foreign aid, the relevant questions are: What are the
9
See Sheikh Maqsood A l i , 'Development through Foreign Assistance, or 
Social Mobilization?' Seminar Paper, Department of Economics, University 
of Dacca, 10 November 1978.
'*'0 Bangladesh Developments in a Rural Economy (in three volumes), Vol.l: 
The Main Report (Washington, International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development), p . 283. The Second Five Year Plan, scheduled to be launched 
in July 1980 also anticipates sizeable inflow of foreign capital.
The initial estimation for the Plan period, i.e. 1980 to 1985, is a 
disbursement of $10 billion, which assumes an aid commitment of $13 to 
$14 billion (S Airce: High Commission of Bangladesh, Canberra, 28 February 
1980).
1 1  Some Thoughts on Development Perspective for Bangladesh: A Case for 
Conferted International Effort (Dacca: Planning Commission, u.d.), p.6.
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sources of this massive aid? What are the effects of such 
aid on Bangladesh's economic sovereignty? What sort of 
debate does foreign aid generate within the community? And 
finally, in conclusion, what are its implications for the 
total gamut of Bangladesh's external relations?
III. Sources of Aid
With Socialism as a declared policy-goal, it was to be 
expected that there would be a high level of interaction 
in the economic field with the socialist countries. But 
the requirements of Bangladesh were too massive for the 
countries of the socialist bloc to be able to satisfy them. 
Neither the Soviet Union nor the East European countries 
could sustain for long the level of assistance that Bangladesh 
needed. Also, one major socialist country (though not quite 
of this bloc) with significant potential as a donor, China, 
did not have any political relations with Bangladesh and 
was unlikely to figure prominently as a source of aid in 
the immediate future. Moreover, the socialist countries 
traditioanlly funded project assistance rather than commodity 
aid programmes, and for Bangladesh the need for the latter 
was more urgent.
The alternative, thus, was to turn to the West. Even 
within this narrow group, Bangladesh would have, ideally, 
liked to diversify her sources of aid to bring the level 
of control that could be exerted by any donor to minimal.
But the chances of this materializing were growing slim 
as the donors were making known their preference for the
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setting up of a Consortium of aid-giving countries. The 
donors had, broadly, three reasons to favour such an 
arrangement: firstly, this would enable a more coordinate 
approach to aid giving by different donors with regard 
to their individual specialization; secondly, it would 
simplify the review process as this would then be under­
taken by the World Bank, rather than by the recipient or 
any single donor, which might have been neither possible 
nor desirable; thirdly and finally, since it was a 
Consortium that had initiated the funding of many of the 
projects, started in the Pakistan period, and now located 
in Bangladesh, and it was natural for such a Consortium 
to continue to fund them, given of course, as seemed likely, 
the Consortium was composed of, more or less, the same 
members.
The principal fears of the Bangladesh authorities were 
three-fold, mainly political in nature. Firstly, would such 
a body reduce her maneuverability in policy making and con­
sequently erode her economic sovereignty? Secondly, would 
the setting up of such a Consortium adversely affect her 
relations with the socialist countries and India? Thirdly, 
would the deepening of her dependence, as the formation of 
the Aid Group implied, be in consonance with her socialist 
goals?
12 For example, the World Bank suggested that many of Bangladesh's 
problems 'could be more easily tackled if it were possible to organize 
a Consortium of donor countries', Bangladesh: Development in a Rural 
Economy, Vol.l, op.cit., p.287.
12
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Vis-a-vis the first, contacts with such liberal donors 
as Australia and the Scandinavian countries generated 
the feeling that donors would eschew outright attempts to 
dominate policy-making and even raised hopes that the 
generous terms of these donors would help to liberalise 
those of other less generous ones. As to relations with 
the socialist bloc and India, as it gradually became apparent 
that these countries would be unable to meet Bangladesh's 
requirements, it came to be expected that they, in all fair­
ness, should not object. As to the third fear, the Planning 
Commission hoped for a 'rapid reduction of dependence on 
foreign aid by the end of the Plan Period' as domestic
13resources were, by then, expected to be built up appreciably.
In spite of some suggestions from Dacca that Bangladesh
chair the Consortium or that it be headed by a smaller
Western donor (just as Holland chairs the Consortium for
Indonesia), the World Bank was reluctant to deviate from
14the normal andthe Consortium, or Aid Group, was finally 
organized under the Bank's auspices in September 1974.
The meetings were to take place in Paris, the Bank's 
European headquarters. Bangladesh's linkage with Western 
donors was thus institutionalized..
As of 31 March 197g, a large proportion of the total 
aid received was from Western sources. From the members 
of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD
13 Preface, The First Five Year Flan 1973-78, op.cit.
14 Discussions with Professor Mosharaf Hussain, former Member of the 
Bangladesh Planning Commission, Oxford, 28 October 1978.
Table 9.1
FUNDS RECEIVED FROM D.A.C. COUNTRIES
(As of March 31, 1978) (Figures in US-Dollar Million)
Aid Giving Country
Grants
Commitment
Loans Total Grants
Disbursement
Loans Total
Undisbursed 
balance on 
April 1, 1978
1 2 3 4= ( 2 + 3) 5 6 7=(5+6) 8=(4-7)
1. Australia 95.887 95.887 67.943 67.943 27.944
2. Belgium 3.425 13.125 16.550 3.425 8.031 11.456 5.094
3. Canada 358.771 358.771 299.542 299.542 59.229
4. Denmark 26.928 16.800 43.728 18.780 12.242 31.022 12.706
5. Finland 0.925 2.325 3.250 0.925 2.325 3.250
6. France 34.216 43.352 77.568 28.438 23.911 52.349 25.219
7. West Germany (F.R.G. ) 59.094 358.164 417.258 43.154 235.880 279.034 138.224
8. Italy 3.233 3.233 3.233 3.233
9. Japan 59.530 468.782 528.312 50.529 317.182 367.711 160.601
10. Netherlands 106.782 42.000 148.782 43.722 29.522 73.244 75.538
11. Norway 61.677 61.677 41.517 41.517 20.160
12. New Zealand 3.165 3.165 2.807 2.807 0. 358
13. Sweden 150.000 150.000 127.758 127.758 22.242
14. Switzerland 15.090# 15.090 5.152 5 .152 9.938
15. U.K. 252.800 30.400 283.200 73.030 26.415 99.445 183.755
16. U.S.A. 299.795 745.347 1,045.142 255.919 661.170 886.089 159.053
Total 1,516.228* 1,735.385 * 3,251.613 1,030.722 1,320.830* 2 ,351.552* 900.061
* Figures include the disbursement made before liberation and for which liability has been accepted.
# Figures do not include Swiss aid channelled through international agencies and assistance to Holy 
Family Hospital and Bangladesh Redcross.
[Source: Planning Commission, Dacca.]
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Table 9.2
FUNDS RECEIVED FROM INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES
(As of March 31, 1978)
(Figures in US-Dollar Million)
Aid Giving Agency
Grants
Commitments
Loans Total' Grants
Disbursements
Loans Total
Undisbursed 
balance on 
April 1, 1978
1 2 3 4=(2+3) 5 6 7=(5+6) 8=(4-7)
1. E.E.C. (Multilateral) 137.160 137.160 128.832 138.832 8. 328
2. Ford/Asia Foundation 6.450 6.450 5.642 5.642 0.808
3. F.A.O. 14.000 14.000 14.000 14.000
4. U.N.R.O.B. 182.050 182.050 182.050 182.050
5. U.N.E.O. 46.995 46.995 46.995 46.995
6. UNICEF 88.731 88.731 72.671 72.671 16.060
7. Un Systems (UNDP,
UNFPA) 37.500 37.500 23.498 23.498 14.002
8. W.F.P. 75.248 75.248 73.252 73.252 1.996
9. International
Voluntary Agencies 105.600 105.600 105.600 105.600
10. A.D.B. 275.030 275.030 41.805 41.050 233.225
11. I .D.B. 7.000 7.000 7.000
12. O.P.E.C.
(Multilateral) 17.400 17.400 13.900 13.900 3. 300
13. IDA/IBRD 945.340 645.340 580.462 580.462 364.878
14. B.C.C.I. 6.500 6.500 6.500
693.734 1,251.270* 1.945.004 652.540 636/;67* 1 ,288.707 656.297
* Figures include the disbursements made before liberation of the Loans for which liability has been 
accepted.
(cont'd)
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Table 9.2 (cont'd)
Abbreviations :
1. E.E.C. = European Economic Community.
2. F.A.O. = Food and Agricultural Organisation.
3. U.N.R.O.B. = United Nations Relief Operations in Bangladesh.
4. U.N.E.O. = United Nations Emergency Operations.
5. U.N.D.P. = United Nations Development Programme.
6. U.N.F.P.A. = United nations Family Planning Association.
7. UNICEF = United Nations Children Emergency Fund.
8. W.F.P. = World Food Programme.
9. O.P.E.C. = Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries.
10. B.C.C.I. = Bank of Commerce and Credit International.
11. IDA = International Development Association.
[Source: Planning Commission, Dacca.]
Table 9.3
FUNDS RECEIVED FROM CENTRALLY PLANNED COUNTRIES
(As of March 31, 1978)
Commitments Disbursements Undisbursed
Aid Giving Country balance on
Grants Loans Total Grants Loans Total April 1, 1978
1 2 3 4=(2+3) 5 6 7=(5+6) 8=(4-7)
1. Bulgaria 1.910 7.600 9.510 1.910 0.015 1.925 7.585
2. China 1.000 58.300 59.300 1.000 1.300 2.300 57.000
3. Czechoslovakia 40.312 40.312 16.357 16.357 23.955
4. East Germany (GDR) 1.868 19.000 20.868 1.868 3. 386 5.254 15.614
5. Hungary 0.004 10.000 10.004 0.004 0.004 10.000
6. Poland 1.175 2.196 3.371 1.175 1.855 3.019 0. 352
7. Romania 0.040 60.469 60.509 0.040 13.202 13.242 47.267
8. USSR 30.000 198.580 228.580 30.000 128.736 158.736 69.844
9. Yugoslavia 0.875 71.136 72.011 0.875 42.502 43.377 28.634
Total 36.872 467.593* 504.465 36.872 207.342* 244.214 260.251
* Figures include disbursements of the Loans made before liberation and for which. liability has been
accepted.
[Source: Planning Commission, Dacca.]
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the total funds received amounted to $3,251.613m. out of
15which $1516.228m. came as grant and $1735.385 as credit.
The undisbursed balance was only $900, which indicates 
speedy, utilization.
The second largest source was international multi­
lateral agencies, most of whom were Western in origin. As 
of 31 March 1978, $1945.004m. was received from them,
$693.734m. as grant and $1251.270 as loans. Of the non- 
Western agencies the Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) gave $17,400m., the Islamic Development 
Bank $7m., and the Bank of Commerce and Credit International 
(BCCI), $6 .5m., all in loans.
A third source was the 'Centrally Planned Countries'
(a euphemism for the Socialist bloc) which provided $504.465m.,
$36,872 as grant and $467.593m. as loan. The amount
17undisbursed was $260.251m.
A new source was the Middle Eastern Muslim Countries
who gave $317.250m., out of which $105.26m. were as grant
and $211,987 were loans. The undisbursed balance was 
1 ft$130.923m.
An analysis of the above aid quantums will show that 
the amounts received from Western sources outweigh by far 
those from others. There is no evidence to show that this 
trend is likely to undergo change in the near future.
15 See Table 9.1.
16 See Table 9.2.
17 See Table 9.3.
18 See Table 6.5 in Chapter 6 .
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Moreover, the terms of assistance were favourable. In 
March 1978 the United Nations Conference for Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) Ministerial Board endorsed the easing
of terms under which assistance is given to the least
19 . . .developed countries (LDCs). Consequently, it is likely
that future Official Development Assistance (ODA) from
the DAC countries will mostly be in the form of grants,
and that past debt liabilities of Bangladesh would be
written off. From among the multilateral sources, assistance
from the UNDP is entirely in the form of grant, while
other loans are on very soft terms.^
A comparison between the third and the fourth sources
reveal that the terms of conditions from the centrally
planned countries are somewhat tougher than those from
the Muslim states of the Middle East. Assistance from the
formetr range from interest-free loans (not grants) to
interest-charge of 3%, with a repayment period of nine to
twenty-five years, while, proportionately, a far larger
portion of aid from the fourth source is in grant form,
with service charges ranging from zero to 4^/2%, while
21the repayment period is between twelve and thirty yeras. 
Another advantage to the recipient of the fourth source over 
the third is that funds from the Middle East can be used 
world-wide for procurements, facilitating cheaper purchases, 
whereas the third source is 'tied' to the socialist countries
19 Seven Years of External Assistance to Bangladesh, op.cit., p.3.
20 -u-^ ibid.
21 ibid.
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only. It is also necessary to bear in mind that the 
Middle Eastern countries as a source of aid are o'f recent 
origin, as they had no political links with Bangladesh till 
as late as 1974. Aid quantums received from this quarter 
are therefore, currently smaller than those from other
sources with whom aid relations dat& back further into the
. 23 past.
24Bangladeshi recipient agencies tend to favour Western 
sources of aid over others for several reasons.
Firstly, most of the recipient agencies have historical 
links with these sources dating back to the Pakistan era 
when the Western countries were primary aid givers. These 
agencies are familiar with Western products as their projects 
have been using Western assistance for years.
Secondly, Western donors give a large proportion of 
their aid as grants, requiring no amortization. Even if 
some of the aid from the Socialist countries is in the 
form of interest-free loans, the principal has to be raxuLd.
Thirdly, Western countries remain the main source for 
the badly required commodity aid. A good example is food- 
grains, which can only be obtained from the U.S., Australia
22
22 Discussions with Dr F. Ahmed, Joint Secretary ERD Dacca, 27 May 1978.
23 It is noteworthy that though trade relations between Bangladesh and 
some other countries have preceded the political, aid relations largely 
because they are usually on a government to government basis, have usually 
been linked to the establishment of political connections. There are 
exceptions, however. The U.S., for instance, was an indirect donor 
prior to according Bangladesh diplomatic recognition.
24 The recipient agencies are the actual aid users, as distinct from the 
governmental department which negotiates the receipt of aid but does not 
itself utilise the aid received. The interests of the two may, though 
not necessarily, be different. See John White, The Politics of Foreign 
Aid (London: The Bodley Head Ltd., 1974), pp.78-88.
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and Canada. Qn one o'ccasion Australian food aid included
25freight charges being paid by the donor.
Fourthly, while aid from the socialist countries is 
mostly 'tied1, that from the West usually involves a wider 
region of procurement, enabling the recipient to 'shop around' 
in different countries for lower prices. Even if sometimes 
aid from a Western source is tied, because export trade 
there is not under State control, the recipient can take 
advantage of the market mechanism in making procurements 
from that country.
Fifthly, as regards technical assistance, i.e.( training 
of the managerial cadres, offers from the West - in particular 
from the English-speaking countries such as the U.S., the 
U.K., Canada, Australia and New Zealand - findt greater 
favour. This is largely due to cultural linkages with the 
English-speaking world.
These agencies,therefore, tend to exert pressure on 
the principal government department or ministry negotiating 
for foreign aid to gravitate more towards Western sources, 
a pressure that inevitably leads to greater interaction 
with the latter.
IV. Aid and Economic 'Sovereignty'
All aid donors are usually interested in the optimal 
utilization of the assistance they render. They also
In 1974. Australia pays freight when food-aid is granted from her 
'Bilateral Reserve for Emergencies', but usually not otherwise. (Source: 
Australian Development Assistance Bureau, Department of Foreign Affairs, 
Canberra.)
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entertain their own notions as to how to maximise benefits 
from the aid they provide. As a result they are sometimes 
prone to indicate their preferences, or to go even further 
and exert pressure on the recipient to conform to their 
wishes.
Such pressures from multilateral sources tend to be
more intense than those from bilateral. There are, broadly,
two main reasons for it: firstly, the quantum of aid they
provide are larger; secondly, since the major multilateral
2 6sources such as the World Bank and the Asian Development
Bank (ADB) are bureaucratic and apolitical agencies, they
are less sensitive to political approaches of the recipient.
Several areas can be identified where such pressures
have been exerted. The first such area is the organizational
structure of projects, and more important, of the governmental
department controlling the projects in question. For
example, when Bangladesh government accepted credit from the
Asian Development Bank for rehabilitation of the Dacca-
Chittagong rail links, it undertook to set up an autonomous 
27enterprise. Again, with regard to a Fisheries project 
that the ADB partly funded, the Bank took very keen interest 
in the apointment of the Finance Director of the Bangladesh
2 6 While Bangladesh has dealings with all the three agencies that comprise 
the World Bank - the International Bank for Reconstruction and Develop­
ment (IBRD), the International Finance Corporation (IFC) and the 
International Development Association (DA) - most of her activities 
involve the IDA whose loans are on highly concessional terms and 
advanced to the poorest countries.
27 Asian Development Bank Railway Loan (Loan No.215), Loan Agreement 
(Special Operations), 10 January 1975, p.9.
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Fisheries Development Corporation (BFDC), the government
agency that controlled the project. The ADB insisted that
the BFDC administrative machinery required total overhauling.
While that might have indeed been so, it was entirely an
internal subject matter for the government. But the pressure
was such that a Ministerial ranking Civil Servant, A.K.M.
Ahsan, was sent to the ADB headquarters in Manila to explain
2 8the government's position on both the projects. Therefore, 
we see that foreign funding agencies did not confine their 
interest to the narrow limits of the projects they funded, 
but extended it to the relevant government departments.
Such pressures did indeed undermine the latter's manoeu\erability.
The World Bank went several steps further and made
comments on the total administrative structure of the
government, suggesting means of improving it. Describing
the system as 'inappropriate to economic management', a
Bank Report purported to advise the political authority
on the directions it ought to follow. The Report said:
If Bangladesh is to grow it will have to 
decentralize decision making and permit 
farmers, small traders, small industrial­
ists, local government representatives 
and public managers to respond to those 
signals through some combination of 
monetary rewards, social status and national 
sentiment.29
The World Bank has also proferred advice which was in 
direct contradiction with a policy that the government was 
politically committed to. The Awami League Government had 
chosen to give a tangible expression to their socialist aims
28 Ministry of Planning, Dacca, 2 November 1979.
29
Bangladesh: Development in a Rural Economy, Vo1.1, op.cit., p.230.
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by limiting the income of individuals in the public sector.
For the government there seemed some value in curtailing
monetary rewards of the bureaucracy whose burgeoning power
had been a traditional subject of public criticism. The
World Bank however, had these comments to make on the subject:
The application of ceilings to incomes 
earned by the top echelon of government 
managers, especially in periods of rapidly 
declining real incomes, constitutes a drag 
on efficiency and blunts initiative.30
Even though direct pressure might not have been 
brought to bear on a subject such as this, the distribution 
of the Report among other donors, and the correlation 
between opinions of donors and the quantums of aid, tanta- 
mounted to the application of indirect pressure on the Dacca 
Government.
A second such area is the all-important food sector, 
particularly the food rationing system and the distribution 
of fertilizer.
The Urban Rationing System has been a fact of life 
in Bengal for decades. Food, procured externally, is 
distributed through a government rationing system in four 
large urban centres called 'statutory rationing areas' 
where every individual is entitled to a subsidized quota of 
food. The public rationing system distributes the balance 
only after the urban requirements are met.
The principal beneficiaries of the rationing system 
are the urban middle classes - government officials, clerks, 
soldiers, merchants, traders and industrial workers - the
30 Bangladesh: The Current Economic Situation and Short Term Outlook 
(World Bank, Report No.710a-BD, 2 May 1975), p.l.
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more politically articulate and potentially volatile 
sections within the community. The main consideration of 
the government in operating this system (inherited from the 
British Colonial period) seems political rather than economic.
Many donors, in particular the World Bank, have always
been critical of this form of rationing. The Bank held that
action is necessary to contain the ration 
program to those most in need. If the 
less needy were progressively diverted to 
the market for their foodgrain requirements, 
it would decrease the amount of food the 
Government would need to distribute, ease 
the impact ofthe subsidy on the budget and ^
make the entire ration program more meaningful.
The Bank opposed the system on two counts; firstly, 
the distribution of subsidized foodgrains tended to depress 
farmgate prices and therefore required additional counter­
vailing action to maintain incentive prices; and secondly, 
the industrial workers and the urban middle classes tended 
to benefit at the expense of the rural poor. In 1978 the 
Government responded to the pressure by raising the price 
of rationed rice from Taka 90 to Tdka 100 per maund (40 kilos) 
and that of wheat from Taka 70 to Taka 80. Also, the 
Government announced its intention that those enjoying a 
monthly income of over Taka 1,600 a month would be shifted 
from the ration shops to the 'Essential Supply Shops' where 
the price would be between the ration and market prices.
The Bank Report commented that 'these are welcome steps and
32the Government is to be commended for having made them'.
3 1  * I ’ J  Qibid., p.9.
3 2 Bangladesh: Current Eoonorma Trends} The Main Report, Vol.l (two 
volumes) (World Bank, Report No.l931-BD, 10 April 1978), p.iv.
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The Government also quite willingly signed the new Title III
Food Aid agreement under Public Law 480 with the U.S. whose
conditions required that the grain imported be used, not in
33the rationing system, but in free market operations.
Pressure was also exerted by donors for the reduction 
of subsidies on fertilizer, which was also, in due course, 
complied with. The Bank had argued that the problem with 
fertilizer usage was supply rather than price, for two of 
Bangladesh's fertilizer plants, one at Ghorashal and the 
other at Fenchuganj, were subject to intermittent breakdowns. 
The users, who turned out to be the better-off farmers, 
would be able to sustain a price hike reasonably, as 
fertilizer was 'said to command a high premium on the black 
market' . 3 4
show :
The Government relented, as the following table will
35
Table 9.4
Year % of subsidy
1973-74 22
1974-75 43
1975-76 53
1976-77 44
1977-78 42
1978-79 50
An analysis of the above table indicates a decline in subsidy 
as of 1976-77. There was a rise in 1978-79, explicably so
33 Interview with Mr Abidur Rahman, Economic Minister, Bangladesh Embassy, 
Washington, 13 September 1978.
3 4  Bangladesh: The Current Economie Situation and Short-Term Outlook 
op .cit., p.4.
35 Source: Bangladesh Agricultural Development Corporation.
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because two severe floods in 1978 resulted in extensive 
crop rehabilitation programmes demanding such increase. 
However, reduction of subsidy on fertilizer is now an 
expressed policy of government.
A third area where donor pressure can be identified 
in the economy is the one concerning monetary and fiscal 
policy. The relevant donor agency here is the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) of which Bangladesh had become a member 
in June 1972, and on which there was considerably reliance 
for balnce of payment support. The Fund (IMF) insisted 
that devaluation of the Taka was essential if exports of 
jute and jute goods had to be gainfully made, if more 
non-traditional items had to be profitably sold abroad, and 
if taka price of imports, had to be raised as a measure 
of control.
The Government was hesitant for mainly three reasons:
firstly, because it thought that the importance of fiscal
policy as a means of removing problems' was exaggerated;
secondly because of the fear of the reaction of the
politically conscious middle class to the inevitable
inflationary consequences; and thirdly, because it had
hoped rising oil prices would discourage synthetic substitute
of jute which would not require devaluation to increase its
36exports.
In the first Aid Group meeting held in Paris in October 
19 74 almost every donor emphasized the need for readjust­
ment of the exchange rate. With Bangladesh hurtling
Interview with Professor M. Hussain, op.cit.
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towards a general economic crisis in 19 74, there was a
general fear that the good will of donors would be lost if
the currency was not devalued. There was need for
further balance of payment support from the IMF which would
certainly be chary of granting it if its advice with regard
to the exchange rate was ignored. The devaluation was finally
announced in May 19 75, which, in the words of donor
officials, 'was a tardy recognition of the damage that was
37being done by an overvalued exchange rate'.
It may be argued that sometimes these pressures, 
especially in the cases of the rationing system and subsidy 
on fertilizer, did indeed lead to socially desirable changes 
of policy, supported by a wide section within the community, 
but the fact remained that the Government was forced to under­
take measures as a result of pressure from external donors 
which undermined her autonomy of decision-making in these
3 8spheres, or in other words, eroded her economic 'sovereignty'.
V. The Internal Debate
The aid linkages with the Western donors provoked 
considerable debate within the policy-making circles. However,
3 7 Just Faaland and J.R. Parkinson, Bangladesh: A Test Case of Develop­
ment (Dacca: University Press Ltd., 1976), p.57.
38 Geoffrey Goodwin argues that 'sovereignty cannot be eroded, it can 
only be extinguished'. 'The Erosion of Sovereignty?' in James Barker 
and Michael Smith (eds), The Nature of Foreign Policy (Edinburgh: Holmes 
McDougall, The Open University Press,1974), p.56. That is, however, 
taking a very juridical and legalistic view of the expression 'sovereignty'. 
Here it is used in a wider sense to imply the flexibility of a country 
to make its own decisions.
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as in the tradition of the Subcontinental bureaucracy, 
Bangladeshi officials are reluctant to publicize their views, 
it is often difficult to discern what form these internal 
discussions assume.
Some indication is provided in academic seminars where 
public officials participate. The number of such seminars 
is, however, small. A significant one on the subject 'Is 
Foreign Aid Essential for our Economic Development' was 
organized at the Department of Economics, Dacca University, 
in November 1978.
Critics of foreign aid were mainly drawn from the academic
circles and argued on a more theoretical plane. Their fears
centred more on the 'exploitative dynamics of economic
dependence'. They argued that'underdevelopment* was a part
of the capitalist system and could not be cured with foreign
aid, however, massive in quantum; the obvious solution was,
therefore, to opt out of the 'capitalist system'. In
Professor Abu Mahmood's opinion:
If you don't have a theory of development 
foreign aid may be necessary for the purpose 
of enriching the oligarchies, regime rotation 
and their counter-insurgency programmes.
There will be a tidal flow of foreign aid, 
loan investments and even outright grants in 
future for the perpetuation of external 
constraints and internal class-structure.
That is the basic law of modern imperialism. ^
A .R . Bhuiyan of the Departmnet of Economics at Dacca 
University, argued that
'Are Foreign Aid and Loans Indispensable for the Socio-Economic 
Development of Bangladesh?;, Seminar Paper at the Department of Economics, 
University of Dacca, 10 November 1978, p.32.
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it can be said that the LDCs [least 
developing countries] do have very little to 
justify their dependence on foreign aid. They 
would do better by exploiting alternative 
sources of investible funds; adopt appropriate 
policies to attract private foreign capital 
and/or obtain commercial loans from abroad.
Also, whether the presence of the trade gap 
is because of structural impediments or are 
simply the result of inappropriate domestic 
economic policies (e.g. over-valuation of the 
currency, uneconomic import substitution etc.) 
has to be carefully examined. Adoption of 
appropriate domestic monetary, fiscal and 
commercial policies and seeking to obtain 
better terms in trading relationship with the 
developed and other developing countries as 
envisaged in various UNCTAD meetings and LDC 
forums might bring greater and more tangible 
benefits than foreign aid.40
Bhuiyan stressed that in addition to the purely economic 
arguments against foreign aid, the latter tends to strengthen 
the hands of the small ruling oligarchy, 'thwarts efficient 
growth, creates undesirable inequity in society and blocks
progress towards an acceptable and viable social and economic
, , 41 order .
These argume.nts are in sympathy with those in the
prevalent neo-Marxist and 'dependencia' literature which
generally see the dependence of the underdeveloped countries
(satellites/periphery) on the developed countries (metropolis/
42centre) as a chronic condition in the World Economy.
Such conditions result in the exclusive benefit of the 
metropolis/centre. Whatever economic growth does take place 
satellites/periphery is influenced by the need of the
40 'Foreign Aid and Economic Development: A Critique', Seminar Paper, 
Dacca University, 10 November 1978, p.8.
ibid.
42 See Chapter 1, footnote 18.
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metropolis/centre. Moreover, development in the under­
developed countries is usually uneven, resulting in the creation 
of pockets of development at the expense of pockets of under­
development with their differences being progressively 
4 3sharpened. Any attempt of the developing countries to 'catch
up' with the developed, would be at the expense of continuing
4 4dependence on external technology and taste-creation.
To these theoreticians, the remedy lies in either
45opting out of the capitalist system, if needs be by revolution,
or by adopting such reforms as stimulating demand among more
indigent groups for low grade consumer goods capable of being
manufactured domestically. Such actions could help to stave
46off external penetration.
Radical solutions tended to be avoided by the middle- 
class based government. Though the 'First Five Year Plan' 
does call for 'the removal of the capitalist system of 
income distribution of the private ownership of means of 
production and of the precapitalist mercantile of feudal 
forms of production relations', it also stresses that the 
'transformation' needs to be gradual, 'since too abrupt a
43 It is necessary to note the distinction between 'economic growth' and 
'development'. While the former may be seen as a 'quantitative process' 
involving the extension of an already established structure of production, 
the latter suggests 'qualitative changes', and the creation of new economic 
and non-economic structures. See D.F. Dowd, 'Some Issue of Economic Devel­
opment and Development Economics', Journal of Economic Issues, Vol.2, No.3 
(1967), p.153.
44 Norman Girvan, 'The Development of Dependency Economics in the Caribbean 
and Latin America: Review and Comparison', Social & Economic Studies,
Vol.22, No.1 (1973), p.26.
45 See Gerard Chiliand, Revolution in the Third World: Myths and Prospects 
(Sussex: The Harvester Press, 1977), p.12.
46 3C. Furtado, op.cit., passzm.
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dislocation at one time may seriously disturb the production
, , 47 system1.
Such a philosophy would also entertain the notion of
foreign aid, to which civil servants, currently involved
in policy making,are not averse. The Secretary of the
External Resources Division, A.M.A. Muhith has argued;
It is true that foreign aid promotes 
dependency relationship and perhaps 
stands in the way of hard decisions which 
warrant austerity. For Bangladesh hard 
decisions are indeed extremely hard.
Economic egalitarianism at this stage 
means distribution of endemic poverty.
With the current trade regime that prevails 
in the globe it will not be possible to 
make both ends meet in a resource poor 
country like Bangladesh during the next ten 
or twenty years . 4 8
The dilemma of the policy-makers, and their final 
choice of action, have been succinctly put by a former 
chief of the Planning Commission, Professor Nurul Islam.
To him
The most politically delicate choice was 
the relative dependency on the Plan or 
foreign aid; with the oft repeated emphasis 
on self reliance and socialism, heavy 
dependence on foreign aid, particularly 
from the non-socialist countries, especially 
the big powers, created a political dilemma 
for Bangladesh. There was the choice, on one 
hand, of severe austerity; the brunt of such 
austerity would have fallen on the already
47 The Fzrst Five Year Flan 1973-78, op.cit., p.2. At the end of the 
first plan period, 1973-78, the government, aware of the weak data 
base for the formulation of a realistic Second Five Year Plan, as well 
as the inability to achieve some of the First Plan's objectives, decided 
to launch a Two Year Plan (1978-80) as a logical extension of the first 
plan to bridge the period before the Second Plan period commences in 
July 1980. The Two Year Plan does not contain any new development 
philosophy.
48 'Is Foreign Aid Essential for Development in Bangladesh?' Seminar 
Paper, Department of Economics, Dacca University, 10 November 1978.
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impoverished masses and this would have 
been partially politically palatable by a 
universally accepted regime of egalitarian 
consumption standards; this in turn would 
have required a degree of ideological 
motivation, not discernible in post­
independence Bangladesh. On the other hand 
there was the option of seeking a large inflow 
of foreign aid from the rich, powerful nations 
which brought with it certain restrictions 
in political and economic decision-making. 
'Bangladesh opted for larger foreign aid.^9
At yet another seminar held in Dacca in December 1979,
the Finance Minister, Professor M.N. Huda signalled a
continuing dependence on foreign aid, which he justified
with the argument that
short term need for external economic 
assistance and long term national objective 
of self reliance and neither inconsistent 
nor mutually exclusive.50
The debate seems to have been resolved in favour of
the acceptance of foreign aid for two main reasons: one,
the immediate massive needs for the country required 'a
breathing space in the process of the structural trans- 
51formation' of the economy that only large scale foreign 
assistance could provide, and secondly, the middle class- 
based leading elite tended to avoid the more radical solutions 
in favour of the more moderate ones.
49 ,N. Islam, Development Planning in Bangladesh: A Study in Politzoal 
E lonomy (London: C.Hurst & Co., 1977), p.8.
50 Bangladesh Observer, 29 December 1979.
51 Nurul Islam, Development Strategy in Bangladesh (Queen Elizabeth 
House, Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1978), p.94.
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VI: Concluding Remarks: Implications for Foreign Relations
The policy of accepting external aid had several 
important implications for the total gamut of Bangladesh's 
external realtions.
Firstly, it led to greater interactions with the 
Western world. Multilaterally and bilaterally, the West 
was the major donor. The concentration on the West in 
Bangladesh's foreign relations was therefore inevitable.
As the volume of aid depended on the goodwill of the donors, 
such goodwill had to be preserved through good relations 
with the latter.
Secondly, there was undermining of her sovereign 
status in the economic sphere due to pressures of external 
origin. Some, such as the pressure to reform the rationing 
system or reduce the subsidy on fertilizers, might have led to 
results that might generally be regarded as beneficial, 
but the fact remained that these outside pressures imposed 
constraints on the government's freedom of action in the 
determination of policies.
Thirdly, there was a modicum of security hazard in 
exposing the country's entire economy to outside view and 
analysis, which as a recipient Bangladesh found impossible 
to avoid. The input-output tables which forms the basis 
of the First Five Year Plan and of the forthcoming 
Second Five Year Plan gives the donor countries, who are 
also associated with the formulation of the Plans, vital 
knowledge about the most sensitive spots in the production
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relations in the country. Disproportionate damage can there­
fore be inf li^cted should a donor turn hostile, by discreetly 
withholding aid to a critical sector in the economy, while 
at the same time not appearing to have committed hostile 
act of a magnitude that would attract wide attention.
Fourthly, and finally, and this implication is relevant 
to foreign policy-making, the central significance of aid 
relations to the national life accords a preponderance in 
all policy-making (including those in the area of external 
relations) to that segment of the bureaucracy that controls 
foreign aid negotiations.
52
This point was stressed by Dr Sheikh Maqsood Ali, a former Director 
of the Project Implimentation Bureau of the Planning Commission 
in his seminar paper, op.cit., pp.1-2.
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CHAPTER 10 
THE ELITES AND FOREIGN POLICY-MAKING
I. Introduction
If we believe that 'nations do not act, it is their 
leaders who do, and in any given situation the decision­
makers involved are for all practical purposes, the nation','*' 
it is essential that we study the governing elite for a 
proper understanding of their actions, including those with 
regard to foreign affairs. This is particularly true of 
societies where the dominant value of government is admini­
strative. It is first necessary, however, to define and 
identify such elite.
A useful framework in this connection has been 
provided by Gabriel Almond. Defining the elite as those who 
are 'influential', he has suggested a four-fold functional 
classification: (a) the political elite, which includes 
public representatives and party leaders; (b) the bureau­
cratic elite, which means the professional corps of the 
executive establishment; (c) the interest elites, i.e. the 
representatives of the vast number [in the U.S.] of private 
policy oriented associations, ranging from nationwide
aggregations to local formation; and finally (d) the
2communications elite, the leaders of the media.
1 Patrick M. Morgan, Theories and Approaches to International Politics: 
What Are We to Think (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1975), 
p p .50-51.
2 'The Elites and Foreign Policy' in James Berber and Michael Smith (eds), 
The Nature of Foreign Policy: A Reader (Edinburgh: Holme McDougal,
Open University Press, Milton Keynes, 1974), pp.241-3.
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What is relevant to the developed, powerful and
prosperous United States is more likely than not to be so
to the underdeveloped, weak and indigent Bangladesh. In the
latter case, private policy oriented associations have not
yet developed, and their role as active interest groups are
therefore limited. However, such bodies as the Chambers of
Commerce, the Trade Unions, &nd the various religious formations
channel their pulls and pressures through the medium of
various political parties. A limited influence is exercised
by a number of bilateral 'Friendship Societies'. For instance,
the Soviet-Bangladesh Friendship Society engaged in some
public relations activity on behalf of Moscow in 1972 when
it organised an exhibition in Dacca on 'Fifty Years of the
3Sovzet U m o n  . But very often leaders of these societies 
are those who are also otherwise significant members of 
the political elite. To cite-an example, the President of the 
China-Bangladesh Friendship Society, Mirza Ghulam Hafiz, 
was an influential Cabinet Minister in the Zia Government 
till he became a Speaker of the Parliament in 1979.
The same is true of the fourth category, the communi­
cations elite. Since most communications outlets (such as 
the radio, the television networks, national newspapers) 
are not in private hands, the concerned elite does not exercise 
influence as in developed politics. However, individual 
members of the communications elite have been powerful agents 
of policy at times. But in most cases they have acted, not 
in their capacity as media persons, but through other political
3 As'ian Analysis (February, 1972), p.2.
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linkages. An illustration is Enayetullah Khan, a newspaper 
editor, who was a key member of President Ziaur Rahman's 
Cabinet till October 1978.
This, therefore, leaves the first two categories, the 
political and bureaucratic elites, as most relevant. These 
will be presently examined.
II. The Political Elite
An apparent feature of Bangladesh politics, as in many 
other new developing nations, has been leadership given by 
a single personality at any given point in time, who fits
4Kissinger's cognomen of a 'prophet', possessing charisma -
'a quality of extraordinary spiritual power attributed a
a person ... capable of eliciting human support in the
5direction of human affairs'. Theoretically then his will 
should have shaped the country's external behaviour. But 
given the importance of foreign policy in terms of the 
country's security and obtaining external resources for 
development his will is, of necessity, conditioned by 
professional advice.^
Political colleagues of the leader, i.e. individual 
politicians tend to be disinclined towards foriegn policy
4 See Chapter 1, op.cit., p.47.
5 Immanuel Wallerstein, Africa: The Politics of Independence (New 
York: Random House, 1961), p.99.
6 This phenomenon is not true of developing states where the relevant 
professionals may have lower influence and calibre, unable to provide 
similar support to the leader, as in Uganda. See Maurice Ea.st, 'Foreign 
Policy-Making in Small States: Some Theoretic Observations Based on a 
Study of the Ugandan Ministry of Foreign Affairs', Policy Sciences:,
Vol.4, No.4 (1973), pp.491-2.
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matters for three broad reasons: firstly, the problems of 
their territorial constituencies are so numerous, given the 
low state of over-all development, that they have no time 
for interest in external affairs. Secondly, even if they 
had the time, and interest, they lack the information base 
and staff support to formulate informed opinions. Finally, 
the politicians are indeed aware of a vast governmental 
machinery trained to handle such intricacies to which they 
are content to leave the entire subject.
The political parties are similarly less interested.
The Awami League, the party that led the movement for 
independence, did indeed have the basis of its foreign policy 
laid down in the 1970 election Manifesto. It was to be 
'independent and non-aligned, based on the principle of 
friendship to all and malice towards none'. The terms were 
general enough to permit considerable latitude by implementors.
The other major parties were somewhat more specific, 
but not much. While NAP (Bhashani) wanted 'peaceful settle­
ment of Kashmir dispute; rights of self-determination to
the people of Kashmir; withdrawal from CENTO and SEATO:
9abolition of colonialism and neo-colonialism1, NAP (Muzaffar) 
sought 'an independent and non-aligned foreign policy and
 ^For the politician, interest in foreign policy questions does not usually 
help secure votes at the constituency level.
Q
'The Manifestos of Different Political Parties in Outline', Bangladesh: 
Contemporary Events and Documents (Dacca: External Publicity Division, 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, u.d.), p.69.
9 ibid., p .71.
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friendly relations with Afro-Asian countries in general 
and neighbours in particular'. The Jamaat-i-Islami wished 
for 'withdrawal from CENTO and SEATO' and 'effective steps 
for the solution of the Kashmir problem'. Other parties 
like the Muslim League (Convention), the Muslim League (Council) 
and the Pakistan Democratic Party had nothing to say in their 
manifestos with regard to foreign policy.
The attitude of these parties with some backing in 
what was then East Pakistan, contrasted sharply with the 
West Pakistan based Pakistan People's Party of Zulfikar Ali 
Bhutto. The PPP spelt out its foreign policy aims in more 
detail:
To pursue independent non-aligned Foreign 
Policy and meaningful bilateral relations 
with Big Powers and closer relations with 
Socialist Countries, particularly People's 
Republic of China, To follow a strong policy 
against India till all basic disputes between 
her and Pakistan in Kashmir and Farakka are 
settled in a just m a n n e r . ^
One can conclude, therefore, that most Bangladesh based 
political parties of any importance, even in contrast to 
those in Pakistan, have had no strong bias vis-a-vis foreign
ibid., p.74.
ibid., p.75. PPP's more detailed interest in foreign affairs was 
largely due to the personal experience and predilections of its Chairman, 
Bhutto, a former Foreign Minister, and leaders such as J.A. Rahim, a 
former Ambassador. A leader's interest in foreign affairs is related 
to his repertoire of experience in that field. See Margaret G. Hermann, 
'Effects of Personal Characteristics of Political Leaders on Foreign 
Policy' in Maurice A. East, Stephen A. Salmore and Charles E. Hermann 
(eds), Why Nations Act: Theoretical Perspectives for Comparative Foreign 
Policy Studies (London: Sage Publications, 1978), p.67.
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affairs. The repertoire of the experience of their leaders 
in foreign policy matters was. limited, unlike some of 
their Pakistani counterparts. All the Parties were basically 
agreed on 'non-alignment', a populist theme of the period, 
but apart from that interest in the foreign-policy area 
was minimal.^
13
III. The Bureaucratic Elites
It has been held that bureaucrats usually have more
confidence in their ability to make sound judgements in
the foreign affairs arena than do most citizens, and they
are likely to feel they are more qualified to do so than
15either politicians or scholars. This section will, among
other things, demonstrate that Bangladeshi bureaucrats are
no exception. In the latter case these feelings are
strengthened by the fact that politicians are content to
leave this area as a bureaucratic preserve, as discussed
X 6in the last section.
13 This is less surprising when considered against the fact that even in 
developed polities there have been occasions, in the not too distant past, 
when foreign affairs engaged minimal attention in electioneering by 
political parties, e.g. in Post-War Britain. See H.G. Nicholas, The
British General Election of 1950 (London: Macmillan, 1951), pp.304-5.
14 The various Communist Parties are exceptions in the sense that they 
espouse close links with their ideological allies abroad, whether Peking 
or Moscow, but their power is not enough to be a significant input in 
the determination of policy.
15 Charles S. Schleicher, International Behavior: Analysis and Operations 
(Columbia, Ohio: Charles E. Merril Publishing Co., 1973), p.28.
In fact,traditionally,bureaucrats have been significant in all areas 
of policy making in Bangladesh's predecessor state, Pakistan, a phenomenon 
that has been one of the former's political inheritance. For a recent 
study of Pakistan's bureaucratic elite in a historic perspective, see 
Asaf Hussain, Elite Politics in an Ideological State: The Case of Pakistan 
(Kent: Dawson & Sons Ltd., 1979). pp.61-78.
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In this area, the leader, or the head of government 
has tended to rely heavily on bureaucratic advice. But the 
source of this advice is not any particular sector in the 
bureaucracy. Several are involved, all of whom deserve 
attention. We shall commence our analysis with the sector 
theoretically responsible for the conduct of foreign relations, 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
A. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Foreign Office); The
formal structure of the Foriegn Office is as follows: below 
the Minister, who is the political head, there is the Foreign 
Secretary (FS), the permanent head of the Ministry. He 
is normally assisted by an Additional Foreign Secretary 
(AFS) . There is usually a division of functions between
the FS and the AFS, with the former confining himself to 
political matters, and the latter looking after general 
administration of the Ministry as well as of the missions 
abroad.
Within the Ministry, there are divisions, of two broa-d 
categories, territorial and functional. Each of the 
territorial divisions is headed by a Director General (DG) . The 
divisions advise the Minister through the Secretary as to 
the policy to be followed in relations between Bangladesh 
and the countries which come within the divisions's juris­
diction; it analyses reports from missions abroad, issues 
them instructions on behalf of the Ministry, and maintains
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. . . . . . . 17 . . .liaison with foreign missions in Dacca. The division
or Directorate-General is subdivided into Directorates,
each headed by a Director, which are again subdivided into
Sections, each headed by a Section Officer. There is for
instance, one Section Officer for Australia and the Pacific.
The Section Officer is the 1 contact-point1 where information
is collected, collated and with recommended actions sent up
along the chain of command, through the Director and Director-
General (with their comments) to the Secretary. Decisions
on minor matters may be taken at any level depending on it
importance, though more important matters are left to the
Secretary or the Minister.
The Functional divisions are created on the basis of
particular functions such as Protocol, Administration,
Legal Advice etc. Their heads may be variously described
(such as Chief of Protocol,or Legal Adviser) but they perform
18functions similar to those of the Director General.
17 Discussions with officials of the Ministry of Fonegn Affairs, Dacca,
12 November 1978. The functions of the territorial division are very 
similar to that of the Foreign Office of Britain, which is still held as 
a model by the Foreign Ministries of the Subcontinental countries. For 
a description of the duties of a British Foreign Office territorial desk 
see Lord Strang, The Diplomatic Career (London: Andre Deutsch Ltd., 1972), 
p.85. Also, Kurt London, Hew Foreign Policy Is Made, Second Ed., (Toronto
D. van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1950), pp.121-5.
18 The territorial divisions are (i) Americas, Western Europe and Pacific;
(ii) South and South-East Asia, Legal, Consular, Research and Library;
(iii) Eastern Europe and China; and (iv) Middle East and Africa. The 
main functional divisions are (i) Administration; (ii) External Publicity 
division; and (iii) Protocol. Normally Legal Affairs and Treaties would 
constitute another functional division, but at the time of writing it was 
combined with South and South East Asia Territorial division under one 
Director-General. Information collected from: 'List of Ifficers Working 
at Headquarters as on 1.2.1978' (Dacca Ministry of Foreign Affairs).
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The structure is elaborately discussed to make the
theoretical point that there is not a 'lack of even the
rudiments of effective bureaucracy' as has been generalised
by Kissinger as being true of the foreign policies of newer
19political states.
Within a brief spell of independence, Bangladesh 
inherited almost the entire Bengali component of the Pakistan 
Foreign Service. There was therefore no dearth of trained 
personnel in this area, particularly as Pakistan, like India, 
favoured a much longer period of training for diplomatic 
officials than is considered necessary by many Western
4. 20governments.
However while the personnel are trained and well 
equipped to handle politico-diplomatic matters, the nature 
of their profession precludes their access to experience 
in the economic sphere. This is because while they do not 
handle economic matters while posted at home (Foreign Office 
personnel are unique among higher civil servants in as much 
as they remain confined to their particular Ministry), 
they are also denied the experience overseas as functional 
Ministries place their own personnel in missions abroad for 
this purpose.
The High Commission for Bangladesh in London can be taken 
to illustrate this last point. Apart from the High Commissioner, 
a political appointee, there were in October 197 8 , nine senior
19 'Domestic Structure & Foreign Policy1, in Handreider, op.cit., pp.32-33.
20 P. Boyce, Foreign Affairs of New States: Some Questions of Credentials 
(Brisbane: University of Queensland Press, 1977), p.11.
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officials in the Mission; the Deputy High Commissioner, the
Economic Minister, Counsellor (Press), First Secretary (Labour),
First Secretary (Administration), the Military Attache^
Second Secretary (Press),tfc Postal Attache/ and Third Secretary
(Consular Affairs). Of the nine, only three i.e. 33% were
Foreign Office personnel: the Deputy High Commissioner,
the First Secretary (Administration) and the Third Secretary
(Consular Affairs). None of them had any direct responsibility
for economic interactions with the U.K. which constitute
the most significant component of the bilateral relations
21between Bangladesh and the U.K.
This lack of experience in the technical sphere of 
economic foreign relations reduces the indispensability of 
this type of bureaucrat to the political hierarchs. While 
Kissinger's 'prophet' will rely more on his bureaucracy on 
technical matters such as economic, he will be less dependent 
onpurely political matters, where he is likely to see 
himself as an expert. One indicator of the reduced 
significance (at least to the political hierarchs) of the 
Ministry was, when in 19 75 Mujib introduced the one party 
system in the form of BAKSAL, the Central Committee includ^L
22several permanent Secretaries but not the Foreign Secretary.
Another reason for the reduced domestic clout of the 
Foreign Office is that it lacks a powerful clientele at 
home whose interest it serves and which has political influence.
21 High Commission for Bangladesh, London.
22 Out of 115 members of the BAKSAL Central Committee, 15 were Permanent 
Secretaries including those of Planning (ERD) and Foreign Trade. The
Foreign Secretary was, however, excluded from this list. Bangladesh 
Gazette (in Bengali), Special Edition, Saturday, 7 June 1975, p p .1205-1209.
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This is unlike the Commerce Ministry, which has a constituency 
in the numerous trading interests within the country, or the 
Planning Ministry, which services a vast segment of the public 
and private sectors in the economy. While Commerce and 
Planning Ministries can have their parochial interests 
served by the clients who may 'speak for them' to the 
political authorities, and to whom in turn they may grant 
special favours, the Foreign Office, by the very nature of 
its functions lacks such a domestic clientele of any signifi­
cant influence.
However eroded may be the role of the Foreign Office in 
the total gamut of external relations, it remains an
institutional focus, as does its counterpart in London, for
23the formulation of foreign policy in the broadest sense.
B. The External Resources Division (ERD): While the Foreign
Office is formally in charge of the country's external
interactions, the responsibility for economic relations has
24been assigned to other agencies/Ministries. The principal 
among them is the ERD, which was located in the Ministry of 
Planning between 19 71 and 1979, and then moved to the Ministry 
of Finance. The functions of the ERD have been described 
as follows by a former chief of the Planning Commission:
As argued, in pointing to the continued significance of the British 
Foreign Office in British Foreign Policy by Joseph Frankel, British 
Foreign Policy 1945-1973 (Oxford University Press, 1975), p.2.
These agencies may be described as the other 'Foreign Ministries' as 
has been done in a case study of the Norwegian foreign policy system. 
Nils 0rvik, Departmental Decision-Making (Oslo: Universitets forlaget, 
1972), p.42.
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The External Resources Division, as its name 
implies, was concerned with mobilising resources 
from abroad for the implementation of the [Five 
Year] Plan ... it was not involved merely in 
making recommendations but [in] also actually 
carrying out detailed aid negotiations for projects 
and commodities as well as for supervising the 
process of utilisation of foreign economic and
technical assistance.25
The ERD was therefore formally empowered by the 
Government to negotiate directly with foreign countries 
for the purpose of obtaining aid and for maintaining con­
tinued liaison with the donors during the process of the 
utilization of such aid. It is the ERD that signs all the 
Agreements on behalf of the Government with other countries. 
Theoretically, these agreements are subject to clearance 
by the Foreign Office, but the need for such aid is so over­
whelming that it is highly unlikely that a proposed potential 
source would meet with Foreign Office disapproval. Since 
the ERD identifies such potential sources, it leads the 
way in establishing connections with them. Obviously, 
therefore, apart from handling economic foreign relations, 
(which in any case is the major segment of the total foreign 
interactions of an indigent actor like Bangladesh), the 
ERD has a significant contribution to make in the total 
foreign policy sphere.
The last point is borne out by the fact that when in 
1978, the Bangladeshi delegation to the United Nations was 
saddled with the task of fighting Japan for the Security 
Council seat, the ERD viewpoints were represented by the 
presence in that delegation of its permanent Secretary.
25 . . . .Nurul Islam, Development Planning in Bangladesh: A Study in Politzcal
Economy (London: C. Hurst & Co., 1977), p.43.
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The ERD has structured itself in a fashion not unlike 
the Foreign Office with territorial and functional sub­
division of responsibilities. Below the Secretary, there
are six Joint Secretaries (JS) with the rank of DGs in the 
2 6Foreign Office, who are in charge of territories or 
functional areas. Their divisions are in turn subdivided 
into desks headed by Deputy Secretaries (as Directors in 
the Foreign Office) and again into Sections headed by 
Section Officers. The organisation is, therefore, adequately 
geared to perform the role.
It is noteworthy that those who have been permanent 
Secretaries of the ERD have had considerable linkages 
with international finance organizations and have thus 
been members of the horizontal international elite. Of 
the three Secretaries since the First Five year Plan was 
launched in 1973, the first M. Syeduzzaman is currently an 
Alternate Executive Director of the World Bank in Washington. 
The second, K. Mahmood, is an Alternate Executive Director 
of the Asian Development Bank in Manila. The third, and 
current Secretary, A.M.A. Muhith was associated with the 
World Bank and was also an Executive Director of the Asian 
Development Bank. There is therefore the obvious tendency 
for empathy with Western aid-donors and their economic 
system. When seen thus, the Government policy-decision to 
accept the formation of an Aid Consortium under World Bank
2 6 Their functions are as under: JSI: Western Europe and Americas; JSII: 
Coordination and Aid Consortium matters; JSIII: World Bank, Asian Develop­
ment Bank, Scandinavia, Australia/New Zealand; JSIV: Japan and South-East 
Asia; JSV: Middle East & OPEC; JSVI: India, Socialist Countries and 
Administration. Discussions in the External Resources Division, Dacca, 
November 1979.
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auspices in 1974, despite the heavy socialist overtones of 
political rhetoric, becomes more explicable.
C. Ministry of Commerce: Though to date foreign aid remains
a more important aspect of the economic foreign policy than
foreign trade, this is not to minimize the importance of the
agency responsible for trade, the Ministry of Commerce,
in the foreign policy sphere.
Several illustrations for this may be cited. Trade
played a significant role in relations with the core areas of
27foreign relations such as India. It has often initiated shifts 
in the course of political relations: for instance, this Ministry
was the first governmental agency to articulate publicly its
2 8dissatisfaction with India.
Secondly, though the Commerce Ministry cannot dictate
political relations on the positive side in the same way
as the ERD can, it can be an invaluable asset in maintaining
political relations, once established. For instance, it
signed a large number of General Trade Agreements with
29socialist countries. Since these Agreements contain only 
broad principles and not the details of actual trade as 
do specific Trade Protocols, their significance is more 
political than economic. These were important in underlining 
Bangladesh's political sovereignty at a time when the country
27 See Chapter 3. 
ibid.
29 In 1972 alone, the Commerce Ministry signed General Trade Agreements 
with Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, GDR, Hungary, India and the USSR.
Lau and Parliamentary Affairs, Vol.I, No.l (Dacca: Institute of Law 
and International Affairs, January 1975), Appendix 1.
332
was desperately endeavouring to obtain recognition by other 
international State Actors.
Thirdly, the Commerce Ministry can, and did, act as a 
conduit for links with other countries when for some reason
or other political and diplomatic linkages are unavailable.
30 31For instance trade contracts with China and Egypt
preceded political links and in many ways helped set the
stage for the latter.
Organizationally, it is a much smaller agency with
one Secretary, one Additional Secretary, and three Joint 
32Secretaries. However Commerce retains some 'power' over 
economic external relations by the fact that it acts as 
the parent administrative Ministry for a number of senior 
positions in the Missions abroad. In 1978 Bangladesh 
Government had Economic Ministers posted in Washington, 
London, Brussels, Bonn, Moscow, Tehran, Ryadh, New Delhi, 
Islamabad, Tokyo and Peking, all of whom reported to the 
Ministry of Commerce. Apart from them there are a host of 
junior officials in the various Trade Offices in Karachi, 
Singapore, Calcutta, Sydney and Hong Kong . 3 3
30 See Chapter 5.
31 See Chapter 6.
32 The work load of the Joint Secretaries is divided as under: JSI: 
Administration, Insurance & International Trade Organisations; JSII: 
Important and JSIII: Export, Barter and Bilateral Trade: 'Distribution 
of Works', Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, Ministry 
of Commerce'.
33 Source: High Commission for Bangladesh, Canberra.
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D. Other Functional Ministries: When a specific issue-area
attains salience in foreign relations, the relevant
functional Ministry often tends to assume the role of the
guardian of the country's interests. An important instance
is the role of the Ministry of Flood Control and Water
Resources during the Farakka dispute with India. It was
the head of this Ministry, Admiral M.H. Khan, who led the
Bangladesh delegation to the U.N. in 1976 when Farakka
assumed the character of a crisis, and made statements,
which while centering on Farakka, also had bearing on
34the total gamut of Indo-Bangladesh relations. The Ministry 
of Defence is yet another significant agency, emphasising 
close links with sources of defence procurements. The Home 
Ministry also became relevant es|>£cially when its personnel 
interact with the Indians and the Burmese on issues arising 
out of border conflicts. It needs to be pointed out, 
however, that the influence of any such Ministry is not 
usually as sustained in foreign relations in general as those 
of the Foreign Office, the ERD, or the Ministry of Commerce.
What Joseph Nye states to be a growing phenomenon in
advanced countries also appears to be true of many developing
countries, specially those with a pronounced administration-
oriented governmental culture, such as with many ex-British
Colonies. Nye holds that
today there is an overshadowing of 
foreign offices as societies interact 
with each other at many points that 
cannot be easily controlled. There are 
direct contacts among what was once
34 a.For instance see Admiral Khan's statement in Chapter O
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considered domestic bureaucracies of different 
governments. Foreign offices cannot hope 
fully to monitor the range of direct ^ 5
contacts among governments of advanced countries.
In fact, with regard to Bangladesh, as indeed might
be the case with many developing countries, the proposition
may be advanced that not only do agencies other than the
Foreign Office participate significantly in the various
activities within the sphere of foreign relations, but also
that in this sphere the influence of the economic bureaucracy
preponderates with the necessary consequence of a higher
priority of economic interests over political, except
perhaps in such extreme cases as of a threat to security and
36sovereignty.
Two factors moderate departmental 'parochialism1. First 
the system of administration provides for transfer of higher 
civil servants between Ministries, except in the case of 
the Foreign Office which is manned mostly though not 
exclusively by Foreign Service Officials. For instance, a 
Deputy Secretary in the Ministry of Commerce, may, on promotion,
35 Joseph S. Nye, 'Transnational and Transgovernmental Relations' in 
Geoffrey L. Goodwin and Andrew Linklater (eds), New Dimensions of 
World Politics (London: Croom Helm , 1975), p.40.
36 Though policy outcome is seen here in terms of organizational output, 
this is distinct from analysis based on Graham T. Allison's Organizational 
Process conceptual model which sees governmental behaviour relevant 
to any important problem as reflecting independent output of several 
organizations (Graham T. Allison, 'Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile 
Crisis' in Handreider (ed), op.cit., pp.341-2). In other words, pulls 
and pushes of competing agencies determine policy on any given issue.
In this particular study the general assertion is being made that there 
is a constant 'tilt' of influence in favour of economic Ministries.
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become a Joint Secretary in the ERD. Therefore, while
there is a broad general bias for economic interest to
preponderate, the scope for 'departmentalism' that is 'the
tendency for departments to pursue particularistic goals in
37the policy process' is Harrowed.
Secondly, while their allegiance may not be to any 
particular department, all these officials, the entire 
bureaucratic elite, tend to have as their constituency the 
broad social category they represent. Whether these 
officials are former Pakistan Foreign Service (PFS) diplomats 
or members of the former Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP) cadre, 
as most senior bureaucrats are, they share a commonality 
of background. They were trained in Western institutions: 
all senior Foreign Service officials were trained in the 
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, and CSP officials at 
Oxford, Cambridge, Harvard or other prestigious Western 
institutions. They form a part of the 'new bhadralok' of 
Dacca, a successor to the old Calcutta bhadralok in a socio­
logical sense, bred in Western intellectual ethos, despite 
all intra-elite differences, heir to the same traditions.
This critical segment of the community, the new bhadralok 
comprise small landholders (the larger ones, the Zamindars, 
being Hindus, had gone away to India following the East Bengal 
Land Acquistion Act of 1951), middling tradesmen (the bigger 
ones, who were non-locals, were patronised by Pakistani Central 
authorities, and they too left after Bangladesh's independence
37 . .Martin Painter and Bernard Carey, Poltt'ics Between Departments
(Brisbane: University of Queensland Press, 1978), p.9.
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in 1971) and middle-class professionals such as bureaucrats,
lawyers, doctors, engineers and contractors i.e. those who
have 'positions and status apart from traditional land based
sources and represent the small but developing urban
3 8bourgeoisie'.
Within this category the bureaucrats, civil and military, 
emerged as being in greater control because the development
of the other component representing the bourgeoisie were
39 .uneven. For instance just as in case of the Calcutta
bhadralok, because of the dictates of the Colonial situation,
the metropolitan bourgeoise, of which the peripheral bourgeoisie
40is an appendage, lay in Britain, the new bhadralok may also
be said to have their industrial counterpart in the West.
In neo-Marxian terms this category could indeed be viewed
as the comprador class whom Ralph Pettman describes as the
'privileged elites' who 'tend to detach themselves in
important ways from the peripheral sector of their own
41population'. The predilections of this class are crucial 
in all spheres as policy making, though to see foreign policy­
making exclusively in these terms would be to raise a variable, 
however important, to the level of explanation.
Robert La Porte,Jr., 'Pakistan and Bangladesh ' in Robert N. Kearney 
(ed), Politics and Modernization in South and Southeast Asia (New York: 
John Wiley and Sons, 1975), p.147.
39 . . .  . .For a theoretical exposition of this phenomenon, see Samir Amin,
Unequal Development: An Essay on Social Formation of Peripheral Capitalism,
Trans. Brian Pearce, Sussex, The Harvester Press, 1976, p.345.
40 See John McGuire's definition of the Calcutta bhadralok in Chapter II, 
footnote 13.
41 . . .R. Pettman, State and Class: A Sociology of International Affatrs
(London: Croom Helm, 1979), p.447.
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IV. Concluding Remarks
The group-character of the bureaucratic leaders has
significant impact inthe shaping of their images thereby
42determining their behaviour. This has several implications 
affecting the external expression of their State.
Firstly, they are for obvious reasons, culturally 
structurally linked to the West. Their minds and intellects 
have been conditioned by Western institutions. Even those among
them who entertain socialist ideas do so largely because they
have been 'greatly attracted by the socialist solutions
of social and economic problems preferred by the intellectuals
4 3of the metropolis'. They therefore tend to display more
sympathy for regions and sources from where they draw their
intellectual and cultural nourishment. In this connection,
the following quote, from a case study of Kenya by two
analysts, is apt:
We would predict that elites in the 
smaller penetrated heterogeneous 
and violence-prone underdog states 
who accept the capitalist-organized 
international economic system and 
whose key reference groups are not 
domestic, but rather the Western 
organizers of international trade and 
finance, will practice economically 
dependent acquiescence.44
For a linkage between 'image' and 'behaviour', see Kenneth E. Boulding, 
The Image (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1956), p.6.
43 Edward Shils, op.cit., Political Development in the New States 
(Gravehage, Morton & Co., 1963), p.20.
44 Patrick J. McGowan and Klaus Peter Gottwald, 'Small State Foreign 
Policies', International Studies Quarterly, Vol.19, No.4 (December 1975), 
p.497.
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Secondly, although they are small in number, because 
of their high professional skill they see a wider role 
for themselves in the affairs of the world than is objectively 
dictated by the size and strength of their country. This 
often encourages challenging and ambitious goals, such as 
the determination to take on Japan in a bid for the Security 
Council seat in 1978, in which they were successful. Also, 
because of individual merit, some contrive to obtain for 
themselves positions of importance in international organiz­
ations. In this they are often assisted by their colleagues 
in government. A pointer is the massive diplomatic initiative 
launched in 19 77 to obtain the appointment of the former
Bangladesh Home Secretary, Salauddin Ahmed, as No.2 in the
45World Food Council. Such initiatives have the two-fold
effect of greater international interactions than would
otherwise have been the case and that of somewhat enhanced
46influence of the country in international forums.
Source of information: High Commission for Bangladesh, Canberra.
46 What is favourable in the area of external relations may not be so in 
the domestic arena, where the impact of such a phenomenon may be quite 
adverse. As one analyst has observed: 'Because living in small countries 
is not easy - especially for people whose horizons are not limited by 
their national boundaries - key people may tend to be more abroad than 
their peers in larger states. When in common in small LDCs, one person 
is holding two portfolios in government, which in larger wealthier 
countries would be held by two Ministers, the effects of his absence on 
the administration may be very serious'. B.L. Jacobs, 'Administrative 
Problems of Small Countries' in Percy Selwyn (ed), Development Policy in 
Small Countries (London: Croom Helm, 1975), pp.140-141. This is very 
relevant in the case of Bangladesh and extends beyond Ministers to 
senior bureaucrats, many of whom tend to live abroad, on assignments 
and training, for long periods of time.
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At the same time, their complex international linkages, 
which make them a part of the horizontal international elite, 
hinder the development of a sense of 'nationalism', so crucial 
to state-building. This weakens the 'outer-shell' of the 
'State', making it more 'penetrable'.
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CHAPTER 11 
THE SUMMING UP
The main argument of the thesis has been, broadly, that 
Balgladesh has two foreign policy aspirations, the search for 
security and the guest for external resources for development 
both these aspirations lead Bangladesh to develop foreign 
policy strategies that are co-termiripus rather than mutually 
exclusive, viz. in both cases they involve the building up 
of a web of extra-regional linkages. Dacca's concentration, 
in such extra-regional linkages, is focused on three areas - 
the Superpowers, the Middle East, and China, and on the 
international organizations.
However, it is worth noting that while the first 
aspiration, the search for security, is aimed at developing 
a counterpoise vis-a-vis the regional pre-eminent power, 
India, i.e. while it is 'Indo-centric1, the second aspiration 
has more general and global ramifications. Also, the quest 
for resources require interactions with some additional 
international actors, such as some other western donors apart 
from the United States, but since these reactions are mostly 
conducted under the umbrella of the Aid Consortium they can 
be subsumed under the general subject of relations with 
international organizations. Then again, while the first 
aspiration leads to what is the political component of 
Dacca's external relations, the second aspiration relates 
to the economic.
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The following discussion is purported to bring into 
sharper relief the conclusions reached in the different 
chapters, and to relate such conclusions to Bangladesh's two 
major external aspirations.
A. Search for Security
The global importance of the more powerful regional 
neighbour is usually linked to the establishment, beyond all 
shadow of doubt, of her position as the regional pre-eminent 
power. This implies some sort of 'regional-hegemonism', if 
not domination, and the ability to exercise in that region 
power as defined by Raymond Aron, i.e. 'the capacity of a 
political unit to impose its will upon other units'.^ In 
other words, the larger/stronger neighbour tends to view 
herself as being in the pivotal role in the region. India 
finds herself in such a situation in the subcontinent. The 
assertion of Hedley Bull's, that 'the deepest fears of the
2smaller units in the global system are their larger neighbours' 
thus becomes true of Bangladesh.
Though the threat perception from India is not specifically 
military^ though India is strategically by far the superior*) 
the overwhelming influence that India is capable of exercising 
itself is sufficient to be perceived as eroding Dacca's 
sovereignty. In an attempt to stave off or minimise this
1 R. Aron, Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations (Trans.) 
Richard Howard and Annette Baker Fox (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson,
1966), p.71.
o  0 0
H. Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Orders in World Polztzcs 
(London: Macmillan, 1977), p.310.
3 See table on 'The Regional Power Blance(?)", p.vi.
Indian influence, to maximise her,ability to manoeuvre and to 
retain a sufficient degree of independence in foreign policy 
formulation, Bangladesh is engaged in constant endeavours 
to manipulate her external environment. Hence her emphasis 
on extra-regional linkages.
There are several options that a weaker/smaller neighbour 
might have in a comparable millieux, i.e. vis-a-vis a stronger/ 
larger neighbour. One is what Erling Bj01 has described as 
pilot-fish behaviour, i.e. keeping close to the shark to
4avoid being eaten. Finland's relations with the Soviet
Union are an example, based on the early Finnish perception
that her'national interests do not permit ties nor the pursuit
5of alignment with an anti-Russian [Soviet] policy'.
Sweden on the other hand, in addition to behaving as a 
pilot fish, tried to make herself as troublesome as 
possible for the potentially more powerful enemy 
to overcome. There may be a third way, i.e. by 
seeming to opt out of the international system altogether,
4 Erling BjjzSl, 'The Small States in International Politics in August Schou 
and Arne Olav (eds), Small States in International Relations (Stockholm: 
Almqvist and Wiksell, 1971), p.33.
 ^ Urho Kekkonen's speech given at the Swedish Agrarian Union in Stockholm, 
7 December 1943 in Thomas Vilkuna (ed), Neutrality: The Finnish Positiony 
Speeches by Dr U m o  Kekkonenj President of Finland (Trans), P. Ojansu and 
L.E. Keyworth (London: Heinemann, 1970), p.30. Finland's relations with 
her powerful neighbour, the U.S.S.R., was given a structural basis by 
the Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance between the 
two countries in 1948. The temptation to compare it with the Indo- 
Bangladesh Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation of 1972 would be great 
if the differences between Finland and Bangladesh on the one hand and 
the U.S.S.R. and India on the other, were not so obvious. Finland is 
not a developing, Third World, non-white and non-Christian country and 
does not, due to these attributes (or rather, the lack of them) find it 
necessary to involve herself in the world system to the extent that 
Bangladesh does. The U.S.S.R. on the other hand, sees her neighbour, 
Finland, as a sovereign buffer state. A sovereign Bangladesh may be of 
no such value to India.
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as Burma attempted to do, though this is a course extremely 
difficult to maintain over any reasonable length of time.
Dacca has opted for the second option, the essential 
difference from Sweden being that Bangladesh's deterrence 
is political rather than military, built by involving herself 
in a web of international interactions that make the political 
price of aggression for the potential enemy very heavy indeed. 
This behaviour pattern is quite the reverse of the hypothesis 
advanced by Ronald Barston that a small power has a low-level
7of international involvement.
For Bangladesh, this attempt to seek a balance against 
the regional pre-eminent actor is rooted in her historical 
ethos. Within the Subcontinent during the colonial era the 
Bengali Muslims, who over decades developed a kulturgemeinschcft
However, even Burma had to adopt some sort of policy vis-a-vis the 
more powerful neighbour, inasmuch as she 'adjusts and adapts, but no 
longer kowtows'. Ralph Pettman, Small Power Politics and International 
Relations in South East Asia, op.cit., p.58. Even though a small power 
might choose to opt out of the international system, she might find it 
difficult to ignore a powerful neighbour. Then again it is doubtful if 
any state actor can quite opt out.
7 Ronald P. Barston, 'The External Relations of Small States' in August 
Schou and Arne Olav (eds), op.cit., p.41. Barston bases this argument 
on the assumption that the interests of small states are usually regional 
and economic considerations and will be placed higher on a scale of 
interests than for the Big Powers. Unlike the Great Power, the actions 
of a Small State are of a limited consequence to most other members of 
the international system. Nor does the small state," when it is involved 
in a conflict situation, have to adopt a multilateral focus, i.e. assess 
the likely effects of her actions on friends, allies, neutrals and a 
host of others, to the same extent as a Great Power. Barston, however, 
overlooks the fact that the essentially regional interests of a small 
state may have wider international ramifications, and also that the 
primacy of her economic interests may lead her to greater international 
interactions in search of further resources or better terms of trade. 
Bangladesh, for instance, as in July 1978, had diplomatic relations witl 
as many as sixty-eight countries. (1979 Statistical Yearbook of 
Bangladesh [Dacca: Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, Ministry of Plannirg, 
1979]., pp.38-43) .
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of their own, tended to buttress their sense of security 
by seeking an alliance with the West Bengali Hindus when 
threat perceptions were received from North Indian Muslims 
and with the latter when the former appeared to be the source
gof such threats. While, the earlier balance within a three-
body system was rather simple, in the contemporary international
scene it has become a complex manoevre within a many-body
system as there are now many other actors involved. However,
this behavioural inheritance, i.e. the attempt to counteract
any potential source of threat by building external linkages
was too deeply rooted in the ethos of the Bengali Muslims to
be easily shaken. This strategy now finds expression in
Dacca's concentration on three sets of international actors
(the Superpowers, the Middle Eastern Muslim states and China)
and the International Organizations.
As for the Superpowers, global détente precludes the
possibility of a superpower protective umbrella through
alliances (as was earlier provided to Pakistan) and also
eliminates the possibility of any influence that Bangladesh
9might have with a superpower alliance-partner; this dictates 
assiduous cultivation of both superpowers sometimes under 
trying circumstances. However over the years elite linkages
g
See Chapter I .
9 Keohane has argued that institutionalized bargaining system in the form 
of formal alliances invests the indigent, smaller powers with dispropor­
tionate influence in American policy-making. See Robert 0. Keohane,
'The Big Influence of Small Allies', Foreign Policy, No.2 (Spring 1971), 
pp.161-162. Edward E. Azar has talked of a small-nation power 'the 
power to give or withhold friendship', Probe for Peace: Small-State 
Hostilities (Minneapolis: Burgess Publishing Co., 1973), p.33. This 
phenomenon has lost some of its significance due to superpower detente. 
However, should detente break down, and events of early 1980 shows it to 
be more brittle than it was supposed, the influence that Keohane speaks 
of may become relevant once again.
and the preponderance of Western aid have combined to cause 
an inevitable drift in the Western direction that have 
peripheralised the Soviet Union vis-a-vis Bangladesh's 
foreign policy interest without actually alienating Moscow 
to any great degree. Bangladesh's relations with China 
centre around the latter's systemic adversary relations with 
India; while this does make for ample reasons for close 
Dacca-Peking relations, these are propped up by such diplomatic 
subtleties as Dacca's tacit support for 'anti-hegemonism'
(of the Soviet Union) in exchange for Peking's explicit support 
for 'anti-expansionism' (of India).'*''*' The Middle East, for 
Dacca, is a source of inspiration and sustenance, both 
spiritual and material. Linkages with the countries of this 
region are not only important for obtaining resources, but 
al§o are sometimes invoked in minor conf1 ict-situations with 
other states, as in the case of the refugee dispute with 
Burma.
Apart from the territorial areas of the Superpowers, the 
Middle East and China, Bangladesh also concentrates on 
international agencies in her attempt to build up her linkages. 
She was eager to join the United Nations, for instance, at 
a very early stage and was quite willing for that purpose, 
to live down her radical and unconventional nascence by 
readily accepting the prevalent mores of the global states 
system. Dacca attests to the fact that Martin Wight's 
observation of over a generation ago, that the chief object
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^ See Chapter 4. 
■*■*■ See Chapter 5.
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of policy of the small powers is the maintenance of
international order, largely holds good to this day. The
U.N. provided Bangladesh with a seal of legitimacy, a sense
of security, a source of material support and a convenient
13forum to air her view. Amry Vandenbosch has said of small
states that the U.N. enables them
to play a part in the world politics out 
of proportion to their population, economic 
or military strength. They will not easily 
give this up; they will wish to see the 
U.N. as a strong going concern for that 
enhanced their political power immeasurably.^
This has indeed been true of Bangladesh, as evidenced
in her enthusiastic participation in U.N. activities, including
the successful bid for the Security Council seat in 1978,
undertaken even at the risk of alienating a powerful rival
15candidate, Japan, one of her major aid donors.
All this is not to argue that Bangladesh's relations with 
India are essentially confrontational; indeed at various 
points in time quite the reverse has been true and a period 
of regional detente was initiated when the Janata party 
assumed power in India in 1977. However, Bangladesh, being 
by far the weaker, finds it necessary to develop a structural
12
M. Wight, Power Politics (London: Royal Institute of International 
Affairs, 1946, Reprinted 1949), p.28. To Bangladesh, international order 
had a high enough premium for her to run the risk of straining the carefully 
cultivated relations with the U.S.S.R. by criticizing the Soviet action 
in Afghanistan in 1978-80, which she saw as a clear breach of such order.
13 See Chapter 8.
14 . . .A. Vandenbosch, 'The Small States in International Politics &
Organization', The Journal of Politics, Vol.26 (1964), p.312.
15 See Chapter 8.
response to Indian pre-eminence and the web of external 
linkages is the means she adopts for the purpose.
B . Quest for External Resources for Development
If the maintenance of sovereignty in respect of perceived 
threats from a powerful neighbour was one major foreign policy 
interest for Bangladesh, the other was obtaining international 
assistance for massive economic reconstruction and developmental 
needs. This aspect of Bangladesh's external policy thrust 
was not 'Indo-centric', for, from the very initial stages, 
Bangladesh's requirements were much too great for India to 
be able to satisfy. It was, therefore, necessary for Bangla­
desh to reach out beyond the subcontinental subsystem, to 
interact with the developed world, and draw from it as much 
of her requirements as possible. Because both her search 
for security and her quest for external resources necessitated 
connections with bascially the same set of international 
actors, it was not difficult for Dacca to marry her political 
foreign policy with the economic.^
Bangladesh's developmental aspirations, at least within 
the parameters of the accepted political and economic 
phyilsophy of the policy-makers, were of a level that even 
the Soviet Union was unable (and after 1975, unwilling) to 
satisfy. This led to greater interactions on the part of 
Dacca, with the West, which, both multilaterally and 
bilaterally, was the largest donor.
A second implication of this policy-aspiration for 
Bangladesh was that there was a modicum of erosion of her
%
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16 See Chapter 9.
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sovereign status in the sphere of economic policy-making.
Some of these pressures (such as the ones to reform the 
rationing system and to reduce the subsidy on fertilizer 
distribution) might have brought in- beneficial results., but 
the fact remains that these pressures were of external origin 
rather than of domestic politics.
Thirdly, there was some security hazard involved in 
exposing the country's economy to close outside view, laying 
the system bare to damage by a potentially hostile donor that 
could be inflicted by simply withholding aid to a critical 
sector in the economy.
Finally, the quest for aid gives preponderant voice 
to that portion of the bureaucracy that controls the economic 
ministries/agencies. The Foreign Office finds itself fettered 
in this issue-area, a phenomenon exacerbated by the absence
of a domestic constituency to add to its clout as in the
. . . . 17case of either the Planning authorities or Commerce Ministry.
Bangladesh's westward orientation is inextricably linked
with the predilections of her elite. For Bangladesh, foreign-
policy making on the whole, is an elite preserve. "This elite
is a part of the new bhadvalok of Dacca, possessing many
characteristics of the old bhadvalok of Calcutta. This crucial
segment of the community provides linkages with the Western
political and economic systems. This group draws its
nourishment from the intellectual and cultural pabulum of
18the West. Being a part of the international
17 See Chapter 10.
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elite, this category tends to feel that it has a
disproportionately larger role to play in world affairs,
than is dictated or justified by the power of the country.
This also heightens the country's international involvement.
This elite tends to make up for its inferiority in 'power'
19terms by emphasizing 'respect for [its] dignity'.
On the whole, then, Bangladesh's external behavior is 
not totally passively reactive. Nor is it simply what Robert
C. Good analyzed foreign policies of new states to be -
2 0'domestic policy carried beyond the boundaries of states'.
It is shaped by factors which have their origins both
externally and internally, or as they have been described
21by Northedge as 'systemic' and 'idiosyncratic' forces.
Generally, in her intra-subcontinental relations 
Bangladesh does not project her Third World image. She would 
derive very few benefits from doing so, as her potential 
rivals also belong to this group. This is only done on an 
extra-subcontinental basis such as on international economic
As was the case with small power elites in Europe during World War II. 
See Annette Baker Fox, The Power of Small States: Diplomacy in World 
War II (Chicago: the University of Chicago Press, 1959), p.182.
20 'Changing Patterns of African International Relations', Amerzcan 
Political Science Review (September, 1964), p.638.
21 Professor Northedge has identified two forms of pressures that 
influence the external behavior of states; those that come from outside, 
i.e. from the international system itself which he calls '"systemic" 
forces' and those that emerge from within, which he calls '"idiosyncratic" 
forces'. He ascribes the former as being relevant to the devjeloped, 
industrialized societies - he cites the U.K. as an example - and the 
latter to the states with lesser experience in foreign affairs, whose 
'foreign policy tends to be rather an external projection of internal 
requirements than a rational reaction to international events'.
F.S. Northedge, The International Political System (London: Faber & Faber, 
1976), pp.171-172. It is foubtful if this form of simple internal/external 
dichotomy can be sustained for long in any comparative analysis. It 
certainly cannot be, in this particular case.
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issues where such identity gives her a group-character that 
has consequent additional clout. It helps her avoid affronting 
the major Powers as the latter perceive and accept such 
behavior as a form of international Trade Unionist activity. 
There is consequently a lower profile on high risk issues 
such as the Sino-Soviet dispute, or Superpower rivalry and 
higher profile on low-risk issues such as expressed in debates 
on the New International Economic Order, or in condemnation 
of Neo-Colonialism, Zionism, and Apartheid.
If Bangladesh's external relations are marked by extreme 
circumspection, that is largely because, in the perception of 
her policy-makers, how she relates herself to the world is 
crucial to her survival.
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